Can E-Voting Be Fixed? And, If So, Why Isn't Anyone Doing It?
from the some-suggestions dept
While there are some who still say that electronic voting serves no good purpose, there are others who believe that with some changes, e-voting could be reasonable to try out. Wired News has asked some of e-voting's biggest critics how they would build e-voting machines that were more trustworthy, and most of the ideas seem fairly reasonable. Of course, nothing would be completely hackproof or fraud-proof, but the suggestions Ed Felten and David Wagner make certainly seem not just to make sense, but like they should be the bare minimum that anyone designing an e-voting system would insist on. The system they describe isn't that complicated: a touchscreen machine that prints out a ballot that is handed in (so like filling out a regular ballot, but with the benefits of both a touch screen and a paper trail), no removable memory cards, simple e-voting software built from the ground up for that purpose (so other features aren't left over from old code) with the source code open and available for anyone to inspect. Also, have some sort of check to make sure that any software loaded onto a machine is the same as the code that was officially certified. These aren't huge monumental changes anyone is talking about... but it doesn't seem like any of the e-voting companies are interested in following through. Of course, it would seem like a huge opportunity for a company to step up and provide exactly this, as election officials who are getting beaten up over bad e-voting machines would (hopefully) be happy to embrace a solution even the experts were more comfortable with.