Too Much Work To Test E-Voting Machines For Security?
from the you-stop-when-it's-secure dept
As the problems with Maryland's e-voting system keep getting attention, along with reports of just how hackable many of these machines are, it looks like one county in California just doesn't want to bother with doing a full security test before approving the machines. They did have a test that just looked at the security of the voting process (which found some problems), but did not bother to test to see if the machines were hackable -- which you would think would be a big deal. However, when challenged on this, the elections official stated: "I'm sure it's true more testing could be done. I'm not sure where it ends." This seems like an odd statement for someone in charge of running a fair election. First of all, the testing should never end. If there's any vulnerability at all, they should want to know about it so that it can be corrected (or the machines can be scrapped). But, something as basic as testing to see if the machines can be hacked doesn't seem like an extraordinary request -- especially given all of the other reports of how easy it is to hack some e-voting machines. The response seems to be that the machines won't be hackable because of security tape and tags -- but it's already been shown that (at least on other e-voting machines), they don't do very much.