You, as the owner of the car, are the insured responsible party for the use of the car (if it was stolen, fight the ticket with a stolen car police report).

In Maryland, the owner of the vehicle is fined, HOWEVER not given any points on their license. It’s not a matter of “due process” because the fact is that the car was caught speeding and the owner is financially responsible without legal consequences to their reckless driving.

And yes, if someone (even a door-to-door salesman you haven’t invited) slips on a step on your doorway, they are your liability.

First of all, only the IIHS was accused of being an industry shill; yet, you mock our arguments by suggesting it is a conspiracy theory because all of the other references “must be industry shills” even though that accusation was not made. Feel free to leave out logical fallacies from your posts.

Second, I am guessing you looked at the IIHS references for those that you just added. The link to the FHWA study was one of the only references on the original IIHS page actually regarding the effectiveness of red-light cameras in increasing safety. The second link is an executive summary of the first study, thus being completely redundant. Now, you don’t have to actually read everything you reference, but the fact that they are hosted on the same site should have tipped you off…maybe?

So…you have the FHWA study that was already referenced in your IIHS link to add to the discussion.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/22/2267.asp

For example, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) study of accident reductions in Oxnard, California did not actually examine accidents at camera intersections. Instead, it compared citywide crash rates between intersections with signals and intersections without signals. Likewise, the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) 2005 study of cameras did not compare the accident rate before cameras were installed to the rate afterward. Instead, it estimated expected crashes in the after period by comparing intersections with cameras to intersections without.

FHWA also selectively excluded certain cities from its analysis, including Greensboro, North Carolina and cities in Virginia, which experienced a significant increase in injuries and accidents according to other studies. The report also selectively excluded the reporting of certain data to ensure independent researchers would be unable to challenge or verify the study’s conclusion. The federal agency went to far in its secrecy as to refuse a Freedom of Information Act request for a set of its results listed by location. The National Motorists Association had made the request intending to verify the particular conditions at the intersections studied.

The researchers suggested that the IIHS and FHWA studies were tainted by financial conflicts of interest. The insurance industry directly funds IIHS. And, although the FHWA study was sponsored by the US Department of Transportation, study co-director Bhagwant Persaud has accepted significant payment from IIHS for his past research. Orban explained that the insurance industry not only makes money from traffic tickets that carry license demerit points, but it also makes greater profit when the number of accidents increases.

“Higher crash rates suggest higher risk; justifying higher premiums and profits,” the report stated. “Due to the pricing methods used, automobile insurers do not have a financial incentive to lower crash rates or perceptions of risk.”

This is an actual study of whether red light cameras would be effective in Florida, relevant to the task at hand. Unsurprisingly, they suggest “no”.
http://hsc.usf.edu/nr/rdonlyres/c1702850-8716-4c2d-8eeb-15a2a741061a/0/2008pp001008orbanetalredlightpapermarch72008formatted.pdf

In the IIHS study, researchers compared Oxnard,
California, which installed cameras, with three towns
that did not. The first criticism of this study’s design
is that camera intersections were not separately
analyzed. Instead, crash and injury counts at
Oxnard’s 11 camera intersections were added with all
125 signalized intersections in Oxnard (Retting &
Kyrychenko, 2002). Thus, the study actually
compared differences in crash and injury growth rates
between intersections with and without traffic
signals, and not between signalized intersections with
and without cameras. A further criticism of this study
is that the conclusions drawn from the statistical
analysis were incorrectly reported. When the results
were correctly analyzed for statistical significance, no
change in total crashes could be substantiated
(Burkey & Obeng, 2004; Kyrychenko & Retting,
2004).
The FHWA study (Council, Persaud, Eccles, Lyon
and Griffith, 2005) evaluated seven jurisdictions in
multiple states. The analysis concluded cameras were
associated with decreased angle crashes and injures.
The university professor who co-directed this study
and provided the methodological ideas has also
conducted research for the IIHS (Persaud, 2007;
Persaud, Retting & Lord, 2001; Persaud, Hauer,
Retting, Vallurupalli & Mucsi, 1997). The research
design and reporting concerns are as follows.
• The researchers listed 15 geographic areas
with camera programs. However, only seven
areas were selected for the analysis because
the researchers concluded “significant
effects are likely for all crash severities” in
these jurisdictions. The decision to
selectively (non-randomly) choose among
the 15 areas increases the chance of
incorrectly favoring one conclusion over
another (camera effectiveness or
ineffectiveness). Three areas excluded by
the researchers were included in the major
studies from Virginia and Greensboro, North
Carolina, which did not find reductions in
angle crashes.
The researchers called this a “before-andafter”
study, yet it appears they did not
compare crashes and injuries at intersections
before and after cameras were installed.
They did not report using the before period
data in estimating expected crashes for the
after period. Instead, the study made
estimates of expected crashes and injuries
for the period after cameras were installed
using non-camera intersections. Also, counts
of crashes and injuries from the before
period were not reported in the results.
• In estimating crashes for the period after
cameras were installed, the analysis
excluded important factors that are known to
affect intersection crashes. Changes
attributed to cameras could actually occur
from these excluded factors, such as
differences in yellow light timings and speed
limits.
• Although the Methods section identified six
types of crashes (for example, red light
running crashes), findings were reported for
only angle and rear end crashes. Changes in
crashes and injuries for the other types,
including red light running crashes, and
changes in total crashes and injuries were
not revealed. This also renders the economic
analysis incomplete since it did not include
changes in total crashes and injuries.
• Instead of reporting the full results of the
statistical analyses, only an example with
made-up numbers was provided.
• Crash and injury counts were not reported
by intersection or jurisdiction. As such, it is
unknown where the favorable experiences
attributed to cameras actually occurred.
Correct reporting of research findings
requires providing sufficient detail to allow
other researchers to validate conclusions. It
is impossible to replicate this study or to reanalyze
the findings.