I read the "five places" as being four pants pockets (two front, two back) and one shirt pocket. And some pants have more; I keep my cell phone in an extra pocket on the right leg of my pants.
That's not even counting the possibilities in coat pockets and inside pockets and so on, of course. Or clipping something on to your belt (even if just a belt pouch), or "wearable computing" devices such as Google Glass, or...
For the record, in case someone finds this discussion later on:
This is apparently only for when the "most visited sites" tiles haven't been populated yet. The reasoning is that pre-chosen tiles are more likely to be useful, or otherwise desirable, than blank, empty tiles. People who already have enough "most visited sites" data to have populated all of the tiles shouldn't see any change.
Even for new users, it will reportedly replace the default tiles (including the sponsored ones) with your "most visited sites" once you've used the browser long enough that the internal calculation that judges what sites are "most visited" has enough data to do its work. I'd intuitively expect this to be a dynamic, every-time-you-use-the-program, ongoing calculation, but instead it apparently happens only after 30 days.
"Opt-out" versus "opt-in" is a matter of which choice is the default, the one you get if you don't pay enough attention to make a conscious choice.
The described setup configuration process will put the filters in place if you just say "yes" to everything. Unless "yes" is not the default (e.g. if it's radio buttons and a "Next" button, and the "no" radio button is selected by default), then someone clicking through without paying attention will get the filters - and that means the filters are the default, which makes this an "opt-out" scenario.
Not to mention that, as others have stated, it seems that opting out only affects whether the filters will actually be applied to your traffic - not whether your traffic will pass through the filtering software.
If they can ensure that the only place to get genuine merchandise is the official store, then all merchandise available through other channels will be counterfeit, and thus illegitimate. That way, anyone who sees merchandise claiming to be theirs that isn't sold through their official store will know it's guaranteed to be counterfeit.
If people resell the genuine merchandise through other channels, then some of the merchandise available through those other channels will in fact be genuine, and that guarantee won't be there.
That only works if they can keep the 100% lockdown on resale, though... and it's questionable and potentially scummy even then.
There's no logical way to end up at VeriSign (whose only way to take down the offending link might well be to take down the entirety of .com), you're right about that.
But there's no logical way to end up at the registrar (whose only way to take down the offending link was to take down the whole domain), either - and yet that's where this already ended up. So why shouldn't we now consider the scenario where the other illogical thing might happen?
Perhaps what is needed is a requirement that the laws must be written in a form the average citizen can understand.
The trouble with that is the people who will go looking for loopholes.
In order to avoid leaving loopholes to be exploited and abused, or at least to be very clear about where those loopholes are and are not, it is necessary to word the law very precisely - well beyond the limits of the precision used in ordinary day-to-day discourse.
Phrasing things precisely very quickly comes to involve phrasing them in ways which are complex, abstruse, and otherwise hard to understand - and there we have the roots of what is called "legalese".
(Try it sometime; try to phrase something so that there is no possible way that anyone could misinterpret it, or take it - or part of it - out of context to mean something else. It's far harder than you might think, beyond a few relatively simple cases, and the resulting phraseology bears a striking resemblance to legalese.)
And then people start intentionally extending legalese to obfuscate things further for their own purposes, which is indeed abusive and should be avoided, and things snowball from there. Everything before that point, however, is not only not an inherently bad thing, but is in fact necessary to avoid other bad things.
The real issue is that many who support net neutrality forget to mention that many of the discussions for sponsored services are OVER AND ABOVE WHAT YOU ALREADY GET. That is to say that, as an example, it would be extra over your current transfer limits, or faster service than you are currently getting, usually by setting up a direct peer with your ISP or preferential routing.
It would still mean that any newcomers, who can't afford to pay for the "sponsored services" treatment, would be at a disadvantage compared to the established players; it would raise the barrier to entry, thus reducing competition and (potentially disruptive) innovation.
There are other problems with this line of argument as well, but that's the most obvious and probably most important.
What he means by "actual democracy" is probably what is also referred to as "direct democracy", i.e., the people themselves vote directly on the actual issues rather than (s)electing people to vote as their representatives.
Each application under this section shall include a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation
(Cutting off there not to obscure anything, but because there's no reasonable stopping point without including the entire subsection, which means I need to cut off somewhere.)
If you want to argue that this does not require that the things sought actually be relevant, only that there are reasonable grounds to believe such, you might be able to support that - although based on Sensenbrenner's comments, it seems very likely that the law was not intended to allow such an interpretation. Claiming that the word does not appear in the law, however, is simply ignoring the facts.
I suspect the counterargument to that would be something like:
"The criteria used to determine whether or not someone is a threat to our national security are sensitive information, because if those criteria were publicly known, the people who are classified as threats would realize it, and would be able to avoid placing themselves at risk of capture."
There are counters to that argument as well, of course - I can think of at least three possible angles to take, just off the top of my head. But it is sufficiently plausible to at least make as an argument against releasing the information.
One one hand, if you resist, you give the officers cause to use force. But if you DON'T resist when they take it too far, you end up dead.
This is why, as I said here a while ago, I think there's room to argue for the right of anyone to resist any arrest - whether lawful or otherwise.
I understand why the law classifies "resisting arrest" and the like as crimes. That classification has negative (and hopefully unintended) consequences, however, and I'm not sure those costs don't outweigh the benefits.
You weren't around on the pre-mass-commercialization Internet, were you?
There was plenty of stuff then, albeit of rather different type from what there is now; if all the mass-commercialization sites went away, that could and likely would return, and there have been enough developments in user-generated content that there would likely be quite a bit beyond just "the old stuff" as well.