Investment Bank Fails In Attempt To Quash Discussion Of Its Telemarketing Efforts
from the calling-streisand dept
As courts across the country have endorsed the rule that, under section 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, the hosts of blogs and message boards are immune from suit for content that others post to their sites, companies that want an easy way to suppress such criticisms have struggled to find ways to bring suit anyway. Especially among commercial litigators with limited exposure to intellectual property law, the trendy way to evade section 230 is to allege that criticism using the name of a company “tarnishes” its trademark, or that criticism using the name of an individual violates the right of publicity. Another popular way to evade section 230 is to charge the web host with being an “information content provider.”
In its recent attempt to enjoin Julia Forte, the operator of 800Notes.com and whocallsme.com, from carrying posts that criticized its telemarketing techniques as well as it s business model, Houlihan Smith & Company tried both tacks — it claimed tarnishment and right of publicity violations, and it pointed to Google search results that included negative statements about it in the search snippets for the two web sites and alleged that Forte must be putting its name, and derogatory words such as “fraud” and “scam,” into her title tags and description meta tags. Houlihan actually got a temporary restraining order (TRO) at first, by coming into court without any notice and bamboozling the state court judge with a long sworn complaint and supporting affidavits. But when Forte found a lawyer (me) and removed to federal court, the judge quickly saw through Houlihan’s bluster and refused to give an injunction. But how it lost is of particular interest. (I discuss the oral opinion and the plaintiffs’ arguments in greater detail on the Consumer Law and Policy Blog, with links to the relevant documents from both sides)
In part, Houlihan lost because the federal judge, Virginia Kendall, could actually read the HTML code and could see that the complaint was based on lies. (Not one of those judges who “don’t know technology” as Mike recently discussed). As she remarked at the outset of the preliminary injunction hearing, one of her specialties as federal prosecutor was child pornography, and because porn purveyors are champions at manipulating code, she had to learn about it. So, although Forte had supplied an affidavit explaining how to read the HTML code, Judge Kendall just pulled up the code herself and read it, told plaintiffs’ counsel that she couldn’t see any trademarks or defamatory words in the code that was before her, and asked if they had any other proof. They didn’t.
On the trademark claims, Judge Kendall also rejected the motion for a preliminary injunction, but interestingly she did it without mentioning the First Amendment or the doctrine of prior restraint. She first noted that under trademark law, just as a trademark may be used by a reseller to truthfully identify the name of the product that is being sold, so a critic may use the name of the trademark holder to truthfully identify the name of the company being criticized. And as defined by the federal trademark “dilution” statute, dilution law only forbids uses of trademarks that injure the reputation of the trademark; it does not apply to uses that injure the reputation of the business. Otherwise, any plaintiff could evade section 230 immunity just by changing the label of a defamation claim and calling it a trademark claim.
Representing Forte, we were sorry not to have won on First Amendment and prior restraint grounds, but Judge Kendall’s ruling may actually have a broader impact, protecting other hosts of interactive discussion sites, for her discussion of trademark law. At this point, Judge Kendall has only given an opinion from the bench, explaining why she was not granting a preliminary injunction (we have ordered the transcript). But she indicated that she would be issuing a written opinion. It could be worth waiting for.


Why the law is the way it is
An old friend of mine, indeed he is a former colleague here at Public Citizen, who used to represent consumers in tiffs with airlines and with the FAA and the old Civil Aeronautics Board, had this realpolitik comment about the politics at play here:
"Understand one thing about the FAA: If they repeal the current rule, and a plane crashes, there will be hell to pay. If they leave it on the books, the only downside will be complaints from a relatively small number of passengers who dislike the inconvenience of turning off their laptops or smartphones for 10 minutes. I’m sure you can guess how that choice will be resolved by an agency."
Re: Re: One of the big problems with DMCA takedowns....
With respect, it is not "the trial lawyers" who "won't let something like that pass." The inability for others to sue over takedowns is a consequence of the Burger and then the Rehnquist Court's increased used of standing and other Article III doctrines to prevent suits in the public interest on the ground that the person suing lacks sufficient personal, concrete interest in the litigation to justify use of the courts. Not at all the "trial lawyers."
Re: Buy Back?
I agree with this comment. Companies don't have to have web sites accessible from second-level domains in EVERY TLD available.
My favorite reaction to my blog post
Came from someone connected to one of the media entities in question, who suggested that while we are in euphemism land, maybe it should be called "the Big Head-Trauma-Denial-And-Coverup Game."
"use in commerce"
I agree with almost everything you say (and thanks for the link to my blog post about it), but I offer one technical correction. The problem is not lack of "use in commerce" but rather the fact that the video is entirely noncommercial, or, in the relevant language of the two sections of the Lanham Act invoked here, there is no "connection with any goods or services" and the video is plainly not a "commercial advertisement." We used to make the "use in commerce" argument in our defense of Internet critics running gripe sites and the like, but when we won the Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer, 403 F. 3d 672, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosley_Medical_Institute,_Inc._v._Kremer (and that is a Ninth Circuit case, which will be the controlling law here), that court indicated that it was the "in connection with goods or services" and not the "use in commerce" language on which it was relying. After doing several more cases like Bosley, I have come to conclude that this is, in fact, the better argument.
Why shouldn't I be able to promote "Eat More Kale"?
My take on this fight -- Muller-Moore should not be supported in his effort to take "Eat More Kale: out of the public domain.
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2011/12/chik-fil-a-and-eat-more-kale-a-pox-on-both-your-h ouses.html
Response to Rei
The review is still there -- see http://doctorbase.com/blog/makhnevich
Re: Hmm
We have argued in the past that there is a right to read anonymously as well as a right to speak anonymously, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=126, and would certainly make that argument again in an appropriate case.
The details are linked from the underlying story -- Sotka don't look so good
The complaint http://www.fkks.com/docs/complaint_salvator.pdf alleges (¶ 7)that many creative judgments were made in creating the photograph, and further (¶ 8) that the original digital image was further altered in a variety of ways in consultation two art experts. The artist's affidavit (part of the file linked above) goes into a fair amount of detail about the creative choices (¶¶ 4, 6-7, 9) and the digital alternations (¶¶ 8, 10-11). The complaint further alleges that Sotka posted the image on her web site as a freebie as part of a threat to make a high quality digital copy available, and encourage rapid dissemination of that high quality image, unless plaintiff stopped interfering with her efforts to sell merchandise through Brouhier's web site with copies of the photo printed on them. Of course, that doesn't matter absent copyrightability, but the issuance of this threat could well have encouraged the judge to grant the preliminary injunction.
One procedural flaw: The order http://www.fkks.com/docs/SalvatorMundiOrder.pdf violates Rule 65(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires any order granting a preliminary injunction to (A) state the reasons why it issued. But the order just says the reasons were stated on the record at the hearing. But that is only a ground for appealing the order.
Good comment from Karl
My reaction is similar to Karl's but perhaps less strongly. Electronic Arts' argument is that the two companies are in related markets, in that both sell their products by association with the same sports and athletes; they may also appeal to similar groups of consumers. This may well be a contestable case, depending on the facts, although Energy Armor's product is pure nonsense as Karl notes, and besides it may well lack the finances to cover the cost of the litigation.
Doctor's name
The linked New York Times story carried the doctor's name: Dr. Jesse Stoff, 55, of the East End Wellness Center in Riverhead. A bit surprised that the Techdirt post did not do so as well.
A slightly different take
I am not at all disappointed that Overlawyered agreed to take down his original post about Wolk. From my reading of the record, Wolk had a valid complaint about the gist of the post, even if his failure to file suit in time damned his litigation, even if Overlawyered had other valid defenses.
I discuss the case here: http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2011/09/arthur-alan-wolk-gets-overlawyered-to-take-down-its-critic isms.html
Access v HJosting ISP's
Some people refer to hosting ISP's as "Online Service Providers" or "OSP's" to reflect that distinction. However, because both enjoy the protection of section 230 immunity, I prefer to use a common term for both.
Judge Sparks is, in turn, benchslapped
The chief judge of the Fifth Circuit sent Judge Sparks an email, supposedly intended to be kept private, that reprimands him for being cute and being quoted in national blogs. In the future, she warns, Sparks is not to "allow such rhetoric to overcome common sense."
http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202514158040&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1
Thanks to Hulser (and others)
The dangling "dangling" has been undangled.
Before discovery, not just before trial -- and not so unusual
Although Kevin Smith does use the phrase "without a trial", it is not at all unusual to decide fair use at the summary judgment stage. The gist of his post is not to praise the avoidance of a trial, but rather the avoidance of the discovery phase of the case, in that the judge ruled that the fair use defense was decisive on a motion to dismiss.
To do that, the judge took advantage of the standard rules that (1) an affirmative defense can be addressed on a motion to dismiss if the existence of the defense is disclosed by the materials that are properly considered on a motion to dismiss, and (2) that even if a document is not attached to the complaint, it can be considered on a motion to dismiss if it is referenced in the complaint and the defendant supplies it to the court, and so long as there is no dispute about the authenticity of the copy that is supplied to the court.
The judge referred in passing to the consideration of an affirmative defense on a motion to dismiss as "irregular," but in fact it is not at all unusual. We commonly invoke these principles in the course of defending the online free speech of our clients, moving to dismiss at the outset of the case when we consider such a motion warranted.
Thanks for featuring this case on Techdirt.
Disagreeing with Matt
I second Paul Keating’s comments about the dangers of a strict loser pays system and of the proposed requirement that a plaintiff who wants to pay has to post a bond for the defendant’s cost, but in my own view Matt’s comments suffer from deeper flaws.
First, the policy that courts should be open to everyone, which Matt regards as a “stupid policy,” actually has its origins in the petition clause of the First Amendment, which entitles all Americans to “petition . . . for a redress of grievances.” And it would be great if Matt would share the source of the data that support his assertion that “most lawsuits are little more than legalized extortion.”
Second, Matt’s arguments about how Rule 11 should be applied to sanction plaintiffs and lawyers, and how Rules 12 and 56 should be applied to dispose of lawsuits early, have no relation to the lawsuit that Mike criticized in his post, or that I myself have been sued for criticizing. Those are part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but both the suit that Mike and I have criticized Wolk for filing, and the lawsuit that was later filed against me, were filed in a state court to which the Federal Rules have no application. Moreover, Rule 11 is still enforced in appropriate circumstances, and Rules 12 and 56 are the mechanism by which many suits are dismissed (or decided in the plaintiff’s favor) at early stages. Indeed, data from the Administrative Office of US Court suggests that most cases are still being resolved well before trial, in most cases by a judicial action of some kind. (The annual statistical reports can be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx)
Finally, I disagree with Matt’s suggestions about the possible application of Pennsylvania’s disciplinary rules to Wolk's lawsuits and to Wolk's warnings about litigation. It is not a violation of a lawyer’s obligations to threaten legal action, and in fact it is probably better that parties discuss possible litigation before it is filed so that they can work out their differences without having to sue and defend. In a number of respects, Matt has taken some aspects of the rules that he cites out of context. For example, under Rule 3.6, it is not any public statement about a case that is prohibited, but only statements that "will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter" -- most commonly, by polluting the jury. But nothing Wolk has threatened to file against me, against Techdirt, or against blawger Scott Greenfield http://blog.simplejustice.us/2011/07/30/why-lawyers-cant-control-the-web.aspx#comment-11247452, is likely to get even close to a jury trial.
Moreover, lawyers have First Amendment rights just like everybody else, and if they think somebody has done something wrong, the First Amendment protects their right to say so. That is especially true about the criticism of judges and their decisions. After all, a judge is a public official – and in the federal system, a judge is not only a public official but a public official with a lifetime appointment. They are not entitled to a legal shield against being criticized. And again the same First Amendment that Techdirt or I would assert as a defense to a libel suit if Wolk sues us also protects Wolk against being disciplined by the Pennsylvania bar.
Finally, just as I have argued that a libel suit against the defendants and lawyers who beat Wolk in his original libel suit is the last place where the propriety or impropriety of the judge’s decisions or the defense lawyers’ actions ought to be debated and decided, http://volokh.com/2011/08/03/do-changes-to-a-blog-posts-url-and-the-sites-metatags-restart-the-statu te-of-limitations/comment-page-1/#comment-1250369, I don’t see a bar disciplinary proceeding as a satisfactory forum for deciding whether Wolk’s current lawsuits or threatened future lawsuits have merit. Wolk recently dismissed the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas lawsuit against me and the other defendants. If he decides to tempt fate by refiling it, so far as I am concerned it ought to be up to the judges to whom that suit is assigned first to decide whether it has merit. If, as I believe likely, the suit is dismissed for lack of merit, the judge will then be able to decide whether to assess fees or other sanctions. Another possibility is the issuance of a vexatious litigation injunction, a tool commonly employed against pro se litigants who simply cannot take a judicial no for an answer. But it makes the most sense to have such decisions made by the judge who has had to address the suit on the merits, not by some separate legal authority.
Over the years, I have had clients who, after the suits against them based on their online speech were dismissed, were determined to file bar charges against the lawyers on the other side. I have yet to see such a charge succeed. As I see it, they are largely a waste of time.
Mixed feelings about the humor
I have decidedly mixed feelings about humor in judicial opinions. At one level, it certainly helps break up the day; there is so much dry text, often nonsense in the larger scheme of things, that we have to get through as lawyers (and judges).
But then I remember the request for Supreme Court review that I did about twenty-five years ago, arising out of an opinion by First Circuit Judge Bruce Selya, who is notorious for maximizing the number of obscure words in his opinions. He wrote a decision dismissing a lawsuit that has been brought on behalf of nearly a hundred workers in Puerto Rico who had lost their jobs when a women's underwear factory "reorganized." http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/835/11/296423/ Judge Selya just could not get over the fact that the factory made women's underwear, and reading the opinion made me wonder whether he has put more effort into inserting double entendres than into making his legal decision. Meanwhile, ninety women were out of a job.
Not that I feel so badly about the fact that Georgia Pacific will have to accept a limited term on its monopoly of the diamond pattern that patent gives it, instead of the indefinite that a trademark would have given it.
(untitled comment)
Mike, sometimes I try to be acerbic and witty in my posts, but I just give up. You win, hands down. We lawyers just have no chance.
Re: The Review
The hotel's papers do address the details of the complaint and represent that the hotel did try to reach out to the reviewer, and indeed the hotel claims that it explained everything to the reviewer about what the hotel staff had done following receipt of the complaint, and indeed what the hotel had been doing more generally about bed bugs. The hotel asserts as well that it got an email from the reviewer admitting that the reviewer couldn't be sure that it was the hotel that caused the reviewer's bed bug problem. The hotel asserts that the TripAdvisor review was posted after all of this exchange and that not only was the review false, but the assertion that the hotel acted as if they don't care is false as well, and that the person posting the review jolly well knew that this all was false.
Of course, this is what the hotel says. The complaint cites an exhibit showing some of this communication, but I don't have the exhibit. If the defamation case is litigated, a judge or a jury may eventually have to decide who is telling the truth.
We at Public Citizen defend online speakers against bogus claims, and our clients do use the Streisand effect as part of their self-defense, but I would not say that a business that has been defamed should never bring a defamation lawsuit. Rather, I would say that a business that is being falsely and unfairly slammed should think long and hard about what impact the speech is really having on their business, consider whether counter-speech can be effective, and decide whether the impact is so devastating that litigation is worth both the cost and the risk. Here, the hotel recites that two customers said they were not coming because of the review, and that it hears daily from potential customers about the review. Is that enough to make this lawsuit worth their while? I am not so sure.
By the same token, people who get sued for defamation need to think long and hard whether to defend the cases, even if they can afford counsel, or whether to bite the bullet and admit they were wrong. Folks who use the Streisand effect can end up paying for that later if they are found liable for defamation.
In the end, IMHO, as long as our society puts value on reputation and affords a cause of action for defamation, then, in my view, we need at least the possibility of such litigation to discourage deliberately false statements that can in some circumstances have a serious impact on reputation. And I think it ill behooves those of us who care about free speech online to blow off defamation plaintiffs with the notion that they should never file such lawsuits.
Mike has said no such thing, but I read some of the commenters as saying that.