Once Again, Why Homeland Security's Domain Name Seizures Are Almost Certainly Not Legal
from the once-more,-with-feeling dept
Earlier this month, in discussing some of the Homeland Security/ICE domain seizures, Karl put together an excellent comment, going through the legal analysis as to why the domain seizures were almost certainly not legal. Karl is not a lawyer, so I sent the comment to a series of lawyers I know who are very much on top of First Amendment issues, and they came back saying that his post was accurate, so I asked him to turn it into a full post, and here it is. With COICA being brought back, the timing is particularly appropriate.
These seizures are the very definition of prior restraint.
The activities that these sites are doing has never been considered criminal infringement. Remember that "evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement of a copyright." (17 U.S.C. 506(a)(2)) The state has not met their burden of showing that criminal activity occurred at all.
Moreover, it's pretty hard to claim "willful infringement" when a site has been declared completely legal under its own country's laws -- as is the case with Rojadirecta. If it's infringing, it's at most "innocent infringement," which is in no way a criminal act.
Furthermore, none of these sites are "primary" infringers. To be criminal, they must be considered an accomplice, and that requires much, much more proof than "contributory" or "vicarious" infringement does in tort cases. You must share the primary's actus reus and mens rea -- in layman's terms, you had to actively, intentionally, and directly participate, and moreover you had to know the act was criminal. It's amazingly obvious that this doesn't apply to many of these websites.
Under 17 U.S.C. 512's "safe harbors" provisions, if the sites followed the rules laid out therein, they are not liable for infringement at all, and the only relief available is laid out in 512(j). Nothing in 17 U.S.C. 506 takes those safe harbors away. Even if you wrongly believe it did, obeying the law would (once again) make you an "innocent infringer" at most, thus ineligible for criminal infringement under 506. Yet there was not even an attempt to show that the sites did not follow those rules. And apparently many did.
These seizures were also done ex parte, meaning that the defendants were not given prior notice, and were not given a chance to contest the seizures in a pre-seizure hearing. Nor, for that matter, were they given that chance after the seizures occured.
Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana makes it very clear that an ex parte seizure of potentially protected speech, with the intent to take material out of circulation, is prior restraint:
While a single copy of a book or film may be seized and retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause, books or films may not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing. The risk of prior restraint, which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth Amendment protection accorded searches for and seizures of First Amendment materials, renders invalid the pretrial seizure here. Even assuming that petitioner's bookstore and its contents are forfeitable when it is proved that they were used in, or derived from, a pattern of violations of the state obscenity laws, the seizure was unconstitutional. Probable cause to believe that there are valid grounds for seizure is insufficient to interrupt the sale of presumptively protected books and films.
Note that even taking the offending material itself out of circulation is prior restraint. These seizures went beyond that, and attempted to take entire websites out of circulation, non-infringing speech and all.
Some rebut with Heller v. New York, but nothing in Heller contradicts Fort Wayne:
A copy of the film was temporarily detained in order to preserve it as evidence. There has been no showing that the seizure of a copy of the film precluded its continued exhibition. Nor, in this case, did temporary restraint in itself "become a form of censorship," even making the doubtful assumption that no other copies of the film existed. [Emphasis in original.]
In other words, Heller only applies when you seize a copy of the work, you do it to preserve it as evidence, and it does not prevent public access to the work itself.
Moreover, Heller quotes United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, which lays out three requirements for ex parte seizures:
(1) there must be assurance, 'by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film'; (2) '[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution'; and (3) 'the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision' to minimize the impact of possibly erroneous administrative action. [Emphasis mine.]
These seizures fail every single one of those requirements. Those requirements were put in place "so that administrative delay does not in itself become a form of censorship." This is exactly what is happening here. Forfeiture proceedings for the first round of seizures were only initiated six months after the seizures occurred. The majority of sites still have not had a chance to contest them, and some have only recently been contacted by the government, months after the domains were seized.
Others may rebut with Arcara v. Cloud Books, in which an adult bookstore was closed down because of prostitution occuring on its premises. The usual claim is that "the First Amendment is no shield against criminal activity." But Arcara was only constitutional because "the sexual activity carried on in this case manifests absolutely no element of protected expression." Furthermore, "We have also applied First Amendment scrutiny to some statutes which, although directed at activity with no expressive component, impose a disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected First Amendment activities."
Copyright infringement does, in fact, have "an element of protected expression" -- that is, a First Amendment defense can be raised (it need not be raised successfully). For that reason alone, Arcara does not apply. But even if the activity was not itself protected, the mere fact that it imposes a "disproportionate burden" upon free expression, disqualifies it from Arcara exemptions. Arcara absolutely, positively does not apply to these seizures.
In case you're wondering -- no, obscenity is not any more "presumptively protected" than copyright infringement is. (Hint: child pornography is a subset of "obscenity.") The same seizure rules (18 U.S.C. 46) apply to both; First Amendment challenges can be raised to both; obscenity, unlike infringement, is always a criminal offense; and the punishment for obscenity is about the same as for criminal infringement. (It's all in 18 U.S.C. 71.)
It's also a dodge to claim that domain names are not "presumptively protected speech." First of all, that's not true. Name.Space v. Network Solutions ruled that general top-level domains (just the .com, .net, etc parts) are not protected, solely because they cannot possibly be expressive. When the domain name can possibly be expressive -- such as when it includes the full creative URL -- it is presumptively protected speech, and First Amendment concerns apply. (See: every single "sucks site" case, and the one about Glenn Beck raping and murdering a young girl in 1990.)
But it's even more of a dodge because the domain names are not even allegedly infringing. They were seized solely to prevent the public from accessing the websites themselves. So the TLDs' status as "protected" is completely immaterial; it only matters whether the websites themselves are possibly protected expression.
And, of course, they are. The majority of the speech on some sites (forums, blog posts, comments, etc) is absolutely, 100% protected speech.
Now, about those seizure laws. 17 U.S.C. 506(b) references 18 U.S.C. 2323, which allows the seizing of any "article, the making or trafficking of which" is criminal infringement. Compare this with the ennumerated articles that can be impounded from 17 U.S.C. 503: "all copies or phonorecords," "all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles," and "records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt." These laws were clearly to be used for counterfeit goods, not file sharing.
According to 18 U.S.C. 2323(a)(2), the actual procedures for criminal seizure are in 18 U.S.C. 46. There are three sections dealing with civil forfeiture, none of which seem particularly appropriate. It seems that judicial forfeiture is covered exclusively in 18 U.S.C. 985. 985(d) states:ates:
Real property may be seized prior to the entry of an order of forfeiture if--
(A) the Government notifies the court that it intends to seize the property before trial; and
(B) the court--
(i) issues a notice of application for warrant, causes the notice to be served on the property owner and posted on the property, and conducts a hearing in which the property owner has a meaningful opportunity to be heard; or
(ii) makes an ex parte determination that there is probable cause for the forfeiture and that there are exigent circumstances that permit the Government to seize the property without prior notice and an opportunity for the property owner to be heard.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(B)(ii), to establish exigent circumstances, the Government shall show that less restrictive measures such as a lis pendens, restraining order, or bond would not suffice to protect the Government's interests in preventing the sale, destruction, or continued unlawful use of the real property. [Emphasis mine.]
In other words, even with counterfeit goods, you're supposed to allow an adversarial hearing before seizing anything. An ex parte seizure order is the "nuclear option," to be used only when other methods are insufficient. The affidavits claim that these were indeed "exigent circumstances," but that claim is completely laughable on its face -- especially since the sites were operational for years at the same domain name, without risk of "destruction" or "sale," and the seizures did not preserve (or even help gather) any evidence whatsoever. And no, "continued unlawful use" is not an "exigent circumstance" when that "use" involves potentially protected expression, or, for that matter, when the use is not necessarily unlawful in the first place.
...Now, I'm not a lawyer, and I'm only repeating what I've been able to dig up. You can possibly disagree with some of the above. But in order for these seizures to be legal, you have to disagree with all of it. I'm sure some here will try (and many more will just call me a "freetard" or "pro-piracy" or "LOL!" at me). But no matter how you slice it, the legality of these seizures is not obvious. It's not even likely.
The more I read the law, the more convinced I become that the seizures were a repulsive abuse of power. ICE did this deliberately to route around safe harbors and the First Amendment. They had no intent of filing criminal charges and were hoping the domain owners would be scared into silence. It is prior restraint, and it is censorship, plain and simple.

Re: Re: Re: Re: Yes, it's trolling and yes, it's ridiculous
He denied it just two weeks ago:
Except that the entire focus of the article was on the aiding and abetting charges. In order to show that Megaupload "aided and abetted" criminal infringement done by their users, they have to show that a specific user committed criminal infringement.
And they have not done that. So, Mike is entirely correct.
Separately, that specific allegation - even if true - probably doesn't rise to the level of criminal infringement. But that allegation was not the basis of the aiding and abetting charges, so it's irrelevant to that discussion.
So, once again, you have shown that you are the one that is "slimy and dishonest" (your words).
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Yes, it's trolling and yes, it's ridiculous
It isn't difficult.
...is one of average_joe's favorite go-to lines. (As is "on the merits.")
Could there be sock puppetry at work here?
I don't know, but it wouldn't surprise me, since 1. AJ has admitted he posts anonymously, 2. he has proven to be fundamentally dishonest, and 3. he's the only person in the universe who honestly believes he's ever won a debate with Mike.
Re: Re: Yes, it's trolling and yes, it's ridiculous
then you said that his victims should consider paying up and playing along
Except he said no such thing. He said it was a good idea for "the tech industry to think about participating in the case," not that it was a good idea for them to "pay up." Not once did he say that the tech companies should give in to the patent trolling, just that they have an interest in the outcome of the case.
Once again, you're lying. What a shocker.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Prior Art
you can't just go to the USPTO and say "I want to patent the wheel". You can't because prior art exists.
Actually, yes, you could. The patent examiner would do a cursory search for prior art, but patent examiners are notoriously lousy at this, because a) they're not experts in the field, and/or b) they're swamped, and/or c) they're under pressure to approve as many patents as possible.
Then once someone "infringes" by making a wheel of their own, they get sued by the patent holder. It is now the defendant's burden to show that the patent is invalid, as an affirmative defense.
That actually happened in the Apple v. Samsung case. Apple's "rubber banding" patent was invalidated as prior art - after the jury had awarded a $1-billion judgement against Samsung.
Re: Re: Read for comprehension!
If IV trolled someone but then pointed out that they should cave in because it was in their best interests on some unrelated matter, do you think Mike would think it was a good idea then?
Does Mike think it's a good idea now?
No. He called it "a potentially poorly thought out strategic move that could backfire." Admittedly, I'd like him to use stronger language too, but what can you do.
On the other hand - if it were IV doing this sort of trolling, you would be on their side, saying that they're just "protecting their property," and that anyone who is against it just hates patent law and loves patent piracy, or some such nonsense.
Then, spam the comments with some misreading of unrelated case law, or misstatements of the Founders' opinions, or multiple "Y u no debate meeeee!" posts at Mike, or some other idiotic attempt to derail the conversation. Just like you always do.
I don't think the DMCA applies in criminal cases, but even if it did, what's going to happen that would affect others like Google?
That's not the only issue, of course, but even if it were, then it would mean that the government could seize Google (or whoever the next Google is), even though they are completely compliant with the DMCA.
All they would have to do is take Viacom's accusations (or whoever the next equivalent of Viacom is), claim that shows probable cause for criminal infringement, and boom! Instant seizure, shutdown, and arrest. No DMCA defense, no advance notice, no prior chance to defend their actions. And all their assets would be frozen, so no money to mount a legal defense.
That's exactly what happened to Megaupload.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
I'm asking Mike to admit that this would weaken some of the rights that copyright holders have as far as anticircumvention is concerned.
So, Joe, can you point to anywhere in the copyright statutes that says that copyright holders have a right to control all access to the works that they authored?
No, you can't, because that was never a right that was granted to them.
And, clearly, Congress did not intend to grant copyright holders those rights. That's why they explicitly included a "savings clause" in 1201(c): "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title."
This bill would merely clarify that intent - nothing more.
Furthermore, as it stands, this statute applies to much more than copyrighted material. Let's take the classic example: "jailbreaking" your phone so that you are able to switch to a different carrier. If you did this, what access to copyrighted works are you gaining?
The answer: none. "Jailbreaking" your phone does not result in access to any material whatsoever that is within the scope of copyright, as defined in 17 USC 102.
In other words: the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions grant rights to people who have no copyright interests whatsoever.
This is a major flaw in the law as it stands. You said, and I agree, that the intent is to allow copyright holders to protect themselves against infringement. But it is overreaching as it stands, and this bill would simply rectify the situation.
As far as the 106 rights go, all I've heard are conclusory statements that DRM does absolutely nothing to prevent piracy.
That's not really the issue. Anti-circumvention measures (not merely DRM) may help prevent piracy - but, of course, shutting down public libraries would also help prevent piracy. The plain fact is that anti-circumvention provisions do not serve the public welfare. Anti-circumvention measures may help prevent activity that is infringing, but they also bypass all of the limitations on copyright rights that are Constitutionally necessary.
Plus, as I said, anti-circumvention measures are unlawful even regarding material that is not covered by copyright law.
Also, replying to another comment:
making it legal to traffic in technologies that can be used to circumvent access controls would make it easier to infringe.
This is aboslutely false. How easy it is to infringe depends entirely upon how easy it is to actually circumvent the particular access controls. Whether that is legal or illegal makes little difference. I mean, for fuck's sake, people print DeCSS on T-shirts. It can't get more easy than that.
What it would do is make it easier to "traffic in technologies" that don't infringe. But nothing in this bill would make it any more difficult for copyright holders to enforce their rights. It would simply legalize activities that never infringed on their rights in the first place. If someone makes something that can bypass copy protection for the purposes of infringement, they can still get sued, and they can still face criminal charges. And it is not any harder for either copyright holder or the govenrnment to bring these charges against them.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
EFF are the most rabid piracy apologists in the nation.
The EFF are not, and have never been, piracy apologists, much less "rabid" piracy apologists.
It's exactly like calling the ACLU "Nazi apologists" because they fought for the right to free speech in Skokie, or calling them "Communist apologists" because they fought the Palmer raids.
Anyone who says something this ridiculous shows that they have a radical agenda against free speech and public rights. So, again, thanks for clearing that up.
Nice
While I have some minor doubts about the success of this platform in the long-term (mostly for reasons having nothing to do with the platform itself), it's excellent to see more of these business models actually making it to the marketplace.
Every single attempt is a benefit to artists, even if (God forbid) the attempt is unsuccessful. The worst that will happen is that it will lead to attempts that succeed. The best that will happen is that it will succeed, artists will have a platform that actually benefits them directly, and the public will benefit from artists' successes without having to sacrifice any of their freedoms.
Whether this particular platform succeeds or fails, it's a win-win proposition for everyone, artists and the public alike.
Re: Re: Re:
pirate apologist buddies at EFF
...and with that phrase, you demonstrate that you're a liar who is not worth listening to. Thanks for clearing that up.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
Whatever claims are held are the government's. This is criminal law.
Actually, I was wrong. It is also civil law. 17 USC 1203 allows civil actions against people who violate 1201.
Still, that does not mean that any of the rights granted in 106 were violated. These are the only things that are considered an infringement of copyright, as 501 makes clear. (In fact, 1203 doesn't talk about copyright holders, but "any person injured by a violation of section 1201.")
Considering 1201(c) ("Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title"), I think it's fair to say that Congress did not intend to grant copyright holders any more rights that they already had. They were never seeking to add another right to 106.
It's pretty clear that the Congressional intent was to prohibit circumvention specifically for the purpose of infringement. Making this intent clear, by explicitly stating it in the statutes, would not in any way diminish the rights granted in 106, and would simply clarify Congress' intent in enacting the statutes in the first place.
There is no sane reason to be against this bill at all.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
Yeah, that was me. I'm on a phone.
Re: An appropriate defense
Exhibit A: A random collection of comments from Youtube.
Followed by Exhibit B: the flagged comments from Sophisticatedjanedoe's Favorite Posts of the Week.
Stupid
I thought cases like this went out the window in the late 90's, when the Internet happened, and everyone on the planet realized that curtailing offensive speech was a waste of time.
Still, it could get a lot worse. Look at Mike Diana. As part of his probationary sentence, he was ordered to stop drawing altogether - and to submit to random searches and seizures of his drawings and writings throughout his probation.
Hopefully whatever this guy faces won't be nearly so totalitarian.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
I should have also pointed this out.
What about the fact that it causes harm to the victim? What about the interests of society?
What about non-consensual acts that do not cause physical harm to the victim? Are they somehow not rape?
And, what about when society decides that the rape doesn't harm their interests? Does this make it better?
The act doesn't need to physically harm the victim to be rape. It does not need social disapproval to be rape.
So, yes, the main evil is that it is done against the victim's will.
I'm saying this less to rebuke your statements, and more because these things simply need to be said. I didn't say them, and that was wrong of me.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Even Mike can't help misreading the Constitution
For example an author writes a book. The book is stolen and a copy is sold to a publisher. The copy is not stolen property and subsequent copies would also not be stolen property. So the author's only recourse would be against the original thief.
It's important to note that, if this book weren't covered by copyright for whatever reason, that doesn't mean there aren't other ways to go after the thief and publisher. Trade secrets and privacy rights are examples.
Had copyright never existed, it's a pretty sure bet that the scenario you describe would have been covered by some other set of laws. (Since copyright is essentially a financial right, I'd guess it would be subsumed under trade secrets laws.) So, copyright laws aren't necessary to protect this particular right.
Which makes it all the more doubtful that this particular right is what the Founders were considering.
Re: Re: Re: Re:
Does this mean his training as a lawyer is complete?
He did say he just got his JD...
Re: Re: Re: Re:
Wow. So it's reasonable to think that the only reason rape is not OK is because it goes against the victim's will? That strikes me as very controversial. What about the fact that it causes harm to the victim? What about the interests of society?
We're off topic here, but I'll bite.
If an act "causes harm to the victim," but is genuinely consensual, then it's not unreasonable to think it's OK. Or, at the very least, not outright immoral. Obviously, I don't know (or care about) Mike's stance on this issue, but as far as I'm concerned, consensual acts between adults are nobody's business but theirs.
As far as the "interests to society" - again, if the acts are consensual, then what business is it of society's? How are the "interests to society" harmed by consensual acts between adults?
In fact, those who tout the "interests to society" line tend to be those whose not-so-subtle goal is to outlaw pornography. People like the religious right, or mid-80's anti-porn feminists. I'm a fan of neither group, to put it mildly.
But, getting back on track, this doesn't apply to copyright infringement. You have said that it is wrong even if it does not do any harm to the copyright holder, and even if society's interests are harmed in enforcing those rights. You are concerned solely with persecuting infringers, regardless of whether that helps society or not, regardless of whether that helps creative artists or not. So, obviously, you don't care about those things.
In fact, between you and Mike, it is Mike who is much more concerned about "harm to the victim" - since he, and not you, is the one who examines practical means to minimize the harm from infringement (or even to turn it into an benefit). It is he, and not you, who is concerned with "the interests of society" - since he has made it abundantly clear that copyright laws are supposed to serve the public first and foremost. (Something you continuously deny.)
Face it, Mike is far more moral than you are when it comes to copyright. I believe you already know this. It's why you lash out at him so much.
It's one thing to disagree with me, but you needn't call me names like this.
Those are the exact names that you call Mike all the time. I think you've even called me that once or twice, long ago.
I guess I should try to avoid sinking to your level. It requires an immense amount of restraint, and sometimes I slip up.
Re: Re: Even Mike can't help misreading the Constitution
I see your various arguments regarding copyright being a 'natural right', and raise you Karl's very well put refutation of them:
You have to understand: Crosbie believes that copyright was intended to protect unpublished writings only. In his eyes, the notion that copyright was supposed to be a post-publication monopoly is an abomination, a twisting of the intent of "copyright clause."
He is, in other words, a copyright abolitionist.
It is indeed ironic that his "natural rights" argument is echoed by copyright maximalists. But they are both wrong.
You linked to quotes about the post-publication monopoly not being a natural right. If you want to see a discussion with Crosbie directly, in which I show that the "copyright clause" was indeed talking about a post-publication monopoly, it is here:
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121025/18244920850/copyright-new-mercantilism.shtml#c135
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: A sad misunderstanding
Incorrect. Nobody is ever forced.
All the major labels had roughly the same "standard" contract. That included assigning all the rights to the recordings, and it was not a point that the labels were willing to negotiate. There are very few cases where artists retained their copyrights, but these are all well-known, gold or platinum artists who were able to negotiate this in their second contract with the labels. You can very nearly count them on one hand.
And unless you signed with a major, you could not get on commercial radio, could not play most of the larger venues, and could not get your records into national record stores. The major labels acted (and act) collectively, essentially forming a total monopoly on music.
So, no, you weren't "forced." You were only "required" to assign the rights if you hoped to actually make a living at your art.
Many of those same artists use the work and it's wide distribution and promotion to be able to build a fan base and charge for access to their live shows.
Yes, they did, but this revenue stream is unaffected by piracy (it's actually increased in the past ten years). In fact, you don't need copyright at all to do this.
If they are forced back to working at the 7-11 after that, they likely are not the artist that the public wants to hear from, read, or buy art from, plain and simple.
We're talking artists that sold units in the tens of thousands, sometimes the hundreds of thousands. That simply isn't enough to make money under the old major label system.
There is no unlimited source of revenue to pay people who feel they are an artist, the system is built so that those who are appreciated by the public can make a living being an artist.
You're right, there is not an unlimited source of money. But under the old label system, the vast majority of that money did not go to the creative artist at all.
Most of the people under that system could not make a sustainable living, whether they were appreciated by the public or not. Most songwriters could not write songs unless they spent their time performing for the public; most book writers who are not good public speakers were forced to do speaking tours or lectures. The ones who didn't have to do this were a small, small, small minority of songwriters or authors. That was (and is) true even among the songwriters or authors on major labels or who were signed with big publishing houses.
Again, if you look at the top grossing artists on major labels, nearly all of them made a tiny percentage of their income from royalties. They all make their money from other things - live touring, product endorsements, etc.
The notion that copyright helps artists make money, is almost entirely a myth. It is a myth that naive artists believe, in the same way that they believe copyright is some sort of "natural right" earned by their labor, but it is a myth nonetheless. It is like the myth of the "rock star lifestyle:" something that is deliberately promulgated by people who earn their money off of artists, in order to keep a fresh supply of labor to stock the plantation.
Would you, as Mike Masnick appears to want to, deny the artists the rights to own the material they create?
Neither myself nor Mike are copyright abolitionists. Mike wants copyright to fundamentally benefit the general public - which, not coincidentally, is also copyright's Constitutional purpose.
I personally want to see copyright continue. I simply recognize that the current form is an abomination. It hurts artists more than it helps them, and it does tremendous damage to the public good.
Specifically, I would start by re-legalizing all forms of non-commercial copying and distribution. I would also like to see copyright transfers abolished by law: copyright "ownership" should remain with the artists, and only licenses should be allowed. There are a few other things I'd like to see, but listing them would make this a novel-length reply.
Re: Re: Re: Re: A sad misunderstanding
Sorry about the formatting...