The SAA provided that Stephens Media automatically received an exclusive license in any copyrighted work it assigned to Righthaven, so that Stephens Media retained “the unfettered and exclusive ability” to exploit the copyrights. Righthaven, on the other hand, had “no right or license” to exploit the work or participate in any royalties associated with the exploitation of the work. The contracts left Righthaven without any ability to reproduce the works, distribute them, or exploit any other exclusive right under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Without any of those rights, Righthaven was left only with the bare right to sue, which is insufficient for standing under the Copyright Act and Silvers.

because we agree that Righthaven did not have standing, it is not appropriate for us to go further or for the district court’s alternative ruling to stand. We therefore vacate the portion of the district court’s order that analyzed the merits of the fair use defense and granted the motion for summary judgment.

We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.

If the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.

The upshot is that (1) similarity of content, (2) strong motives, (3) prior behavior, and (4) capacity all point to a very strong likelihood that the Government will intercept at least some of the plaintiffs’ communications, including some that the 2008 amendment, §1881a, but not the pre-2008 Act, authorizes the Government to intercept. At the same time, nothing suggests the presence of some special factor here that might support a contrary conclusion. The Government does not deny that it has both the motive and the capacity to listen to communications of the kind described by plaintiffs. Nor does it describe any system for avoiding the interception of an electronic communication that happens to include a party who is an American lawyer, journalist, or human rights worker. One can, of course, always imagine some special circumstance that negates a virtual likelihood, no matter how strong. But the same is true about most, if not all, ordinary inferences about future events. Perhaps, despite pouring rain, the streets will remain dry (due to the presence of a special chemical). But ordinarily a party that seeks to defeat a strong natural inference must bear the burden of showing that some such special circumstance exists. And no one has suggested any such special circumstance here.

Consequently, we need only assume that the Government is doing its job (to find out about, and combat, terrorism) in order to conclude that there is a high probability that the Government will intercept at least some electronic communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties. The majority is wrong when it describes the harm threatened plaintiffs as “speculative.”

Syverson tried to argue that the deal with Stevens Media, the parent company of the Las Vegas Review-Journal, involved an actual copyright transfer. "Righthaven and Stevens Media were well aware of the Silvers case and attempted to comply," said Syverson early on in his argument.

"It looks like form over substance," said one of the judges on the three-judge panel. "It seems like an attempt that's too cute by half to get around Silvers."

Another judge noted that Stevens could take back any of the rights at any time, meaning any "transfer" of copyright wasn't very meaningful. Righthaven couldn't really have licensed the copyrights or published the articles it had the rights to, since Stevens Media could have reclaimed those rights at any time.

First of all, Hoehn's use wasn't "transformative," noted one judge on the panel. "How is the nature and character of the article changed at all, by posting it to a website?" he asked. "Have you ever seen a newspaper that didn't have space for letters to the editor, or a space for comments?"

Just the fact that he meant to inspire debate doesn't justify copying the full work, said another judge. "What if I copied Justice Sotomayor's book into a blog post and invited people to comment on it?" he asked.

In its order dismissing the FAC, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims against the Regents and claims seeking damages against individual defendants in their official capacity on the grounds that these individual defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity... Plaintiffs have verbatim re-pleaded those claimsfrom the FAC for purposes of appeal.... As these claims have already been dismissed with prejudice, the Court does not analyze them further.

Under the Copyright Act, distributed items must be “material objects” in which a copy is “fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Plaintiffs’ new allegations that “the Video Furnace system administrator retains an original copy of the AVP DVD while distributing copies to end users, which copies remain on the end user’s computer as long as the Video Furnace InStream player remains open” does not change this outcome. For a copy to be fixed, it must be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The “copy” on the end users computer, as alleged, is not fixed.

This Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to cure the defects with their DMCA claim. First, the allegations in the SAC do not support a claim that Defendants violated 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) by using the HVS Video Furnace software to “circumvent . . . a technological measure that effectively controls access to” the DVDs because UCLA had lawful access to the DVDs and Plaintiffs essentially allege improper usage of the DVDs.

Google Books is a revolutionary search technology for books—a modern and marked improvement over the traditional card catalog. Google has scanned and indexed more than 20 million books by agreement with major research libraries. The Google Books tool allows any user to enter a search query, obtain a list of books containing the user’s search terms, and view limited “snippets” of surrounding words showing how the terms are used. Google Books does not allow users to read a book online, or even a single page of a book, without express permission from the rightsholder. But its search capabilities help users find books to buy or borrow, connecting them with the books they need, and thus bringing to light a wealth of information previously hidden, undiscoverable, in books sitting on library shelves. Google Books thus offers enormous benefits to authors and readers and to the progress and diffusion of human knowledge.

Despite the individual issues at the heart of Plaintiffs’ suit—and unrebutted evidence that a significant portion of the proposed class in fact approves, and benefits from, Google Books’ uses—the district court certified a plaintiff class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) consisting of “[a]ll persons residing in the United States who hold a United States copyright interest in one or more Books reproduced by Google as part of its Library Project.” SPA2. That decision was error, for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent, as required by Rule 23(a), the large number of class members who would be harmed if Plaintiffs prevail—that is, the many class members who benefit economically and in other ways from the Google Books project and do not want to see it curtailed.

General Verrilli, can you be specific on who that person would be? Because, as I understand it, it's unlikely that, for example, the lawyers in this case would be charged with any criminal offense. It's more probable that their clients would be; but, according to the government, their clients have no Fourth Amendment rights because they are people who are noncitizens who acted abroad.

So it's hard for me to envision. I see the theoretical possibility, but I don't see a real person who would be subject to a Federal charge who could raise an objection.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, is it really such speculation, General? I mean, just imagine that -- yourself in this lawyer's position, and the lawyer says, I'm representing a person associated with a terrorist organization, I'm representing KLM in the case of one of these lawyers, and I'm going to be talking to that person's family members and associates and trying to find out everything that I can.

Now, as a lawyer, would you take precautions, or would you pick up the phone and start writing e-mails to all those people?

GENERAL VERRILLI: If I took precautions, it would be because of a belief that I had to comply with an ethics rule, and the ethics rule would be the cause of me taking those precautions. It doesn't change the standard.

JUSTICE KAGAN: I don't even think it has to do with an ethics rule. If you're a good lawyer -forget the ethics rule and how the ethics rules apply. Are you really going to tell me that you, as a lawyer, would just pick up the phone in the face of this statute and talk to these terrorists' associates?

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You have two arguments; one is likelihood of future injury and the other is present obligations or cause. I want to focus on the former. Our standard is certainly impending, and you articulated it by saying, substantial risk. There is obviously a vast difference between those two.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I don't think, Your Honor, that the Court has settled on certainly impending. The cases that the -- the Government cites are cases like -- I think that the one that the Government cites, relies on most heavily is Summers. But in Summers, the distinction between likelihood and certainly impending was not one that the Court relied on in -- in that decision. The Court said that plaintiffs couldn't meet even the lower standard. So I think that the discussion of certainly impending -

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But both in Summers and Monsanto the Government tells us: We knew that the governmental act was occurring, and then once we knew that, the question was substantial risk.

MR. JAFFER: Justice Kennedy, the -- the -the cases that we rely on, Monsanto, Laidlaw, Meese v. Keene, these are cases in which the Court didn't look to the certainly impending standard at all. The question that the Court asked in those cases was: Is there a substantial risk? Is there a substantial risk that effectively compels the plaintiffs to act in the way they are -- they are acting?

JUSTICE SCALIA: Does that assessment take into account the fact that a court is going to pass upon the Government's ability to intercept these communications?

MR. JAFFER: It does, Justice Scalia. I mean you -- you are right that there is a court that in some sense stands between plaintiffs and the future injury that they -- that they fear.

JUSTICE SCALIA: With the obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment.

MR. JAFFER: I don't think it's that simple. The -- the -- the court, the FISA court, is tasked with assessing the reasonableness of targeting and minimization procedures. But the statute itself forecloses the court from imposing the kinds of limits that plaintiffs think the Fourth Amendment requires. So for example, the statute itself in section (g)(4) says that the Government is not required to identify the facilities to be monitored. And the statute itself in defining targeting procedures defines them to be procedures intended to ensure that the targets are outside the United States.

JUSTICE SCALIA: But if as you say those procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, it doesn't matter what the statute says.

MR. JAFFER: Well, the Court would have to -

JUSTICE SCALIA: If those statutory provisions would produce a violation of the Fourth Amendment, they are null and void, right?

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think that's right.

The -- the court -

JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So the FISA Court would presumably know that.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think if that had happened over the last 4 years, the Government wouldn't be seeking reauthorization of the statute now.

JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see how the rest of your challenge or your challenge to the remainder of this statute can be characterized as a facial challenge, because it necessarily assumes that the FISA court will mistakenly say that there has been no Fourth Amendment violation, doesn't it?

MR. JAFFER: I don't think that's so, Justice Scalia. Our concern is not -- not that -- that the FISA court will make mistakes, although it well might. The concern -- the main concern is that the reasonableness inquiry that the FISA court engages in is a narrowly cabined one. They court can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified the facilities. They can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified a specific target.

Twitter respectfully submits that its users have standing on three separate and independent grounds to move to quash subpoenas directed to Twitter for their records. First, Twitter’s users have standing under New York law because Twitter’s Terms of Service have long established that users have a proprietary interest in their records. Twitter users own their Tweets and should have the right to fight invalid government requests. Second, Twitter’s users have standing under § 2704(b) of the federal SCA, which provides that a user who receives notice of a subpoena for their account records “may file a motion to quash such subpoena . . . in the appropriate . . . State court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2704(b). Finally, Twitter’s users have standing based on a long line of precedent establishing that individuals whose constitutional rights are implicated by a government subpoena to a third party can challenge the request. Accordingly, the Court should find that Twitter’s users have standing on any one, or all, of these bases.

Defendant’s Tweets are also protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and art. I, § 12 of the New York Constitution because the government admits that it cannot publicly access them, thus establishing that Defendant maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in these communications.

If you have actually managed to convince your clients that it is a good idea for them to spend tens thousands of dollars (or more) in this case for the sole eventual purpose of merely costing Mr. Hoehn money, you can rest assured that it will be a public relations negative for them, in no small part due to Righthaven’s poor handling of this case, along with hundreds of others, from its inception to present. I strongly suggest that you consider recommending a different "make-work" project for your clients. I understand that in this day and age of biglaw layoffs, it is a constant battle to make sure that your existence is justified on the firm’s billing ledgers. This is the wrong case with which to round out your sheet. I can assure you of that. Your clients will waste money and all the money will buy them is the opportunity to look like idiots.

Righthaven appears to be inviting the court to commit what Righthaven would contend is legal error by dismissing this action,’’

A third-party who has been assigned the bare right to sue for infringement has no interest in the legal dissemination of the copyrighted material. On the contrary, that party derives its sole economic benefit by instituting claims of infringement, a course of action which necessarily limits public access to the copyrighted work. This prioritizes economic benefit over public access, in direct contradiction to the constitutionally mandated equilibrium upon which copyright law is based. The legislative history relating to the Copyright Act of 1976 supports this interpretation.

Righthaven argues that the application to intervene is timely because it brought the motion soon after being dismissed from the case and rectifying the problems with the SAA by creating the Amended and Restated SAA. The Court disagrees. Righthaven filed this case more than ten months prior to its application to intervene. It is true that Righthaven could not have sought to intervene until it was dismissed, but this is because of the method in which Righthaven chose to pursue this litigation. Righthaven’s application is untimely because ten months have passed since filing, intervention would prejudice Democratic Underground as multiple of their discovery motions were dismissed as moot when Democratic Underground was dismissed, and the reason for delay was of Righthaven’s own making. See, e.g., Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, Inc., 309 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (laying out factors to consider in timeliness analysis). In fact, the reason Righthaven now seeks to intervene is to circumvent the Court’s June 14 Order by creating standing and rights after the fact. This is improper and does not make the application timely.

The Court is dubious as to whether Righthaven can essentially create standing in the middle of a case so as to either prosecute the case independently or intervene. Further, the Court questions whether Righthaven can even have a legitimate interest under any agreement (no matter the rights purportedly transferred) because Stephens Media and Righthaven’s arrangement seems very much like a contingency fee arrangement with an entity unauthorized to practice law.

"While many supporters of net freedom continue to celebrate the recent decision penalizing the Rightshaven lawsuit mill, open source advocates are beginning to understand the brutal implications for enforcing licensing terms. Simply put, open source projects without CLAs (Contributor License Agreements) will not be able to sue anyone for breaking the license agreement. Smaller, less-professional projects will have to choose between accepting casual contributions and enforcing the license.


The limit threatens much of the casual work done by corporate partners. While it's usually relatively easy for small, independent developers to sign a contract giving away all rights to the code, it's another matter for a corporate developer to get permission from the legal department. If the company is paying for the development-- something that is common with many projects supported by companies-- the company owns the code and the company needs to sign the document. This will be too much red tape for many developers.


The interpretation also dramatically threatens an important right built into many open source licenses, the right to fork the code. In the past, anyone could take a project protected by the Gnu Public License and start adding their own enhancements. Many projects have forked over time when developers have disagreements over the best path.


The trouble is that the new team creating the fork won't have CLAs governing the old code making it impossible for them to enforce the license. Any forked project won't be able to enforce all of the rights, a crucial issue because the judge is requiring plaintiffs to be able to control the copyright completely before suing.


The matter also threatens some CLAs that transfered an exclusive reproduction right to any project. Some CLAs don't transfer much more than the right to sue, something the court said couldn't be transfered. If projects don't renegotiate these agreements with all contributors, they'll be unable to enforce their license.


While all of these limitations can be overcome with more legal paperwork, they still threaten the more casual open source projects. Teams will need buildmasters, coders, architects and lawyers if they want to create anything lasting. Unfortunately, the strength of open source licenses are directly related to the strength of copyright."

Here, the rights in the copyrighted Work retained by Stephens Media deprive Righthaven of everything except the right to pursue alleged infringers, a right that is still subject to Stephens Media’s oversight. Accordingly, Righthaven does not possess an exclusive right in the Work and therefore does not have standing to bring a suit for infringement.

1. The Purpose and Character of the Use: Here, the judge finds the fact that Hoehn was using the article in order to create a discussion, and was doing so in a way entirely differently than the rightsholder, to lean towards a ruling of fair use:

   It is undisputed that Hoehn did not and could not profit from posting the Work. Under Sony, noncommercial/nonprofit use is presumptively fair. Additionally, this factor focuses on the purpose or character of the new work. Here, Hoehn posted the Work as part of an online discussion. Hoehn avers he posted the Work to foster discussion in a specific interactive website forum regarding the recent budget shortfalls facing state governments. This purpose is consistent with comment, for which 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides fair use protection. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Hoehn’s noncommercial use of the Work for comment favors a finding that the use was fair.

   This is a great ruling for people who post works of others for the purpose of discussion.


2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work: This is a surprising, but welcome statement from Judge Pro. He notes that much of the article in question may not actually deserve any real copyright protection at all, as it just provides factual data, and such is not intended to be protected by copyright law.

   The Work is an editorial originally published in the LVRJ. The Work is a combination of an informational piece with some creative elements. Roughly eight of the nineteen paragraphs of the Work provide purely factual data, about five are purely creative opinions of the author, and the rest are a mix of factual and creative elements. While the Work does have some creative or editorial elements, these elements are not enough to consider the Work a purely “creative work” in the realm of fictional stories, song lyrics, or Barbie dolls. Accordingly, the Work is not within “the core of intended copyright protection.”

   This part of the ruling could certainly be useful in future cases, in noting that just because someone writes an article or creates some form of content, it shouldn't automatically get copyright on the entirety of the work, if not all of it reaches the level of creative input necessary to qualify for copyright. This is a point that is often lost in discussions of copyright.


3. The Amount Used: This is the big question. This is why many people, falsely, assume that any time "all" of a work is being used, it cannot be fair use. However, as we've pointed out time and time again, that's simply not true, and this case reinforces that point. Here, Judge Pro notes that there's no dispute that all of the work was being used, but points out that this is just one factor in the four factor test, and that "wholesale copying does not preclude a finding of fair use." If the other sections weigh heavily towards fair use, that'll outweigh this point -- which is what happened in this case.


4. The Effect Upon the Potential Market for the Work: In the end, for all the discussions of the four factors, it's this factor that quite frequently is the make-or-break factor in determining fair use, which intuitively makes sense. If the use hurts a market, people are generally wary of saying it's fair. If it doesn't hurt the market, it's much easier to claim it's fair. In this case, the court notes that there's no real impact on the market:

   It is undisputed that Hoehn’s use of the Work is noncommercial. Challenges to noncommercial use require a showing that the particular use is harmful or negatively impacts the potential market for the copyrighted work. Id. Righthaven has not presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that Hoehn’s use is harmful. Rather, Righthaven contends that because Hoehn replicated the entirety of the Work “[s]uch circumstances warrant the conclusion that [Hoehn’s] infringement has likely caused a substantial impairment on the potential market for the Work and that [Hoehn’s] infringing copy of the Work fulfilled the demand for the original.” (Resp. (Doc. #13) at 12-13.) Additionally, Righthaven argues that the market for the Work was impacted negatively because potential readers are able to read the Work on the Website and would have no reason to view the Work at its original source of publication. However, Righthaven has not presented any evidence of harm or negative impact from Hoehn’s use of the Work on the Website between November 29, 2010 and January 6, 2011. Merely arguing that because Hoehn replicated the entirety of the Work the market for the Work was diminished is not sufficient to show harm. Therefore, Righthaven has not presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that the fourth factor favors a finding of fair use.

   I have to admit that I think this section could be much stronger against Righthaven, and am a bit disappointed that the judge didn't take the next step. It's important to note that this factor is supposed to be about the impact on the market for the copyright holder, and if we assume (as the court is doing in this case) that Righthaven is, in fact, the copyright holder, the argument on this factor looks even worse for Righthaven. That's because, based on Righthaven's situation and the limited rights it has, the only "market" it has control over is the market to sue. That's it's sole source of revenue for what bits of this copyright it might own (but probably doesn't). So, if we look at that, we see no impact whatsoever, because it's not as if the guy here (Hoehn) is going to compete with Righthaven in suing over the work.

“As of today, there should be no question whether Righthaven has standing,” Gibson said.

Gibson noted that rights holders have three years to file a lawsuit from the time the infringement occurs — meaning the bloggers who settled might be sued again if their settlements or lawsuits are vacated.

“The statute of limitations,” he said, “is three years for copyright infringement.”

While many plaintiffs in data breach cases (unsuccessfully) allege harm suffered based on an increased risk of identity theft as well as inconvenience and out-of-pocket expenses associated with credit monitoring, Plaintiff employed a unique argument. As the court described, “Plaintiff generally alleges that defendant’s customers, including plaintiff, ‘pay’ for the products and services they ‘buy’ from defendant by providing their PII [personally identifiable information], and that the PII constitutes valuable property that is exchanged not only for defendant’s products and services, but also in exchange for defendant’s promise to employ commercially reasonable methods to safeguard the PII that is exchanged. As a result, defendant’s role in allegedly contributing to the breach of plaintiff’s PII caused plaintiff to lose the ‘value’ of their PII, in the form of their breached personal data.”

According to the court, the alleged was enough for purposes of standing. “On balance, the court declines to hold at this juncture that, as a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to allege an injury in fact sufficient to support Article III standing . . . [T]he court finds plaintiff’s allegations of harm sufficient at this stage to allege a generalized injury in fact.”