We're obviously thrilled that after 18 months it looks like we will get the domain names back. I think this is a sign that you can stand up for what's right in copyright law and win.

“Cracking down on piracy of copyrighted works – including popular apps – is a top priority of the Criminal Division,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Software apps have become an increasingly essential part of our nation’s economy and creative culture, and the Criminal Division is committed to working with our law enforcement partners to protect the creators of these apps and other forms of intellectual property from those who seek to steal it.”

“Criminal copyright laws apply to apps for cell phones and tablets, just as they do to other software, music and writings. These laws protect and encourage the hard work and ingenuity of software developers entering this growing and important part of our economy. We will continue to seize and shut down websites that market pirated apps, and to pursue those responsible for criminal charges if appropriate,” said U.S. Attorney Yates.

“The theft of intellectual property, particularly within the cyber arena, is a growing problem and one that cannot be ignored by the U.S government’s law enforcement community. These thefts cost companies millions of dollars and can even inhibit the development and implementation of new ideas and applications. The FBI, in working with its various corporate and government partners, is not only committed to combating such thefts but is well poised to coordinate with the many jurisdictions that are impacted by such activities,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Lamkin.

For the feds, it’s not enough to simply seize domain names without warning or due process—they want to make sure everyone knows the website operators were breaking the law, even if that has yet to be proven in court. That’s why every domain that gets seized ends up redirecting to one of these dramatic warning pages, replete with the eagle-emblazoned badges of the federal agencies involved. You know the one I mean:

I thought eagles were solitary birds—but apparently they'll flock anywhere the RIAA points. At least that seemed to be the case with the hip-hop blog Dajaz1, which was treated to a year of Promethean pecking while the court waited patiently for the RIAA to fail to produce any evidence.

And that's just one of over 700 websites seized without due process. The first round of seizures, commencing the so-called Operation In Our Sites (which I suggest renaming to Operation Motherfucking Eagles), was announced from Disney headquarters, possibly by a tyrannical Mickey Mouse, but more likely by ICE Director John Morton sporting a dumb grin over the presence of whatever movie stars Disney managed to rustle up for the event. It's Chinatown Hollywood. The only place where eagles and mice get along.

To commemorate the fruits of this alliance, I created the Seized Tee for Techdirt's new Insider Shop. Government regulations prevent us from directly replicating agency badges, but that proved to be a plus, since I think I have drastically improved them in terms of both clarity of purpose and, more importantly, overall eagle-ness, which was clearly a prominent factor in their original design:

Buying the Seized Tee also gets you access to the Techdirt Crystal Ball for one year, two First Word/Last Word credits, and an Insider Badge on your profile and comments. Wear it with pride, and when people ask you about it, be sure to tell them that this kind of government censorship is a real thing that is happening as we speak, and it's a problem that's only going to get worse if it goes unchecked. Eagles do not beget doves.

The reason we are fighting the good fight is to stop people from doing bad things and hold them accountable for their actions. Whether you are enforcing trademark rights or car thefts, this has to be done one person at a time. In 2010 a client asked me what we could take away from the offenders to make them stop. My simple answer was “Their freedom.” Entrepreneurs will always find a way to do business. Bad guys need to be put away to reflect on their actions. Nothing else will stop them. When you take away only the tool, you are training the criminal to improve. I am not in the business of training crooks. Are you?

I see this as abuse of the US criminal justice system for the commercial gain of large US corporations. It is clear that the online gaming industry is legal under international law and in the case of these documents is it also clear that the rule of law was not allowed to slow down a rush to try to win the war of public opinion.

These documents were filed with Forbes magazine before they were filed anywhere else and were drafted with the consumption of the media as a primary objective. We will all look at this and discuss the future with our advisors, but it will not stop my many business interests globally that are unrelated to anything in the US....

Today's sysadmin todo list:

0. Get corporate membership with EFF.

1. Identify all applications with user-generated content.

2. Move all associated domains to a non-US based registrar.

3. Migrate DNS, web serving and other critical services to non-US based servers.

4. Migrate yourself to a non-US controlled country.

I'm sorry for US sites and users. Your government is hell-bent on turning the internet into a read-only device like TV, easily regulated and controlled. The population will be required to sit quietly and keep their eyes glued on the screen so they don't miss the ads, with any infringers deemed terrorists and pedophiles and thus deserving of summary punishment by DHS squads.

Hopefully the internet will route around the damaged segment, and the rest of us can continue to enjoy the amazing interactivity it has brought our society.

Many people on the comments assumed the content was posted by us. This can happen to any site that allows public to post content. SOPA may not have passed, but what happened shows that it is already being practiced. All they have to do is to ask GoDaddy to take a site down. We have 2 millions user generated forms. It is not possible for us to manually review all forms. This can happen to any web site that allows user generated content.

Unfortunately, some groups believe that speech or ideas that they disagree with should be silenced. This could not be more wrong. No matter the point of view, everyone has a right to be heard.

The motion picture and television industry has always been a strong supporter of free speech. We strongly condemn any attempts to silence any groups or individuals.

The Internet is home to creativity, innovation and free speech. We want to keep it that way. Protecting copyrights and protecting free speech go hand in hand."

The government seized and shut down two Internet domain names—the 21st century equivalent of printing presses. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (noting that through use of the Internet, “any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”). Seizure of that sort is a prior restraint on speech. Prior restraints are “‘the most serious and least tolerable infringement’ on our freedoms of speech and press.” United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ). They can be justified only by scrupulous attention to procedure and an extraordinary showing on the merits. Neither is present here.

The government seized and shut down Puerto 80 and its users’ means of communication in an ex parte procedure with no notice to Puerto 80 and no adversary hearing of any kind. It held those domain names for more than six months before any court ever considered whether the seizure violated the First Amendment or caused Puerto 80 substantial hardship such that the domain names should be released pending a determination of the merits of the forfeiture case. To date, no court has reached the merits of the government’s case. When the district court did rule, it dismissed the First Amendment concerns in a paragraph, improperly placing the burden on Puerto 80 to show that it suffered substantial hardship from the government’s prior restraint. And the government did all this without ever having had to prove to any court that Puerto 80 (or anyone else) was guilty of copyright infringement. Indeed, to this day the government takes the position that it will never have to justify its seizure by showing that Puerto 80 violated any law. (MJN, Exhibit D at 1.)

The procedure used by the government flies in the face of First Amendment law. Decades of First Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the government is entitled to seize property used for speech only after notice to the property owner and an adversarial hearing that fully vets the merits of the government’s case and concludes that the defendant acted unlawfully. This seizure was conducted with no notice, no hearing of any kind, and was based only on the government’s assertion that it had probable cause to believe that criminal infringement occurred because some of the content linked to by Puerto 80 may be unauthorized. That procedural failure is itself enough to condemn the government’s action as an unlawful prior restraint. And it is compounded by the government’s substantive failure to show anything more than probable cause to believe that criminal copyright infringement had occurred. The First Amendment requires more than probable cause. It requires a final determination on the merits that Puerto 80’s use of the domain names was unlawful. For both reasons, the government’s prior restraint was unlawful and should be lifted.

The government’s view of its powers under the civil forfeiture law, articulated for the first time in its opposition to Puerto 80’s motion to dismiss, is breathtaking. In the government’s view, it doesn’t need to allege that Puerto 80 violated any law, or even engaged in any civil wrong, in order to seize and shut down its Internet domain name. As long as the government thinks that someone, somewhere in the world, is engaged in copyright infringement, it believes it is entitled to seize any asset that might be connected to that infringement, whether or not the owner engaged in any wrongdoing, and whether or not that asset in fact “facilitated” the commission of any crime. And it further believes it is entitled to seize Internet domain names and shut down protected speech without ever having to prove that the speech was, in fact, unlawful, much less that the owner of the asset was responsible for any crime.

On the government’s view of its powers, it is entitled to seize the Google, Bing, or Yahoo web site, because someone, somewhere, has used those sites’ search engines to find infringing content. It is entitled to seize Verizon’s telephone network for the same reason. It is entitled to seize the power company, since numerous crimes are “facilitated” by the use of electricity. And the only reason the government lost the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), is that it asserted the wrong statute. Had the government simply seized the New York Times’ printing presses, pointing out that they were being used to “facilitate” the disclosure of government secrets, it would have been able to block the disclosure of Daniel Ellsberg’s secrets.

But in attempting to argue its new “facilitation” theory, the government cites to different acts by different actors (Puerto 80, other websites that are streaming content, and unidentified users who follow links to the content) for different elements of the alleged offense. Not only does this approach render the government’s opposition brief incoherent; it does nothing to change the fact that the Complaint fails to plead the elements of criminal copyright infringement by Puerto 80 or any other actor.

Under the government’s newly-raised construction of the statute, the government may use the forfeiture statute to make an end-run around the First Amendment by seizing a lawful channel of communication. Such a seizure prevents lawful speech, and constitutes a prior restraint on that lawful speech. The government’s suggested construction of the forfeiture statute would render it unconstitutional, and should therefore be rejected.....

[....]

If the government’s theory of “facilitation” were adopted, the government would be permitted to shut down a search engine, website, newspaper, and printing press not just prior to a determination of the illegality of the content, but without ever having to show that it was operating unlawfully. It would permit, for instance, the government to shut down an entire printing press and newspaper for running an advertisement that contained allegedly infringing content. Or it would permit the seizure of a search engine because of its indexing allegedly infringing material. Such actions are plainly unconstitutional.

In Fort Wayne, state and local officials (respondents) filed a civil action pursuant to Indiana’s RICO laws, alleging that the defendant bookstores had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by repeatedly violating Indiana’s obscenity laws. 489 U.S. at 50-51. Prior to trial, respondents petitioned for, and the trial court granted, immediate seizure of the bookstores pursuant to a state law that permitted courts to issue seizure orders “upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a violation of [the State’s RICO law] involving the property in question has occurred.” Id. at 51. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the pretrial seizure order was unconstitutional, stating that “mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circulation.” Id. at 66. As in Fort Wayne, the government here has seized an entire business and effectively suppressed all of the expressive content hosted on it, including political discussions, commentary, and criticism by the site’s users— without it being determined whether the seizure was “actually warranted” under the relevant statutes. Id. at 67.

The prior restraint on Puerto 80 users’ and readers’ First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm of the highest order. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Violations of First Amendment rights are commonly considered irreparable injuries for the purposes of a preliminary injunction.”). In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, the Supreme Court stayed the lower court injunction that prohibited CBS from broadcasting video footage documenting unsanitary practices in the meat industry, finding that such prior restraint caused “irreparable harm to the news media that is intolerable under the First Amendment.” 510 U.S. 1315, 1315-16, 1318 (1994) (emphasis added). The deprivation of Constitutional rights is, therefore, ipso facto irreparable injury and subject to expedited review.

In the instant case, the government effectively shut down an entire website, suppressing all of the speech hosted on it, based on an assertion that there was probable cause to believe that some of the material linked to by the website (though not found on the website itself) might be infringing. Puerto 80 was not provided any advance notice, nor was it provided the opportunity to contest the seizure before (or, for that matter, shortly after) the government shut down the site. Nor were the site’s users afforded any notice or opportunity to contest the seizure. That procedural failing itself indicates that the government’s action was an unlawful prior restraint. “[T]he lack of notice or opportunity to be heard normally renders a prior restraint invalid.” United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 312 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968)).

Despite what Puerto 80 appears to believe, the Government has neither charged Puerto 80 with a crime, nor has it filed a civil lawsuit against that company. Instead, and as the Complaint makes absolutely clear, the Government has brought a civil action against certain property an in rem proceeding against two domain names that facilitated the commission of criminal copyright infringement and are thus subject to forfeiture pursuant to Section 2323(a)(I) of Title 18, United States Code.

(1) the existence-of a valid copyright; (2) an act of infringement of that copyright; (3) willfulness on the part of the infringer; and (4) either that (a) the infringement was for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or (b) the infringer reproduced or distributed, during any 180-day period, one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more copyrighted works, with a total retail value of more than $1,000.

With respect to private financial gain, the Complaint makes clear that when an Internet· user selected an individual link to a particular sporting event from the Rojadirecta website and the corresponding stream of the telecast began to run, advertisements that were separate and distinct from any commercials that may have been aired during the stream of the sporting event broadcast were periodically displayed at the bottom of the video during the live stream. (Compl. ~ 14c). On a motion to dismiss, this Court is required to draw all inferences from the allegations of a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Roth, 489 F.3d at 510. It is certainly a permissible inference for this Court to draw that these advertisements generate revenue and result in private financial gain.

Thus, while the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable cause (and even without a warrant in various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment are involved... It is "[t]he risk of prior restraint, which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth Amendment protections accorded searches for and seizure of First Amendment materials" that motivates this rule.

Nor is the Government required to show probable cause for forfeiture. See,~, Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 47. Instead, the complaint simply needs to establish a "reasonable belief' that the government will be able to meet its burden at trial. Id. "In other words, the complaint need not allege facts sufficient to show that specific property is tainted, but facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the government can demonstrate" the ultimate trial burden "for finding the property tainted."

There is no basis for the Court to conclude that searches of laptops or other electronic devices at the border should be subjected to a different standard than that for other closed containers. Nor is there a basis for the Court to conclude that Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violated by the routine search and detention of his devices at the border.

• You mostly store everything on your laptop. So, unlike a suitcase that you're bringing with you, it's the opposite. You might specifically choose what to exclude, but you don't really choose what to include. With a suitcase, you specifically choose what to include.
• The reason you bring the contents on your laptop over the border is because you're bringing your laptop over the border. If you wanted the content of your laptop to go over the border you'd just send it using the internet. There are no "border guards" on the internet itself, so content flows mostly freely across international boundaries. Thus if anyone wants to get certain content into a country via the internet, they're not doing it by entering that country through border control.

Possibly most importantly, though, the FBI is now presumably in possession of a complete copy of the Instapaper database as it stood on Tuesday morning, including the complete list of users and any non-deleted bookmarks. (“Archived” bookmarks are not deleted. “Deleted” bookmarks are hard-deleted out of the database immediately.)

Instapaper stores only salted SHA-1 hashes of passwords, so those are relatively safe. But email addresses are stored in the clear, as is the saved content of each bookmark saved by the bookmarklet.

The server also contained a complete copy of the Instapaper website codebase, but not the codebase of the iOS app.

Linked Facebook, Twitter, or Tumblr accounts only store their respective OAuth keys. Linked Evernote accounts only store the Evernote email-in address. Linked Pinboard accounts, however, store plaintext usernames and encrypted passwords, and the encryption keys are present in the website source code on the server.

So the FBI now has illegal possession of nearly all of Instapaper’s data and a moderate portion of its codebase, and as far as I know, this is completely out of my control.

Contrary to the grounds on which the domain names were seized, the Rojadirecta site is not violating copyright law, let alone criminal copyright law. Rojadirecta explained this to the government when, on February 3, 2011, it sent ICE and the Department of Justice a letter requesting immediate return of the subject domain names pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(f). Following that letter, counsel for Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. (“Puerto 80” or “Petitioner”), the company which owns the sites, repeatedly tried to discuss the seizure with the government, but was unable to engage with the government until it notified the U.S. Attorney’s Office of its intent to seek a temporary restraining order and file a petition for immediate return of the seized domain names. It was not until then that Puerto 80 was able to have a substantive conversation with the appropriate officials. Hoping to avoid burdening the court, Puerto 80 held off filing the instant petition pending the outcome of those negotiations. On May 26, 2011, the government informed counsel for Puerto 80 that the only acceptable “compromise” would entail Puerto 80 prohibiting its users from linking to any U.S. content anywhere on its sites. Because this “solution” would prohibit Puerto 80 from engaging in lawful acts not prohibited by copyright law, Puerto 80 chose instead to challenge the seizure in court.

The seizure imposes another hardship on Puerto 80, in that it constitutes an invalid prior restraint and suppresses its users’ and readers’ protected First Amendment activities. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989) (“[W]hile the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable cause . . . ., it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment are involved.”). See also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985) (“The First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material, and requires that the Fourth Amendment be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’ in such circumstances.”) (internal citation omitted); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326, n.5 (1979) (noting that the First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for, and seizures of, presumptively protected materials). In Fort Wayne, state and local officials (respondents) filed a civil action pursuant to Indiana’s RICO laws, alleging that the defendant bookstores had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by repeatedly violating Indiana’s obscenity laws. 489 U.S. at 50-51. Prior to trial, respondents petitioned for, and the trial court granted, immediate seizure of the bookstores pursuant to a state law that permitted courts to issue seizure orders “upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a violation of [the State’s RICO law] involving the property in question has occurred.” Id. at 51. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the pretrial seizure order was unconstitutional, stating that “mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circulation.” Id. at 66. As in Fort Wayne, the government here has seized an entire business and effectively suppressed all of the expressive content hosted on it, including political discussions, commentary, and criticism by the site’s users—without it being determined whether the seizure was “actually warranted” under the relevant statutes. Id. at 67.

In Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2004), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a Pennsylvania statute that permitted the state’s Attorney General or a district attorney to seek a court order requiring an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to “remove or disable items residing on or accessible through” the ISP’s service upon a showing of probable cause that the item constituted child pornography. The district court found that the statute imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. It concluded that under Fort Wayne Books and Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), a court must “make a final determination that material is child pornography after an adversary hearing before the material is completely removed from circulation.” Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (emphasis added). The court further noted that the state statute “allow[ed] for an unconstitutional prior restraint because it prevents future content from being displayed at a URL based on the fact that the URL contained illegal content in the past.” Id.

In the instant case, the government effectively shut down an entire website, suppressing all of the speech hosted on it, based on an assertion that there was probable cause to believe that some of the material linked to by the website (though not found on the website itself) might be infringing. The site’s owner was not provided any advance notice, nor was he provided the opportunity to contest the seizure before (or, for that matter, shortly after) the government shut down the site. Nor were the site’s users afforded any notice or opportunity to contest the seizure. Because case law is clear that “mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove [protected material] from circulation,” Fort Wayne, 489 U.S. at 66, the seizure of the expressive materials in this case violates the First Amendment. See also Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (finding that a procedure that permits a judge to make an ex parte finding of probable cause that material is child pornography, with no opportunity for the content publisher to receive notice or be heard, violates the First Amendment). This First Amendment deprivation extends not just to registered users of Rojadirecta, but also to anyone wishing to visit the website. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“[T]he protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . . That right may not constitutionally be abridged . . . .”).

Indeed, several courts have held that the act of indexing and linking to copyrighted material— which was the government’s basis for seizing the domain names—is not direct or indirect copyright infringement. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, at *2 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (finding that hyperlinking to other sites does not constitute direct infringement); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660, (SHS) 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (unreported) (linking to content does not implicate distribution right and thus, does not give rise to liability for direct copyright infringement); Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1202 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Hyperlinking per se does not constitute direct copyright infringement because there is no copying.”).

Puerto 80 does not host any infringing material on the websites which operate under the subject domain names... In the same way a search engine or other site which aggregates links to existing material on the Internet, Rojadirecta provides an index of links to streams of sporting events that can already be found on the Internet through a search for those sites or simply by typing the URL for the site directly. Id. Such activity does not constitute direct copyright infringement, much less criminal infringement. See supra, at note 8. Indeed, United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Or) made this point in a letter he wrote to ICE Director John Morton and Attorney General Holder expressing concern over the government’s seizure of the subject domain names....

Puerto 80’s operation of the Rojadirecta site does not constitute contributory infringement because the subject domain names are capable of—and are, in fact, used for— substantial non-infringing uses. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, reh’g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (summary judgment inappropriate where material fact existed as to whether file-sharing program, which was “used overwhelmingly for infringement,” is “capable of substantial non-infringing uses.”).

Nor is Rojadirecta a site devoted simply to linking to such streams. In addition to providing a forum for discussion on sports, politics, and a variety of other topics, the Rojadirecta site enables users to post links to authorized sports broadcasts. For example, on Saturday, February 12, 2011, the Rojadirecta site (hosted on the rojadirecta.es domain name) provided a link to “9:30am Hockey (NHL): Los Angeles – Washington.”... Clicking on this link opened a new window for the Yahoo! sports website for the National Hockey League, and provided a live stream of the match between the Los Angeles Kings and Washington Capitals. Id.

Nor does Puerto 80’s operation of the Rojadirecta site constitute vicarious liability because it does not have “a right and ability to supervise that coalesce[s] with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.” Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’ns Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 971 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (emphasis added)). Puerto 80 does not receive any revenue that is derived from specific content hosted on, or streamed by, the sites to which it links.... In other words, Puerto 80 does not receive any revenue from any site to which a user can link from the subject domain names based upon the content of that site. Id. To the extent there is any site to which Rojadirecta links that contains infringing material, Puerto 80 receives no specific financial benefit from a user clicking through to that site and viewing such content.... Because Puerto 80’s revenues are not tied to whether or not infringing material is linked to or accessed, the government cannot show that Puerto 80 has a “direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials” which “coalesce[s] with” any right or ability to supervise what is linked to on the site. See Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ’g (USA), Inc., Nos. 93 civ. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994) (direct financial benefit not established where defendant leased space at a trade show for a fixed fee to exhibitors who played infringing music, but defendant’s revenues were not dependant on whether exhibitors actually played music or what they played); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (in DMCA safe-harbor context, “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” not established “where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service”) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the House Committee on Commerce Report, H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998)).