"MegaUpload was served with a criminal search warrant for alleged third-party user conduct and was advised not to interfere with that criminal investigation or with the files -- as such disclosure, would jeopardize the ongoing investigation. To ask MegaUpload to cooperate and then use that cooperation against them, to us seems to be both unfair and misleading."

Using an undercover computer, [redacted] observed how a visitor may view content hosted on Megaupload.com. For example, on November 20, 2011, [redacted] observed the copyrighted picture "Zack and Miri Make a Porno," which was released in 2008 by The Weinstein Company, on the website Megavideo.com.

Neither a restraining order nor an injunction is sufficient to guarantee the availability of the Subject Domain Names for forfeiture. By seizing the Subject Domain Names and redirecting them to another website, the United States will prevent supporters of the Mega Conspiracy or third parties from redirecting the Subject Domain Names to servers elsewhere in the world, and thus using them to commit additional crimes. Furthermore, seizure of the Subject Domain Names will prevent visitors from continuing to access the websites located at the Subject Domain Names.

.... these materials will certainly assist him to learn what steps, if any, the government took to inform the court of the scope of its planned seizure and related execution of search warrants. They would also show any plan provided by the government or the court in the warrant materials for minimization to protect innocent users before the seizure or to segregate the data after seizure. Federal judges increasingly impose detailed conditions prior to execution of computer searches.... For example, Judge Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit has observed that if the government refuses to forswear the ability to retain or use data that should have been segregated initially, the judge “should order that the seizable and non-seizable data be separated by an independent third party under the supervision of the court, or deny the warrant altogether.” .... Unsealing will allow Mr. Goodwin, as well as the general public, to learn which, if any, such conditions were undertaken in this case.

Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment people have a right to be secure in their “papers” and “effects” against unreasonable searches and seizures. A person's “effects” may be the subject of Fourth Amendment protection even where there is no particular privacy or liberty interest.... A property seizure occurs when a governmental intrusion meaningfully interferes with an individual's possessory interest.... The Fourth Amendment analysis, in turn, requires the Court to determine whether the seizure was “reasonable.” Gaining access to the materials that served as a basis for the government’s seizure of his property can assist Mr. Goodwin and other innocent Megaupload users in determining whether the seizure was unreasonable.

The public also has a strong interest in understanding the government process in executing search warrants on cloud computing servers that contain innocent third-party property. Seizures of domain names, and resulting searches of related servers, are tools the government is using with increasing frequency in criminal copyright enforcement actions. For example, the federal government has reportedly seized more than 800 websites so far under its Operation in our Sites campaign. The government has issued press releases and otherwise sought to publicize its efforts, obviously giving its own perspective on its actions. Legislators, the media, and the public are vigorously debating the very issue of these domain name seizures and related searches, even as a large percentage of Americans continue to use cloud computing services. Access to judicial records would ensure a more accurate and informed public debate, rather than one informed merely by the government’s press releases

The fingerboards of our guitars are made with wood that is imported from India. The wood seized during the Aug. 24 raid, however, was from a Forest Stewardship Council-certified supplier, meaning the wood complies with FSC's rules requiring that it be harvested legally and in compliance with traditional and civil rights, among other protections. Indian authorities have provided sworn statements approving the shipment, and U.S. Custom allowed the shipment to pass through America's border and to our factories.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decided to enforce its own interpretation of Indian law, arguing that because the fingerboards weren't finished in India, they were illegal exports. In effect, the agency is arguing that to be in compliance with the law, Gibson must outsource the jobs of finishing craftsmen in Tennessee.

This is an overreach of government authority and indicative of the kinds of burdens the federal government routinely imposes on growing businesses. It also highlights a dangerous trend: an attempt to punish even paperwork errors with criminal charges and to regulate business activities through criminal law. Policy wonks call this “overcriminalization.” I call it a job killer.

Many business owners have inadvertently broken obscure and highly technical foreign laws, landing them in prison for things like importing lobster tails in plastic rather than cardboard packaging (the violation of that Honduran law earned one man an eight-year prison sentence). Cases like this make it clear that the justice system has strayed from its constitutional purpose like stopping the real bad guys from bringing harm.

The sheer volume of modern law makes it impossible for an ordinary American household to stay informed. And yet, prosecutors vigorously defend the old legal maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." That maxim may have been appropriate for a society that simply criminalized inherently evil conduct, such as murder, rape, and theft, but it is wholly inappropriate in a labyrinthine regulatory regime that criminalizes activities that are morally neutral. As Professor Henry M. Hart opined, "In no respect is contemporary law subject to greater reproach than for its obtuseness to this fact."

It is absurd and unjust for the government to impose a legal duty on every citizen to "know" all of the mind-boggling rules and regulations that have been promulgated over the years. Policymakers can and should discard the "ignorance-is-no-excuse" maxim by enacting a law that would require prosecutors to prove that regulatory violations are "willful" or, in the alternative, that would permit a good-faith belief in the legality of one's conduct to be pleaded and proved as a defense. The former rule is already in place for our complicated tax laws — but it should also shield unwary Americans from all of the laws and regulations as well.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe specific requirements for serving a summons on a corporate defendant in a criminal case. These requirements are neither vague nor optional – they quite explicitly require both service upon an agent of the corporation and a mailing to the corporation’s last known address within the United States. The Federal Rules do not contemplate service of a criminal summons on a wholly foreign corporation without an agent or offices in the United States. Wholly foreign corporations, therefore, may not be prosecuted for alleged violations of federal criminal law unless they waive service. In short, a corporation such as Megaupload cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of this Court for criminal proceedings absent its consent.

Federal crimes are delimited by statute. It is for Congress, not for the courts, to say (and to warn) what constitutes a crime. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 213-14 (quoting United States v. Wilberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820) (“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment”)). Courts interpreting penal statutes will exercise restraint and adopt a narrow statutory interpretation unless Congress has definitely indicated that it intended a harsher reading. Id. Because “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984), reh’g denied, 456 U.S. 1112 (1984), the Act cannot be read to make secondary infringement a crime.

These omissions are not small, they are not subtle, they are not few, and they are not inconsequential. The Government has attempted to make out an all-encompassing case of an alleged criminal copyright conspiracy without bothering to allege concrete specifics of the actual infringement allegedly committed. It has attempted to build one of “the largest criminal copyright cases ever brought by the United States” out of conclusory ipse dixit, reciting statutory verbiage and nothing more. Certainly Counts Four through Eight do not reflect facts supplying requisite probable cause.

The Government seeks forfeiture of all of Defendants’ revenue because it has assumed all of the revenue is tainted by crime. But there is no probable cause to support that assumption, which by no means follows from—and is, indeed, at odds with—acknowledged aspects of Megaupload’s business that stand well removed from the alleged infringement. To put matters in perspective, consider the maximum statutory fine that might be imposed upon Megaupload and the individual Defendants were they convicted on all five criminal counts, Counts Four through Eight, concerning the alleged copyright infringement: The maximum fine per count for a first offense of criminal copyright infringement under 21 U.S.C. § 506(a) would be $250,000 for the individual and $500,000 for the corporation, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319(b), 3571(b)(3), 3571(c)(3), such that imposing the fine upon these Defendants consecutively across all five counts would result in a combined fine of $7,500,000.00. Yet tens of millions of dollars, more than ten times the amount of that maximum fine, have been seized from these Defendants as derived from the business. The math does not compute.

The Government’s shuttering of Megaupload, purely on its own ipse dixit, is a modernday throwback to the unconstitutional prior restraints on speech that are a notorious enemy of the First Amendment. In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989), for instance, the State of Indiana filed a civil action against several owners of adult bookstores alleging RICO violations and, based on an ex parte showing of probable cause, seized “the real estate, publications, and other personal property comprising each of the three bookstores operated by the corporate defendants.” Id. at 51. Even assuming that the seized materials were obscene, and thus unprotected, the Court held that “our cases firmly hold that mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circulation.” Id. at 66; see United States v. Jenkins, 974 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It is, of course, well-settled that the government may not seize presumptively protected expressive materials without a prior judicial determination of obscenity”). The bottom line is that the Government cannot order seizure of “literally thousands of books and films [to be] carried away and taken out of circulation by [a] pretrial order” until “the claimed justification for seizing books or other publications is properly established in an adversary proceeding.” Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 67; see, e.g., Multi-Media Distributing Co., Inc. v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 606, 614 (N.D. Ind. 1993)...

Here, the Government has effectively accomplished what Fort Wayne Books foreclosed. It has shuttered Megaupload, and, with it, a treasure trove of books, films, videos, photos, digital expression of every stripe, without any adversarial proceeding at all. What is more, if the Government had its way, 1,100-servers worth of that collection would have been wiped, with members of the public (including rightful owners of that material) left the poorer for it. In this sense, what the Government has done in this case raises further alarms, for it has seized not only allegedly infringing copies, but effectively taken down everything that was on Megaupload.com, taking works out of circulation entirely. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973) (explaining that “a single copy of a book or film may be seized and retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause” but it is when a book or film is “taken out of circulation completely” that the seizure rises to the level of a prior restraint). The parallels between this case and cases in which prior restraints have been denounced as unconstitutional are unsettling and, if nothing else, warrant heightened judicial skepticism and scrutiny

• Our original post referred to Vazquez as a "drug smuggler." This was based on the San Antonio Express-News report that refers to him as a "drug trafficker." Perhaps there is a difference between one and the other, but it does not seem to be one of significance. Either way, the threat email was quite upset that we did not specify that he was merely "acting as a money launderer for a Mexican drug cartel." I will admit that I do not see how this makes a major difference one way or another, but in the interest of accuracy in reporting, we have changed our original reference from "Mexican drug smuggler" to now say "money launderer for a Mexican drug cartel" -- which is how both the federal prosecutors and the lawyer sending the email appear to describe him. Considering that the lawyer claims to represent the production company, however, I still am at a loss as to how this matters. I do not believe our original statement in any way defamed the production company. It was a mere use of a synonym for the original report. But that should only concern Vazquez. It makes no mention of Aloe Entertainment nor any statement about that company.


• The threat email says that the headline of our post "implies that the film has drug money in it" and suggests that "the film or its production has drug ties." Except we never said that. We did not state it. We did not imply it. We said nothing of the sort. We explained the same chain of events that we explained above, which noted that the production house bought the screenplay from Vazquez. Nowhere did we suggest that drug money went the other way. So, we were left somewhat baffled by the threat.

Additionally, there can be no serious argument that the Government has alleged that the Rojadirecta Domain Names' facilitation of the underlying copyright offense was anything but substantial. See Amended Complaint... ("At all relevant times, the links displayed on the main homepage of the Rojadirecta Website were purposefully aggregated and organized by the owner(s) and/or operator(s) of the Rojadirecta Website. Moreover, more than half of the material available on the Rojadirecta Website at any given time during law enforcement's investigation appeared to be dedicated to making infringing content available to users of the Rojadirecta Website.")....

Puerto 80's arguments about its own conduct are irrelevant and misapprehend the nature of the inquiry

Indeed, the Rojadirecta Domain Names were repeatedly noticed that they were linking to copyright infringing content.

Under the government’s construction of [the law], every domain name that pointed to a website containing links to infringing copies would “facilitate” and have a “substantial connection” to the offense of criminal copyright infringement, and would therefore be subject to forfeiture. The broad construction of the term “facilitation” the government seeks would give it the power to shut down google.com, yahoo.com, bing.com, or any of an array of other channels of communication that—like every site on the Internet—link to content provided by third parties that might or might not be infringing. The property in question is two domain names, which (in the government’s words) are merely “labels” that “resolve” to websites, and are distinct from the servers that host the website or any content of it....

The government’s theory would have allowed it to seize the New York Times issue that published the Pentagon Papers and destroy it, on the theory that the New York Times was facilitating Daniel Ellsberg’s violation of national security laws. And the Times would have had no opportunity to show that its speech was lawful. There is no reason to think Congress intended the forfeiture statute to extend so broadly. And even if it had, Congress lacks the power to confer such plenary control over speech on government agents acting without judicial sanction.

The government argues that the links on the Rojadirecta website are not protected speech because they constitute copyright infringement. But that argument exactly misses the point of the prior restraint doctrine. Unless and until there has been a final determination on the merits after an adversary hearing, there is no basis to find that criminal copyright infringement occurred on the third party sites to which the Rojadirecta website linked.

Ross Feinstein, a spokesman for Immigration and Customs Enforcement said Sunday that government officials had followed all proper procedures in the case of Dajaz1, which was one of more than 760 sites seized.

"The domain name seizures show that some agencies in the Obama administration care more about the interests of Hollywood studios and the big record labels than due process, transparency, and accountability. It is hard to believe that ICE and DOJ had Dajaz1's Fifth amendment rights in mind when they seized their property and held it for more than a year without ever being able to build a case."

"A blog has the same protections as a newspaper or magazine, and yet ICE saw fit to seize this site for over a year for dubious reasons," Lofgren told MT. "It's an outrageous abuse of First Amendment and due process rights, raising serious questions about why the Department of Justice allowed this seizure to continue when the government clearly did not have probable cause."

May First/People Link has removed the server from the facility and is in the process of analyzing it. The server will not be put back into production.

On Wednesday, April 18, at approximately 16:00 Eastern Time, U.S. Federal authorities removed a server from a colocation facility shared by Riseup Networks and May First/People Link in New York City. The seized server was operated by the European Counter Network (“ECN”), the oldest independent internet service provider in Europe, who, among many other things, provided an anonymous remailer service, Mixmaster, that was the target of an FBI investigation into the bomb threats against the University of Pittsburgh.

“The company running the facility has confirmed that the server was removed in conjunction with a search warrant issued at the request of the FBI,” said May First/People Link director Jamie McClelland. “The server seizure is not only an attack against us, but an attack against all users of the Internet who depend on anonymous communication.”

Disrupted in this seizure were academics, artists, historians, feminist groups, gay rights groups, community centers, documentation and software archives and free speech groups. The server included the mailing list “cyber rights” (the oldest discussion list in Italy to discuss this topic), a Mexican migrant solidarity group, and other groups working to support indigenous groups and workers in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. In total, over 300 email accounts, between 50-80 email lists, and several other websites have been taken off the Internet by this action. None are alleged to be involved in the anonymous bomb threats. The seized machine did not contain any riseup email accounts, lists, or user data. Rather, the data belonged to ECN.

“We sympathize with the University of Pittsburgh community who have had to deal with this frightening disruption for weeks. We oppose such threatening actions. However, taking this server won’t stop these bomb threats. The only effect it has is to also disrupt e-mail and websites for thousands of unrelated people,” continues Mr. Theriot-Orr. “Furthermore, the network of anonymous remailers that exists is not harmed by taking this machine. So we cannot help but wonder why such drastic action was taken when authorities knew that the server contained no useful information that would help in their investigation.”

• Defendants are enjoined from using any Philip Morris marks, in websites, domain name extensions, links to other websites, search engine databases.
• The domain name registrars are directed to transfer the domain name certificates to plaintiff (for deposit with the court).
• The registrars are directed to transfer the domain names to GoDaddy, who will "hold the registrations for the . . . domain names in trust . . . during the pendency of [the] action."
• GoDaddy shall also update the DNS data so it points to a copy of the complaint, summons, and court documents.
• Finally, Western Union is directed to "divert" transfers made by US consumers to three named individuals

From my perspective, the three cases demonstrate the problems with ex parte judicial oversight. Only hearing one side of the story isn't enough to trigger the kind of draconian remedies the courts are granting. In particular, in this case, interdicting money being sent via Western Union is quite troubling. Basically, the court says that money being sent by customers who may have done nothing wrong goes into a holding tank--the customers don't get their money back now (and maybe never?) even if the transaction didn't consummate. It seems like rejecting the money transfers, rather than interdicting the money, would have a lot fairer to the buyers caught in the middle. But they aren't in court to defend their interests, and no one else is speaking up on their behalf, so the rightsowner can make a pure cash grab from potentially innocent buyers. That kind of result wouldn't happen with real due process.

True Religion, a company which manufactures jeans, brought a similar enforcement action against foreign "rogue" websites in the Southern District of New York. It first obtained a temporary restraining order, which the court converted into a preliminary injunction. The relief obtained by True Religion is similarly broad as, and presents the same due process concerns raised by, the Chanel case.

True Religion filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. As in the Chanel case, it went after numerous domain names in a single lawsuit, and it presented declarations from its investigators that they bought counterfeit goods from those domain names. True Religion also presented evidence that defendants undertook efforts to conceal their true identities (primarily by supplying 'purposely-deceptive contact information' to registrars), and that if defendants were provided notice, they would "likely destroy, move, hide or otherwise make [the domain names, products in question, accounts, and records] inaccessible to the Court." True Religion filed its lawsuit on November 15, and the court issued an ex parte TRO three days later. The TRO broadly enjoined the conducts of defendants and third parties, authorized service via email, and set a hearing for November 30, 2011. Defendants were required to show cause on or before the hearing date as to why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction. True Religion filed two sealed declarations and an unsealed declaration. No defendant appeared or filed any pleadings. On December 2, 2011, the court issued the preliminary injunction.

The TRO:

The TRO finds that True Religion established a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claims that defendants sold products which infringed on True Religion's trademarks and copyrights and that defendants' conduct will cause irreparable injury to True Religion. The TRO also finds that defendants undertook efforts to conceal their identity and that if "True Religion were to proceed on notice to defendants," defendants would shift their operations. Pending the court's ruling on True Religion's request for an injunction, the court issues the TRO, which contains the following provisions:

- defendants and any third parties acting in concert with them, including ISPs, registrars or third party selling platforms are restrained from selling allegedly infringing items;
- True Religion is entitled to broad financial discovery and discovery from various service providers (MasterCard, Visa, PayPal, back-end service providers, web designers, third-party selling platforms, registrars, registries, ad-word providers, etc.);
- third party payment processors and financial institutions are ordered to freeze any of defendants' funds;
- domain name registries (VeriSign, Neustar, Public Interest Registry) and registrars are orderd to "temporarily disable" the domain names referenced in the TRO, "through a registry hold or otherwise";
- third party service providers are ordered to cease providing service to defendants.

The Preliminary Injunction:

The order largely tracks the TRO, but adds a approximately 24 new domain names. As with the TRO, the preliminary injunction broadly enjoins defendants from exploiting True Religion's copyrights and trademarks. In addition, it contains the following provisions:

- third party service providers who are provided notice are enjoined from providing services to defendants in conjunction with any of the acts which defendants are enjoined from doing;
- a broad asset freeze, directed at banks, payment processors, PayPal and other payment services providers;
- continuing right to conduct discovery for True Religion;
- domain name registries and registrars are directed to continue disabling and lock the domain names, including the new domain names;
- third party service providers, including ISPs, back-end service providers, affiliate program providers, web designers, sponsored search engine or ad-word providers are ordered to "disable service" to the defendant websites; and
- an authorization to serve process via "registered electronic mail" pursuant to rule 4.

__

This is a slightly different flavor from the Chanel orders, but it raises similar due process concerns. The initial order (the TRO) is issued on an ex parte basis without notice, and it contains extraordinary relief -- it's essentially a kill switch for the websites in question. There are a variety of reasons why this has the potential to run roughshod over the rights of defendants or third parties; among other things, there could be some mistake as to the underlying domain name or website. There's no assurance that the site as a whole (as opposed to one or two products) is infringing. Also, after bona fide adversarial proceedings, True Religion's copyrights or trademarks may not turn out to be as enforceable as they seem at first blush. But on the strength of True Religion's unchallenged assertions, the court orders various third parties, including registrars, registries, payment processors, ad-word providers and others, to cut off the defendants. (The court did require True Religion to post a bond of $10,000--a laughably nominal amount.)

Regardless of whether the court has the authority to issue an injunction binding third parties who are not before the court, and who may not even be subject to the court's jurisdiction, many service providers will just follow the court order anyway. They may have no interest in expending resources to fight for a third party's due process rights. Indeed, in its declaration filed after the TRO was issued, True Religion indicated that the registries (VeriSign, Affilias, Public Interest Registry, Nominet UK) disabled many of the domain names in question upon receiving notice of the court order. PayPal also froze the funds in 84 different PayPal accounts.

It's unclear how much business defendants conducted in the United States. If their business activities in the US were nominal, this looks like an extraterritorial enforcement by a US rightsowner in a US court. It's tough to tell, given that the process hasn't been adversarial or even designed to facilitate bona fide participation by the defendants.

I know there are some tweaks in pending SOPA/PIPA legislation that surely would be even more helpful to plaintiffs, but courts today seem willing to grant broad remedies to rightsholders without any legislative change at all. It seems that today, rightsowners are able to go to court and, quickly and at low cost, take down domain names and get an order directing third parties, including service providers, ad networks, and payment processors, not to provide services to various websites. That's a pretty good deal if you are a rightsholder. They may even prefer that to the ITC proceedings proposed in OPEN.

_______

Additional comments from Eric Goldman

This case raises so many unanswered questions for me:

1) Just how many rightsowner vs foreign rogue website lawsuits are already in the court system? Are the Chanel and True Religion cases unique, or are dozens or hundreds of similar cases percolating through the system?

2) Did so much of this case really need to be done under the cloak of secrecy, and even if the answer is yes, why is so much of the case history still sealed?

3) Just how far can rightsowners go in suing dozens or hundreds of unrelated defendants in a single lawsuit? We've seen some pushback against copyright trolls. Are trademark owners similarly overreaching?

4) Just how far can rightsowners go in forcing third party service providers, like domain name registrars, ad networks, payment service providers and others, to honor rulings where the service providers aren't litigants? We dealt with this issue a bit in the 47 USC 230 context in the Blockowicz case. In that case, the Seventh Circuit set some important limits on the reach of Rule 65. Without an adversarial process, were the Chanel and True Religion courts perhaps a little lax in their reading of Rule 65?

5) If rightsowners can already get in court so much of the remedies that SOPA would provide, then why are they pushing so hard for SOPA?

6) Then again, if rightsowners can already get SOPA-like remedies in court, why are we fighting so hard against SOPA? This reminds me a little of the public outcry against UCITA a decade ago--much of the angst was about the parts where UCITA merely restated then-current contract law. Similarly, perhaps SOPA is more of a mirror on present reality than a bona fide change in the law. At minimum, it suggests SOPA may be distracting us from other real problems. If we object to the remedies in SOPA, not only do we need to kill SOPA, but we need to proactively seek new statutes that prevent the outcomes Chanel and True Religion are getting in court.

I plan to continue my personal efforts against SOPA, but it's clear that killing SOPA isn't enough to end the fight. Perhaps OPEN would help by giving rightsowners an easier path to attacking illegitimate foreign websites and thereby alleviate the pressure that rightsowners are putting on doctrines not specifically designed to deal with that problem. That would be a good reason to support OPEN, but it's now 100% clear to me that OPEN also needs more immunities, safe harbors and other limitations on rightsowner powers. If rightsowners get a shiny new enforcement toy via OPEN, they should have to give up some of their overreaching elsewhere.

• an injunction against the defendants prohibiting them from using any Chanel marks or selling any Chanel products;
• an injunction against the top-level domain name registry, directing it to change the registrar of record for the domain names to GoDaddy (!);
• an injunction telling GoDaddy to change the DNS data for the domain names so the domain names resolve to a site where a copy of the case documents are hosted (servingnotice.com/sdv/index.html);
• authorization for Chanel to enter the domain names into "Google's Webmaster Tools" and cancel any redirection of the domain names;

First, I did not get a clear sense that this is an enforcement action against a single defendant. If there's no credible allegation of a conspiracy or an arrangement between whomever is behind these domain names, it strikes me as problematic for Chanel to file a placeholder lawsuit and then add or remove defendants at its convenience.

Second, it was not entirely clear why the lawsuit was in Nevada. The domain names are not registered to a registrar that is based in Nevada, and there's no clear basis for in rem jurisdiction. It's possible that plaintiff picked this jurisdiction as a matter of convenience, but there's no apparent relationship between the alleged counterfeiting activities and the State of Nevada.

Then there's the matter that some of the court's relief is directed at a variety of entities that are not parties to the dispute (including the registrars, the registry, Facebook, Twitter, Google, etc.). I'm not sure how this court can direct a registry to change a domain name's registrar of record or Google to de-list a site, but the court does so anyway. This is probably the most problematic aspect of the court's orders. [Interesting that GoDaddy was chosen as the registrar that the domain names would be transferred to.]

Finally, there's no clear basis to authorize a transfer of a defendant's property pending resolution of a lawsuit to the plaintiff. (See Bosh v. Zavala.) I don't see this as particularly problematic in this case because Chanel is not looking to liquidate the domain names, but it certainly raises due process red flags, given that this is all done with minimal (or no) notice to defendants.

Missing from the ruling is any discussion of the Internet's global nature; the judge shows no awareness that the domains in question might not even be registered in this country, for instance, and his ban on search engine and social media indexing apparently extends to the entire world. (And, when applied to US-based companies like Twitter, apparently compels them to censor the links globally rather than only when accessed by people in the US.) Indeed, a cursory search through the list of offending domains turns up poshmoda.ws, a site registered in Germany. The German registrar has not yet complied with the US court order, though most other domain names on the list are .com or .net names and have been seized.

The raids forced Gibson to cease manufacturing operations and send workers home for the day while armed agents executed the search warrants. “Agents seized wood that was Forest Stewardship Council controlled,” Juszkiewicz said. “Gibson has a long history of supporting sustainable and responsible sources of wood and has worked diligently with entities such as the Rainforest Alliance and Greenpeace to secure FSC-certified supplies. The wood seized on August 24 satisfied FSC standards.”

Juszkiewicz believes that the Justice Department is bullying Gibson without filing charges.

“The Federal Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. has suggested that the use of wood from India that is not finished by Indian workers is illegal, not because of U.S. law, but because it is the Justice Department’s interpretation of a law in India. (If the same wood from the same tree was finished by Indian workers, the material would be legal.) This action was taken without the support and consent of the government in India.”

The investigation into the activities of the two companies included a sting operation in which the Department of Homeland Security set up a fake payment processing company called Linwood Payment Solutions. The company processed payments throughout 2009 both to and from the online poker sites. According to the affidavit, Linwood processed over $33 million in payments over the course of more than 300,000 transactions.

“It is illegal for internet gambling enterprises to do business in Maryland, regardless of where the website operator is located,” said U.S. Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein. “We cannot allow foreign website operators to flout the law simply because their headquarters are based outside the country.”

Are there errors in the affidavit? If so, do they even matter? The answer is no.

These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.

Thus, while the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable cause (and even without a warrant in various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment are involved... It is "[t]he risk of prior restraint, which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth Amendment protections accorded searches for and seizure of First Amendment materials" that motivates this rule.

1. Deuces, by Chris Brown
   
   This song was released for free by Chris Brown, as a part of a mixtape entitled Fan of a Fan -- apparently released as part of the effort to rehabilitate Brown's reputation, following the incident with Rihanna. It was only after the song was released free, and a bunch of (you guessed it) hiphop blogs and forums started promoting it, that his label, a subsidiary of Sony Music decided to release it commercially. That song was sent directly to dajaz1 from someone at Brown's record label, using an email from the record label, and it's clear from the email that the sender is urging the recipient to spread the songs.
   
   
2. Long Gone, by Nelly
   
   This song was sent directly by a VP at the record label, who was thanked in the blog post on the website, which linked to where the song could be downloaded. A simple search by Agent Reynolds of the person thanked on the blog posting (which I did) would quickly uncover the fact that the person was a VP at the record label.
   
   
3. Fall For Your Type, by Jamie Foxx
   
   This song was sent directly by a known promoter of music, who has worked with the major record labels. The email clearly suggests that it is promoting the song for the rightsholder, and directly encourages the recipients of the email to download and share the song.
   
   
4. Mechanics, by Reek Da Villian
   
   This one's interesting, since Reek Da Villian is not signed to a major record label, but is an artist whom Busta Rhymes has taken under his wing, and has been supporting and promoting for a while now. That song was apparently sent directly by Busta Rhymes -- though I did not see that email. However, considering that his work is not represented through an RIAA affiliated label, it seems odd that Reynolds would rely on an RIAA representative to later claim that this file was infringing. There's even a sort of odd admission of this in Agent Reynold's affidavit, where he notes:

   "Based on my review of public record listings, as well as conversations with RIAA representatives, I know that as of October 26th, 2010, all of the above referenced songs were determined to be "Pre-release" or not yet released for purchase to the general public, three were copyrighted, and the copyright holders did not authorize their third party distribution over the Internet by DAJAZ1.COM or any other website."

   Note that he says all were pre-release, but only three were copyrighted. Of course, this is another example of where Agent Reynolds shows his confusion about the law. All new and original creative works in the US when set in fixed format are automatically covered by copyright (technically "copyrighted" is not a verb, also). What Agent Reynolds probably meant, but got wrong, was that the Reek Da Villian song was not registered (which is not required to be covered by copyright). Still, if we assume that he believes what he wrote, how is it copyright infringement when Agent Reynolds himself admits that one of the songs is supposedly not covered by copyright? And why would the magistrate judge allow that?

The report did not cite under what law the domain names were seized. As far as I know there is no federal law that allows the seizure of domain names. That of course is the troubling part. Although I have no love for sites that allow the distribution of protected works for free, when the federal government starts making up their own remedies for violation of laws, its a problem. Moreover all that happened here was a claim by the government of improper conduct by the site. There does not appear to been a hearing where any of the domain owners got notice or what you would call due process, which is an opportunity to defend themselves prior to the domain seizure

Shockingly, TorrentFreak was informed that wheels were also set in motion to seize The Pirate Bay domain. But for reasons that remain unclear that didn't come to pass. Our source believes that the US authorities would've had to contact the Swedish authorities on the matter first, but that since there is already an unfinished criminal process against the site, the time was not considered right. There is an implication, however, that patience won't last forever and may run out after the founders' upcoming court appeal.

Another site in the cross hairs appears to be MegaUpload. Although a domain seizure was suggested, it now seems that another route has been taken, at least for now. We have also been informed by other sources that further sites are being watched although it proved impossible to discover their names.