There you have it. Violent video games are a "bigger safety threat" than guns, according to two out of three respondents. Seems pretty open and shut. Everyone cross out the word "gun" on your pet piece of legislation and replace it with "video game!" The nation is saved!

Many of you may be reaching for your guns/lower jaw/commenting implement. Before we start firing off mouths/angry wall o' text screeds/bullets, let's have a look at the methodology.

PPP surveyed 800 voters nationally from January 31st to February 3rd. The margin of error for the survey is +/-3.5%. We oversampled 416 Democratic and 508 Republican primary voters with margins of error of +/-4.8% and +/-4.4% respectively. In Iowa between February 1st and 3rd we interviewed 313 Democratic and 326 Republican primary voters with margins of error of +/-5.5% and +/-5.4% respectively. This poll was not paid for or authorized by any campaign or political organization. PPP surveys are conducted through automated telephone interviews.

My worries about Choruss come from a few different angles. I think any sort of collective/group licensing scheme involving such a third party is an economically inefficient, and unnecessary solution, that ends up doing more harm than good. I know you like to tell the story of SACEM. To me, that's a horror story. It's a story of how to create a system that leads to massive wasted resources, inefficiency, a reliance on a bad (but easy) business model, followed quite quickly by regulatory capture that leads to an ever increasing inefficiency. Look at what SACEM has resulted in, and all I see are massive inefficiencies. The idea of adding to that legacy concerns me. If you look at collections societies, over time they just keep trying to increase how much they collect, and will often lean on the government for help in doing so. The story of PRS in the UK is instructive here.

My concern is specifically that we're seeing other business models that are working tremendously well. I know you were unable to stay for my keynote in Nashville, but I went through examples of many different artists (small, medium and big) who were embracing new business models to tremendous success -- none of which relied on any sort of licensing proposal.

So, then, along comes a licensing plan where I need to pay (and, yes, I know this isn't determined yet and experiments will occur) say... $5/month for Choruss. Now suddenly that's $60/year that I'm paying for music (some of which gets siphoned off by the bureaucracy in the middle, even if it's a non-profit, just for administration) that relies on some magic formula to figure out who it goes to. I'm now less inclined to spend additional money directly with my favorite artists, because I've already spent the money via Choruss. My favorite artists get less money (and I'm reliant on your system to make sure that my favorite artists are actually rewarded). My money is spent less efficiently, and now there's a group in the middle who has every incentive in the world (even as a non-profit) to try to get an ever increasing part of the pie.

That just doesn't make sense to me.

You talk about the two issues: collecting a pool of money and distributing it efficiently. What's wrong with letting the market do that? People are giving money, gladly, to the artists who give them a reason to buy. That's your efficient collection and distribution system all in one. Except it doesn't need a middleman like Choruss.

The problem the recording industry faces isn't that there hasn't been an effective licensing system in the middle. It's that they weren't giving people a reason to buy. A licensing scheme isn't a reason to buy. It's a removal of a threat. That's negative value (we won't sue!), not positive value (here's additional scarce value you want to pay for). The artists I highlighted in my presentation were all giving positive reasons to buy. I'm afraid that focusing on a system like yours focuses on that negative reason to buy (you won't get sued!) rather than the positive reason (check out all the benefits I get).

That's my big concern.

That concern is exacerbated by the fact that every time a direct question is asked about how Choruss will work, your response is "it's just an experiment, so we don't know." I recognize that it is an experiment and you don't know all of the answers, but it feels very much like a dodge. I'm sure it's a fine line, because there are many details you don't know about, but you've been so vague about everything that it's hard to know what to think. A bunch of universities have agreed to it, but who are they? Why would they agree to test something without the details being clear? Who's setting up what those details are? In Nashville, you said some would involve all students, but at the SanFran Music Tech event you were saying they'd all be voluntary for the users. It just has this quantum feel to it. Any time anyone tries to get specific and warn about a certain aspect, you can just claim "well, we might not do that."

My biggest concern, frankly, is that putting in this inefficient, unnecessary bureaucracy in the middle, we take away resources from the new, more efficient, business models that are working. Both times I've seen you speak about Choruss, you've claimed that those business models won't necessarily be harmed, because they can still be built on top of Choruss -- but that goes against fundamental economics. If people have less money due to Choruss, they're a lot less likely to buy into these other business models.

Now, I'll be the first to admit that competing between business models is a good thing, but the very foundation upon which any sort of collective licensing system is built is to basically get everyone to opt-in, somehow or another -- and thus is set up to crowd out more efficient business models. Otherwise it just doesn't work. So you have every incentive to get third parties (universities, ISPs) to put in place policies that either force, or heavily incentivize, their students/subscribers to adopt a much more inefficient plan. The incentives are skewed. You and the universities/ISPs benefit -- but users (and musicians) do not.

• Why do we even need such a plan when plenty of musicians are showing that they can craft business models on the open market that work?
• How does adding yet another middleman make the music market any more efficient?
• What's wrong with letting the market mechanism handle the collection and distribution of the funds directly between musicians and fans?
• Will the recording industry promise to stop trying to shut down file sharing systems if this program gets adopted?
• Will the recording industry promise to stop pushing for 3 strikes if this program gets adopted?
• How will the program prevent the gaming opportunities, where artists set up scripts to constantly reload/download their songs?
• Why should music be separated out and subsidized while other industries have to come up with their own business models?
• Why should those who don't listen to much music and aren't interested in giving their money to the recording industry be required to participate if their university or ISP decides to make them?
• Why should we have a business model focused on negative value (you don't get sued), rather than positive value (here's something scarce that's worth buying)?
• The history of collections societies shows that they only tend to expand, and try to capture more rents. Why would Choruss be different?
• If Choruss becomes big, won't lots of other industries want in? Movies will want their own version. Then newspapers. And if newspapers are getting their cut, then why not bloggers too? Or blog commenters? Or just any website? The road this leads down is a bad one, where we end up creating massive bureaucracies to subsidize every form of content, rather than focus on business models where those content providers have to provide a reason to buy their particular product. How do you prevent that?

1. The painful lessons of experience. You might want to look into the history of attempts by general news sites to get consumers to pay for access. Did you actually think we hadn't thought of it, and tried it? Your ignorance of the field and of history is one of the things that makes the online guys reject everything you say. Do you need a list? The burden of research here is on you; it's your idea, after all. But I can tell you where to start.

2. The problem of scale (volume). It takes scale to make paid content work, and you don't have the volume you think you have. Quit making up wishful percentages based on your totally bogus monthly unique-user count ("well, if we get just 10 percent of our 85 zillion unique users to pay"). If you're going to engage in wishful thinking, base it on the cohort of individuals who visit your website more than three times a week. You will be shocked, and dismayed. I've been saying this for years: How can you get them to pay if you can't even get them to visit frequently when it's free?

3. The problem of scale (breadth). The idea of premium paid content (to generate reader revenue) plus free commodity content (to support an ad model) is alluring, but be honest with yourself. Local sites don't have the breadth of content to simultaneously support a paid premium content model, while maintaining enough free pages to harvest the advertising benefits of the open model.

4. Relative strength of the geotargeted advertising model. Ultimately the idea of paid content goes to war against the idea of ad-supported content. In local markets, the ad model is stronger than in global markets. There is, and always will be, a gross surplus of ad inventory on the Internet, and that drives CPMs into the sand. But actual deliverable geotargeted advertising -- and please understand that I'm talking about a reality that includes the entire sales support system, not theory -- is an entirely different matter. Local advertising sold by local sales forces is a substantial revenue stream, and if you're not tapping into that, it's your own fault.

5. Competition. There are plenty of competitors and would-be competitors just waiting for you to strangle your own website so they can step in and steal your future. The larger the market, the more this is true. In some relatively small, isolated markets you may be able to get away with it. For awhile.

6. Lack of unique content, coupled with a false sense of being unique. When you've had a virtual monopoly for decades, you grow arrogant and develop blind spots about your own weaknesses. From the viewpoint of the consumer, you're not nearly as unique and special as you think. And you've exacerbated this problem with your poor pay scales historically, and more recently your vicious cutting aimed at higher-salary veterans.

7. Support costs. If somebody drops 50 cents into a newsbox and it won't open, they just go away mad. If somebody is paying for access to your website and it won't work, they're going to call and suck up 12 dollars of staff time. You have no idea what you're getting into. Computers are evil, perverse devices aimed at driving humans crazy.

8. Your own staff. Your online staff hates the idea and they'll do everything they can to undermine it. Yeah, you can fire them. Why don't you get a table saw and cut off the fingers of your right hand while you're doing it? I've seen this happen time after time as newspapers consolidate print and online staffs, and the "formerly known as print" people conspire to expel the "formerly known as online" people. The result is a great leap backward. It's self-destructive.