Phil Pattee, assistant Bar counsel, said the agency couldn’t disclose the nature of the grievances against the attorneys or whether they relate to complaints from outside parties or the Bar’s own review of the Righthaven cases or both. But he confirmed the grievances relate to the attorneys’ work for Righthaven.

“We’ll be asking them about Righthaven,” he said.

“I will be responding to the informational requests of the Bar and believe that after such responses and clarifications, the matter will be properly addressed. Miss Lowry indicates her concurrence,” Gibson said Thursday.

Righthaven appears to be inviting the court to commit what Righthaven would contend is legal error by dismissing this action,’’

Besides the $5,000, Hunt ordered Righthaven to disclose its original lawsuit contract with Stephens Media in active lawsuits over R-J material. He also ordered that a transcript of today’s hearing, in which he made several negative comments about Righthaven’s conduct, be posted on Righthaven court dockets.

“In the court’s view, the arrangement between Righthaven and Stephens Media is nothing more, nor less, than a law firm — which incidentally I don’t think is licensed to practice law in this state — with a contingent fee agreement masquerading as a company.”

Hunt noted it was Righthaven’s CEO, Las Vegas attorney Steven Gibson, who drew up the lawsuit contract between Righthaven and Stephens Media. Defense attorneys have said it was Gibson who signed off on some of the false disclosures and that Gibson is behind the entire Righthaven litigation campaign.

As shown in the preceding pages, the Court believes that Righthaven has made multiple inaccurate and likely dishonest statements to the Court. Here, however, the Court will only focus on the most factually brazen: Righthaven’s failure to disclose Stephens Media as an interested party in Righthaven’s Certificate of Interested Parties. (Dkt. #5.) Rule 7.1-1 of the Local Rules of Practice for the District of Nevada requires parties to disclose “all persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships or corporations (including parent corporations) which have a direct, pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.” This Local Rule requires greater disclosure than Federal Rule 7.1, which only requires non-governmental corporate parties to disclose parent corporations or corporations owning more than 10% of the party’s stock. Frankly, if receiving 50% of litigation proceeds minus costs (Dkt. #79, SAA Section 5) does not create a pecuniary interest under Local Rule 7.1-1, the Court isn’t sure what would.

Making this failure more egregious, not only did Righthaven fail to identify Stephens Media as an interested party in this suit, the Court believes that Righthaven failed to disclose Stephens Media as an interested party in any of its approximately 200 cases filed in this District. Accordingly, the Court orders Righthaven to show cause, in writing, no later than two (2) weeks from the date of this order, why it should not be sanctioned for this flagrant misrepresentation to the Court.

Unless otherwise ordered, in all cases except habeas corpus cases counsel for private (non-governmental) parties shall identify in the disclosure statement required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 all persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships or corporations (including parent corporations) which have a direct, pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.

Rather, former in house counsel for Righthaven apparently failed to consider the full scope of the "direct, pecuniary interest" language under Local Rule 7.1-1 in failing to list Stephens Media on its Certificate of Interested Parties.... Unlike its federal rule counterpart, Local Rule 7.1-1 does not define what constitutes a direct, pecuniary interest and there is an absence of case law addressing the scope of the required disclosures. While the Court has concluded otherwise, it is certainly understandable how Local Rule 7.1-1 could have arguably been reasonably construed to not require the disclosure of Stephens Media’s interest in any recovery in excess of costs under the Strategic Alliance Agreement (the "SAA").

The obligation to disclose Stephens Media as an interested party pursuant to Local Rule 7.1-1 was certainly not appreciated by Righthaven's undersigned outside counsel, who has been licensed to practice before this Court since 1998.... Counsel reasonably viewed any contingent payment to Stephens Media under the SAA as constituting an indirect interest that required a two-step payment process assuming any case resulted in a recovery.... Simply put, receipt of settlement funds through settlement or recovery by the enforcement of a judgment would be made to Righthaven.... Righthaven would then be contractually obligated under the SAA to subsequently pay Stephens Media any recovered sums over and above costs incurred.... Thus, while counsel certainly appreciates the Court's guidance and will adhere to its decision, there is certainly an arguable and reasonable basis to construe Stephens Media's pecuniary interest as indirect, and not direct, under the SAA.

The court has reviewed the proposed brief and agrees that it may be useful to the court in ruling on the pending order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of standing

Court records suggest the State Bar in reviewing the Righthaven litigation is focusing on two broad areas:

-- Whether Righthaven and its attorneys have engaged in champerty and barratry – generally defined as the improper incitement and prosecution of lawsuits by parties with no real interest in the outcome – and that hope to profit by such lawsuits.

Attorneys for one of the Righthaven defendants, Thomas DiBiase, for instance, have charged: "DiBiase asserts that the purported copyright assignment from Stephens Media to Righthaven is a sham and that Righthaven is engaged in champerty and barratry by filing litigation on copyrights that it does not own."

-- Whether Righthaven and its attorneys have made misrepresentations to the court. If true, that would appear to be a violation of the Nevada Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct.

These rules say, in part, "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer" to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." The rules also say, "A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."

The bill's definition of autonomous vehicles is unclear, even circular. Autonomous driving exists on a spectrum. Many vehicles available today have autonomous features, while falling short of complete computer control. Surely the bill's authors do not intend to require that, for instance, today's self-parking Lexus LS 460L be tested and certified.

"Well your website is like you, it's your intellectual property," Angle said. "So they can't use something that's yours, intellectual property, unless they pay you for it or get your permission... And he didn't ask me for it, and he didn't pay me for it. I would have sold it to him."

Angle was asked: "So the latest is that it is up again, and you are just going to have to see as far as pursing this in court? Is that the plan?"

"Well we are going to pursue it," Angle replied. "I don't think that Harry is above the law. He needs to obey the law if you and I need to obey the law. Harry isn't immune. He needs to obey the law as well."