Many people in the technology startup community have very high regards for Paul Graham and Y Combinator, the exclusive seed accelerator program in Silicon Valley which has under its belt acclaimed successes like reddit, Airbnb and Dropbox. There’s equal standing for Andreessen Horowitz, a private equity investment company with notable alumni such as Groupon, Instagram and Skype.

Now those people and companies have put their most valuable support – money, experience and brand – behind “InstallMonetizer“, a company that describes itself as a “windows based software monetization platform”. Very carefully selected words.

Consumers Receiving Product Recommendations- We review the consumer’s pc for existing software. This is done to provide the consumer an advertiser software which they currently do not have installed on their computer. This information is not stored in order to maintain consumer’s privacy. We gather personally identifiable and may include information regarding your geo-location, ip address, operating system, language setting and information regarding whether recommended advertiser software has been accepted, downloaded, installed and any reason for failure installing. None of his information is personally identifiable.

We endeavor to take security measures to guard against unauthorized access to the systems where we store your data. This includes internal reviews of our data collection, storage, and processing practices and security measures and physical security measures.

I’m not going to delve into the technical aspects of crapware – its effects on system performance, reliability and satisfaction are pretty well documented. The fact that there is a thriving ecosystem of “crapware, adware, spyware” removers is enough evidence it’s a significant issue.

Perhaps more importantly, I strongly believe crapware installers among other foul practices have eroded the trust of the Windows app ecosystem as a whole.

What used to be a fairly standard flow of app discovery has turned into a minefield of misleading download links on websites, defaulted checkboxes or sneaky install crapware buttons in position of “next” in wizards and browser homepage overrides. And it just takes one wrong click to have irreversible consequences.

Last but not least, disregarding the moral factor of this investment, I’m puzzled why such visionary investors would invest in a process that is slowly being phased out by changing industry practices...

I admit every person and company has the right to set their own moral compass, but it’s genuinely disappointing to see such respected and influential people and companies put their weight behind a practice that has undermined and continues to undermine the credibility of the Windows app ecosystem.

This Court recently ordered the unsealing of the documents previously submitted by the United States to support taking down the Megaupload cloud storage site by seizing the domain name(s) --- such unsealing lays bare a crucial omission the Government made to the Court in the secret process.  Specifically, the Government’s affidavits underpinning the warrants omitted critical, exculpatory information regarding whether, why and how Megaupload knew it was hosting criminally infringing files.  The Government represented that, “[o]n or about June 24, 2010, members of the Mega Conspiracy were informed, pursuant to a criminal search warrant from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, that thirty-nine infringing copies of copyrighted motion pictures were present on their leased servers at Carpathia Hosting, a hosting company headquartered in the Eastern District of Virginia,” and that, “[a]s of November 18, 2011, thirty-six of the thirty-nine infringing copies of copyrighted motion pictures were still being stored on servers controlled by the Mega Conspiracy,” after it was informed of the infringing content.... This snippet—which appears in each relevant affidavit and is the only direct, corroborated evidence the Government purports to offer as proof that Megaupload had requisite knowledge—suggests that Megaupload was warned of its potentially criminal complicity yet persisted in hosting the files without concern for their illegal content.  The affidavits, in short, paint Megaupload as a brazen scofflaw. 

The truth, as the Government well knows, is quite different.  Megaupload had every reason to retain those files in good faith because the Government had sought and obtained Megaupload’s cooperation in retrieving the files and warned that alerting users to the existence of the warrant and the Government’s interest in the files could compromise the investigation.  Carpathia informed Megaupload that the warrant was sealed, and that only Carpathia and Megaupload, not the users of the infringing files, were to know of its existence, and at the Government’s request provided Megaupload a copy of the sealing order. The Government selectively parsed its account so as to exclude critical facts that negate any notion that Megaupload had criminal mens rea to retain the infringing files.  The Government deliberately neglected to apprise the Court that:

•       Megaupload received the June 24, 2010 warrant in the course of cooperating with a Government investigation; 
•       Megaupload was informed of the June 24, 2010 warrant by its vendor, Carpathia Hosting (“Carpathia”), with the Government’s consent and for the express purpose of obtaining Megaupload’s voluntary assistance with executing the warrant;
•       The Government declined to communicate directly with Megaupload about the warrant, instead deputizing Carpathia to communicate on its behalf;
• Carpathia directed Megaupload not to open “EM7 tickets” on the infringing files—which would have alerted a larger number of people to the existence of the warrant and jeopardized the secrecy of the investigation—“[b]ecause of the Government’s seal on the warrant,” asking that Megaupload instead deal directly with a single person at Carpathia;
• Megaupload’s preservation of the status quo, particularly by not taking down or otherwise disturbing the files identified in the June 24, 2010 warrant, was faithful to the Government’s express desire, reflected by the Magistrate Judge’s order sealing the warrant (provided to Megaupload by Carpathia at the Government’s request) and by Carpathia’s instructions on the Government’s behalf, for Megaupload to ensure that evidence would remain preserved and that the target users would remain unaware of the investigation; and
• Consistent with its stated desire that the warrant and investigation remain confidential so as not to tip off the target users, the Government—neither directly nor through Carpathia—ever requested that Megaupload take down the files identified in the June 24, 2010 warrant.

Nowhere did the Government tell this Court that its June 24, 2010 warrant had been calculated to enlist good-faith cooperation with a criminal investigation, while preserving the secrecy thereof. Nowhere did the Government tell this Court that the Government had sought Megaupload's voluntary assistance in executing the warrant. Nowhere did the Government tell this Court that Carpathia had assured Megaupload, in the interests of its requested cooperation, that there was no basis to believe that Megaupload was a target. Nowhere did the Government tell this Court that Megaupload had in fact cooperated precisely as requested. Most importantly and most troublingly, nowhere did the Government tell this Court that Megaupload had been informed by Carpathia, acting on behalf of the Government and heeding the Government's insistence upon sealing, that the secrecy of the warrant and the Government's investigation must be preserved to avoid destruction of evidence and notification of the targeted users. Nor did the Government inform this Court that the sealing order it had obtained and furnished Carpathia to provide to Megaupload likewise required secrecy and expressly specified that [redacted ]. In sum, nowhere did the Government tell this Court that Megaupload had done exactly what the Government had asked it to do--execute a search warrant without alerting the ostensible targets to the existence of an investigation. The Government's contention to this Court that Megaupload's preservation of the status quo was evidence of criminal intent is false, and deliberately so.