Copyright is not quite like other types of property. It has some similarities, to be sure, but at its root it is fundamentally different than tangible property like fields and houses and cars and computers. And that's because it is non-rivalrous in consumption. Copyright is a special kind of economic good and special kinds of rules should therefore apply to it. Among those rules, you should have those that take into account that you can have too much copyright....

I don't want to get into a semantic discussion, but I am not completely comfortable with calling copyright property. Simply saying property. I don't even like the phrase intellectual property. I prefer intellectual privilege. I think copyright is a privilege, because it's created by statute, it doesn't exist in a state of nature, it's not recognized by common law. It's purely the creature of statute and you can't say that about the sorts of property rights we enjoy in our persons and in our farms and our cars and computers. Those rights, the rights in those forms of tangible property... you can't deny they're protected at the common law. And many people, me among them, would say that they're protected in a state of nature....

Important ramifications follow from what you call copyright. Me? I like to say it's a privilege that has certain property-like aspects and indeed the best things about copyright -- and there's a lot to like about copyright -- are those features that most resemble property. It's alienable, you can transfer it to other people, you can go to the copyright office and check to see who owns the copyright. There is something like trespass afforded to people who suffer wrongful use of their property. Wonderful things. That's the best thing about copyright.

I was just talking to someone who works out here in Southern California in the local regional air quality control board, and we got into this conversation, and he said "we don't call them property, we don't even call them privileges, we call them permits" I said "well you can buy and sell permits" and he said "there are some things that are like property, but we don't call them property, because we don't want the state thinking, for example, we can't change the rules without suffering a takings claim." And that's true of copyright as well. Look, if Congress decides tomorrow, that we're going to just stop copyright -- they won't, but they might say, per some of the suggestions, of our reformers in our book -- we're going to tinker around the edges, and maybe, just once, around the edges, trim back the restrictions. If they did that, would they face a takings claim? No, no! It's just not part of common law...

Let's recognize, that if you take that approach to copyright, you pretty quickly run into a tough paradox. And it's that the Constitution, says that "only for limited times" shall lawmakers protect these works of authors. So if you're a fan of real property, intangible property, as I am, you don't want to hear about lawmakers saying "we're putting a fuse on your property rights in your house or your car or your computer. We're going to let you have property rights for, oh, maybe 20 years and then 'poof' it's gone, anybody can take it." No, we would take exception if the federal government said that policy with regard to our 401ks or our houses or cars, and for good reason. Yet that's the policy we have copyrights, and it's by design. It's in the Constitution. It's as if the Constitution had a clause that said 'oh also, property rights in your farms and factories and houses -- yeah, we're going to end all those after 34 years.' That's not how they treat tangible property. We're glad of that. And yet that is how we treat copyright and I think we should be glad of that.

1. Reinstate the Founders’ Copyright Act,
2. Withdraw the U.S. from the Berne Convention,
3. Develop misuse doctrine into an escape from copyright,
4. Focus copyright policy on consumers’ costs, not producers’ profits, and
5. Reconceive “IP” as “Intellectual Privilege.”

How can misuse doctrine open an escape from copyright? The doctrine bars claims of copyright infringement that arise under conditions of misuse. It does not, however, bar claims premised on violations of common-law rights, such as trade secrets or the contractual terms of a license. In effect, misuse doctrine corrects the overweening power that results from combining copyright privileges with common-law rights, by negating only the former. Suppose for instance that a copyright holder wrongly tried to squelch rights protected by the First Amendment and the fair use doctrine by including in its license a clause forbidding public criticism of the work. A court might remedy that misuse by denying the considerable enforcement powers afforded by the Copyright Act even while leaving the underlying contract in force. In practical terms, the dispute would become a matter of state contract law rather than federal legislation. Repeated applications of the same doctrine in other cases would eventually encourage the development of business models premised solely on contract law, tort law, trade secret law, and other common-law devices. Misuse thus opens an escape from a world where copyright comprehensively regulates access to expressive works to one where only common-law rules apply

When we say patents protect inventions, what we mean is they protect specific solutions to problems, rather than the idea of solving a particular problem. The design for a plough can be patented; the idea of ploughing a field can't. A specific new drug that stops a headache can be patented; the function of using a drug to stop a headache can't. Lemley explains how patent applications were increasingly written to go outside these bounds, culminating in a case in the 1940s where a judge finally declared patent claims that attempted to fence off a function -- "functional claiming" -- as an invalid use of patents.

An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.

To take an example, suppose that the patent claim includes as an element a “means for processing data.” Read literally, without reference to section 112(f), this language would encompass any possible means for processing data, including any computer, but also a calculator, an abacus, pencil and paper, and perhaps even the human brain. Section 112(f) permits the use of such functional language, but doesn’t permit it to cover any means of performing the data-processing function. Instead, the claim would be limited to the particular “means for processing data” actually described in the patent specification (say, an iPad) “and equivalents thereof.”

A patentee who claims “means for calculating an alarm limit” is invoking the limits of section 112(f), and the claim will accordingly be limited to the particular software algorithm or implementation the patentee described in the specification. But if the same patentee claims “a computer programmed to calculate an alarm limit,” courts today will read the term “computer” as sufficient structure and will understand the claims to cover any computer that can calculate an alarm limit, however the calculation is programmed.

We don’t need to change the statute to achieve this result. We don’t even need to overrule existing cases. We just need to pay attention to a law that is on the books but doesn’t seem to get applied in practice. The Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court could, with one fell swoop, do away with most of the problem of overclaiming in software patents – and with it, most of the problems with software patents in general. All it needs to do is to take the statute at face value and limit functional claims to the particular way the patentee implemented that function. In the software world, the way an inventor implements a function is not with “a computer” or “a processor,” but with a particular computer program. The patent claim should accordingly be limited to that particular computer program, and ones that work in the same way to achieve the same result.

What we need now is a case that presents an appropriate opportunity for Professor Lemley's argument to be presented, and a judge that is willing to accept it.

In this interview, Rebecca highlights the ways in which many companies have accepted fan fiction and other fan created derivative works as a necessary part of getting consumers to engage with the content.

It takes a big studio to make The Avengers, but it doesn't necessarily take a big studio to write a piece of Avengers fan fiction. Big content companies largely recognize that fan activities are really good for them because they engage people.

With the legal framework in place, expanding it to cover other conduct—obscenity, defamation, “unfair competition,” patent infringement, publication of classified information, advocacy in support of terror groups--would be a matter of adding a few words to those paragraphs. One sentence slipped in as a rider on some must-pass omnibus bill would do it: “Section 102(2)(B) is amended to add ‘or civil action under 17 USC §271′.”—voila, a nuclear weapon for patent trolls.

Then there’s the technological architecture. If SOPA passes, thousands of commercial ISPs, colleges, small businesses, nonprofits, and other entities that maintain domain servers are going to have to reconfigure their networks, potentially at substantial cost, in order to easily comply with the new law. There is an introductory clause in the latest version of the bill stipulating that no network operator will be required to implement a specific technology or redesign their networks in any particular manner in order to be considered in compliance. But let’s think realistically about what compliance will look like. Genuine “rogue sites” often operate via dozens of different domains, which means we’re apt to see regular updates to the government’s standing blacklist, potentially adding dozens or hundreds of domains in one go. Any sane network operator is just going to build a filter that reads off the current list of banned domains from a government feed and automatically stops resolving them. (This will, incidentally, be an enormously attractive attack surface for hackers: Spoof the SOPA feed—either at the source or to a particular provider—and you’ve got an instant bulk denial of service attack!)

Once the up-front costs of implementing that filter mechanism are paid, the marginal cost of additional censorship is effectively zero for the providers. It won’t much matter to the providers, at that point, whether the blacklist contains 10 domains or 10,000. The technology itself, needless to say, will be indifferent to the rationale for blacklisting. The filter will just automatically implement the list of domains it’s given; it won’t know or care whether they’re being blocked for hosting pirated movies, Hamas propaganda, or the Pentagon Papers.

Political actors—or special interest groups—who want to expand the scope of blocking will no longer have to justify putting in place a wholly new system of Internet blocking. Instead, the rhetorical question will become: Now that we’ve got this whole filter architecture in place for music and movie pirates, how can we possibly justify not using it for sites that host terrorist propaganda or classified documents, for sites that implement a patented business model without permission, for sites enabling speech some U.S. court has held libelous, and for whatever new moral panic is gracing the cover of Time in five years. Surely you’re not suggesting that illicit downloads of Norbit are a bigger problem than whatever outrage Joe Lieberman is fulminating against this week, are you?

If Superman uses the power of a blue sun to bestow superpowers on another person, is that a taxable asset transfer?  Who would want to try to collect?

If two superheroes marry, share a power, then later divorce, could one be forced to give up the power during the division of assets?  Does it matter who had the power originally?  Even though the shared power may be a non-rival good, one of the two superheroes may still have a claim to exclusivity.  Perhaps the power is a trademark ability of one character, or maybe they signed a superhero pre-nuptial agreement that determined the disposition of any shared abilities.

If one superhero lends a power to another (or to a normal person), does that superhero have an implied right to its return?  In other words, is a bailment created?  I think the answer here is yes.

there is the question of public perceptions as to the value and fairness of the agreement. A perception that it is fair as between stakeholders is important to IP law, which it is not readily self-enforcing. By this I mean that IP law requires people to self-consciously refrain from behaviours that are common, easy, and enjoyable: infringement is so easy to do and observing IP rights, particularly copyright, involves, particularly these days, some self-denial. IP law therefore needs support from the public in order to be effective, and in order to receive any such support IP law needs to address the needs of all stakeholders. 135 Treaties that strengthen enforcement without addressing the needs of users look unfair and will bring IP law further into disrepute.

"Until some terrible tragedy happens where a child or teenager commits suicide because they have been bullied by e-mail, texting or sexting," said Rep. Sandra Blanton.

"Keep them in lockers and not allow them in the classroom or on school property to do the sexting," Rep. Blanton said.

Q: Does copyright piracy put your job at risk? A: Yes. Canadians who work in the copyright-related industries have seen numerous job losses - from the artists who create music to truck drivers who deliver CDs and DVDs to retailers. Since the advent of widespread P2P file sharing 10 years ago, retail sales of music have declined by more than half; this has forced ongoing job reductions and slashed funds available for Canadian artist development.