That public interest cannot be realized if the inherent difficulty of proving actual damages leaves the copyright holder without an effective remedy for infringement or precludes an effective means of deterring further copyright violations. The statute reflects a legislative determination of the range of assessments necessary to vindicate those public interests, see 17 U.S.C. 504(c), and Congress’s judgment as to the appropriate amounts is entitled to deference.

We conclude that an award of $9,250 per each of twenty-four works is not “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” .... Congress, exercising its “wide latitude of discretion,”... set a statutory damages range for willful copyright infringement of $750 to $150,000 per infringed work.... The award here is toward the lower end of this broad range. As in Williams, “the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to [federal law]” support the constitutionality of the award.

Congress’s protection of copyrights is not a “special private benefit,” but is meant to achieve an important public interest: “to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” ... With the rapid advancement of technology, copyright infringement through online file-sharing has become a serious problem in the recording industry. Evidence at trial showed that revenues across the industry decreased by fifty percent between 1999 and 2006, a decline that the record companies attributed to piracy. This decline in revenue caused a corresponding drop in industry jobs and a reduction in the number of artists represented and albums released

The absolute amount of the award, not just the amount per violation, is relevant to whether the award is “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”

But because the verdicts returned by the second and third juries are sufficient to justify these remedies, it is unnecessary for this court to consider the merits of the district court’s order granting a new trial after the first verdict. Important though the “making available” legal issue may be to the recording companies, they are not entitled to an opinion on an issue of law that is unnecessary for the remedies sought or to a freestanding decision on whether Thomas-Rasset violated the law by making recordings available.

Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the Due Process Clause does not require that the statutory damage award be proportional to the actual harm defendant has caused the plaintiff. Defendant attempts to derive this rule from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). But as the district court held, Williams, not Gore, establishes the applicable framework for determining whether an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act comports with due process.

Gore is inapposite. It imposes limitations on a jury’s authority to award punitive damages in circumstances where the legislature has not constrained the jury’s discretion. It thus requires that the jury award not be grossly disproportionate to the plaintiff’s injury or defendant’s misconduct. Absent such limitations, the Gore Court reasoned, defendants could not have fair, constitutionally sufficient notice of the magnitude of potential sanctions.

The Gore framework, however, does not apply to a statutory regime in which Congress has specified in advance the range of appropriate damages. In that circumstance, the statute itself supplies the constitutionally required notice deemed missing in Gore. Moreover, unlike jury awards of punitive damages, an award of statutory damages is based on legislative judgments that must be accorded deference by the reviewing court. Williams, not Gore, sets forth the appropriate standards for conducting such review.

While Plaintiffs do not believe that either verdict was improper under the law, or that the second verdict should be remitted, they would have considered accepting a remittitur simply so that this case could finally come to an end. However, any remittitur must otherwise be consistent with the law and be guided by what actual juries have awarded under similar circumstances. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs find it impossible to accept a remittitur that could be read to set a new standard for statutory damages -- essentially capping those damages at three times the minimum statutory amount of $750 (or $2,250) for any "noncommercial individuals who illegally download and upload music." (Id. at 2, 25.) This far-reaching determination is contrary to the law and creates a statutory scheme that Congress did not intend or enact.

Indeed, Congress has spoken on this very topic. Congress deliberately and purposefully established a range of statutory damages that applies without regard to the commercial motivation of the defendant.

A rule that the maximum permissible award in cases involving so-called "noncommercial" infringers is three times minimum statutory damages also ignores the harm caused by such infringers. From an economic perspective, individuals who give away copyrighted works illegally can cause as much harm as those who sell those works illegally, particularly when the so-called "non-commercial" infringer uses a P2P service. The notion that an infringer who does not make a profit should automatically be entitled to better treatment than an infringer who does make a profit is found nowhere in the law. The "not for profit" infringer is hardly entitled to special protection, which is why Congress conferred no such protection.

The Court's cap would set a new ceiling such that no copyright owner could effectively enforce their rights unless they could and did sue on numerous works. No copyright owner would be motivated to enforce its rights where it could only sue on a handful of works because the potential recovery would be too limited. Congress set a wide range of statutory damages for copyright cases precisely because plaintiffs need to be incentivized to bring appropriate cases to enforce their rights -- even those who own a small number of copyrights or those who only have a limited number of works infringed. Conversely, the Court's artificially depressed cap compels parties with a large number of copyrights at stake to sue on all of them, rather than a more modest number. This serves only to increase the discovery and trial burdens on parties and courts. Yet the Court's inflexible "three times" cap would invariably penalize plaintiffs with a small number of works at issue, and would force those with a lot of works to add to their complaints unnecessarily.