This Panel Opinion is a classic case of bad facts making bad law. Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation does not file this brief to dispute the Court's factual conclusions regarding the conduct at issue in this case. However, the Panel Opinion went far beyond what was necessary to address that conduct. As a result, it has created new legal uncertainty for online service providers and their customers, undermining over a decade of legislation and jurisprudence designed to help reduce that uncertainty. A predictable legal environment has proven to be crucial not only the growth of the Internet generally, but the growth of innovative platforms for free expression, in particular. This case should not provide a vehicle to impede that development.

Most important, the Panel Opinion adopts a "loose causation theory" that disconnects the scope of inducement liability from the defendants' acts—raising the troubling possibility that a single inducing act (such as a message to one customer) could open the floodgates to liability for third-party infringement entirely unrelated to that act. The Opinion's loose causation theory conflicts with fundamental common law principles of proximate cause essential to both predictability and fairness. The Panel's decision to depart from those principles was apparently based on the unfounded assumption that the Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) requires it. Not so. First, Grokster expressly recognized that secondary liability under copyright derives from common law principles. Second, given that Grokster's specific inducement standard was imported from patent law, it is more likely that the Court also intended to import the analytical framework patent law applies where, as here, a service is capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses.

There is a danger that this passage could be misconstrued to stand for a broader proposition that we do not believe the panel intended: that any time an online service provider is found to have exercised "substantial influence" over any user-submitted content on its service—no matter what that finding was based on—it thereby loses its DMCA safe harbor protections for all user-submitted content on the entire service. This is how some copyright plaintiffs have already tried to read the panel's ruling. In a recent submission to the Southern District of New York in the Viacom v. YouTube case, for example, the plaintiffs have asserted, citing the panel opinion, that this Court “made clear that where DMCA eligibility is unavailable due to the right and ability to control prong of the safe harbor, the DMCA defense is broadly lost as to all clips in suit.” Ltr. from Paul M. Smith to Hon. Louis L. Stanton at 2 (March 22, 2013) (attached as Ex. 1).

Imagine, for example, a video-hosting service that was otherwise eligible for the section 512(c) safe harbor, but that on one occasion commissioned a particular user to upload a video that, unbeknownst to the service, turned out to be infringing. A court might conclude that the service exerted a “substantial influence” over that instance of infringement and, if the service earned a direct financial benefit from it, there would be grounds for denying the safe harbor for a claim based on that video. But it would make no sense to thereby disqualify the service provider from DMCA protection across the board—even for countless other videos whose posting it did not control or from which it earned no benefit.

Likewise, consider a search engine eligible for protection under the section 512(d) safe harbor for linking to infringing material online. If one of the millions of links provided by the search engine pointed users to infringing material that had been authored by the search engine itself and that users were charged to view, a finding of control plus financial benefit might be warranted for that particular link. But, again, there would be no plausible basis for categorically depriving the service of the safe harbor for the millions of unrelated links it delivers to material that it does not control or financially benefit from.

Unlike patents, copyrights protect expression, not products or devices. Inducement liability is not limited, either logically or as articulated in Grokster III, to those who distribute a “device.” As a result, one can infringe a copyright through culpable actions resulting in the impermissible reproduction of copyrighted expression, whether those actions involve making available a device or product or providing some service used in accomplishing the infringement. For example, a retail copying service that accepts and copies copyrighted material for customers after broadly promoting its willingness to do so may be liable for the resulting infringement although it does not produce any copying machines or sell them; all it provides is the “service” of copying. Whether the service makes copies using machines of its own manufacture, machines it owns, or machines in someone else’s shop would not matter, as copyright liability depends on one’s purposeful involvement in the process of reproducing copyrighted material, not the precise nature of that involvement.

For a time, for example, isoHunt prominently featured a list of “Box Office Movies,” containing the 20 highest-grossing movies then playing in U.S. theaters. When a user clicked on a listed title, she would be invited to “upload [a] torrent” file for that movie. In other words, she would be asked to upload a file that, once downloaded by other users, would lead directly to their obtaining infringing content. Fung also posted numerous messages to the isoHunt forum requesting that users upload torrents for specific copyrighted films; in other posts, he provided links to torrent files for copyrighted movies, urging users to download them

Fung and amicus curiae Google argue that the acts of infringement must be caused by the manifestations of the distributor’s improper object—that is, by the inducing messages themselves. Columbia, on the other hand, maintains that it need only prove that the “acts of infringement by third parties” were caused by the product distributed or services provided.

We are mindful, however, of the potential severity of a loose causation theory for inducement liability. Under this theory of liability, the only causation requirement is that the product or service at issue was used to infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights. The possible reach of liability is enormous, particularly in the digital age.

Fung argues, on this basis, that some of the acts of infringement by third parties relied upon by the district court may not have involved his websites at all. He points out, for example, that by far the largest number of torrents tracked by the Torrentbox tracker are obtained from somewhere other than Torrentbox.com. If a user obtained a torrent from a source other than his websites, Fung maintains, he cannot be held liable for the infringement that resulted.

We do not decide the degree to which Fung can be held liable for having caused infringements by users of his sites or trackers. The only issue presently before us is the permanent injunction, which, as in Grokster III, does not in this case depend on the “exact calculation of infringing use[] as a basis for a claim of damages.” 545 U.S. at 941. We therefore need not further entertain Fung’s causation arguments at this time, but leave it to the district court to consider them, in light of the observations we have made, when it calculates damages.

The district court should not have rejected this safe harbor on the ground it did. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007), held that the § 512(a) safe harbor does not require that the service provider transmit or route infringing material, explaining that “[t]here is no requirement in the statute that the communications must themselves be infringing, and we see no reason to import such a requirement.” Id. at 1116; see also id. (“Service providers are immune for transmitting all digital online communications, not just those that directly infringe.”).

Under these circumstances, we hold the connection between the infringing activity and Fung’s income stream derived from advertising is sufficiently direct to meet the direct “financial benefit” prong of § 512(c)(1)(B). Fung promoted advertising by pointing to infringing activity; obtained advertising revenue that depended on the number of visitors to his sites; attracted primarily visitors who were seeking to engage in infringing activity, as that is mostly what occurred on his sites; and encouraged that infringing activity. Given this confluence of circumstances, Fung’s revenue stream was tied directly to the infringing activity involving his websites, both as to his ability to attract advertisers and as to the amount of revenue he received.

Beyond the specifically-named examples, no one reading this injunction can tell what it means for a term to be “widely known to be associated with copyright infringement.” We understand the desire to build flexibility into the injunction. But Rule 65(d), overall, prefers certainty to flexibility. Subsection (ii) of the injunction’s definition of “Infringement-Related Terms” therefore must be modified to state simply that the phrase includes specifically named terms.

Fung maintains, and we agree, that certain provisions of the injunction could be interpreted to prevent Fung from ever working for any technology company whose services others might use to infringe copyright, even if those other companies are not themselves liable for primary or secondary copyright infringement.... We agree that insofar as the injunction can be interpreted to prohibit Fung from seeking legitimate employment, it is more burdensome than necessary to provide Plaintiffs relief.

Because CBSI distributed several torrent software programs and encouraged infringement on torrent networks, CBSI is liable for all infringement on the torrent network.

Plaintiffs have not shown any likelihood that Defendants will be found liable for their continuing activities. There is ample evidence of BitTorrent’s – and other P2P software’s – ability to infringe copyrights and that a large number of individuals use the software to infringe. Defendants are clearly aware of both of these facts. However, inducement of infringement requires more than just knowledge of actual or potential infringement. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005). While there might be some evidence of past inducement of copyright infringement, there is no evidence of any ongoing distribution of any file sharing software “with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”

The Court is well-aware that injunctions are often properly imposed where allegedly wrongful conduct has ceased. However, there must be at least some evidence that future infringement may occur. Here, Plaintiffs’ only solid evidence of possible inducement comes from reviews that were published a decade ago.... The other articles cited by Plaintiffs merely discuss P2P issues, including legitimate distribution through P2P, and the various technological and legal issues that have emerged with the technologies. (See id., Ex. M, O, T, U, V, X.) The Court has no reason to believe that Defendants will purposefully encourage copyright infringement now or in the foreseeable future.

The nature of some of the supposedly problematic articles also demonstrates that an injunction is not in the public interest. Most of the articles cited by Plaintiffs are straightforward, legitimate news articles that do not in any way encourage or induce copyright infringement. This suggests that Plaintiffs’ goal goes far beyond stopping actual infringement by Defendants and extends instead to silencing public discussion of P2P technologies.

The majority opinion is rooted in its conception of what Congress ought to have done rather than what it did. It is also an abdication of this court’s obligation to interpret Congressional policy rather than alter it. When this court convenes en banc, it frees itself of the obligation to follow its own prior precedential decisions. But it is beyond our power to rewrite Congress’s laws. Similarly, we are obliged to follow the pronouncements of the Su-preme Court concerning the proper interpretation of those acts.

• While it probably does not change US law (with some possible exceptions, especially in the realm of patents), it certainly does function to lock in US law, in a rapidly changing area of law, where specifics are far from settled. Supporters of ACTA continue to insist that not only does it not change US law, but that it cannot change US law, since it's an "executive agreement" rather than a treaty (more on that later). The reality, however, is that to be in compliance with this agreement, the US needs to retain certain parts of copyright law that many reformers believe should be changed. At the very least, it ties Congress' hands, if we want to be in compliance with our "international obligations."
  
  An example of this is on the question of inducement theory for copyright law. Within copyright law there is direct infringement (you did the infringement) and indirect or secondary infringement (you had a hand in making someone else infringe). In general we should be wary of secondary liability issues, because they can create chilling effects for new innovations. It's why the Supreme Court allowed the VCR to exist, despite the fact that it enabled infringement. Contributory infringement (in which you're more actively involved) has been illegal, but there has been some question about inducing infringement (i.e., leading or pushing others into infringing). There was an attempt by Congress nearly a decade ago, under the INDUCE Act, to make inducement a violation of copyright law, but it failed to go anywhere in Congress. Of course, the Supreme Court then stepped in with its Grokster decision that made up (pretty much out of thin air) a standard for "inducement" to be a violation of the law.
  
  Normally, if Congress decides the Supreme Court got something wrong, it can pass a law to clarify. However, under the terms of ACTA, countries need to consider inducement a violation of copyright law. There's no way to read this other than to tie Congress' hands on the question of inducement. That's a big issue because we're still sorting through the true impact of considering inducement as against the law. I know it's tough to believe Congress could ever push back on ever more draconian copyright law, but with the SOPA/PIPA backlash, there's at least a sliver of hope that some are aware that these issues impact innovation. Should Congress realize that greater liability through inducement is a mistake, under ACTA, their hands are mostly tied if they want to fix it. That's a problem.


• Beyond just locking in parts of copyright law, ACTA also expands it. First, it takes things that would normally be considered non-commercial file sharing (which is potentially against the law), and turns it into commercial scale criminal infringement. Similarly, it appears to broaden the definitions around inducement/secondary liability to make what had been a civil (between two private parties) issue into criminal aiding and abetting. Basically, there are parts of ACTA that effectively seek to take what would normally be civil infringements, dealt with between two private parties, and allow the entertainment industry to offload the policing to government law enforcement (paid for by tax payers) and leading to a higher likelihood of jail time.


• Copyright law is, by its very nature, a bundle of forces -- some that incentivize good behavior, and some that are bad. There should be no question that copyright has some good effects and some bad effects. The real question is in weighing the good and the bad and making sure that that the bad don't outweigh the good. Often, copyright law has used exceptions (fair use, public domain, de minimus use, first sale, etc.) to act as a "safety valve" in an attempt to make sure the bad doesn't outweigh the good.
  
  However, ACTA pretends that copyright is only good and there's no need to minimize the bad effects. That is, it only talks about the enforcement side, and completely ignores the necessary exceptions to copyright law that make it function. Basically, it exports the punishments from the US, but leaves out the safety valves. That's pretty scary. It may be (well, not really) okay in the US where fair use is clearly established, but most other countries don't have fair use at all (if they have anything, it's a much weaker system known as "fair dealing"). Exporting strict enforcement without exceptions is dangerous and will lead to unnecessary limitations on creativity and speech.


• There are serious health risks associated with ACTA, especially in the developing world. In this case, Europe pushed strongly to include patents under ACTA (something the US actually preferred to leave out). This has complicated matters for some countries. Under existing international agreements, countries can ignore pharmaceutical patents to deal with health emergencies. That is, if you have an outbreak and need a drug that pharmaceutical companies are unwilling to supply at a reasonable price, governments can break the patent and produce their own. That becomes much more difficult under ACTA, which could be a real threat to health around the globe.
  
  Similarly, there are very reasonable concerns that ACTA will be used to crack down, not on actual counterfeit medicines, but on "grey market" drugs -- generic, but legal, copies of medicines. Some European nations, for example, already have a history of seizing shipments of perfectly legal generic drugs in passage to somewhere else. For example, say that a pharmaceutical company in India is shipping drugs to Brazil that are legal in both countries. However, those drugs violate a patent in Europe. If, during transit, those drugs pass through Europe, customs agents may seize them. That's already been happening, but the fear is that there's greater power to do so under ACTA.


• ACTA presents certain requirements for border patrol agents in determining what is and what is not infringing. This is a big issue for a variety of reasons. First, as we've seen in the US, ICE/border patrol isn't very good at figuring out what is and what is not infringing. Traditionally, there are significant questions of fact to be explored in determining if something is infringing, but under ACTA, border patrol often will be in a position to make a snap decision. Believe it or not, Homeland Security itself was worried about ACTA, because of fears that it would actually make it more difficult to be effective on intellectual property issues -- and might require them to spend more time trying to figure out if something is infringing, rather than if there's a terrorist trying to get into the country.


• Again, while ACTA supporters insist that it won't require changes to US law, there are a few parts of ACTA that are so vague that you can definitely see how they could be interpreted to require changes to US law. One key example is where certain kinds of patent infringement cases protect against either injunctions or damages... whereas ACTA would require one or the other.


• Even the signing parties don't agree on the purpose, scope and nature of ACTA. This may be the scariest part. Part of the debate in the US is over the USTR and President Obama's claim that ACTA is not a binding treaty, but rather a sole executive agreement that doesn't need Congressional approval. Many believe that this is unconstitutional, and Senator Ron Wyden has asked the President to explain what certainly appears to be a violation of the Constitution. However, over in Europe, they're insisting that it is a binding treaty. The US, on the other hand, has already said that it can ignore anything it doesn't like in ACTA. If you think that's a recipe for an international problem, you get a gold star.


• Finally, international trade agreements are a favorite tool of the copyright maximalist. You see it all the time. If they can't pass legislation they want, they resort to getting these things put into international trade agreements, which get significantly less scrutiny. This also allows for two tricks: the first is leapfrogging, where you get each country to implement the laws required by these agreements in slightly different ways, and then push other countries to match (or better yet, exceed) the rules in the other countries to stay in compliance. Then you use those agreements to demand the same thing from other countries to "harmonize" international laws. It's already been admitted that ACTA was done outside of existing structures for IP-related international agreements (like WIPO and the WTO) because a few countries wanted to negotiate it without input from Brazil, Russia, India and China... but the plan has always been to get ACTA approved, and then pressure those other countries to join.
  
  The sneaky part is that once you have some of these "international obligations," it's almost impossible to get out of them. Copyright maximalists love to shout about how we must absolutely respect our "international obligations" on these kinds of treaties, to limit the government's ability to fix copyright law.

Circumstantial facts like these tend to be the only available evidence in any event, for the jury lacks direct access to the defendant’s mind. The jury must often infer knowledge from conduct, and attempts to eliminate evidence of knowledge may justify such inference, as where an accused inducer avoids further confirming what he already believes with good reason to be true. The majority’s decision to expand the statute’s scope appears to depend on the unstated premise that knowledge requires certainty, but the law often permits probabilistic judgments to count as knowledge.

The Court appears to endorse the willful blindness doctrine here for all federal criminal cases involving knowledge. It does so in a civil case where it has received no briefing or argument from the criminal defense bar, which might have provided important counsel on this difficult issue.

"[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties . . . [but] mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct . . . ."

The analogy between accomplice liability and contributory infringement fails given careful consideration of the reasons behind imposing criminal sanctions on indirect actors. Accountability for accomplices requires a tight nexus between the mental state of the defendant and the ultimate criminal act committed by another. This paradigm cannot be used, however, to structure contributory infringement law given the different theoretical bases for the two secondary liability regimes and the particular evidentiary issues accompanying infringement.

KEI has learned that the European Union has proposed language in the ACTA negotiations to require criminal penalties for "inciting, aiding and abetting" certain offenses, including "at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting and copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale."

"significant willful copyright or related rights infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain"

That Flagpole Sitta video made me incredibly happy, just when I thought there was NOTHING that could make me listen to that song again. A thousand thank you's.

"Morally, I'm a Christian. 'Thou shalt not steal.' But to me, even copyright infringement when it occurs may not necessarily be stealing."

"(copyright infringement) does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud... The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use."

It's now decided that Assisting with assisting with assisting of eventual copyright infringement is a crime.