A secretive federal court last year approved all of the 1,856 requests to search or electronically surveil people within the United States “for foreign intelligence purposes,” the Justice Department reported this week.

The 2012 figures represent a 5 percent bump from the prior year, when no requests were denied either.

The legislation does not require the government to identify the target or facility to be monitored. It can begin surveillance a week before making the request to the secret court, and the surveillance can continue during the appeals process if, in a rare case, the spy court rejects the surveillance application.

The same Justice Department report this week said the government issued 15,229 National Security Letters last year, down from 16,511 in 2011.

As an instrument of public oversight, the annual reports on FISA are only minimally informative. They register gross levels of activity, but they provide no measures of quality, performance or significance. Neither counterintelligence successes nor failures can be discerned from the reports. Nor can one conclude from the data presented that the FISA process is functioning as intended, or that it needs to be curbed or refined.

Last summer, in an effort to strike the right balance between government transparency and the protection of critical intelligence activities, the government declassified four statements concerning its activities pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) Amendments Act of 2008. Not content with that disclosure, Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF” or “Plaintiff”) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request seeking additional information related to two of the declassified statements, specifically, that on at least one occasion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) “held that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” and that “on at least one occasion the FISA Court has reached th[e ] conclusion” that “the government’s implementation of Section 702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law.”

The government has determined that disclosure of the information withheld from Plaintiff could result in exceptionally grave and serious damage to the national security. Plaintiff obviously cannot contend otherwise. The Court accordingly should defer to the government’s determination in this case, uphold the Department’s withholdings, and grant this motion.

Yet, as the amicus brief points out, the OLC’s opinions aren’t some intermediary step toward establishing the final legal interpretations for the executive branch. In general, they are the final legal interpretations for the executive branch. The FBI could choose to exercise the authority that the OLC said it had — or not — but Congress, the judiciary and the public at large all deserve to know what the executive branch thinks it can do, once it issues a conclusive opinion.

Many foreign companies are converging toward a common argument for why they’re better than their American competitors. It’s not that the foreign-made technology is better, more resilient, or more ubiquitous, nor that the foreign companies are more innovative or better managed. They compare not their businessmen but their politicians. They argue simply that American laws undermine any American product — that these laws fail to protect privacy of personal or business information of all users. This argument works partly because consumers claim to “avoid doing business” with companies they don’t trust to protect their privacy.

The Government has provided copies of the opinions and the filings by the Government to this Committee, and the Government will continue to inform the Committee about developments in this manner.

There's currently nothing on the New York Times web site about the votes (either yesterday's or today's). The Associated Press wrote a story about the House's vote in September but nothing yet from yesterday or today. The Washington Post did post a story this morning. A Google news search will land hits with mostly tech or web-based media outlets.

Compare the lack of response to the way people react to privacy breaches connected to Facebook or Twitter. Media outlet after media outlet carried reports about a private picture of Randi Zuckerberg, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg's sister, accidentally being made public somehow through social media channels. And how many of your Facebook friends posted that silly, pointless "privacy notice" on their walls?

The degradation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is an academic or theoretical matter for so many people and often lacks a strong human narrative to draw public outrage. Indeed, the very secrecy behind the application of federal domestic wiretapping has made it impossible to introduce a human narrative. We do not even know how many Americans have been spied on due to these rules (which was what Wyden's amendment was trying to fix). Like our foreign drone strikes and indefinite detention laws, the public's distance from the actual rights violations (and government-fueled fears of acts of terrorism) is a useful barrier for the state to get away with expanding its authority beyond the Constitution's limitations without significant voter pushback.

Whereas, just about everybody's on Facebook. Facebook's privacy systems affect them directly every day, and they see it. So Americans are furious that Instagram might sell their photos, while shrugging at what the federal government might do with the exact same data.

There was never really any chance of FISA not being renewed, but the proposed amendments would have added vital checks to the law, most of which seemed to be just common-sense—such as requiring a report to Congress on the program's privacy impact. With all these changes rejected, the renewal means another five-year virtual carte blanche for the NSA to collect data on US citizens under a secret interpretation of the law that the public is not allowed to see, without even providing an estimate on how many Americans have had their privacy violated.

What was in the Wyden-Udall amendment? Even according to the White House's leaked talking points, which were strongly opposed to the amendments, it sounds like something that just makes sense:

What the Amendment Does: Requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress and the public on the impact FAA and other surveillance authorities have on the privacy of United States persons.

As Wyden has pointed out in the past, and re-iterated during debate this morning, not only is Congress unable to get an estimate from the NSA on how many American citizens have been spied on through FISA, he is unable to even get a yes or no answer as to whether such an estimate exists. Considering FISA is supposed to be subject to Congressional oversight, this seems like a pretty big problem, and one worth fixing before renewing the program for another five years. Instead, the Senate voted to wash its hands of the issue, despite solid evidence that the NSA is engaged in widespread spying on US citizens and at least one known instance in which the 4th Amendment was violated. So much for checks and balances.

Update: As expected, immediately following the rejection of this amendment, the Senate voted to extend FISA for another five years.

What the Amendment Does: Requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress and the public on the impact FAA and other surveillance authorities have on the privacy of United States persons.

Sen. Ron Wyden, one of the most ardent defenders of civil liberties in the Senate, has been asking the NSA for months for information on how the FISA Amendments Act has impacted Americans.

The NSA has so far refused, yet, as the New York Times reported in 2009, we know the NSA was still intercepting domestic communications in a "significant and systematic" way. We also know the secret FISA court ruled, on at least one occasion, that the government had violated the Fourth Amendment when conducting surveillance under the FAA. Yet the NSA has rather unbelievably claimed releasing the number of Americans whose privacy has been violated would violate those same Americans' privacy.

Ron Wyden's amendment would force the NSA to come clean and give a general estimate of how many Americans have been affected by this unconstitutional bill, and finally give us information Americans deserve.

In addition, another Wyden amendment would clarify that the acquisition of American communications is prohibited without a warrant. Sen. Wyden has accused the government of conducting "backdoor searches," whereby the government collects communications of foreign individuals talking to Americans, but later goes back into the government's database of intercepted communications and reviews the Americans' communications. Sen. Wyden hopes this clarification to the law will help guard against further intrusive spying on American communications.

• The Administration opposes this amendment. The goal of this amendment is to obtain an estimate of the number of U.S. persons' communications that may have been collected. Two independent inspectors general have determined, and reported to Congress, that it is not feasible to provide actual numbers or estimates. They also found that an effort to provide such numbers by deliberately trying to identify U.S. person information would adversely affect the privacy of any U.S. persons whose incidentally collected communications may exist within the collected data.
• Representatives of the Intelligence Community have briefed the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees in more detail as to why it is not feasible to provide such numbers or estimates and stand ready to answer questions from other Members in a classified setting.
• FAA contains significant privacy protections for U.S. persons, to include extensive reporting to Congress to allow Congress to assess the privacy impact of FAA on U.S. persons.

• We oppose this amendment. The Executive Branch works diligently to ensure Congress is fully informed of the intelligence collection operations under FAA, notwithstanding the need for the Executive Branch to carry out certain sensitive intelligence activities in a classified manner.
• As part of Congress' intensive oversight of FISA activities, the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees receive, in classified form, all FISA Court opinions that include a significant interpretation of FISA provisions.
• We have committed to reviewing FISC opinions for release to the public with necessary redactions to protect national security equities and that effort is ongoing.
• This process must, by necessity, be undertaken with great care. In many cases, classified information is so intertwined with the legal analysis that redacting the classified information leaves a document that lacks any meaningful analysis. Because the Executive Branch is already undertaking a review of the FISC opinions for possible public release, we believe this amendment is unnecessary.

• We support the House passed sunset date of 2017 and oppose any effort to shorten the sunset date to 2015. The extensive congressional and judicial oversight and the strong track record of compliance supports an extension longer than, not shorter than, the original authorization.
• Aligning FAA with expiration of provisions of the Patriot Act risks confusing distinct issues.
• Frequent Congressional and public debate on intelligence authorities poses a greater risk of inadvertent disclosure of classified information.
• No additional reporting requirements are necessary. Section 702 of FISA is a well calibrated statute that provides for ample oversight by all three branches of government. This oversight framework ensures robust protections for the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons.

• We strongly oppose this amendment as it will effectively repeal the FISA Amendments Act and other federal laws by requiring a probable cause determination to obtain information on our foreign adversaries located overseas. As such, it would overturn years of federal law.
• This proposed amendment would severely limit the effectiveness of law enforcement, authorities at all levels of government. For example, Governments rely on legal tools such as grand jury subpoenas. The use of such tools would be prohibited under the amendment if that information is drawn from almost any system of records.

Reid wanted S. 3276 to be considered with a limited number of amendments, but Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) objected and said he didn’t understand why the Senate couldn’t just pass the House FISA bill. He referred to a letter stating that the Obama administration supports the House-version.

The constitutional standard for all search warrants is probable cause of crime. FISA, however, established a new, different and lesser standard -- thus unconstitutional on its face since Congress is bound by, and cannot change, the Constitution -- of probable cause of status. The status was that of an agent of a foreign power. So, under FISA, the feds needed to demonstrate to a secret court only that a non-American physically present in the U.S., perhaps under the guise of a student, diplomat or embassy janitor, was really an agent of a foreign power, and the demonstration of that agency alone was sufficient to authorize a search warrant to listen to the agent's telephone calls or read his mail.

Over time, the requirement of status as a foreign agent was modified to status as a foreign person. This, of course, was an even lesser standard and one rarely rejected by the FISA court. In fact, that court has rarely rejected anything, having granted search warrants in well over 97 percent of applications. This is hardly harmless, as foreign persons in the U.S. are frequently talking to Americans in the U.S. Thus, not only did FISA violate the privacy rights of foreigners (the Fourth Amendment protects "people," not just Americans); it violated the rights of those with whom they were communicating, American or non-American.

It gets worse. The Patriot Act, which was enacted in 2001 and permits federal agents to write their own search warrants in violation of the Fourth Amendment, actually amended FISA so as to do away with the FISA-issued search warrant requirement when the foreign person is outside the U.S. This means that if you email or call your cousin in Europe or a business colleague in Asia, the feds are reading or listening, without a warrant, without suspicion, without records and without evidence of anything unlawful.

Moreover, everyone in Congress has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, which could not be more clear: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects..." shall not be violated, except via a warrant issued by a neutral judge upon the judge finding probable cause of crime. If we let Congress, which is a creature of the Constitution, change the Constitution, then no one's liberty or property is safe, and freedom is dependent upon the political needs of those in power.

The President and the leadership of both political parties in both houses of Congress have abandoned their oaths to uphold the Constitution. They have claimed that foreigners and their American communicants are committed to destroying the country and only the invasion of everyone's right to privacy will keep us safe. They are violating the privacy of us all to find the communications of a few. Who will keep us safe from them?

Wyden said he would lift his hold in exchange for a Senate floor vote on an amendment requiring the government to account for how many times Americans’ communications have been accepted, and another amendment prohibiting U.S. spy agencies from reviewing the communications of Americans ensnared in the program.

If that doesn’t go over, he’d lift the hold so the Senate could vote on brief extension of the act so his amendments and others could be fully debated next year.

“I’m willing to go along with a short-term extension as long as we have a chance in the early future, in 2013, to have a debate,” Wyden said.

First, we asked if any entities have made any estimates -- even imprecise estimates -- about how many US cmmunications have been collected under section 702 of the FISA statute (which is the central provision of the FISA Amendments Act). You did not answer this question. Please provide an answer. We would expect this answer to be unclassified, but if you disagree please provide your reasons for keeping this answer secret.

Second, we asked if it was possible to estimate the order of magnitude of this number. (For example, is the number of US communications collected under section 702 closer to 100. or 100.000. or 100 million?) You did not answer this question directly, however the Director of the NSA has made public statements that appear to estimate this order of magnitude. Specifically, the NSA Director has said that "the story that [the NSA] has millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false." Please explain whether this statement should be understood to mean that the number of US communications collected under section 702 is less than "millions or hundreds of millions." Since the NSA Director made this statement publicly, we would expect this answer to be unclassified as well.

Third, we asked if any wholly domestic American communications had been collected under section 702 authorities. Your response was classified. We do not understand how simply stating whether any wholly domestic communications have been collected under section 702 authorities would have any impact at all on US national security interests. if you believe that it would, please explain why. And if you agree that it would not, please provide an unclassified answer to this question.

Fourth, we noted that the FISA Amendments Act does not prohibit searching through communications collected under section 702 to find the communications of particular Americans, and asked if the US government has ever attempted to search for the communications of a specific American in this way without a warrant or emergency authorization. Your response was classified. We do not understand how providing a 'yes' or 'no' answer to this question would impact US national security interests in any way, and we ask that you provide an unclassified response.

We note that classifying these answers does not just keep them secret from the public. Most members of Congress including eleven of the thirteen senators that signed our letter - do not have any staff who are cleared to read your attachment, which will make it extremely difficult for most members to review and understand these" answers.

We cannot provide additional answers to your questions in an unclassified format. Rather than provide you with imprecise, unclassified information, I reiterate our offer to meet with you -- and any other Members of Congress -- in a classified setting to discuss these authorities and answer any questions you might have.

I also share your interest in an informed public debate on the government's use of its intelligence collection authorities. As you know, it is my responsibility under the law to protect critical intelligence activities from public disclosure in order to safeguard sensitive sources and methods, including the government's acquisition of vital foreign intelligence information through FAA authorities. Our earlier publicly available letters, including my August 24, 2012 unclassified letter (with classified annex) responding to your July 26, 2012 inquiry, and General Alexander's November 13, 2012 letter, properly balance protecting classified information and informing the public of the manner in which FAA is implemented.

General Verrilli, can you be specific on who that person would be? Because, as I understand it, it's unlikely that, for example, the lawyers in this case would be charged with any criminal offense. It's more probable that their clients would be; but, according to the government, their clients have no Fourth Amendment rights because they are people who are noncitizens who acted abroad.

So it's hard for me to envision. I see the theoretical possibility, but I don't see a real person who would be subject to a Federal charge who could raise an objection.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, is it really such speculation, General? I mean, just imagine that -- yourself in this lawyer's position, and the lawyer says, I'm representing a person associated with a terrorist organization, I'm representing KLM in the case of one of these lawyers, and I'm going to be talking to that person's family members and associates and trying to find out everything that I can.

Now, as a lawyer, would you take precautions, or would you pick up the phone and start writing e-mails to all those people?

GENERAL VERRILLI: If I took precautions, it would be because of a belief that I had to comply with an ethics rule, and the ethics rule would be the cause of me taking those precautions. It doesn't change the standard.

JUSTICE KAGAN: I don't even think it has to do with an ethics rule. If you're a good lawyer -forget the ethics rule and how the ethics rules apply. Are you really going to tell me that you, as a lawyer, would just pick up the phone in the face of this statute and talk to these terrorists' associates?

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You have two arguments; one is likelihood of future injury and the other is present obligations or cause. I want to focus on the former. Our standard is certainly impending, and you articulated it by saying, substantial risk. There is obviously a vast difference between those two.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I don't think, Your Honor, that the Court has settled on certainly impending. The cases that the -- the Government cites are cases like -- I think that the one that the Government cites, relies on most heavily is Summers. But in Summers, the distinction between likelihood and certainly impending was not one that the Court relied on in -- in that decision. The Court said that plaintiffs couldn't meet even the lower standard. So I think that the discussion of certainly impending -

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But both in Summers and Monsanto the Government tells us: We knew that the governmental act was occurring, and then once we knew that, the question was substantial risk.

MR. JAFFER: Justice Kennedy, the -- the -the cases that we rely on, Monsanto, Laidlaw, Meese v. Keene, these are cases in which the Court didn't look to the certainly impending standard at all. The question that the Court asked in those cases was: Is there a substantial risk? Is there a substantial risk that effectively compels the plaintiffs to act in the way they are -- they are acting?

JUSTICE SCALIA: Does that assessment take into account the fact that a court is going to pass upon the Government's ability to intercept these communications?

MR. JAFFER: It does, Justice Scalia. I mean you -- you are right that there is a court that in some sense stands between plaintiffs and the future injury that they -- that they fear.

JUSTICE SCALIA: With the obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment.

MR. JAFFER: I don't think it's that simple. The -- the -- the court, the FISA court, is tasked with assessing the reasonableness of targeting and minimization procedures. But the statute itself forecloses the court from imposing the kinds of limits that plaintiffs think the Fourth Amendment requires. So for example, the statute itself in section (g)(4) says that the Government is not required to identify the facilities to be monitored. And the statute itself in defining targeting procedures defines them to be procedures intended to ensure that the targets are outside the United States.

JUSTICE SCALIA: But if as you say those procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, it doesn't matter what the statute says.

MR. JAFFER: Well, the Court would have to -

JUSTICE SCALIA: If those statutory provisions would produce a violation of the Fourth Amendment, they are null and void, right?

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think that's right.

The -- the court -

JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So the FISA Court would presumably know that.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think if that had happened over the last 4 years, the Government wouldn't be seeking reauthorization of the statute now.

JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see how the rest of your challenge or your challenge to the remainder of this statute can be characterized as a facial challenge, because it necessarily assumes that the FISA court will mistakenly say that there has been no Fourth Amendment violation, doesn't it?

MR. JAFFER: I don't think that's so, Justice Scalia. Our concern is not -- not that -- that the FISA court will make mistakes, although it well might. The concern -- the main concern is that the reasonableness inquiry that the FISA court engages in is a narrowly cabined one. They court can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified the facilities. They can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified a specific target.

Discomfort with the government’s capacity, technical or legal, to collect and retain massive amounts of personal information is understandable. But the 2008 FISA amendments sought a compromise between two essential goals: preserving American liberty and robustly defending Americans’ lives and property. We favored the law and believe that it should be extended.

Having appealed the denial of my request, I got an impressively prompt reply on Tuesday evening from the director of the Office of Information Policy at DOJ, assuring me that she recognized the agency's initial response had been "incorrect," and that a new one would be forthcoming immediately. By Wednesday morning, their stance had changed entirely: They had found the reports I sought, and were forwarding them to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for review to determine what would need to be redacted before release--with a request that ODNI seek to expedite its analysis to compensate for their own delay.

Now, to be sure, I'd rather have had this response a month ago, and the documents before the House vote, but at this point DOJ appears to be doing exactly what they're supposed to and making a good faith effort to facilitate the redaction and release of these important assessments. So it seemed appropriate to follow up on my initial blog post to acknowledge that--and in particular Office of Information Policy director Melanie Pustay, who straightforwardly acknowledged the error and acted quickly to correct it. We'll see soon enough whether a similar spirit of transparency reigns at ODNI.

Cross-posted from Cato-at-Liberty.

“If FISA’s reference to ‘common carrier’ were interpreted in accord with the Communications Act,” Kris and Wilson explain, explicitly citing the Brand X decision, “information (such as e-mail) being carried on a cable owned and offered by a cable modem service provider would not be a ‘wire communication’ under FISA, and acquisition of such information would not be ‘electronic surveillance’ under” the definition that applies to traditional phone calls.

So the FISA Amendments Act allows the government to target foreigners and capture conversations with Americans — with no warrant required, so long as they aren’t actually trying to wiretap the American via a technical loophole.

But if the government’s problem is an inability to reliably determine the location of parties to a communication, it’s not clear why we should be confident that interception under this broad new authority can reliably avoid acquiring many purely domestic communications. Even if it can, blanket authority to acquire the international communications of Americans — with no requirement that the foreign side of the conversation be suspected of any connection to terrorism or espionage‹seems like an incredibly broad way of addressing the issue.

Perhaps Kris and Wilson are correct that a narrower solution to the problem would have been unworkable. On the other hand, perhaps legislators would have tried a bit harder to craft a viable narrow solution if they, and the general public, had clearly understood exactly what the problem was.

The head of the U.S. government’s vast spying apparatus has conceded that recent surveillance efforts on at least one occasion violated the Constitutional prohibitions on unlawful search and seizure.

The admission comes in a letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassifying statements that a top U.S. Senator wished to make public in order to call attention to the government’s 2008 expansion of its key surveillance law.

• It is also true that on at least one occasion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court held that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
• I believe that the government's implementation of Section 702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law, and on at least one occasion the FISA Court has reached this same conclusion.

If we care about the spirit as well as the letter of that constraint being respected, it ought to be a little disturbing that the NSA has admitted it doesn’t have any systematic mechanism for identifying communications with U.S. endpoints. Similar considerations apply to the “minimization procedures” which are supposed to limit the retention and dissemination of information about U.S. persons: How meaningfully can these be applied if there’s no systematic effort to detect when a U.S. person is party to a communication?

More generally, these reports contain a good deal of redacted statistical information that there is simply no plausible excuse for keeping secret. A table of “statistical data relating to compliance incidents,” for example, is included—but entirely blacked out. Are we to believe that the national security of the United States would be imperiled if the public knew the number of times the NSA had difficulty following the law? The reviewers conclude that the “number of compliance incidents remains small, particularly when compared with the total amount of activity”—but is there any legitimate reason for barring the public from knowing what counts as a “small” number, or just how massive the “total amount of activity” truly is?

While we are sure that you would agree that government officials should not describe government authorities in a way that misleads the public, during your tenure Justice Department officials have -- on a number of occasions -- made what we believe are misleading statements pertaining to the government's interpretation of surveillance law.

The first set of statements that concern us are the repeated claims by Justice Department officials that the government's authority to obtain business records or other 'tangible things' under section 215 of the USA Patriot Act is analogous to the use of a grand jury subpoena. This comparison -- which we consider highly misleading -- has been made by Justice Department officials on multiple occasions, including in testimony before Congress. As you know, Section 215 authorities are not interpreted the same way that grand jury subpoena authorities are, and we are concerned that when Justice Department officials suggest that the two authorities are "analogous" they provide the public with a false understanding of how surveillance law is interpreted in practice.

More recently, we were troubled to learn that a Justice Department spokesman state that "Section 215 [of the Patriot Act] is not a secret law, nor has it been implemented under secret legal opinions by the Justice Department." This statement is also extremely misleading. As the NSA General Counsel testified in July of this year, significant interpretations of section 215 of the Patriot Act are contained in classified opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and these opinions -- and the legal interpretations they contain -- continue to be kept secret. In our judgment, when the government relies on significant interpretations of public statutes that are kept secret from the American public, the government is effectively relying on secret law.

Americans will eventually and inevitably come to learn about the gap that currently exists between the public's understanding of government surveillance authorities and the official, classified interpretation of these authorities. We believe the best way to avoid a negative public reaction and an erosion in confidence in US intelligence agencies is to initiate an informed public debate about these authorities today.

As most of my colleagues remember, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act in 2008 in an effort to give the government new authorities to conduct surveillance of foreigners outside the United States. The bill contained an expiration date of December 2012, and the purpose of this expiration date was to force members of Congress to come back in a few years and examine whether these new authorities had been interpreted and implemented as intended.

I believe that Congress has not yet adequately examined this issue, and that there are important questions that need to be answered before the FISA Amendments Act is given a long-term extension.

The central section of the FISA Amendments Act, the part that is now section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act itself, specifically stated that it was intended to address foreigners outside the United States, and it even required the Attorney General to develop procedures designed to make sure that any individuals targeted with this new authority are believed to be outside the United States. So one of the central questions that Congress needs to ask is, are these procedures working as intended? Are they keeping the communications of law-abiding Americans from being swept up under this authority that was designed to apply to foreigners?

In democratic societies, citizens rightly expect that their government will not arbitrarily keep information secret from the public but instead will act with secrecy only in certain limited circumstances.

• Dianne Feinstein, California (chair)
• Saxby Chambliss, Georgia (vice chair)
• John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia
• Olympia J. Snowe, Maine
• Ron Wyden, Oregon
• Richard Burr, North Carolina
• Barbara A. Mikulski, Maryland
• James Risch, Idaho
• Bill Nelson, Florida
• Daniel Coats, Indiana
• Kent Conrad, North Dakota
• Roy Blunt, Missouri
• Mark Udall, Colorado
• Marco Rubio, Florida
• Mark Warner, Virginia