“It’s a single point in the system through which all of the content can be collected if they can manage to activate it,” said Edward W. Felten, a computer science professor at Princeton and one of the authors of the report... “That’s a security vulnerability waiting to happen, as if we needed more,” he said.

Despite the seizure of the phone records, a Justice Department spokesman said the agency valued freedom of the press and was “always careful and deliberative in seeking to strike the right balance between the public interest in the free flow of information and the public interest in the fair and effective administration of our criminal laws.”

On November 5, [redacted], the case agent sent an e-mail asking another Special Agent in the [redacted] Field Office to inquire, in the other agent's capacity as his squad's liaison to the CAU, whether the on-site communications service providers could obtain telephone toll records of U.S. persons making [redacted] calls [redacted]. The case agent's November 5 e-mail listed 12 [redacted] telephone numbers, 8 of which were identified in the e-mail as belonging to Washington Post reporters [redacted] and Washington Post researcher [redacted] and New York Times reporters [redacted] The email identified a 7-month period -- a few months before and a few months after the published articles -- as the time period of interest for the leak investigation.

[....] However, in absence of any request from the case agent or anyone in the FBI, the CAU SSA issued an exigent letter dated December 17, [redacted], to Company A for telephone records of the reporters and others listed in the case agent's November 5, [redacted], e-mail. We determined that the SSA did this without further discussion with the case agent or the Special Agent who had asked only whether such records could be obtained through on-site providers, not that the records should be obtained.

The CAU SSA's exigent letter sought records on nine telephone numbers, seven of which were identified in the e-mail exchanges described above as belonging to Washington Post and New York Times reporters or their news organizations' bureaus in [redacted].....

The exigent letter did not specify the 7-month interval noted in the case agent's November 5 e-mail, or contain any date restrictions. The exigent letter also stated that the request was made "due to exigent circumstances" and that "subpoenas requesting this information have been submitted to the U.S. Attorney's office who will process and serve them formally on [Company A] as expeditiously as possible." However, this statement was not accurate. A subpoena request had not been sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office at the time the exigent letter was served, or at any time thereafter.

The judge also ruled that the government was not in the wrong for failing to disclose to a magistrate judge that it planned to use a stingray to track the defendant, or to explain to the judge how the tracking device it intended to use worked. He characterized this information as a “detail of execution which need not be specified.”

“When the government is seeking a warrant to use new technology, it has the duty to explain to the court what that technology is and how it works,” she said. “Stingrays are a very potent example of why that is so, because it scoops up innocent information of third parties who are not under probable cause surveillance.”

A spokeswoman for the Boston Police Department said the Boston Regional Intelligence Center [] was never notified about the FBI investigation.

In response, FBI supervisory Agent Jason Pack e-mailed a statement suggesting that state and local officials had ample access to information about the Tsarnaev investigation in 2011, through their participation in an FBI unit in Boston, the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

If the FBI’s investigatory work with state and locals on terrorism is situated at the JTTFs, as it appears to be, what useful purpose do fusion centers serve with respect to terrorism? The jury is out on that question. But we know a bit about some non-terrorism related activities at the BRIC.

A public records lawsuit in 2011 showed that the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, like other fusion centers nationwide, devoted resources and time to spying on perfectly peaceful dissenters like Veterans for Peace and Code Pink.

In enacting the ECPA, Congress concluded that customers may not retain a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in information sent to network providers. . . [I]f the contents of an unopened message are kept beyond six months or stored on behalf of the customer after the e-mail has been received or opened, it should be treated the same as a business record in the hands of a third party, such as an accountant or attorney. In that case, the government may subpoena the records from the third party without running afoul of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.

If nothing else, these records show that federal policy around access to the contents of our electronic communications is in a state of chaos. The FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and DOJ Criminal Division should clarify whether they believe warrants are required across the board when accessing people’s email. It has been clear since 1877 that the government needs a warrant to read letters sent via postal mail. The government should formally amend its policies to require law enforcement agents to obtain warrants when seeking the contents of all emails too.

More importantly, Congress also needs to reform ECPA to make clear that a warrant is required for access to all electronic communications. Reform legislation is making its way through the Senate now, and the documents released by the U.S. Attorney in Illinois illustrate that the law can be fixed without harming law enforcement goals. If you agree that your email and other electronic communications should be private, you can urge Congress to take action here.

BURNETT: Tim, is there any way, obviously, there is a voice mail they can try to get the phone companies to give that up at this point. It's not a voice mail. It's just a conversation. There's no way they actually can find out what happened, right, unless she tells them?

CLEMENTE: "No, there is a way. We certainly have ways in national security investigations to find out exactly what was said in that conversation. It's not necessarily something that the FBI is going to want to present in court, but it may help lead the investigation and/or lead to questioning of her. We certainly can find that out.

BURNETT: "So they can actually get that? People are saying, look, that is incredible.

CLEMENTE: "No, welcome to America. All of that stuff is being captured as we speak whether we know it or like it or not."

Under the draft proposal, a court could levy a series of escalating fines, starting at tens of thousands of dollars, on firms that fail to comply with wiretap orders, according to persons who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. A company that does not comply with an order within a certain period would face an automatic judicial inquiry, which could lead to fines. After 90 days, fines that remain unpaid would double daily.

It's illuminating to compare the minimum number of users affected by NSLs each year to the numbers we find in the government's official annual reports. In 2011—the last year for which we have a tally—the Justice Department acknowledged issuing 16,511 NSLs seeking information about U.S. persons, with a total of 7,201 Americans' information thus obtained. That's actually down from a staggering 14,212 Americans whose information DOJ reported obtaining via NSL the previous year. Remember, this total includes National Security Letters issued not just to all telecommunications providers—including online services like Google, broadband Internet companies, and cell phone carriers—but also "financial institutions," which are defined broadly to include a vast array of businesses beyond such obvious candidates as banks and credit card companies.

What ought to leap out at you here is the magnitude of Google's tally relative to that total: They got requests affecting at least 1,000 users in a year when DOJ reports just over 7,000 Americans affected by all NSLs—and it seems impossible that Google could account for anywhere remotely near a seventh of all NSL requests. Google, of course, is not limiting their tally to requests for information about Americans, which may explain part of the gap—but we know that, at least of a few years ago, the substantial majority of NSLs targeted Americans, and the proportion of the total targeting Americans was increasing year after year. As of 2006, for instance, 57 percent of NSL requests were for information about U.S. persons. So even if we reduce Google's minimum proportionately, that seems awfully high.

There's a simple enough explanation for this apparent discrepancy: The numbers DOJ reports each year explicitly exclude NSL requests for “basic subscriber information,” meaning the “name, address, and length of service” associated with an account, and only count more expansive requests that also demand more detailed “electronic communications transactional records” that are “parallel to” the “toll billing records” maintained by traditional phone companies.

In its judgment, the Court of Appeal says extradition hearings are not criminal trials and that the judge deciding whether to order extradition has only to be satisfied there is a case to answer.

The court said the US government had a duty of "candour and good faith" in making an extradition bid, but a summary of the evidence held would suffice.

The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terror shows how the FBI has, under the guise of engaging in counterterrorism since 9/11, built a network of more than 15,000 informants whose primary purpose is to infiltrate Muslim communities to create and facilitate phony terrorist plots so that the bureau can then claim victory in the war on terror.

Two decades ago, the FBI complained it was having trouble tapping the then-latest cellphones and digital telephone switches. After extensive FBI lobbying, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994, mandating that all telephone switches include FBI-approved wiretapping capabilities.

CALEA was justifiably controversial, not least because its requirement for “backdoors” across our communications infrastructure seemed like a security nightmare: How could we keep criminals and foreign spies from exploiting weaknesses in the new wiretapping features? Would we even be able to detect them when they did?

Those fears were soon borne out. In 2004, a mysterious someone — the case was never solved — hacked the wiretap backdoors of a Greek cellular switch to listen in on senior government officials … including the prime minister.

Think this could only happen abroad? Some years ago, the U.S. National Security Agency discovered that every telephone switch for sale to the Department of Defense had security vulnerabilities in their mandated wiretap implementations. Every. Single. One.

Last week, Digital Journal reported that the documents obtained by PCJF detailed how the FBI cooperated with the Department of Homeland Security, US military and private corporations to monitor and investigate Occupy Wall Street protesters as "domestic terrorists" and "criminals." The documents prove that federal agencies are "functioning as a de facto intelligence arm of Wall Street and corporate America," PCJF said.

Thorough analyses of the documents has now revealed a heavily redacted file that clearly mentions a plan to use snipers to assassinate Occupy protesters. The names of the groups or individuals involved in the murderous plot have been redacted, so it is impossible to identify them at this time. What is known is that the FBI never alerted any of the potential victims of the danger to their lives.

An identified [redacted] of October planned to engage in sniper attacks against protesters in Houston, Texas, if deemed necessary. An identified [redacted] had received intelligence that indicated the protesters in New York and Seattle planned similar protests in Houston, Dallas, San Antonio and Austin, Texas. [Redacted] planned to gather intelligence against the leaders of the protest groups and obtain photographs then formulate a plan to kill the leadership via suppressed sniper rifles.

I have reviewed several of the social media web sites for KABIR, SANTANA, DELEON, each of whom has posted radical prom jihad content on their respective pages. Additionally, portions of the social media show that DELEON and SANTANA "liked" postings on KABIR's Facebook page as early as May 2011.

Public items posted by KABIR to his social media accounts include photographs of himself, non-extremist content, radical Islamist content, and items reflecting a mistrust of mainstream media, abuses by the government, conspiracy theories, abuses by law enforcement, and the war in Afghanistan. KABIR's radical postings include videos and links to videos of Al-Qa'ida leader Anwar Al-Awlagi and his lectures, jihad--based videos regarding Afghanistan and elsewhere, videos depicting mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan and elsewhere, videos depicting terrorist training camps and related activities, videos depicting improvised explosive device attacks, and articles regarding the death of American soldiers in Afghanistan. For example, on July 6, 2012, KABIR shared a video to his public Facebook page entitled "Knights of Khorasan Islamic Emirate Operation Against an Army Base in Margha." This video, which I have reviewed, depicts a suicide bombing operation against a large base wherein the suicide- bomber drives an explosives-laden truck into a base and detonates it. The video bears the symbol of As-Sahab, Al-- Qa'ida's media wing, in the lower right corner.

KABIR has "shared" several postings with SANTANA and/or DELEON, both of whom have "liked" or commented on several other postings by KABIR, including the following:

a. On December 7, 2011, KABIR posted a video entitled "Black Flags of Khorasan: Part 2" that he later "shared" with DELEON.- (Based on my training and experience, conversations with other agents, and research of publicly available information, the black flag or banner refers to a traditional flag flown by Muhammad and later by Islamic military leaders. More recently, several jihadi groups and terrorists have adopted the black flag as a symbol for jihad and mujahideen fighters.)

b. On or about January 5, 2012, KABIR shared a link regarding negotiating with the Taliban. SANTANA "liked" the post and SANTANA and KABIR engaged in a public exchange of comments. SANTANA said, "they messed up know?" KABIR followed SANTANA's comment with a comment that appeared to include excerpts of a "Statement of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," which discussed the Taliban's desire to expel the United States from, and establish their own government in, Afghanistan. SANTANA replied to KABIR's comment by writing "Oh yea!!!!"

c. On January 5, 2012, KABIR posted a photo on his Facebook page depicting a veiled and covered woman leaning on an assault rifle. DELEON and KABIR exchanged comments on the photo wherein DELEON said "...hey bro are coming back? whats goin on? how long gona stay there?" KABIR replied "Naa.. not comin back... movin 4wd.... =D.... 1/2 way 2 my destination.. =D."

(Based on the context of this statement, including the fact that KABIR was then in Germany, I believe that KABIR intended to inform DELEON that he had commenced his journey to Afghanistan.)

d. On January 19, 2012, DELEON "liked" a shared link posted on KABIR's page of a video entitled "Dua of Sheikh Muhammad al Mohaisany masjid al haram makkah." The video, which I have reviewed as posted on KABIR's page, appears to be a prayer for the success of the mujahideen and features various photos including Al--Qa'ida leaders Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, 9/11 attacks, bloodied adults and children, and Islamic fighters. The video also calls for the liberation of Al-Aqsa, the mosque referenced in the 1998 Al-Qa'ida fatwa described above.

e. On February 13, 2012, SANTANA "liked" two shared video links on KABIR's page, including one for a video entitled "Imam Anwar al Awlaki -- A Story of Courage."

f. On May 28, 2012, KABIR posted two stories regarding the death of Al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin Laden. DELEON "liked" both stories; SANTANA "liked" one.

g. On June 16, 2012, SANTANA "liked" a video, produced by Al--Qa'ida's media wing, As-Sahab, shared by KABIR to his Facebook page entitled "Ghuraba." This video, which I have reviewed, appears to depict life as a mujahideen fighter and includes several interviews. The video also features mujahideen fighters firing artillery.

h. On July 5, 2012, KABIR posted a photo featuring Al-Qa'ida leader Anwar Al-Awlaqi which contained a quote from Al-Awlaqi. DELEON "liked" and "shared" the photo.

i. On September 16, 2012, DELEON "liked" KABIR's shared link to a video entitled "The Truth Has Come and Falsehood has perished Part 1 Urdu." This video, which I have reviewed, is a production by As-Sahab and begins with footage of Al-Awlaqi and discusses the war in Afghanistan. The video also features current Al-Qa'ida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

On September 17, 2012 SANTANA "liked" KABIR's post of an article entitled "A Public Talk by Ustadz Abu M Jibriel AR: The Truth of The 9/11 Jihad Operation, The Plots Of The Enemies and The Zionist Conspiracy."

Seven House Republicans asked the FBI in September to demand that Twitter take down the accounts of U.S.-designated terrorist groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Somalia's al Shabaab. The letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller was spearheaded by Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas), who said Wednesday that the recent events vindicated the request.

“Allowing foreign terrorist organizations like Hamas to operate on Twitter is enabling the enemy,” Poe said in an e-mailed statement to The Hill. “Failure to block access arms them with the ability to freely spread their violent propaganda and mobilize in their War on Israel.

The FBI and Twitter must recognize sooner rather than later that social media is a tool for the terrorists.

“Twitter maintains that it will take down any account requested by the FBI,” seven Republican members of Congress wrote to the FBI last month. “As of this writing, the FBI has not made a single request to Twitter to take an account down.”

“Not one account has been shut down, unlike on YouTube and Facebook,” Poe told the Free Beacon.

“Twitter is not going to take it upon themselves to shut them down,” which is why the FBI needs to take action, Poe said.

FBI Special Agent Jason Pack told the Free Beacon, “The FBI received the Congressman’s letter and will respond to it appropriately.”

Poe speculated that one reason the Obama administration has not pursued the issue is because terrorists’ Twitter pages are a rich vein for the intelligence community to mine.

Poe, however, said that this is not a good enough reason to give these radical actors free rein on the Internet.

“If that’s [the administration’s] only way of knowing” what terrorists are up to, “we’ve got some serious problems with our intelligence service,” Poe said.

The Free Beacon's Republican slant inadvertently suggests that Poe may just be kicking around Twitter because its "best friends" with Obama.

Twitter’s Washington D.C. lobbying team is comprised of several Obama administration confidants and former Democratic Hill staffers. Adam Sharp, the site’s top government liaison, formerly served as deputy chief of staff for Sen. Mary Landrieu (D., La.). Its global public policy official, Colin Crowell, was a senior aide to Rep. Ed Markey (D., Mass.), while Twitter’s head of international strategy, Katie Jacobs Stanton, once worked with the Obama administration on new media strategies.

Since 2011, several individuals who list their employer as Twitter have donated primarily to Democrats, including the Obama campaign and Massachusetts Senate candidate Elizabeth Warren.

To Julian Sanchez, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, the real scandal over the Petraeus affair is not the extramarital sex, but the invasion of privacy.

"Law enforcement and certainly intelligence agencies have an incredible amount of ability to gather huge volumes of detailed information about people's most intimate online communications, a lot of it without requiring a full-blown warrant, a lot of it without requiring even any kind of judicial approval," Sanchez said.

The guest lists from hotels, IP login records, as well as the creative request to email providers for “information about other accounts that have logged in from this IP address” are all forms of data that the government can obtain with a subpoena. There is no independent review, no check against abuse, and further, the target of the subpoena will often never learn that the government obtained data (unless charges are filed, or, as in this particular case, government officials eagerly leak details of the investigation to the press). Unfortunately, our existing surveillance laws really only protect the “what” being communicated; the government’s powers to determine “who” communicated remain largely unchecked.

For more than a decade, a persistent myth in Washington DC, fueled by several counterterrorism experts, has been that it is possible to hide a communications trail by sharing an email inbox, and instead saving emails in a “draft” folder. This technique has been used by Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Richard Reid (the shoe bomber), the 2004 Madrid train bombers, terrorists in Germany, as well as some domestic “eco-terrorists.” This technique has appeared in federal court documents as early as 2003, and was described in a law journal article written by a DOJ official in 2004. It is hardly a state secret.

Apparently, this method was also used by General Petraeus. According to the Associated Press, “[r]ather than transmitting emails to the other's inbox, they composed at least some messages and instead of transmitting them, left them in a draft folder or in an electronic ‘dropbox,’ the official said. Then the other person could log onto the same account and read the draft emails there. This avoids creating an email trail that is easier to trace.”

The problem is, like so many other digital security methods employed by terrorists, it doesn’t work. Emails saved in a draft folder are stored just like emails in any other folder in a cloud service, and further, the providers can be compelled, prospectively, to save copies of everything (so that deleting the messages after reading them won’t actually stop investigators from getting a copy).

Ironically enough, by storing emails in a draft folder, rather than an inbox, individuals may be making it even easier for the government to intercept their communications. This is because the Department of Justice has argued that emails in the “draft” or “sent mail” folder are not in “electronic storage” (as defined by the Stored Communications Act), and thus not deserving of warrant protection. Instead, the government has argued it should be able to get such messages with a mere subpoena.

The spark that set events in motion was a handful of allegedly harassing emails sent anonymously to Kelley, a friend of Petraeus's, which she brought to a friend at the FBI. Yet it's unclear why an investigation was ever opened, given that everything publicly known about the emails suggests they weren't illegal.

As the Daily Beast reported, they said things like "Who do you think you are? ... You parade around the base ... You need to take it down a notch." The story noted, "when the FBI friend showed the emails to the cyber squad in the Tampa field office, her fellow agents noted that the absence of any overt threats."

It seems the deciding factor in opening the investigation was not the emails' content, but the fact that the FBI agent was friendly with Kelley. (Even more disturbing, the same FBI agent has now been accused of becoming "obsessed" with the Tampa socialite, sent shirtless pictures to her, and has been removed from the case.)

When the FBI friend showed the emails to the cyber squad in the Tampa field office, her fellow agents noted that the absence of any overt threats.

“No, ‘I’ll kill you’ or ‘I'll burn your house down,’” the source says. “It doesn’t seem really that bad.”

The squad was not even sure the case was worth pursuing, the source says.

“What does this mean? There’s no threat there. This is against the law?” the agents asked themselves by the source’s account.

At most the messages were harassing. The cyber squad had to consult the statute books in its effort to determine whether there was adequate legal cause to open a case.

“It was a close call,” the source says.

Possible indicators of terrorist behaviors at hotels: The observation of multiple indicators may represent—based on the specific facts or circumstances—possible terrorist behaviors at hotels:

- Not providing professional or personal details on hotel registrations—such as place of employment, contact information, or place of residence.

- Using payphones for outgoing calls or making front desk requests in person to avoid using the room telephone.

- Interest in using Internet cafes, despite hotel Internet availability.

- Non-VIPs who request that their presence at a hotel not be divulged.

- Extending departure dates one day at a time for prolonged periods.

- Refusal of housekeeping services for extended periods.

- Extended stays with little baggage or unpacked luggage.

- Access or attempted access to areas of the hotel normally restricted to staff.

- Use of cash for large transactions or a credit card in someone else’s name.

- Requests for specific rooms, floors, or other locations in the hotel.

- Use of a third party to register.

- Multiple visitors or deliveries to one individual or room.

- Unusual interest in hotel access, including main and alternate entrances, emergency exits, and surrounding routes.

- Use of entrances and exits that avoid the lobby or other areas with cameras and hotel personnel.

- Attempting to access restricted parking areas with a vehicle or leaving unattended vehicles near the hotel building.

- Unusual interest in hotel staff operating procedures, shift changes, closed-circuit TV systems, fire alarms, and security systems.

- Leaving the property for several days and then returning.

- Abandoning a room and leaving behind clothing, toiletries, or other items.

- Noncompliance with other hotel policies.

Under the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, federal authorities need only a subpoena approved by a federal prosecutor — not a judge — to obtain electronic messages that are six months old or older. To get more recent communications, a warrant from a judge is required. This is a higher standard that requires proof of probable cause that a crime is being committed.

Adel Daoud, 18, was arrested following a months-long FBI undercover investigation. He was taken into custody after he parked a Jeep Cherokee in front of the bar Friday night and walked into a nearby alley where he tried to detonate the device, court documents allege.

The bomb, which was inert and had been constructed by FBI technicians, didn't explode, according to federal authorities.

"That's 100 percent confidence level, it's our data," [Blue Toad CEO Paul] DeHart said. "As soon as we found out we were involved and victimized, we approached the appropriate law enforcement officials, and we began to take steps to come forward, clear the record and take responsibility for this.”

“It does raise questions,” he said. “I think people need to question what they see online, whether it comes from Anonymous or from a news organization or from a politician or from a corporation. You need to not take things at face value right away and jump straight to what you think it says. Somebody says, ‘Oh, this came from the FBI, everybody believes it. Well, let’s think about (it).”

...a list of 12,367,232 Apple iOS devices including Unique Device Identifiers (UDID), user names, name of device, type of device, Apple Push Notification Service tokens, zipcodes, cellphone numbers, addresses, etc.

functions as a conduit between private industry and law enforcement with a core mission to identify, mitigate and neutralize cyber crime. In an effort to streamline intelligence exchange, the NCFTA will often organize SME interaction into threat-specific initiatives. Once a significant online scheme is realized and a stakeholder consensus defined, an initiative is developed wherein the NCFTA manages the collection and sharing of intelligence with the affected parties, industry partners, appropriate law enforcement, and other SMEs.

“Cracking down on piracy of copyrighted works – including popular apps – is a top priority of the Criminal Division,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “Software apps have become an increasingly essential part of our nation’s economy and creative culture, and the Criminal Division is committed to working with our law enforcement partners to protect the creators of these apps and other forms of intellectual property from those who seek to steal it.”

“Criminal copyright laws apply to apps for cell phones and tablets, just as they do to other software, music and writings. These laws protect and encourage the hard work and ingenuity of software developers entering this growing and important part of our economy. We will continue to seize and shut down websites that market pirated apps, and to pursue those responsible for criminal charges if appropriate,” said U.S. Attorney Yates.

“The theft of intellectual property, particularly within the cyber arena, is a growing problem and one that cannot be ignored by the U.S government’s law enforcement community. These thefts cost companies millions of dollars and can even inhibit the development and implementation of new ideas and applications. The FBI, in working with its various corporate and government partners, is not only committed to combating such thefts but is well poised to coordinate with the many jurisdictions that are impacted by such activities,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Lamkin.