At about midnight, Ruben Ceballos, 19,was awakened by screams and loud banging noises outside his home. He said he ran to the left side of his house to find out who was causing the ruckus.

"When I got outside I saw two officers beating a man with batons and they were hitting his head so every time they would swing, I could hear the blows to his head," Ceballos said.

Silva was on the ground screaming for help, but officers continued to beat him, Ceballos said.

After several minutes, Ceballos said, Silva stopped screaming and was no longer responsive.

There's a man laying on the floor and your police officers beat the [explicit] out of him and killed him," said the woman. "I have it all on video camera."

The woman continued:

"I am sitting here on the corner of Flower and Palm right now and you have one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight Sheriffs. The guy was laying on the floor and eight Sheriff's ran up and started beating him up with sticks. The man is dead laying right here, right now."

The grainy black and white video appears to show the alleged victim, David Silva, 33, lying on the ground. Another person is then seen walking up to Silva and attempting to pick him up. Both men appear to scuffle, and after a few minutes, Silva is seen being struck with an object.

Other cars are seen arriving at the scene with lights flashing on top of them. Several other men are then seen in the video, also striking Silva more than a dozen times with objects. Silva is then seen being taken into custody.

KCSO Spokesperson Ray Pruitt told 23 ABC it took 5 deputies, 2 CHP officers and a K-9 to subdue Silva.

Pruitt said officers were forced to use their batons to arrest Silva but no tazers, pepper spray or guns were used during the altercation.

The office did identify the officers involved in the arrest as Sgt. Douglas Sword and deputies Ryan Greer, Tanner Miller, Jeffrey Kelly, Luis Almanza, Brian Brock and David Stephens.

With respect to changing incentives for creators, distributors, and users, research could help determine

• how the expenses involved in creative expression and distribution differ across sectors and the role of copyright in generating revenues to offset those expenses;
• under what circumstances sources of monetary and/or non-monetary motivation outside of that provided by copyright are effective in motivating creative activity;
• the motivations of various types of users and potential users of creative works, including both infringers and lawful users; the effects of enhanced enforcement remedies on promoting creativity, technological innovation, and freedom of expression; and
• how the costs of distributing creative content are affected by social media and other new technologies.

With respect to the enablers of and impediments to voluntary licensing transactions in copyrighted works, research would help determine

• the significance of transaction costs as barriers to utilization of copyrighted works;
• the extent of problems involving orphan works (whose owners cannot be identified), user-generated content, and collaborative and iterative works;
• what are successful arrangements for managing transaction costs;
• the roles of public and private institutions in facilitating licensing;
• the relationship of transaction costs to legal rules such as compulsory licenses; and
• changes in transaction costs with new technological and business developments.

With respect to the enforcement challenges, research could help determine

• how much is spent by governments and private parties on copyright enforcement;
• against whom enforcement efforts are targeted and what remedies are sought and granted;
• the results of enforcement efforts in terms of compensation, prevention, education, and deterrence;
• how the effectiveness of enforcement efforts is changing with the expansion of digital networks;
• the costs and benefits of current enforcement methods vis-a-vis those associated with proposed new enforcement methods;
• the relative vulnerability of different business models to infringement; and
• the costs and benefits of fair use exceptions and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbors.

In assessing the balance between copyright protection and the statutory exceptions and limitations to copyright research could help determine

• the costs and benefits of copyright exceptions and limitations in terms of the economic outputs and welfare effects of those individuals, businesses, educational institutions, and other entities that rely on them;
• how copyright and the various categories of limits and exceptions interact with innovative and/or disruptive technologies and platforms; and
• what adverse effects, if any, exceptions and limitations have on copyright holders and their potential to generate economic outputs and welfare effects.

Eventually, research will help inform decisions about key aspects of copyright policy, including

• the appropriate scope of copyright protection;
• the optimal duration of the copyright term;
• the best arrangements for correcting market imperfections that inhibit voluntary licensing;
• appropriate safe harbors and fair use exceptions to copyright;
• effective enforcement remedies for infringing use and the best arrangements for correcting deficiencies in enforcement mechanisms;
• the advisability of reintroducing a formal registration requirement; and
• the advantages and disadvantages of reshaping the copyright regime with different rules for different media.

the outrageous attacks made on the real Alan Cooper are shameful. However, they are also easily discredited, and undersigned counsel would appreciate an opportunity to do so. Similarly, the other two declarations submitted by Mr. Duffy and Prenda also have problems, which undersigned counsel would like to briefly address and refute.

For example, although Gibbs claimed he was supervised by Steele and Hansmeier at Prenda Law, when pressed for specifics about the degree of supervision he received, Gibbs only offered that Steele and Hansmeier gave him authority to file certain cases here. See Dkt 108-5, at 77:8-24. Gibbs' further testimony has revealed he had significant autonomy in handling the cases. See Dkt 108-5, at 77:25-78:4 (claiming Steele and Hansmeier "gave me certain parameters [pursuant to] which I could settle the case myself.");

The Court stated: "First, with an invalid assignment, Plaintiff has no standing in these cases." Dkt 48, at 9:8. Apparently re-articulating the same concern, the Court added: "Second, by bringing these cases, Plaintiff's conduct can be considered vexatious, as these cases were filed for a facially improper purpose." Dkt 48, at 9:9-10. As both Gibbs and Prenda/Duffy/ Van Den Hemel noted in their Responses To The OSC, the Court is mistaken about the law in this regard; the signature of the assignee is irrelevant to the validity of the assignment, so long as the assignor signs. See Dkt 49, at 25:9-26:19; Dkt 108, at 11:24-12:9.; see also 17 U.S.C. 204(a). Lastly, the Court stated: "the Courtm will not idle while Plaintiff defrauds this institution."; Dkt 48, at 9:10-11. However, even if the Court were to discount the evidence submitted impugning Cooper's credibility and blame Steele for this "fraud,"; it hardly rises to the level of fraud upon the court recognized by the Ninth Circuit, i.e., "a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991).

Regarding any other alleged fraud the Court may consider, as Section III above makes clear, except in rare circumstances not present here, this Court is not empowered to sanction Steele or anyone else based on conduct occurring entirely outside of the subject cases and the Central District. Based on its prior statements, the Court may have erroneously felt otherwise before.

Disturbingly, the Court's apparent conclusions about the relationships between the persons and entities named in the March 14, 2013 OSC wholly ignores evidence to the contrary. Compare, e.g., Dkt. 69-1, pp. 21:18-2, 38:22-39:15, 40:8-12 (regarding who owns AF Holdings) with Dkt 108-5, at 114:5-8 (I do have the picture, and I know who the client is. We have talked about the client, and the client has been running everything. Yeah, I know who the client is”); see also Dkt 108-5at 19:15-18 (suggesting Prenda law is "controlled by Mr. Steele.")

However, Steele cannot be sanctioned for any of these alleged misrepresentations made to this Court regarding the relationships among the parties and entities named in the Court’s March 14 OSC because Steele has taken no actions nor made any representations to this Court of any kind, nor is there any evidence before this Court that he acted or was otherwise involved in anyone else's alleged misrepresentations to this Court.

The decision to lift the protective order rests with the judge who put it in place. Documents provided by MIT in the Swartz case included individual names and information regarding MIT employees. It is MIT policy and practice to protect employee privacy. MIT provided the documents under the express understanding that they would be protected from disclosure, which is the purpose of the protective order. Given this, we are concerned about any public release of information about individual MIT employees: we will seek to protect their privacy. At the same time, MIT is eager to share important facts about its actions in the Aaron Swartz matter with the public: Professor Hal Abelson has been charged by President Rafael Reif with conducting an analysis that will be made public in the coming weeks.

"This statement is an insult to my intelligence. The documents were provided to the government before any protective order was entered, and directly contrary to this statement, with the express understanding that they would be used in a criminal prosecution', which would lead to a PUBLIC TRIAL, at which time the documents would be offered into evidence and the witnesses would testify, in public. MIT never could have expected these materials not to become public, and I find this statement to be shockingly misleading and insincere."

Criminal proceedings in our nation's courts are presumptively public....

As described above, the circumstances in this case have changed dramatically. Perhaps most obviously, with Mr. Swartz's death, there is no longer a case to prosecute and thus no danger that disclosure will impede a fair trial. Mr. Swartz's tragic death has also led to an increase in public interest in both the details of the investigation and prosecution and the reasonableness of prosecutions under the CFAA generally. In its discussions with Mr. Swartz's counsel about modifying the Protective Order, the Government has not, to date, asserted any reliance interest based on the Protective Order. Even if it were to assert such an interest, any Government reliance on the Protective Order's terms is tempered by the fact that it is a blanket order and therefore inherently overinclusive. As this District explained in Bulger, modification of such a blanket order is not unusual. Id. at 54. As a result, the only interest left to be balanced against the significant public interest in access to unredacted documents is the alleged privacy interest of the government employees and third party individuals named in the discovery materials. For the reasons discussed below, those interests are minimal and are overcome by the public interest in the disclosure of these documents.

“I welcome President Reif's commitment to transparency. However, this announcement is misleading. MIT does not get to decide in what form the evidence is released publicly. The judge does. MIT has already given this evidence to the courts, at which point it gave up proprietary control over the evidence. President Reif's decision simply foreshadows the inevitability that the judge will release at least this much of the evidence. It sets a low bar, but it does not decide the matter. The redacted documents MIT is releasing only tell one part of the story. Huge amounts of information would still be hidden beneath the protective order -- information that MIT's investigators themselves will not have access to unless the protective order is lifted. If MIT is really committed to transparency and having a full, complete investigation, they need to join the call with Aaron’s lawyers to lift the protective order."

"This is not a change in MIT's position. MIT could have no expectation of privacy or security since this evidence was given to the government with the understanding that it was evidence in a public trial,” said Robert Swartz, Aaron’s father. “They understood when they gave these documents to the government that they had no rights to privacy or security. MIT should release all internal communications related to this case whether or not they were provided to the government including all internal communications they had related to how they handled it and decided not to ask the government to drop the case."

That was the case for the most recent action by the British Phonographic Industry (BPI), which represents the recording industry in the UK, as reported by Techdirt last week. Now Andres Guadamuz on his TechnoLlama blog has dug a little deeper into the judge's reasoning for granting these orders, and discovered the following remarkable section:

the evidence indicates that blocking orders are reasonably effective. The effect of the order made in Italy with regard to TPB [The Pirate Bay] referred to in 20C Fox v BT at [197] was a 73% reduction in audience accessing TPB in Italy and a 96% reduction in page views. The blocking order made in Italy in relation to KAT has had a similar effect. As for the effect of the orders made in England in relation to TPB, as at 19 December 2011, TPB was ranked by Alexa as number 43 in the UK, while as at 21 November 2012, its UK ranking had dropped to number 293.

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In its judgment, the Court of Appeal says extradition hearings are not criminal trials and that the judge deciding whether to order extradition has only to be satisfied there is a case to answer.

The court said the US government had a duty of "candour and good faith" in making an extradition bid, but a summary of the evidence held would suffice.

This snapshot allegedly shows that the Defendants were downloading the copyrighted work—at least at that moment in time. But downloading a large file like a video takes time; and depending on a user’s Internet-connection speed, it may take a long time. In fact, it may take so long that the user may have terminated the download. The user may have also terminated the download for other reasons. To allege copyright infringement based on an IP snapshot is akin to alleging theft based on a single surveillance camera shot: a photo of a child reaching for candy from a display does not automatically mean he stole it. No Court would allow a lawsuit to be filed based on that amount of evidence...

And as part of its prima facie copyright claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants copied the copyrighted work. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). If a download was not completed, Plaintiff’s lawsuit may be deemed frivolous. In this case, Plaintiff’s reliance on snapshot evidence to establish its copyright infringement claims is misplaced. A reasonable investigation should include evidence showing that Defendants downloaded the entire copyrighted work—or at least a usable portion of a copyrighted work. Plaintiff has none of this—no evidence that Defendants completed their download, and no evidence that what they downloaded is a substantially similar copy of the copyrighted work. Thus, Plaintiff’s attorney violated Rule 11(b)(3) for filing a pleading that lacks factual foundation.

RULE 1. IN ORDER TO SUE A DEFENDANT FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, YOU MUST PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT DOWNLOADED THE ENTIRE COPYRIGHTED VIDEO.

RULE 2. A “SNAPSHOT OBSERVATION” OF AN IP ADDRESS ENGAGED IN DOWNLOADING AT THAT MOMENT IS INSUFFICIENT PROOF OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

Though the subscriber, David Wagar, remained silent, Plaintiff’s investigation of his household established that Benjamin Wagar was the likely infringer of Plaintiff’s copyright. As such, Plaintiff mailed its Amended Complaint to the Court naming Benjamin Wagar as the Defendant in this action. (ECF No. 14, at 2.)...

In cases where the subscriber remains silent, Plaintiff conducts investigations to determine the likelihood that the subscriber, or someone in his or her household, was the actual infringer. . . . For example, if the subscriber is 75 years old, or the subscriber is female, it is statistically quite unlikely that the subscriber was the infringer. In such cases, Plaintiff performs an investigation into the subscriber’s household to determine if there is a likely infringer of Plaintiff’s copyright. . . . Plaintiff bases its choices regarding whom to name as the infringer on factual analysis. (ECF No. 15, at 24.)

The Court interprets this to mean: if the subscriber is 75 years old or female, then Plaintiff looks to see if there is a pubescent male in the house; and if so, he is named as the defendant. Plaintiff’s “factual analysis” cannot be characterized as anything more than a hunch.

Such an investigation may not be perfect, but it narrows down the possible infringers and is better than the Plaintiff’s current investigation, which the Court finds involves nothing more than blindly picking a male resident from a subscriber’s home.

But this type of investigation requires time and effort, something that would destroy Plaintiff’s business model.

[W]hen viewed with a court’s duty to serve the public interest, a plaintiff cannot be given free rein to sue anyone they wish—the plaintiff has to actually show facts supporting its allegations.

RULE 3. BEFORE SUING A DEFENDANT FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, YOU MUST DO A “REASONABLE INVESTIGATION” TO DETERMINE THAT IT WAS THE NAMED DEFENDANT WHO DID THE DOWNLOAD, AND NOT SOMEONE ELSE WITH ACCESS TO HIS INTERNET CONNECTION.

Upon review of papers filed by attorney Morgan E. Pietz, the Court perceives that Plaintiff may have defrauded the Court. (ECF No. 23.) At the center of this issue is the identity of a person named Alan Cooper and the validity of the underlying copyright assignments. If it is true that Alan Cooper’s identity was misappropriated and the underlying copyright assignments were improperly executed using his identity, then Plaintiff faces a few problems.

First, with an invalid assignment, Plaintiff has no standing in these cases. Second, by bringing these cases, Plaintiff’s conduct can be considered vexatious, as these cases were filed for a facially improper purpose. And third, the Court will not idle while Plaintiff defrauds this institution.

If Mr. Gibbs or Mr. Pietz so desire, they each may file by February 19, 2013, a brief discussing this matter. The Court will also welcome the appearance of Alan Cooper—to either confirm or refute the fraud allegations.

Based on the evidence presented at the March 11, 2013 hearing, the Court will consider whether sanctions are appropriate, and if so, determine the proper punishment. This may include a monetary fine, incarceration, or other sanctions sufficient to deter future misconduct. Failure by Mr. Gibbs to appear will result in the automatic imposition of sanctions along with the immediate issuance of a bench warrant for contempt.

The virtue of having a video of police encounters has been proven over and over, whether because it belies the allegations of a crime or proves them. But then, sometimes the guy with his finger on the dashcam's "on" button may not want evidence of what is about to happen. Via NJ.com:

Allen Bass, 50, sued Trooper Gerald Dellagicoma and others in 2009, claiming they punched and kicked him multiple times, causing him to urinate on himself, after he complied with their commands to get off his bicycle at Ellis Avenue and Clinton Avenue in Irvington a year earlier.

[Bass] was riding his bike July 10, 2008, in Irvington when Dellagicoma and other troopers who were on patrol in the area got out of their patrol cars and ordered him to stop. Bass claimed he laid on the ground chest-down and spread his arms and legs.

Troopers allegedly then punched and kicked him before arresting him. Bass was charged with drug possession, resisting arrest by flight and resisting arrest by force, court documents show.

Court documents show Dellagicoma, who joined the force in 2001, failed to activate his patrol car camera and was suspended without pay for 30 days, but only served 15 days of that suspension.

Records show Dellagicoma was reprimanded several times prior to the incident for the same infraction.

In another federal civil lawsuit, Salah Williams of Newark, an African-American, claims he was a victim of racial profiling, excessive force and malicious prosecution when Dellagicoma allegedly assaulted, maced, arrested and charged him for no reason while walking near his store in the city... Similar to the Bass case, Dellagicoma also failed to activate his patrol car camera and appear in court, resulting in the dismissal of the charges against Williams.

What makes this special is that in New Jersey, there is a requirement that arose from the racial profiling scandal that rocked the Turnpike, that all encounters with State Troopers be videotaped. The state was kind enough to put cameras in cruisers. Never again would a trooper be falsely accused of profiling a driver just because he was black. (This is known as the "black plus" theory of profiling.)

The only way an incentive system works is to make the cost of noncompliance greater than the cost of compliance. Apparently, a written reprimand and a few days suspension doesn't cut it. And when it happens repeatedly, it is clearly failing to serve as a deterrent. That's not good enough.

The efficacy of video depends on its actually being used, in every instance and including the entire encounter. Anything less reduces it to a game, where the police make the rules, and the rules will not be good for the other side.

The instant discovery dispute ultimately centers around a particular bit of software that the defendant had running on his computer – C-Cleaner. Plaintiff alleges, without any support other than an “EHow.com” user submission, that using C-Cleaner is “proof” that Defendant was destroying evidence.

As described in the annexed declaration of a Certified Computer Examiner, C-Cleaner’s default functions (the only ones used by Defendant) do not permanently delete data, and only affect data that the average user does not even know exists.

It removes unused files from your system - allowing Windows to run faster and freeing up valuable hard disk space. It also cleans traces of your online activities such as your Internet history. Additionally it contains a fully featured registry cleaner.

9. CCleaner is not a “wiping program” and is not designed to “permanently remove information from a computer.” By default, CCleaner removes temporary internet files and other system files.

10. ...For the most part, these are files that the average user does not even know exist and cannot even be viewed by most users. None of the files CCleaner deletes would be within the scope of discovery requests or be considered ‘reasonably accessible’ under FRCP 26.

24. The mere existence of a program such as CCleaner is not sufficient to support an allegation that a party has engaged in inappropriate conduct or deliberately attempted to destroy information. I have examined hundreds of hard drives and many of those contained the CCleaner program...it can be considered a useful program.

25. ...I have worked on many other cases where different programs were used to eliminate data – programs specifically designed for this purpose such as “Evidence Eliminator”. Unlike CCleaner, Evidence Eliminator wipes the free space of the hard drive by default. And in all such cases, the programs had been uninstalled before I imaged the hard drive for examination.”

Furthermore, allegations of spoliation are extremely serious, and the court urges Plaintiff to review the facts very carefully before pursuing this avenue based solely on an eHow.com article. In particular, Plaintiff should review the expert declaration that Navasca filed with his letter brief, to fully understand the purpose and effect of CCleaner.

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Third, the Government attempts to distance itself from what Megaupload was told about the 2010 warrant by emphasizing that it did not directly instruct Megaupload to preserve the allegedly infringing files. (Dkt. 155 at 3.) But it is well settled that a private party's actions are imputed to the Government when that party is enlisted by the Government and acts in accordance with the Government's instructions. Thus, courts confronting criminal searches and seizures have consistently found Fourth Amendment interests implicated where a private party acts as the Government's "instrument or agent." See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010). As the Fourth Circuit has indicated, "the key factors bearing upon the question of whether a search by a private person constitutes a Government search are: '(1) whether the Government knew of and acquiesced in the private search; and (2) whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement or had some other independent motivation.'" ....

Here, Carpathia's communications with Megaupload satisfy both prongs. The Government not only knew of Carpathia's actions but orchestrated them. Indeed, the Government's affidavit in support of the June 24, 2010 search warrant expressly requested that "Carpathia and its customer MegaUpload be permitted to view the warrant and Attachments A and B to the warrant to assist them in executing the warrant." ... Correspondingly, the Order sealing that warrant, which "found that revealing the material sought to be sealed would jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation," authorized the Government to provide the warrant only to Carpathia, and authorized Carpathia to "provide a copy of the warrant with attachments and this sealing order to MegaUpload.".... In conveying the instructions to Megaupload, Carpathia noted that it had "attempted to convince the Government to work directly with Mega on this matter, but given the complex jurisdictional issues, they have been unwilling." .... It is equally clear that Carpathia's sole purpose in communicating with Megaupload on that date was to assist the Government in executing the June 24, 2010 warrant.

Even if the Government could somehow avoid responsibility for Carpathia's instructions and the Magistrate Court's sealing order, there would remain the undeniable fact that the Government failed to inform this Court of critical, exculpatory information about the circumstances under which Megaupload learned of the allegedly infringing files and subsequently cooperated with the Government's investigation. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (material omissions that render search warrants misleading can be grounds for invalidating warrants);...

Notably, the Government avoided communicating with Megaupload directly, instead deputizing Carpathia to do so on its behalf. (See June 25, 2010 email from Phil Hedlund to Mathias Ortmann and Kim Dotcom, Ex. 1 ("Please know that we attempted to convince the Government to work directly with Mega on this matter, but given the complex jurisdictional issues, they have been unwilling").) Far from warning Megaupload that the Government considered it to be part of a worldwide criminal organization, which the Government even at the time was terming the "Mega Conspiracy," the Government, through its anointed agent Carpathia, represented to Megaupload that "[w]e have no reason to believe the [sic] MegaUpload is the target of the investigation."

Megaupload cooperated with the Government and voluntarily arranged with Carpathia to supply the Government with the files identified in the sealed warrant. In accordance with the Government's express admonitions--as conveyed to Megaupload through the sealing order and Carpathia's instructions--Megaupload avoided signaling that anything was afoot or otherwise compromising the investigation, preserving the files in their original condition without alerting users or the public that anything had changed. At no time did the Government or Carpathia indicate that Megaupload could or should remove the files identified in the warrant from its cloud storage platform without compromising the stated secrecy of the investigation, much less did they suggest that Megaupload was legally obliged to do so lest it be complicit in an ongoing criminal conspiracy.

Megaupload's pleading and the search warrant materials at issue disproves the allegation that the government misled the court as part of a conspiracy to entrap Megaupload. For instance, Megaupload alleges that the government "affirmatively [led]" Megaupload to retain certain files on its servers.... Yet Megaupload does not cite a single communication between the government and Megaupload or a single instruction from any member of the government to Megaupload; there are none.

That's very much the impulse behind a new document entitled "Statistical, Ecosystems and Competitiveness Analysis of the Media and Content Industries". It has been prepared on behalf of the European Commission by the Joint Research Centre, which describes its role as follows:

to provide EU policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy cycle.

Significantly, much of the first half of the report is given over to exploring why it is so hard to draw up detailed figures on the media and content industries. Part of the problem is that such official statistics as are available -- and they are relatively limited -- follow older industry categories that don't really fit any more. Even relatively new ones are problematic:

The new OECD definition intends to give a better reflection of the current MCI sector structure. However, the underlying categorization of the Media and Content Industries can not account for one of the most apparent trends in the Media and Content Industries, i.e. its increasing interconnectedness and convergence with ICT (telecom, computer and software industries). Distribution is now separated from MCI and included in ICT category, but increasingly distribution companies are involved in acquisition of content and content rights, packaging and marketing of content, sometimes also adding added value by producing additional services (EPG, communication services etc.) The same is true for new entrants such as major ICT firms like Google, Apple, YouTube, which are also increasingly involved in not just dissemination of content but also in many content related activities.

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On Friday, Whyte found that Rambus destroyed documents when it anticipated litigation. Specifically, Whyte said, Rambus employees were told to destroy documents at annual "shred days," from 1998 to 2000, prior to filing the patent suits.

Because litigation was "reasonably foreseeable," Whyte ruled, Rambus should had preserved the documents.

"Rambus engaged in spoliation of evidence when it engaged in the destruction of documents on all three shred days," the 66-page ruling states.

Rambus countered that its engineers tended to be "pack rats" and said that its policy was justified...

"The evidence does not show that Rambus knowingly destroyed damaging evidence," Whyte said.

"Although the evidence does not support a conclusion that Rambus deliberately shredded documents it knew to be damaging, the court concludes that Rambus nonetheless spoliated evidence in bad faith or at least willfully," he added.

Because litigation was "reasonably foreseeable," Whyte ruled, Rambus should had preserved the documents.

"Even if none of the destroyed documents would have shed new light on the disclosure obligation, there may have been internal Rambus documents containing information about Rambus' plans to gain market power by using information learned at [Joint Electron Device Engineering Council] JEDEC meetings. Such evidence could have been relevant and given support to Hynix's equitable claims and defenses," Whyte said.

"The court concludes that Hynix has made a plausible, concrete suggestion that it may have been prejudiced by destruction of JEDEC-related documents, and that Rambus has not overcome this suggestion of prejudice by clear and convincing evidence."

It's a classic demonization of the Internet that ignores the broader context, and is based on the flimsiest of pretexts. Worryingly, the UK government is sending out clear signals that it supports this campaign regardless. It's currently conducting a consultation on "Parental Internet controls", which closes on September 6. It's extremely poorly worded and clearly biased in favour of the idea of making blanket censorship the default.

If such Net blocks are brought in, legitimate sites will inevitably be blocked by mistake, but it's not so clear that the objectives of protecting children will be achieved. With blocks in place, parents may be lulled into a false sense of security, and so fail to supervise their children's online activities adequately, which will leave the latter exposed to greater not lesser risks. Meanwhile, young people will find ways to circumvent the blocks -- or just buy a copy of "The Sun".

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More than 400,000 documents and two terabytes of electronic data that federal authorities say is expensive to maintain....

[....] "Continued storage of these materials is difficult and expensive," wrote Stephanie Rose, the U.S. attorney for northern Iowa. She called the task "an economic and practical hardship" for the Drug Enforcement Administration....

[....] The evidence took up 5 percent of the DEA's worldwide electronic storage. Agents had also kept several hundred boxes of paper containing 440,000 documents, plus dozens of computers, servers and other bulky items.

Two terabytes is enough to store the text of 2 million novels, or roughly 625,000 copies of "War and Peace."

The revelations from this motion, if true, are amazing and appalling. Given the scope of electronic data involves in investigations, the claim that two terabytes constitutes five percent of the DEA's storage capacity is laughable. It suggests that they're screwing with us, and have no ability to do 90% of the things they claim or we fear they're up to.

Indeed, while we worry about their creating mirror images of hard drives of thousands of computers, or obtaining digital evidence from hundreds of thousands of cellphones, this isn't conceivably possible if the total storage capacity of the DEA is 40 terabytes. It just can't be.

In my view disclosure should be provided by the requesting state. The Act provides the person sought with a right to challenge whether the threshold for extradition has been met before he will be extradited. Consistent with the requirements of... the Bill of Rights Act to a fair hearing, the person sought should be given access to sufficient information to enable him or her to fully participate in that hearing on an equally informed basis. Without access to materials relevant to the extradition hearing phase, the person sought will be significantly constrained in his or her ability to participate in the hearing and the requesting state will have a significant advantage in terms of access to information.

She also found the "Record of Case", the document which made the argument for extradition, did not currently meet the legal requirements. She said the FBI was under an "obligation of candour" to provide any evidence which could impact on the court's judgment of whether the extradition threshold had been met - and no information had been provided to support FBI claims. The document "did not comply", she said.

The Crown is seeking for all images and CCTV footage from the raids to be suppressed.

The imposition of data preservation requirements on a journalist who is not a party to the litigation raises questions apart from the merits of the order. Journalists need to be able to discard data when they no longer have any of their own use for it.  Yes, “the public has a claim to every man’s evidence,” but don’t members of the public who are not involved in litigation have the right to discard information despite the fact that it might turn out to be useful evidence for somebody else’s case?  Does the public have a claim to heroic efforts on every man’s part?  Shouldn’t there be higher standards for subpoenas demanding intrusive searches for discarded data in the hands of third parties?

The problem is compounded when it is a journalist that has been subpoenaed.  To what extent does society have any entitlement to make journalists in particular take heroic measures, such as searching the nooks and crannies of their computer equipment for fragments of discarded data?  The judge was sensitive to the fact that our client here is a journalist, telling Escape Media that he was not prepared to allow it to make any general search of Digital Music News’ computers.  But an issue that we may have to pursue on appeal is whether a journalist should ever have to undertake such drastic preservation efforts in aid of a lawsuit in which he is not involved, particularly given the relative unlikelihood that fragments of identifying data remain on his computers somewhere.

Indeed, the problem is broader than just journalists.  Companies often keep log files with respect to server visits (and hosted comments), but there is little business justification for keeping those logs forever; so generally speaking they are discarded after a period of time (EFF's best practices recommendations are worth a look in this regard).  Does the mere act of discarding log files set a company up for the possibility of a demand for forensic examination of the underlying servers, in the hope that some fragment of the data might be recovered?  In this regard, the trial court's order has chilling implications for other California companies, even beyond the issue of journalists. 

Issues of how to preserve the data remain to be decided.  This is not like just leaving one of your file cabinets untouched for a period of time; it is not even as easy as making sure you don't delete any of your email.  Preserving the web site while creating a copy of the underlying servers is a complicated process, requiring the services of a forensic specialist, and the cost could be substantial.  The estimates that we have been given are well into the five figures; but even the cost of several thousand dollars would be an enormous imposition on this small company.

Since January, the Dotcom legal team has asked for the footage, but police refused, until finally the agency agreed that an IT expert for DotCom could come and collect a copy of the footage. When the IT expert arrived at the police station, he found the server completely disassembled, and authorities said they could not reassemble it or give him any footage. Now, no one outside the police agency is sure the footage still exists.

The New Zealand police declined to give an interview to Campbell, but sent an e-mail stating, "Police would happily release the footage in question but currently have no authority to do so. The footage is contained on a hard drive lawfully seized on a warrant obtained by police at the direction of Crown Law following a properly formulated mutual legal assistance request from the United States."

The United States has seized and frozen all of Megaupload's assets, which, together with those seized from the other Defendants, include more than $60 million in cash and well over $100 million all told. In taking this extraordinary step, the Government must necessarily be alleging that every dollar of these assets is the proceeds of illegal activity. The basis of this allegation are the Government's self-selected copies of a tiny fraction of Carpathia's 1,100+ servers; even as to that fraction, the Court is asked to assume that every scrap of information on those servers amounts to criminal copyright infringement or perhaps some other illegal activity. If there is logic to the Government's actions, there is nothing lawful to be found across Megaupload's business as reflected on those 1,100+ servers. Only thus might the Government forbid Carpathia from so much as transferring to Megaupload the Mega Servers housing Megaupload content. Notably, the government is further forbidding Megaupload from using any of its assets to pay Carpathia for continued preservation of the Mega Servers' content. And, it has, in the face of Carpathia's earnest submission that it will cease preserving the servers absent the requested relief, urged the Court to deny such relief, because "the government has already completed its acquisition of data from the Carpathia Servers authorized by the warrant." ... In essence, the Government has taken what it wants from the scene of the alleged crime and is content that the remaining evidence, even if it is exculpatory or otherwise relevant to the defense, be destroyed. And by refusing to permit Megaupload to use its assets to mount a defense, the Government is effectively making sure that Megaupload has no practical way to preserve the evidence itself.

Such a course of proceeding by the Government would be troubling in any circumstance. But this is, of course, a criminal case. It is, in fact, what the Government has called the largest such case it has ever brought in the history of alleged copyright infringement. If the Government's position now wins the day, the integrity of of what ensues will be lost--the Mega Servers will have been wiped and potentially exculpatory or relevant evidence will have been spoliated, en masse, before being properly surveyed by the parties, not to mention the Court. The Government's case may be advantaged by this course of action, but much else will suffer and due process will not permit it.

Its reasoning then becomes altogether mystifying when it asserts (without any substantiation) "that the Carpathia Servers may contain child pornography, rendering the Carpathia Servers contraband." ... To take the Government at its word, therefore, it at best is greeting with equanimity and at worst is advocating, the imminent destruction of evidence of child pornography. It is passing strange for the Government to express preference for the destruction of evidence of criminal misconduct over the preservation of it for criminal investigation.

The government's intransigence on the preservation of evidence is the latest example of the government's scorched-earth approach to the Megaupload prosecution. Theoretically, criminal defendants are innocent until proven guilty. Yet the seizure of Megaupload's servers, freezing of its assets, and arrest of its top executives did immense damage to the company long before they had a chance to tell their side of the story to the jury. Now, the government seems to be trying to deny Megaupload the opportunity to fully defend itself in court. Megaupload may be found guilty, but like everyone else it has the right to a fair trial.