The MPAA respectfully submits that such an interpretation of § 512(f) is wrong and threatens to cause significant harms that Congress could not possibly have intended. The MPAA's interest in this matter is not academic. The MPAA and its members confront the piracy of their works by Internet actors on a massive global scale. One of the only means that the MPAA and its members have to ensure that Internet services that carry, host, or link to such content take steps not to facilitate such rampant piracy is through the DMCA's notice-and-takedown provisions. The rule that Plaintiff and Amici advocate, if carried to its logical conclusion, would impose significant and unwarranted burdens on copyright owners like the MPAA and its members who unfortunately must send literally millions of takedown notices every year to combat the mass infringement of their works on the Internet.

Fair use is an affirmative defense. It excuses conduct that otherwise is actionable as infringement, as the Supreme Court, the First Circuit, and numerous other courts and the Copyright Act’s legislative history have made clear.

... the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.

Here, the Court concludes that the plain meaning of “authorized by law” is unambiguous. An activity or behavior “authorized by law” is one permitted by law or not contrary to law. Though Congress did not expressly mention the fair use doctrine in the DMCA, the Copyright Act provides explicitly that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. Even if Universal is correct that fair use only excuses infringement, the fact remains that fair use is a lawful use of a copyright. Accordingly, in order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with “a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,” the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA. Such an interpretation of the DMCA furthers both the purposes of the DMCA itself and copyright law in general. In enacting the DMCA, Congress noted that the “provisions in the bill balance the need for rapid response to potential infringement with the end-users [sic] legitimate interests in not having material removed without recourse.”

Copyright claim #0:

My article, “How to Play Nintendo DS Games on Android”, is infringed by the text excerpted on the site, beginning with the text: “Did you know that your Android device can play NDS games? With the help of an emulator (yes there is a free, open-source DS emulator out there on Google Play), you can play games like Phoenix Wright, Dragon Quest IX and Touch Detective on your phone.”

Original work URL(s):

http://anurag2008.hubpages.com/hub/How-to-Play-Nintendo-DS-Games-on-Android

Downloading ROMs and BIOS files is illegal. I don’t support piracy and this guide is only for entertainment purpose. Reader discretion is advised.

How Does Nintendo Feel About the Emergence of Video Game Emulators?

The introduction of emulators created to play illegally copied Nintendo software represents the greatest threat to date to the intellectual property rights of video game developers. As is the case with any business or industry, when its products become available for free, the revenue stream supporting that industry is threatened. Such emulators have the potential to significantly damage a worldwide entertainment software industry which generates over $15 billion annually, and tens of thousands of jobs.

How Come Nintendo Does Not Take Steps Towards Legitimizing Nintendo Emulators?

Emulators developed to play illegally copied Nintendo software promote piracy. That's like asking why doesn't Nintendo legitimize piracy. It doesn't make any business sense. It's that simple and not open to debate.

there is no requirement in the DMCA that a notice-giver inform the service provider of an infringer's possible affirmative defenses, only that she affirm her good faith belief (as appears to be the case here) that the copyrighted material is being used without her (or her agent's) permission

If fair use and license can be ignored when filing a DMCA takedown notice, persons like the Defendant (and, indeed, far more powerful organizations), would have a safe haven to freely muzzle their critics by literally chasing them off the Internet. A victim – who did nothing unlawful and whose acts were authorized by the Copyright Act – would be left without recourse and without a voice.

The DMCA requires the copyright owner issuing a takedown notice to affirm that she has a “good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added). “The fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 107. An allegation that a copyright owner issued a takedown notice knowing that the use in question was in fact authorized by law, and/or that she had not formed a good faith belief to the contrary is, therefore, sufficient to state a claim under Section 512(f).

It is rare – perhaps sadly so – that one has both the opportunity and a reason to praise the litigation skills of opposing counsel. This, then, is something of a unique opportunity. Attorney Beck, a former partner with the national law firm Foley & Lardner LLP, and Attorney Riden, a former senior counsel to Foley & Lardner, have, collectively, almost 40 years of sophisticated litigation experience. Among his many accolades, Attorney Beck is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell, a Chambers recognized attorney, a Massachusetts Super Lawyer, a Top 100 New England attorney, and a nationally recognized authority on trade secret and non-competition law. Attorney Riden is a Massachusetts Super Lawyer, a recipient of the Best Lawyers designation, a frequently quoted legal authority, and a former appellate law clerk. They are, in short, eminently qualified to represent the interests of Plaintiff in this action and to fully brief the issues raised by this Court’s Order of April 10, 2013, requiring them to show cause why the present action should not be dismissed.

This being the case, the addition of two more legal Goliaths will do little to advance this Court’s understanding of the issues raised (which do not seem to be so complex as to cry out for the assistance of non-parties), and instead will only needlessly multiply the costs of an already overly-costly litigation. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Gina Crosley-Corcoran respectfully requests that the non-party requests for leave to file an amicus brief be denied.

It shall not be a violation of this section to circumvent a technological measure in connection with a work protected under this title if the purpose of such circumvention is to engage in a use that is not an infringement of copyright under this title.

The President shall take the necessary steps to secure modifications to applicable bilateral and multilateral trade agreements to which the United States is a party in order to ensure that such agreements are consistent with the amendments made by this Act.

1. Prince's recent DMCA takedown on six second clips on Vine of a Prince concert at SXSW. These clips were clearly fair use -- showing tiny snippets where the music isn't even recognizable.
2. Prince's DMCA takedowns sent over fan-recorded concert videos of his performance of Radiohead's song "Creep." As EFF points out, Prince has no real copyright claim here. The copyright of the song is Radiohead's -- and Radiohead demanded that the videos be put back online -- and the copyright on the video is whoever took the videos. But that didn't stop Prince.
3. Of course, no surprise here, Prince's connection to the infamous YouTube takedown of Stephanie Lenz's 29-second video of her toddler dancing to a Prince song in her kitchen. The lawsuit over that one is still going on. That one might actually be more about Universal Music than Prince, but given his other takedown actions, it would be surprising if he didn't support Universal on that one (even if he's had other disagreements with the label).

Last August, when someone posted a question about CipherCloud’s service to StackExchange, a popular question and answer site for software developers. “How is CipherCloud doing homomorphic encryption?” the question read.

That’s a geeky question, but an honest one. CipherCloud’s service is designed to encrypt data stored in exiting online applications without hampering the way these applications operate, and that’s not an easy thing to do. If you encrypt a collection of data, for instance, you may have trouble searching that data. One solution is a technique called “homomorphic encryption,” which would let users manipulate encrypted data as if it wasn’t encrypted — and that’s what the question was getting at.

On Saturday, the company sent a DMCA takedown notice and defamation complaint to StackExchange. With its letter, CipherCloud complained that StackExchange users violated its intellectual property in posting its marketing materials to the site and that defamed its operation in misrepresenting the way its technology works. The users guessed that CipherCloud used something called deterministic encryption, a relatively weak form of security. The company said this is not the case, pointing out that one of the posters, Sid Shetye, is the CEO of CipherDb, a company that competes with CipherCloud in some ways.

“I don’t think there’s a court in the country that would hold [the posters] liable for defamation,” [Corynne McSherry of the EFF] says. And if CipherCloud did try to bring defamation charges against the users, she says, the company could be exposed to a potential counter suit under SLAPP laws, which are designed to prevent individuals or companies from using bogus lawsuits to silence critics.

Naturally, UMG appealed, and in doing so made some compelling arguments about the wording of the law. The appellate court agreed, and has now issued pretty much the opposite decision: pre-1972 sound recordings are not covered by the DMCA (pdf and embedded below) and thus Grooveshark has no DMCA safe harbors for such songs.

There are a few different parts to the ruling, but the core argument is straightforward: section 301(c) of the Copyright Act explicitly states that no "rights or remedies" under common law copyright on pre-1972 recordings shall be "annulled or limited" until 2067, and it's pretty hard to argue that the DMCA doesn't do that:

Initially, it is clear to us that the DMCA, if interpreted in the manner favored by defendant, would directly violate section 301(c) of the Copyright Act. Had the DMCA never been enacted, there would be no question that UMG could sue defendant in New York state courts to enforce its copyright in the pre-1972 recordings, as soon as it learned that one of the recordings had been posted on Grooveshark. However, were the DMCA to apply as defendant believes, that right to immediately commence an action would be eliminated. Indeed, the only remedy available to UMG would be service of a takedown notice on defendant. This is, at best, a limitation on UMG’s rights, and an implicit modification of the plain language of section 301(c). The word “limit” in 301(c) is unqualified, so defendant’s argument that the DMCA does not contradict that section because UMG still retains the right to exploit its copyrights, to license them and to create derivative works, is without merit. Any material limitation, especially the elimination of the right to assert a common-law infringement claim, is violative of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.

For defendant to prevail, we would have to conclude that Congress intended to modify section 301(c) when it enacted the DMCA. However, applying the rules of construction set forth above, there is no reason to conclude that Congress recognized a limitation on common-law copyrights posed by the DMCA but intended to implicitly dilute section 301(c) nonetheless.

...

Under such circumstances, it would be far more appropriate for Congress, if necessary, to amend the DMCA to clarify its intent, than for this Court to do so by fiat.

Take note of that last bit, because this ruling has made it more true than ever. And that's where the problems come in. It seems pretty clear that there is some sloppy drafting in how the DMCA is written (which isn't a surprise), in that what you have is wording that can be read this way, even though it clearly goes against the intent and purpose of the DMCA. If the DMCA's safe harbors don't apply to pre-1972 recordings, then the DMCA's safe harbors no longer apply at all to any service that includes music. That can't be what Congress intended, even if the wording of the law can be read that way.

Thus, if you go strictly by the wording, while ignoring the intent, the logic of the decision is sound, but the implications are disturbing: as Grooveshark pointed out in their defense, this interpretation would gut the DMCA. One of the key purposes of safe harbors was to prevent online services from needing to proactively scan for infringing works, since that would drastically and unfairly limit their growth, and we wouldn't have things like YouTube today if that were the case. But if pre-1972 recordings (which is plenty of material) are not included, then user-generated content sites do have to scan everything. And while it might be somewhat easier to identify pre-1972 recordings than it is to identify infringing uploads, it would still be insanely prohibitive — not to mention the massive loss to our culture from having a huge chunk of music history mostly vanish from the internet.

It's a little unclear just how far-reaching this ruling will be (it's at the state level, and it is in itself explicitly contradicting the earlier MP3Tunes ruling, which it declares to be "wrongly decided") but the potential implications are huge. Exempting all pre-1972 recordings from the DMCA would impact all corners of the internet in a bad, bad way. The only optimistic thought is that perhaps it would force congress to revisit the law, and we could finally push for a Digital Millennium Copyright Act that actually works in the digital millennium.

Defendants' argument that no actual controversy exists is specious. Defendants created the controversy with Lee by attempting to enforce the agreement, which they extracted as a condition for gelling dental treatment. Further, under the totality of circumstances, the controversy is sufficiently "real" and " immediate." Defendants cannot pretend now that their notices to Lee were "just kidding," or that Lee lacked any reasonable apprehension of liability. A brief review of Defendants' conduct in response to Lee's exercise of basic rights shows how ridiculous their arguments are: (1) Defendants twice threatened Lee with suit, the second notification being from an attorney who did not specify a deadline by which suit would commence; (2) Defendants prepared and sent a draft version of the complaint they would file in a New York state court (Ex. D); and (3) Defendants sent two invoices, one which threatened referral to a collection agency. No reasonable person could view Defendants' constant barrage of threats as anything other than a real controversy.

Further, Defendants have not released Lee from liability for the amount threatened in the draft complaint, which is in excess of $110,000, or the amount charged by the two invoices. There is an objectively supported threat of future injury-which Defendants' conduct as created.

Apparently, this is the infringing post: http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2008/02/lyrics-for-youtube-music-videos.html (Google Cache). It's a post about a Greasemonkey script that allowed you to show music lyrics in the YouTube interface.

...

I've managed to find the DMCA notice: "The URL listed below is one of nearly 20 song lyrics sites who have attempted to post lyrics for the song titled 'Alden Howell' by the artist Inspection 12. The lyrics posted on this and other sites are not accurate and the artist has not given them permission to post lyrical content. Inspection 12 has been making efforts to contact these websites directly in order to have the content removed. We are attempting to have this URL and others like it to be excluded from google search results for the name 'Alden Howell'."

Unfortunately for Inspection 12, that blog post doesn't include their lyrics. In fact, it only includes a screenshot with lyrics from a much more popular punk band. Inspection 12 has never contacted me and no post from this blog mentions 'Alden Howell' (except for this post, obviously).

As Tim Cushing wrote in a recent headline, "in the long history of specious DMCA claims, this is definitely one of them." Chitu, unlike many people who are rightfully too intimidated by potential liability, filed a counternotice... and it was rejected.

So we've got an obviously non-infringing post that has been wiped off the web and, at the time of writing, is still gone. That's not okay, and it's time to ask how it happened. There's no shortage of reasons.

Firstly (or more accurately lastly), we've got Google's handling of the DMCA request. As Chitu points out, it was just a search result takedown, but Google chose to actually take the post off of Blogspot as well. That wasn't an accident, it's their process:

From time to time, the Search team may receive copyright removal requests for search results that link to other Google products like Blogger or YouTube. In these cases, we forward these requests to the appropriate teams to evaluate the allegedly infringing material.

Actually, maybe "process" is too generous. If they "evaluate" the requests (twice, apparently—once at Search and then again at Blogger), surely they would filter out a takedown like this one that doesn't even pass the laugh test. And not only did these two evaluations fail to catch it, the review they supposedly conducted after receiving a counternotice still didn't catch the error. Given the nature of the law and the requirements it places on Google, all of this is somewhat understandable, and would be somewhat excusable but for one thing: Google's terrible customer service. Blanket, form-letter rejections that ignore all reason and logic, sent by a faceless monolith, are among the most infuriating things a customer can receive. Good luck getting actual help with a human being.

But the buck hardly stops at Google. It doesn't even really land there. After all, why did Inspection 12 file this takedown in the first place? Chitu asked them just that:

I've contacted Inspection 12 and they say "that must have been submitted in error. not fully understanding the DMCA notice. our intent wasn't to post on a blog or complaints about a blog. it was to submit a complaint to google about websites that are posting lyrical content that is falsely described as Inspection 12 lyrics in order to sell ringtones."

That's a lot better than some of the furious missives we've seen in the past when copyright holders have been called on their shenanigans, but there are still some big problems. If you're "not fully understanding the DMCA notice," then you are not allowed to file it. How can you sign your name to say you have a "good faith belief" in something if you knowingly don't understand what it means? Inspection 12 is clearly guilty of abusing the DMCA process. But one thing they're probably not guilty of is perjury.

And that brings us to the final problem, where the buck really does stop: the DMCA itself. As we've discussed before, the prescribed text of a DMCA takedown notice employs some clever wording to imply (intentionally or otherwise) that it's more strict on the rightsholder than it actually is. The "under penalty of perjury" language is surgically separated from the bulk of the notice—it applies only to the statement that you are the copyright holder or an authorized agent of the copyright holder. As for the statement that the material you are targeting is in fact infringing, that's just made under a good faith belief. That is a much lower bar, and while it's not great to stand in court and have it demonstrated that you asserted a good faith belief when there was none, it's hardly a clear-cut and substantial safeguard against abuse the way "penalty of perjury" is.

So let's be clear on this: the DMCA is harsh on anyone messing with copyright holders by incorrectly claiming rights they don't own, but lenient on copyright holders abusing the public.

Nobody is blame-free here, except Chitu and his blog. Google needs to handle these requests better, and Inspection 12 should never have sent that notice (nor should they be wasting their time on a DMCA campaign against lyric websites in the first place). But the real culprit is the DMCA itself, which is constantly pushing companies like Google in this regrettable direction, and makes it all too easy for rightsholders like Inspection 12 to abuse the law. Until we get a system that holds both sides of the equation to the same standard, and until copyright holders demonstrate that they can use the takedown system judiciously and responsibly, all their protestations about online services not doing enough to fight infringement will fall on deaf ears (or be drowned out by laughter).

Viacom's argument that the volume of material and "the absence of record evidence that would allow a jury to decide which clips-in-suit were specifically known to senior YouTube executives" (Viacom Opp. pp. 9-10) combine to deprive YouTube of the statutory safe harbor, is extravagant. If, as plaintiffs assert, neither side can determine the presence or absence of specific infringements because of the volume of material, that merely demonstrates the wisdom of the legislative requirement that it be the owner of the copyright, or his agent, who identifies the infringement by giving the service provider notice. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). The system is entirely workable: in 2007 Viacom itself gave such notice to YouTube of infringements by some 100,000 videos, which were taken down by YouTube by the next business day. See 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 at 524.

Thus, the burden of showing that YouTube knew or was aware of the specific infringements of the works in suit cannot be shifted to YouTube to disprove. Congress has determined that the burden of identifying what must be taken down is to be on the copyright owner, a determination which has proven practicable in practice.

Here, the examples proffered by plaintiffs (to which they claim YouTube was willfully blind) give at most information that infringements were occurring with particular works, and occasional indications of promising areas to locate and remove them. The specific locations of infringements are not supplied: at most, an area of search is identified, and YouTube is left to find the infringing clip. As stated in UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, No. 10-55732, 2013 WL 1092793, at *12 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) ("UMG III"),

Although the parties agree, in retrospect, that at times there was infringing material available on Veoh's services, the DMCA recognizes that service providers who do not locate and remove infringing materials they do not specifically know of should not suffer the loss of safe harbor protection.

The Karim memorandum states that infringing clips of some well-known shows "can still be found," but does not identify the specific clips he saw or where he found them. The Wilkens declaration submitted by plaintiffs asserts that there were over 450 such clips on YouTube at the time, and presumably some of them contained the infringing matter seen by Mr. Karim. To find them would require YouTube to locate and review over 450 clips. The DMCA excuses YouTube from doing that search. Under § 512(m), nothing in the applicable section of the DMCA shall be construed to require YouTube's "affirmatively seeking the facts indicating infringing activity."

Mr. Karim's memorandum does not tie his observations to any specific clips. Application of the principle of willful blindness to his memorandum thus does not produce knowledge or awareness of infringement of specific clips-in-suit, out of the 450 available candidates. Nor does any other example tendered by plaintiffs.

YouTube's decision to restrict its monitoring efforts to certain groups of infringing clips, like its decisions "to restrict access to its proprietary search mechanisms," do not exclude it from the safe harbor, regardless of their motivation.

Description of original work: I am sure that I drew the picture.
The following link is the oldest post of my work.

https://twitter.com/ma31xte/status/266913131790475264

This Panel Opinion is a classic case of bad facts making bad law. Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation does not file this brief to dispute the Court's factual conclusions regarding the conduct at issue in this case. However, the Panel Opinion went far beyond what was necessary to address that conduct. As a result, it has created new legal uncertainty for online service providers and their customers, undermining over a decade of legislation and jurisprudence designed to help reduce that uncertainty. A predictable legal environment has proven to be crucial not only the growth of the Internet generally, but the growth of innovative platforms for free expression, in particular. This case should not provide a vehicle to impede that development.

Most important, the Panel Opinion adopts a "loose causation theory" that disconnects the scope of inducement liability from the defendants' acts—raising the troubling possibility that a single inducing act (such as a message to one customer) could open the floodgates to liability for third-party infringement entirely unrelated to that act. The Opinion's loose causation theory conflicts with fundamental common law principles of proximate cause essential to both predictability and fairness. The Panel's decision to depart from those principles was apparently based on the unfounded assumption that the Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) requires it. Not so. First, Grokster expressly recognized that secondary liability under copyright derives from common law principles. Second, given that Grokster's specific inducement standard was imported from patent law, it is more likely that the Court also intended to import the analytical framework patent law applies where, as here, a service is capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses.

There is a danger that this passage could be misconstrued to stand for a broader proposition that we do not believe the panel intended: that any time an online service provider is found to have exercised "substantial influence" over any user-submitted content on its service—no matter what that finding was based on—it thereby loses its DMCA safe harbor protections for all user-submitted content on the entire service. This is how some copyright plaintiffs have already tried to read the panel's ruling. In a recent submission to the Southern District of New York in the Viacom v. YouTube case, for example, the plaintiffs have asserted, citing the panel opinion, that this Court “made clear that where DMCA eligibility is unavailable due to the right and ability to control prong of the safe harbor, the DMCA defense is broadly lost as to all clips in suit.” Ltr. from Paul M. Smith to Hon. Louis L. Stanton at 2 (March 22, 2013) (attached as Ex. 1).

Imagine, for example, a video-hosting service that was otherwise eligible for the section 512(c) safe harbor, but that on one occasion commissioned a particular user to upload a video that, unbeknownst to the service, turned out to be infringing. A court might conclude that the service exerted a “substantial influence” over that instance of infringement and, if the service earned a direct financial benefit from it, there would be grounds for denying the safe harbor for a claim based on that video. But it would make no sense to thereby disqualify the service provider from DMCA protection across the board—even for countless other videos whose posting it did not control or from which it earned no benefit.

Likewise, consider a search engine eligible for protection under the section 512(d) safe harbor for linking to infringing material online. If one of the millions of links provided by the search engine pointed users to infringing material that had been authored by the search engine itself and that users were charged to view, a finding of control plus financial benefit might be warranted for that particular link. But, again, there would be no plausible basis for categorically depriving the service of the safe harbor for the millions of unrelated links it delivers to material that it does not control or financially benefit from.

We were worried about the part of the DMCA called 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), which says that “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [copyright law].” We had to disable the rootkit to detect what it was hiding, and we had to partially disable the software to figure out what it was doing. An angry record company might call either of those steps an act of circumvention, landing us in court. Instead of talking to the public, we talked to our lawyer.

The research community saw this problem coming and repeatedly asked Congress to amend the bill that would become the DMCA, to create an effective safe harbor for research. There was a letter to Congress from 50 security researchers (including me), another from the heads of major scientific societies, and a third from the leading professional society for computer scientists. But with so much at stake in the act for so many major interests, our voice wasn’t heard. As they say in Washington, we didn’t have a seat at the table.

Congress did give us a research exemption, but it was so narrowly defined as to be all but useless. (So perhaps we did have a seat—at the kids’ table.) I’ll spare you the details, but basically, there is a 116-word section of the Act titled “Permissible Acts of Encryption Research,” and it appears to have been written without consulting any researchers. There may be someone, somewhere, who has benefited from this exemption, but it fails to protect almost all of the relevant research. It didn’t protect Alex and me, because we were investigating spyware that didn’t rely on the mathematical operations involved in encryption.

LAST Sunday afternoon, some friends and I were hanging out in a local bar, talking about what we’d be doing that evening. It turned out that we all had the same plan: to watch the season premiere of “Game of Thrones.” But only one person in our group had a cable television subscription to HBO, where it is shown. The rest of us had a crafty workaround.

We were each going to use HBO Go, the network’s video Web site, to stream the show online — but not our own accounts. To gain access, one friend planned to use the login of the father of a childhood friend. Another would use his mother’s account. I had the information of a guy in New Jersey that I had once met in a Mexican restaurant.

The new opinion effectively rewrites the DMCA to provide different rules for copyright infringement on the internet. It improperly shifts the burden of online copyright enforcement to content owners whose businesses depend on payment for the use of their works, while broadly shielding internet service providers ("ISPs") who use and reap financial benefits from those works (without compensating their owners) even when they have the right and ability to police their sites. The Opinion upends the carefully-crafted balance embodied in Section 512 of the Copyright Act. And, as explained below, the Opinion fails to clarify the limits or scope of the DMCA's "safe harbors."

first, the holding that section 512(c)'s safe harbor for infringement "by reason of the storage at the direction of a user" actually encompasses all "access-facilitating processes that automatically occur when a user" uploads, streams or downloads infringing material eviscerates both the language and structure of the DMCA. Congress created four discrete safe harbors, each addressing different activities. After the Opinion, Section 512(c), now applicable to "access-facilitating processes," swallows several of the other supposedly different and discrete safe harbors whole.

Second, the Opinion ignores longstanding copyright law to hold that an ISP does not have either actual or red flag knowledge of infringement unless it has received information identifying "specific instances of infringement." Section 512(c)(1)(A) requires no such thing. As a result, content owners must now incur the expense of continuously scouring hundreds of thousands (or indeed millions) of constantly changing internet websites, to attempt to locate copies of their works and then send take-down notices or otherwise advise ISPs of these "specific instances of infringement" on their sites. The Opinion requires a world wide web game of "Whack-A-Mole" to police infringement.

Third, as a consequence of the Opinion's interpretation of Section 512(c)(1)(B), websites like Veoh, which (a) copy, perform, and distribute (by offering digital downloads), tens of thousands of infringing works, (b) receive a direct financial benefit from the infringement in the form of advertising revenues that directly increase with each view of an infringing video by a user, and (c) have the "right and ability to control" the infringement as those terms have historically been understood in copyright law, nevertheless get a free pass under the DMCA unless they also engage in an undefined "something more" -which apparently must be akin to inducing infringement. If the Opinion is left standing, ISPs like Veoh will have no obligation either to affirmatively police their site (indeed, they are disincentivized from doing so lest they find an infringing file which would give them "actual" or red flag knowledge), to adopt readily available technical solutions to mitigate infringement, or to obtain authorization from content owners.

These are unauthorized recordings and are unauthorized synchronizations As such, I have a good faith belief that use of the copyrighted work described above is not authorized by the copyright owner (or by a third party who is legally entitled to do so on behalf of the copyright owner) and is not otherwise permitted by law. I hereby confirm that I believe the tracks identified in this email infringe my copyright.

The type of generalized guesswork that Viacom engages in bears no resemblance to the showing of specific knowledge of clips-in-suit that the Second Circuit demanded.

It is not Viacom's burden to prove specific knowledge or awareness. That factual issue is relevant only to the affirmative defense that YouTube is asserting; knowledge of specific infringements is not an element of Viacom's copyright infringement claims against YouTube. At trial, it will be enough for Viacom to prove that the clips-in-suit were on the website, along with some other elements of infringement liability.

Viacom does not even try to make the showing of clip-specific knowledge required by the Second Circuit’s ruling. It instead reverses course and claims that it is YouTube’s burden to affirmatively establish its lack of knowledge as to each specific clip-in-suit. Viacom’s novel burden-shifting argument is wrong. It is contrary to the Second Circuit’s decision, all the case law, and the structure of the DMCA itself. Viacom also ignores the record. YouTube has identified more than sufficient evidence of its lack of knowledge of infringement— including the very fact that the voluminous record in this case contains no evidence of such knowledge. Viacom’s inability to offer any evidence from which a jury could find that YouTube had actual or red-flag knowledge of even a single clip-in-suit requires that summary judgment be entered in YouTube’s favor.

In the longer term, we believe that the widespread concern about cell phone unlocking illustrates how these parts of the DMCA can interfere with consumer rights and competition policy. This interference is not limited to the realm of mobile communications devices. Congress must take action to ensure that laws and policies are keeping up with the pace of technological change. Not addressing these questions will stunt advances in access to digital media for people with disabilities and may prevent new innovations and competitive uses for emerging devices, as uncertainties around the law and the three-year cycle creates a chilling effect for individuals, businesses, innovators and investors who may be covered by the law.

To that end, we request that as the leadership of the two committees of jurisdiction, you convene hearings this year to investigate these possible reforms to the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA in order to begin a thorough discussion of these problems.

Even more than criticism, the announcement prompted bewilderment. Just what is the Library of Congress doing regulating cellphone service, anyway?

Good question. There really isn't a good answer, other than that wireless providers have managed to get the Library of Congress, which oversees the U.S. Copyright Office, to do their bidding.

A better answer is to take the Library of Congress out of the business of being the industry's contract enforcer.

When Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, the goal was to help digital content providers — such as musicians, filmmakers and software companies — prevent illegal pirating of their works.

To state the obvious, people don't unlock phones to steal copyrighted material. They do it to allow their phones to work on other networks.

[....] When Congress' librarian starts behaving like the new sheriff in town, consumers have good reason to suspect the law is stacked against them.

We are providing you this letter of notification pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 USC??512(c) to make Softlayer.com aware of material on its network or system that infringes the exclusive copyrights of Woodman Labs, Inc d/b/a GoPro (“Company”). We hereby affirm that the undersigned is authorized to act on behalf of Company whose exclusive intellectual property rights we believe to be infringed as described herein.

We have a good faith belief that the Internet site found at digitalrev.com infringes the rights of the Company by using the following trademarks of the Company:

“GOPRO” Registered: 3/3/2009 US Registration# 3032989

“HERO” Registered: 12/20/2005 US Registration# 3308141

As you may know, if this information is not removed after notice that complies with the DMCA, the Internet Service Provider may also be held liable for the copyright infringement.

I have a good faith belief that use of the trademark(s) described above in connection with the domain and URLs described above is not authorized by the trademark owner, and such use is not otherwise permissible under applicable law.

I represent that the information in this notification is true and correct and that I am authorized to act on behalf of the trademark owner.

There's nothing in that review that looks like it should trouble GoPro enough to overreact in this fashion. In fact, commenters on the site point out that DigitalRev's reviews of GoPro products usually range from "positive" to "overenthusiastic." So, if the review isn't the issue, what is?

Thankfully, another rep from GoPro responded quickly to clear up the confusion... by adding more confusion. The official statement, left at both Reddit and PetaPixel reads as follows:

Thanks for the heads up on this issue. The letter that was posted next to the review on DigitalRev was not sent in response to the review. Obviously, we welcome editorial reviews of our products. This letter was sent because DigitalRev is not an authorized reseller of GoPro products and they were using images and had incorrect branding and representation of our product in their online commerce store. As part of our program – we ask merchants who are selling our product to use authorized images. That is why DigitalRev was contacted. But – our letter did not clearly communicate this and that is something we will correct.

There are a few things that are muddling this situation at the moment. The notice was sent to digitalrev.com not because of the review, but because digitalreview.com is not an authorized reseller and are using our trademark and product images inappropriately. The notice is in regards to the sidebar, not the review itself, but we can see why it seemed like it as the url links to both.

We would never attempt to restrict anyone's freedom to share their opinion about us or our products, positive or negative.

GoPro does not authorize any of its resellers (or anyone else) to use “GoPro” or “HERO” in domain names. Your registration of goprodivemaster.com is unfortunately in direct violation of this policy. We understand that your intention is simply to sell and promote our products, but GoPro cannot risk misleading customers into believing that they are interacting directly with GoPro when they are engaging with your website or your organization. The use of our trademark terms in your business name may cause confusion, and is prohibited under international trademark law.

Even if the domain redirects to another site, this is not a permissible use of our brand terms.

Please understand: GoPro has spent years building its brand name—only the company itself is legally represented as “GoPro” or the manufacturer of the “HERO” line of cameras. We need you to kindly discontinue the use of our registered/trademarked name as soon as possible.

We really don’t own our stuff anymore (at least not fully); the manufacturers do. Because modifying modern objects requires access to information: code, service manuals, error codes, and diagnostic tools. Modern cars are part horsepower, part high-powered computer. Microwave ovens are a combination of plastic and microcode. Silicon permeates and powers almost everything we own.

This is a property rights issue, and current copyright law gets it backwards, turning regular people — like students, researchers, and small business owners — into criminals. Fortune 500 telecom manufacturer Avaya, for example, is known for suing service companies, accusing them of violating copyright for simply using a password to log in to their phone systems. That’s right: typing in a password is considered “reproducing copyrighted material.”

It hasn’t always been that way. Copyright laws were originally designed to protect creativity and promote innovation. But now, they are doing exactly the opposite: They’re being used to keep independent shops from fixing new cars. They’re making it almost impossible for farmers to maintain their equipment. And, as we’ve seen in the past few weeks, they’re preventing regular people from unlocking their own cellphones.