The party leading to Plaintiff's arrest was hosted by another third party, "Trano", and not by Plaintiff.

This other third party, Trano, provided music entertainment, bouncers and beer at this party, which Plaintiff knew nothing about until the immediate time leading up to the commencement of the party.

Upon arriving at the scene, police found broken beer bottles near the door of the first floor of the apartment and 25-30 teenagers inside. Many were attempting to conceal bottles of beer and other alcoholic beverages, the police report states. Open bottles of alcohol were found in the kitchen area as well as a small amount of marijuana.

Monsarrat identified himself as the host of the party, but denied that any alcohol was being served, the report states. When asked by an officer to inform his guests that the party was ending, Monsarrat became “argumentative” and refused to follow instructions, police said. Officers asked for identification from several partygoers who responded, “We're in high school, we don't have ID."

Jon Monsarrat announced this week that as part of an Internet defamation case, he will expose the real identities and addresses of 100 cyber bullies as part of his new cyber investigation service.

Earlier in 2013 he created a cyber-investigation service, which cracks the real identities of cyber bullies who post defamatory material online. The release of names and identities is part of this new service, for one of Monsarrat's client with an ongoing legal case against cyber bullies. His company is working in partnership with Defend My Name, perhaps the most technically advanced of the top anti-defamation services, and Ishman Law Firm, which has expertise in defending victims from cyber-attack.

Jon Monsarrat said, "Cyber bullies harass and spread lies about their victims using the power of the Internet, which leads to thousands of suicides a year. The police and courts are not always up to the challenge of fighting back. Now I'm bringing two patented technologies to bear to help people in need." Monsarrat was referring to his two patents in collecting and analyzing data from public websites.

The second claim for relief is supposed to be under Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws. Have you ever actually read that statute? I'm not sure you made it all the way through to Section 9(3), which requires that a demand letter complying with certain statutory requirements must be mailed to a defendant at least 30 days before filing suit under Chapter 93A. "[T]he thirty-day requirement, as part of the requirement of a written demand for relief, is a prerequisite to suit, to be alleged and proved." York v. Sullivan, 369 Mass. 157, 163 (1975). Perhaps you jumped the gun a bit here? You filed suit on February 4, so you would have needed to send a demand letter before January 5, 2013 to satisfy the statute. Mr. Newman received no such letter. As far as I can tell, you didn't even comply with the spirit of the 30-day requirement -- you made no attempt to settle the dispute amicably before filing suit, or before filing the amended complaint, or before having it (and its telephone-book sized pile of exhibits) served on Mr. Newman.

Attorney Ishman, I see on your website that you hold yourself forth publicly as a copyright lawyer. I am too. I commend you for that, and for any work you do to legitimately support and protect creators. I like copyright law a lot; I just hate to see it abused. So I wonder whether you may have gotten a bit ahead of yourself with this cause of action.

Claims of common-law copyright are preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Have you read that statute? Since the 1976 Copyright Act became effective, Section 301 has explained that copyright claims are "governed exclusively" by the Act, and that "no person is entitled to any such [copyright] or equivalent right in any such work [within the subject matter of copyright] under the common law or statutes of any State." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).

In other words, common-law copyright claims are a relic. "Under the Copyright Act of 1976 ... common law copyright is abolished." Burke v. NBC, Inc., 598 F.2d 688, 691 n.2 (1st Cir. 1979). There have been no reported cases in Massachusetts state courts since the 1976 Act in which a common-law copyright was found valid. But there have been several that say things like, "These common law claims ... have clearly been preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act." Sicari v. Raccula, 2 Mass. L. Rep. 109 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 8, 1994). To the extent such claims exist, they're generally limited to media where, due to quirks of the Act's history, no statutory right ever existed, such as extemporaneous speeches or pre-1972 sound recordings. But the copyright claim in this case concerns a photograph, and those have been covered by the Copyright Act since Oscar Wilde was a young man. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Your assertion that Mr. Monsarrat's images are "subject to common-law copyright protection under the laws of the state of Massachusetts" (Complaint ¶ 102) is wrong as a matter of black-letter law.

Those assertions are directly contradicted by the record. Set aside the fact that Mr. Monsarrat was at the party and that he was arrested at the party. Set aside the fact that both the police report and the Somerville Journal article stated plainly that Mr. Monsarrat had "identified himself as the host of the party." Set aside the fact that the police report indicates that Mr. Monsarrat denied, to the arresting officer, that there was any alcohol at the party, despite the officer's firsthand observations. Mr. Monsarrat publicly announced his role in the party online, before his arrest. As Mr. Newman pointed out at the time, Mr. Monsarrat had posted an open invitation on his Wheel Questions blog, announcing that he was holding the party, two days before it happened. Complaint Exhibit 4 p. 69 ("I'm holding a party Friday in the Boston area. RSVP to johnny@wheelquestions.org and say a little about yourself for the location.") (quoting Mr. Monsarrat). If Mr. Monsarrat wants to clear his name by suggesting that he was a mere innocent bystander at the party, he cannot hope to succeed in rewriting the public record. His own words will be admissible as non-hearsay, to prove the truth of his statements identifying himself as the host, and to disprove statements to the contrary in the complaint. See Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 243 (1998) ("A party's admission is excluded by definition from the hearsay rule.") (citing Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)); see also Flood v. Southland Corp,. 33 Mass. App. Ct. 287, 294-95 (1992).

The complaint seeks punitive damages in an amount to exceed $5,000,000. That is outrageous on its face, and wholly unsustainable under controlling law. Massachusetts has not allowed such damages since 1974. "In a case of defamation the plaintiff's recovery is limited to actual damages, which are compensatory for the wrong done by the defendant. ... Punitive damages are never allowed ... even after proof of actual malice." Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 365 Mass. 246 (1974) (citations omitted). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reaffirmed that position the following year: "We reject the allowance of punitive damages in this Commonwealth in any defamation action, on any state of proof, whether based in negligence, or reckless or wilful conduct. We so hold in recognition that the possibility of excessive and unbridled jury verdicts, grounded on punitive assessments, may impermissibly chill the exercise of First Amendment rights by promoting apprehensive self-censorship." Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 860 (1975).

It is my understanding that Mr. Monsarrat has busied himself, since the filing of the amended complaint, by reaching out to people he believes responsible for these three-year old discussions, sending them wildly improper threatening letters and/or directly confronting in person. In at least one of those letters, he states, "The purpose of this correspondence to is [sic] notify you that I am suing LiveJournal forum moderator Ron Newman for $5,500,000 for defamation, and that you are named as a Doe Defendant in this lawsuit..." These actions are deeply dismaying. Mr. Monsarrat is tarnishing Mr. Newman's name in scattershot fashion, to many people who may have had no relation to the postings at issue. He may not harass people in the Somerville community by seeking to intimidate them into removing their legitimate free speech comments.

When Mr. Monsarrat succeeds in this intimidation, he helps to destroy the record that would be at issue if the litigation were to proceed. If this pattern of behavior continues, he may be subjecting himself to sanctions for suborning spoliation. Thanks to poor formatting, many of the Complaint's Exhibits reproduce discussion threads in piecemeal fashion, omitting much or all of the text of longer comments. See, for just one example, Complaint Exhibit 4 pp. 31-42. These fragmentary Exhibits leave the original online discussions as the only reliable source of material evidence. Any deletion of those comments, as Mr. Monsarrat demands, makes them invisible to subsequent viewers, depriving defendants of the context-specific defenses that a defamation claim requires. "'The destruction of relevant evidence ... has a pernicious effect on the truthfinding function of our courts.' ... The doctrine of spoliation permits the imposition of sanctions or remedies where a litigant or its expert negligently or intentionally loses or destroys evidence that the litigant (or expert) knows or reasonably should know might be relevant to a possible action, even when the spoliation occurs before an action has been commenced." Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 790, 797 (2009) (quoting Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 553 (2002)).

It appears this action has been filed with an ulterior purpose: not as a good faith means to redress any legitimate grievances, but as a case study to be used in marketing one of Mr. Monsarrat's business ventures. That would be more than improper enough, but worse, the entire purpose of "cyber investigation service" seems to be to empower litigants to make endruns around the discovery process, as Mr. Monsarrat has done.

This partnership, in the place of a putative client and attorney relationship, is more than irregular. It may subject Attorney Ishman and his law firm to the same liability as Mr. Monsarrat, based on their involvement in a larger scheme. See Kurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 192 & n. 8 (1998). "[A] civil action is wrongful if its initiator does not have probable cause to believe the suit will succeed, and is acting primarily for a purpose other than that of properly adjudicating his claims." G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 410 Mass. 262, 273 (1991). It appears that Mr. Monsarrat has dragged Mr. Newman into court, and badgered an untold number of others, to make a name for his "cyber investigation service." This ulterior purpose, combined with the paucity of the complaint's factual allegations and legal claims, strongly suggest that the action has been undertaken without good faith. These improprieties would support counterclaims of abuse of process, see generally Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627, 636 (2010), and under Chapter 93A, see Northeast Data Sys., Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Computer Sys. Co., 986 F.2d 607, 611 (1st Cir. 1993) (filing legal claim "which proves baseless" is an unfair trade practice if claim brought with "ulterior motive"); Nova Assignments, Inc. v. Kunian, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 44 n. 7 (2010); Refuse & Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Servs. of Am., Inc., 932 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1991) ("bringing [a] lawsuit in spite of the evidence" can violate Chapte 93A). These improprieties would further support sanctions under M.G.L. c. 231, § 6F, see Fronk v. Fowler, 456 Mass. 317, 334 -35 (2010) ("Claims that are so unmoored from law or fact are the very definition of 'frivolous': 'Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful.'") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 739 (9th ed. 2009)), and under Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, see Van Christo Adver. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 416-17 (1998).

“Before Twitter and social media, these things would have been said in a union hall and on a leaflet,” said COPE Ontario legal representative Glenn Wheeler. “The Charter of Rights provides for free expression, freedom of association. So we think we are in our constitutional rights to offer our version of the way we see things. That’s fair comment.”

The former general manager of the Toronto Maple Leafs filed a court action Friday alleging defamation against several unidentified Internet commenters believed to have authored and spread rumours about his dismissal.

“Brian has decided that it is time to stop people who post comments on the Internet from thinking they can fabricate wild stories with impunity,” read a letter penned by Burke’s lawyer Peter A. Gall of Heenan Blaikie LLP. “Brian is determined to find the authors of the lie about him and those who have circulated the lie. He is pursuing them in court and will obtain orders compelling them to pay damages for their illegal actions.”

The defendants, whose identities are currently unknown to Burke, are listed only by their online usernames: “NoFixedAddress”, “CamBarkerFan”, “Lavy16”, “mbskidmore”, “Tulowd”, “Loob”, “Naggah”, “mowerman”, “Aaronp18”, “Steve”, “KaBoomin8”, “THEzbrad”, “Slobberface”, “Poonerman”, “isolatedcircuit”, “Kanada Kev”, and “sir psycho sexy”.

Up until three weeks ago very few people had visited this blog. If you are one of my new readers you are probably aware of my current situation. Recently I have been involved in a lawsuit regarding a post I made on this blog earlier in the year. That blog post was merely speculation; just a rumour I heard and had read on hockey forums... It needs to be noted that the blog post I made specifically stated that what I was writing was based on speculations and that it was just rumours...Hopefully, Brian Burke and Hazel Mae will read this and understand how I feel, and what my intentions were. I want to sincerely apologize to them for any personal or professional damages my actions may have caused them.

Alan, this is John Steele again.

You have not responded or contacted me regarding litigation you're involved in. I know you've been served with a third lawsuit. And there are more coming. Don't worry about that.

Well, obviously, if I don't hear from you, I'm going to start filing for certain default motions and start getting relief that way.

I can assure you that just ignoring legal matters, it's not going to go away. I can guarantee you, I'm not going away.

So I highly recommend you at least, you know, follow the rules.... otherwise your life is going to get really complicated.

“Mr. Godfrey. This is John Steele calling. I understand that you just got served. So, I do need to know if you are going to be representing Mr. Cooper in this suit as well. Obviously there is a conflict of interest that I can see but obviously I’m going to have to defer that decision about whether you are going to represent your co-defendant to you. Uhm and I leave the question as to the other suits that are coming your way in the next few days, I’ll just wait until you actually get served before I bringing those up, but at least on this issue, this suit, I do need to know if I may contact Mr. Cooper directly or if I will be working through you. All right. Thank you.”

I was astonished that someone would purport to represent someone in a felony murder case who had never tried a case before and that local counsel, Mr. Grigsby, was complicit in this.

It appeared to the Court that there were. . . defense theories out there, but [Rakofsky had] the inability to execute those theories. It was apparent to the Court that there was ... not a good grasp of legal principles and legal procedure of what was admissible and what was not admissible that inured, I think, to the detriment of Mr. Deaner."

I) Please trick Leigh (old lady) into admitting:
a) she told the 2 lawyers that she did not see the shooting and
b) she told 2 lawyers she did not provide the Government any information about [the] shooting.

granting plaintiffs' motion to amend would be futile since the allegations set forth in the proposed Second Amended Complaint are not sufficient to state a cause of action; as will be discussed below in defendants' motions to dismiss. dismiss.

It is quite clear that defendants" herein who operated legal blogs or posted comments' on those blogs residing out of the country in Canada, or even in the United States ranging from Washington, D.C. and Florida in the east, to Texas and California in the west, had virtually no purposeful activity or minimum contacts with this state. There was certainly no purposeful activities in this state which were substantially related to the alleged defamatory statements as defendants neither wrote the alleged defamatory statements in this state nor did they direct them to our state alone. The statements were posted on the internet with potential world-wide accessibility.

This Court rejects plaintiffs' primary argument in opposition that defendants received "commercial benefits" from the hyper-links contained in their websites to invoke long-arm jurisdiction. This connection to New York, if any, is too attenuated to exercise personal jurisdiction over the out-of state defendants. Plainly stated, there are insufficient contacts with this state to "hale" into court multiple defendants living thousands of miles away in other states which would "chill" their right to free speech.

While the precise words are not exactly identical, they are similar enough to convey a fair report of the Rakofsky e-mail and the Bean motion that were inextricably intertwined with the judicial proceedings before Judge Jackson in the Deaner case. Even though the "trick" e-mail, the Bean motion and Judge Jackson's comments do not portray Rakofsky in a positive light, and Rakofsky may wish to disavow or interpret them in a different way, the defendants were permitted to publicly disseminate them as a report of a judicial proceeding.

You can not look at Judge Jackson's comments in isolation, but in context considering all of his comments and Rakofsky's trial performance. The clear import of Judge Jackson's rulings was to excuse Rakofsky due to his lack of competence and inexperience to defend Deaner in a murder trial. It is acknowledged that the Deaner murder trial was Rakofsky's first trial in a foreign jurisdiction and with which he was totally unfamiliar, and Judge Jackson was vigilant in protecting Deaner's right to effective assistance of counsel.

Significantly, the reported fact that Judge Jackson declared a mistrial in the Deaner case was not defamatory because even Rakofsky initially celebrated the mistrial as a positive development in his career. In other words, defendants' report that a mistrial occurred does not constitute defamation. Instead, the reported statements that Rakofsky was allegedly not competent, inexperienced and unethical are the operative words which may give rise to defamation, except that said content was privileged under the Civil Right Law § 74,

This statute has been narrow construed to meet its limited objective to prohibit commercial appropriation of a person's name and likeness.... These sections also do not apply to reports of "newsworthy events or matters of public interest" otherwise known as the newsworthy exception.... To foster freedom of expression, the meaning of "newsworthiness" has been broadly construed to permit a wide and liberal interpretation....

In this case, it is abundantly clear that coverage of a murder trial in the Deaner case comes within the broadly construed newsworthy exception as a report of a newsworthy event or a matter of public concern. Thus, plaintiffs' fourth cause of action fails to state a claim for a violation...

When pervasive advertisements from a local merchant feature prices that seem to be just too good to be true, they may, in fact, not be the price that the average consumer will pay. Dozens of consumers who have used pseudonyms to post about their experiences with appellee Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. (“Hadeed”) on the popular website www.yelp.com, maintained by appellant Yelp Inc. (“Yelp”), report that Hadeed routinely fails to honor the advertised discount prices. Hadeed’s responses to several consumers on Yelp suggest that it recognizes the problem; yet its complaint for defamation singles out the authors of seven reviews posted on Yelp that say the same thing as the other online detractors of Hadeed and its sister business, Hadeed Oriental Rug Cleaning. Based on that allegation, Hadeed invoked the court’s subpoena power to strip its pseudonymous critics of their First Amendment right to speak anonymously.

The main question on this appeal—an issue of first impression at the appellate level in Virginia—is whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard in overriding the anonymous speakers’ First Amendment rights. Courts elsewhere have recognized that, given the valuable role played by the First Amendment right to speak anonymously in encouraging ordinary people to express themselves fully, it is necessary to balance that right against a plaintiff’s right to seek redress for wrongful speech by adopting a standard requiring a plaintiff to do more than articulate a good faith belief that the speech “maybe tortious.” Before stripping the defendant of a First Amendment right, these courts take an early look at the merits of the plaintiff’s claim to determine whether a valid claim has been alleged and whether there is a prima facie evidentiary basis for that claim. In this appeal, Yelp urges Virginia to adopt the same approach, and to remand this case to give Hadeed an opportunity to pursue its subpoena by meeting the proper standard.

The only person to blame here is me. You have spoken and I have listened. A terrible wrong needs to be righted. I am instructing our attorneys to drop the lawsuit. I want to assure everyone that you may feel free to leave any feedback on our company without fear of reprisal. I have learned my lesson.

Of the current crop of lawsuits, the suit against Nicholls isn’t even the worst.  I haven’t yet been able to see the original documents from the transaction on which Med Express’ lawsuit against Guam resident Tan Jan Chen is based, but the lawsuit against Scranton-area resident Dennis Rogan is over a two-word “neutral” buyer feedback stating “Order retracted.”   Apparently, Rogan bought a piece of equipment on eBay but Med Express had to refund his money because, as it explained in a message accompanying the PayPal refund, “This should not have been still listed—we removed this item a few weeks back-it broke.”   As in Nicholls’ case, the statement over which Med Express sued for libel was true, but even worse than in Nicholls’ case, Rogan had not even left “negative” feedback. 

Rogan could have suggested that the advertising and sale of an item that the seller knew it could not deliver violated FTC rules for mail-order merchants, but he gave the company the benefit of the doubt while concluding, at the same time, that other customers ought to learn that Med Express cannot always be trusted to have the goods that it is advertising.  His generosity did not prevent Radey from signing an affidavit averring that the neutral feedback and negative statement were “false,” attempting to get an injunction requiring that the feedback be taken down, and demanding an award of compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney fees—not the $1.00 in nominal damages that Radey claims are all that he wanted his lawyer to seek against Nicholls.

• Paul Duffy is trying to dismiss the counterclaims filed against him in his defamation lawsuit against Alan Cooper, arguing that the counterclaims make no reference to him personally, but rather John Steele and Paul Hansmeier. Of course, if they were all working together, as an awful lot of evidence seems to suggest, that may be a problem for Duffy. The more hilarious issue is that Duffy claims that Cooper's lawsuit against Prenda (for allegedly falsifying his name on documents) is an "unrelated matter," rather than the whole freaking reason that Duffy is suing. Ken breaks down how incredibly stupid this statement is:

  Yeah, sure, Cooper's suit is "completely unrelated" — except that (1) it involves the same parties, (2) it concerns Prenda's operations, (3) it accuses Prenda of stealing Cooper's identity, which Prenda's and Duffy's complaints suggest is a defamatory statement, (4) John Steele used all three suits to threaten and intimidate Cooper as soon as Cooper filed his complaint, and (5) Prenda's and Duffy's complaints specifically identify the Cooper complaint as one of the forms of defamation they are suing over. This is not just a lie to a federal court. It's not even a plausible lie. It's a stupid, ineffectual, desperate lie.

• Ken explains the reasons why Cooper and Godfread decided to file using Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law, rather than Illinois's. As we had mentioned earlier, the case is in Illinois, so it took many of us by surprise that they were relying on Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law. However, Ken notes that since the key issue in an anti-SLAPP situation is that it forces the plaintiff to present their evidence early, this means that Duffy will be caught in a tough spot: responding with evidence would eviscerate the 5th Amendment protection he took in California.

  But here's the beauty of this situation for Cooper and Godfread — the anti-SLAPP statute forces Duffy and Prenda to come forward with actual evidence establishing that they might win. To do that, they have to come forward with evidence that the statements that they are complaining about are false. But those statements are about exactly the things that Steele and Hansmeier and Duffy took the Fifth rather than address. Duffy and Prenda can't carry their burden unless they reverse the decision to take the Fifth. Ultimately, Cooper's and Godfread's narrower argument is elegant and well-suited to the circumstances. It's not always the right strategy to make every possible argument.

  That "narrower" argument he's talking about is the (slightly surprising) decision by Cooper and Godfread not to point out that many of the statements that Duffy and Prenda are claiming defamatory are either insults or statements of opinion, rather than fact, and thus not subject to defamation. Instead of going down that road, they're focused on forcing Duffy's hand. We noted earlier that Cooper and Godfread had called Prenda's bluff. That may have been premature. Now they're really calling the bluff, and Duffy's going to have to show his cards.
  
  
• Back in the main showdown case in California, we had already pointed out that (over the objections of Team Prenda), Judge Otis Wright had allowed lawyer Morgan Pietz (representing some of those sued by Prenda) to file more evidence. And he's done so. White summarizes the situation nicely.

  Pietz can be excused for sounding a bit triumphant after the attorneys opposing him took the Fifth rather than address the questions he raised. He leads by pointing out that although John Steele claims there is no evidence that he has any ownership interest in Prenda Law's clients, Steele's own attorneys previously told the Florida State Bar the opposite — and a Prenda law local counsel also said that Steele had an interest in AF Holdings. Pietz attacks the credibility of Brent Berry, the real estate agent who claimed that Alan Cooper was in on the scheme and is violent and mentally ill. Pietz points out that Berry is Steele's agent and just sold a house for him in February. Pietz also points out that Berry signed the declaration in February, but Prenda law oddly withheld it until after the hearings before Judge Wright. Finally, Pietz echoes what everyone has been saying — Berry's testimony might suggest that Cooper knew his name was being used, but if accepted it proves that Cooper was a mere shill for the Prenda Law attorneys who actually controlled the plaintiff entities. Pietz also offers rebuttals to the Prenda lawyers' other arguments — he argues that Judge Wright's powers allow him to award attorney fees as sanctions based on the record before him, and he offers the declaration of a technical expert to rebut Prenda's arguments that its investigation of downloaders was reasonable and sufficient.

  Given Judge Wright's clear questions about Prenda's actions, I would imagine that this extra fodder isn't going to be particularly helpful to John Steele, Paul Duffy and Paul Hansmeier.
  
  
• And that's not all. Ken also has updates on a few other Prenda cases around the nation where people are hitting back at all things Prenda. Go check out his post for all the details.

I contacted James Amodio, Med Express’s lawyer, to explain to him the many ways in which his lawsuit is untenable.  He readily admitted that, as the complaint admits, everything that the customer had posted in her feedback was true; he did not deny that a statement has to be false to be actionable as defamation; but he just plain didn’t care.  To the contrary, he told me that I could come up to Medina, Ohio, and argue whatever I might like, but that the case was going to continue unless the feedback was taken down or changed to positive.  And he explained why his client was insisting on this change — he said that it sells exclusively over eBay, where a sufficient level of negative feedback can increase the cost of such sales as well as possibly driving away customers

Yesterday, the Board of Directors of the Society for Scholarly Publishing (SSP) unanimously decided to restore the posts by Scholarly Kitchen chef Rick Anderson that had been removed after the Kitchen and SSP received correspondence from a publisher that didn't like the content.

The posts (“When Sellers and Buyers Disagree” and “One Down, One to Go: Edwin Mellen Press Blinks One Eye“) have been restored without the comment quoted in the letter.

For many reasons I won't go into the ingredients of the sausage by explaining why the posts came down and why they went back up. I will say that the Board and the Scholarly Kitchen volunteers stand behind Rick's posts. The Board also stands behind the business and editorial decisions to take them down last week, until we could gather our busy volunteer leaders to fully evaluate the situation.

We are bringing this information to your attention because you are the publishers of both Ms. Hunt's statement and Mr. Anderson's blog. As such, you have a legal obligation to monitor these types of comments. In order to limit any damage from such events, we request the immediate removal of Ms. Hunt's comments from your blog.

In 1993, Dr. Richardson brought a similar suit against Lingua Franca magazine in response to an article (not available online) by Warren St. John, titled "Vanity's Fare: How One Tiny Press Made $2.5 Million Selling Opuscules to Your University Library." Dr. Richardson lost that suit. In 1994, he was found guilty of gross misconduct by an academic tribunal and fired from his tenured position at the University of Toronto; his press subsequently published a book about the affair titled Envy of Excellence: Administrative Mobbing of High-Achieving Professors.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove all posts relating to Ms. Ellis. Respondent is hereby enjoined and restrained from doing or attempting to do, or threatening to do any act constituting a violation of O.C.G.A- §§ 16-5-90 et seq. and of harassing, interfering, or intimidating the Petitioner or Petitioner's immediate family. Any future acts committed by the Respondent towards the Petitioner which are in violation of this statute and this Protective Order can amount to AGGRAVATED STALKING, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91, which is a felony. A person convicted of Aggravated Stalking shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years and by a fine of not more than $10,000.00

Removing "all posts relating to Ms. Ellis" is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means of addressing any true threats. It fails the First Amendment test because of the collateral damage: it will take down constitutionally-protected criticism of the copyright troll and her demands for money. For example, Ellis complained that "there were vile posts of blasphemy." While blasphemy is doubtless offensive to Ellis, it remains protected speech.

The Georgia Court's overreaching order against Chan also contradicts federal law because it holds a service provider to account for users' posts. Section 230 protects websites that host content posted by users, providing immunity for a website from state law claims (including criminal law) based on the publication of "information provided by another information content provider."

As the owner and operator of the site, Respondent has the ability to remove posts in his capacity as the moderator. However, Respondent chose not to remove posts that were personally directed at Ms. Ellis and would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety. Because the Respondent's course of conduct was directed at Ms. Ellis through the posted messages and information relating to Ms. EIlis, and the conduct was intended (and in fact did) create fear and intimidation in the Petitioner.

[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content – are barred. The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.

Dear Mr. Godfread:

My firm has been retained by Livewire Holdings LLC to pursue claims in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against you and your coconspirators arising from defamation, civil conspiracy and related acts. The alleged acts occurred in e-mail communications and blog posts describing my client as a criminal enterprise. As you know, such statements constitute defamation per se and are, quite frankly, wildly inappropriate. Less-egregious claims have resulted in multi-million dollar judgments, as I trust this one will. The facts of the underlying case are essentially a law school exam hypothetical of every possible variation of libel. Perhaps you can forward my client's complaint to your former professors at William Mitchell. My client is well-aware that you are a major contributor to these blog sites.

The purpose of this e-mail is to inform you of impending litigation so that you preserve all relevant evidence in your possession including, but not limited to, communications between yourself and David Camaratto, Morgan Pietz, Nicholas Ranallo and any other individuals associated directly or indirectly with the sites fightcopyrighttrolls and dietrolldie. Further, any and all other evidence that might be relevant to this matter must, of course, be preserved.

I suspect that you aligned yourself with these defamatory efforts as a marketing strategy. I don't know if these efforts paid off, but I can assure you that making baseless accusations of criminal conduct is not a wise move for a licensed attorney. All of that being said, my client knows that you didn't work alone in these wrongful efforts. If you think we are missing out on more serious actors in your enterprise my client would be willing to consider decreasing your liability in exchange for information about these individuals. Of course, that interest will disappear if someone else comes forward first. Think it over and let me know. If you're willing to take the fall for whole group then you are decidedly a "true believer."

Welcome to the big leagues.

Paul

...please take note of the dog that did not bark in the night. That is, note what the letter does not say. Consider the context. Godfread, on behalf of Cooper, is telling courts that Prenda Law has stolen Cooper's identity, and has filed a lawsuit on that basis. What would you expect in response, if Prenda Law had an answer for that? If I were representing Prenda Law, and had an answer, there is no doubt in my mind I would articulate it. I would say, "As you and Mr. Cooper know, and witnesses will attest, Mr. Cooper was a willing participant in AF Holdings LLC and fully consented to being an officer." Or I might say "You have recklessly and without adequate basis suggested that your client is the Alan Cooper who is an officer of AF Holdings, when even the briefest inquiry would show that AF Holdings is led by the distinguished Alan Cooper of Nevis and St. Kitts." I would say something articulating why Cooper's and Godfread's assertions are false. As I so often say, vagueness in legal threats is the hallmark of thuggery. But Hansmeier says nothing of the sort. He has only adolescent puffed-up threats and insults. What do you think that signifies?

In addition to filing this lawsuit, via email Global Wildlife Foundation president Ken Matherne threatened to file criminal charges, FCC charges, fraud charges, an IRS complaint, a governor’s office complaint, and a federal lawsuit against Brilleaux. Matherne’s email did not explain any basis for the additional threats.

My last case to decide the Apple vs Microsoft case. I am not joking – you can send this email to the judge and soon as I file suit. I will ask you as I asked that kid to take it down, if you think your malice to to our Foundation is free speech – let’s get real lawyers and hosted judges to find out! It scared teachers, parents and the general public. They were canceling trips, it was malicious, and the evidence given to court was a fraud. I did not say anything at the time. But, I think he would get dis-board by the falsified documents he presented to the judge. His father was a friend or I would have had he dis-board.

Everyone will see the truth of you and your boyfriends. You can print this – You do not have a clue what you did to damage my foundation I created for my daughter. And when you wake up in the morning – hoping you have kids- I want you to think about what you have done. Your site has done more damage than the issue and my guys think your damages will be worse the any free speech issue. And we are ready!

We are going to dp this all legal – get ready – I will have one of your partners, associates , friends , spouses, in dispositions for the at least the next 6 – 12 months. Minimum – 1 lawsuit lasted 12.7 years, the next only 6 . I have the means – so write me back or get ready. This again is no threat. Simply a promise. It is no longer about what the kid did – it is about what your company did! And I promise you we will win = you have damaged my daughters trust for at least 50 years. You are about to meet the best attorneys on the planet.

Just send me you attorney of record – you will not hurt my daughter – I do not care what it cost ! Ken It was a BS move – and I appreciate that you do that for the best of people – but you always know our kids are first – and I don't care how many $ it takes – my daughter will not live with this – so I will ask you one more time to pull this down – as a gentleman – or I will come to you! My airplane is only 10k an hour – have more cash & Gold in the bank than you can imagine – but if you hurt my daughter through this – my executives has all authority to go until all is done – I only have 1 daughter and it breaks her heart to see this! I would not do this to you or your family!

Get your check book out – and unless you can buy every judge to the State Supreme Court – you will pay damages = not about freedom of speech –
Oh, And I will follow up with everything I said I would do. Ken White, You better have an attorney or get one .

Cannot wait to meet you – You are and I can “quote again” a piece of shit! You do a disservice to mankind. I hope the judge we come before understands what a parasite you are and does not want his kids or grandchildren to be exposed to someone like you!

And I do not care about are inaccuracies about was said or texted. You are wrong and you are libel. Again, I do not lose lawsuits, and I do not think to can pay off the judges!

Thus, even in jurisdictions that allow an injunction against the repetition of a libel that has been found false and defamatory after a full trial, or in which that issue remains open, injunctions may not issue against speech that has not been finally determined to be false and defamatory. For this reason, courts have rejected attempts to obtain preliminary injunctive relief against Internet speech.

Upon further consideration whereof, the Court also finds that the preliminary injunction was not justified and that the respondents have an adequate remedy at law.

Guy Hingston, an Australian cancer surgeon, sued Google in Federal Court.

"When an individual computer user types 'Guy Hin ...', into the Google search engine as a search, the words 'Guy Hingston Bankrupt' appears," the complaint states. "When the link(s) is clicked on, the article(s) to which the user is directed has absolutely nothing to do with a bankruptcy associated with Dr. Hingston. Dr. Hingston is not bankrupt." (Parentheses and grammar as in complaint).

"Dr. Hingston is a surgeon practicing in Port Macquarie, New South Wales, Australia," the complaint states. "Dr. Hingston's surgical practice focuses on breast cancer. Given his professional practice and position in his community, maintaining his good reputation is critical. Dr. Hingston has lost a number of patients and financiers who are refusing to associate and/or deal with Dr. Hingston as a consequence of the reference on Google to a bankruptcy."

Port Macquarie surgeon Guy Hingston bought the 19-year-old business 2½ years ago.

Dr Hingston said the main reason for CoastJet’s demise was the loss of a $2.8 million deposit on two new jets when American company Eclipse Aviation Corporation went into bankruptcy. The business was made more vulnerable, he said, by its heavy investment in a new partnership with Sweden’s Lund University School of Aviation.

He said CoastJet was preparing for its first intake of 24 students from Sweden at the end of March.

Dr Hingston said he and CoastJet’s staff were devastated. “We had two jets we were about to take delivery of, but with the manufacturer going bankrupt, we’ve lost everything,” he said.

The jets were destined to for CoastJet’s growing air ambulance service, Dr Hingston said, as well as for international airline pilot training and charters.

Hingston claims Google's automatic search result is defamatory, show him in a false light, and are "highly offensive to a reasonable person."

He claims Google was "was negligent in determining the truth of the information or whether a false impression would be created by its publication."

"This issue, and Google's continued failure to remedy this issue, despite numerous demands to do so, has caused significant harm and economic loss to Dr. Hingston in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of this court," the complaint states.

Hingston seeks at least $75,000 in damages for false light, and court costs.

With respect to the Plaintiff being able to prove the statements false, the Plaintiff has a couple of insurmountable problems. First and foremost, the case boils down to two allegedly defamatory statements.

1) The Plaintiff (falsely) claims that the Defendant called her a “prostitute.” ... However, the record clearly reflects that the Defendant did no such thing.... In fact, the claim that she is a “prostitute” seems to have only been uttered by third parties, including Plaintiff's own counsel....

2) The Defendant (correctly) claims that Plaintiff was not permitted to leave China during a certain period of time....

With respect to the first statement, the record clearly reflects that this interpretation of the defendants’ statements is a fabrication. The Defendant, at worst, implied that Zhang Ziyi had wealthy boyfriends who lavished her with expensive gifts.... Given her public persona, and the fact that she is frequently unabashed about sharing her affections with wealthy paramour after wealthy paramour, this is almost certainly a given. Zhang Ziyi’s conduct could be less-than-charitably described as “gold-digging” ..., but it is a far cry from “prostitution.” If Ms. Ziyi intends to prove that she has never received any largesse or gifts from her series of wealthy boyfriends, then this will be an interesting trial to say the least.

As to the second statement, one must wonder what would be defamatory about claiming that a Chinese national found her travel privileges to be temporarily restricted. Given that the Chinese government is one of the most totalitarian regimes in the world, anyone prohibited from leaving the country would find themselves in good company, if not among some international heroes.... Even if the statement was held to have a defamatory meaning, and the defendant uttered the statements complained of, the plaintiff would still run into a legal impossibility – overcoming the actual malice standard in order for her case to survive.

When the defendant moved to strike this case under CCP 425.16, the Plaintiff immediately took steps to start an expensive and relentless discovery campaign. Mr. Meng was deposed three times. Mr. Meng produced reams of documents. The Plaintiff conducted three expert depositions. Throughout all of this, the Plaintiff has not produced one shred of evidence that Meng’s statements were false. Even if she were to somehow do so, mere falsity is not enough: she must also prove that Meng harbored serious doubts about the accuracy of his published information and recklessly disregarded the truth. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff’s discovery campaign has done nothing more than create a rock-solid record that the Plaintiff could never overcome her legal burden. The Plaintiff has, in an effort to run up the bill on the Defendant, managed to disprove her own case so solidly, that the “reasonable possibility” standard was left behind long ago.

Plaintiff Zhang Ziyi is an international celebrity with means that far exceed those of Defendant Watson Meng.... A $200,000 bond will not deprive her of access to the courts, and will likely not even cover the costs of litigation. The Plaintiff does not reside in California, and in fact, resides in a country where the Defendant is persona non grata.... If this court were to grant a fee award to Defendant, he would not likely find justice if he attempted to enforce that award in a country whose government considers him to be a thorn in their side, and where there is no independent judiciary....

Because she does not reside in the State of California, Plaintiff should be required to post an undertaking so that Meng may be assured of recouping his fees and costs following the hearing on the Motion to Strike.... The purpose of Section 1030 is to ensure that a fee award against an out of state plaintiff is not difficult to collect, or fully illusory. The facts of this particular case are probably the most extreme example of the necessity of an undertaking under Section 1030. The Plaintiff is a mega-millionaire with unlimited means; the defendant is all but impecunious; and the defendant would have no reasonable way to collect a fee award, as the plaintiff would be able to simply hide behind a border that the defendant cannot cross. If there was a case that called for a 1030 undertaking, this is it.

The defendant Wayne Skinner, a former Town Supervisor of the Town of Wawayanda, and his wife, the defendant Karen Skinner (hereinafter together the Skinner defendants), were involved in a number of Town policy disagreements with the plaintiff, David LeBlanc. Wayne Skinner was elected to his position as a Democrat. The plaintiff, a Wawayanda businessman, attended numerous Town Board meetings, voicing his concerns over a variety of issues, including property taxes, and donated money to one of Wayne Skinner's Republican political rivals.

Nonparty Gail Soro was one of Wayne Skinner's colleagues, and a Wawayanda Town Board member. Soro likewise was an elected Democrat. In July 2006, Soro discovered a severed horse head in her swimming pool. It was never determined who was responsible for the incident. Nonetheless, as could be expected after any incident with such cinematic bravado, public comment ensued. Of relevance here were a number of blog entries posted on a web site allegedly dedicated to community issues and local government, and a number of comments on the local newspaper's web site. These blog entries and comments accused the plaintiff of being responsible for the horse head incident.

While the discovery of any deliberately placed mutilated animal carcass in a family swimming pool would be shocking and noteworthy, the choice of a severed horse head immediately evokes to many the infamous scene from Mario Puzo's novel, "The Godfather," as immortalized in the film directed by Francis Ford Coppola. The scene, probably one of the most iconic in cinematic history, has come to exemplify an act of intimidation through violence, a reminder of power, and a warning that a request or "offer" from a Godfather or leader of an organized crime family should not be "refused."

In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, with the assistance of Hawkins, the Skinner defendants posted several defamatory statements on the Internet regarding the plaintiff. More specifically, the first and second causes of action in the amended verified complaint alleged that Hawkins, at the request and direction of the Skinner defendants, posted two allegedly defamatory statements regarding the plaintiff on August 29, 2007, and October 6, 2007, respectively, on the now-defunct web site www.wawayandafirst.blogspot.com (hereinafter the Wawayandafirst blogspot). In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had posted the following comment on October 30, 2007, at www.forums.recordonline.com, a site run by the area newspaper (hereinafter the newspaper site): "We all know who was behind the Horse Head . . . there is only one man around town dumb enough, violent enough and with a vendetta to do that . . . Dave LeBlanc . . . I hope all this negative publicity on him destroys his business." The fourth cause of action alleged that the defendants posted the following comments on the newspaper site on October 30, 2007: "Dave LeBlanc is a terrorist" and "Who was the one who threw the horse head in Gail's pool . . . check it out: . . . wawayandafirstblogspot.com."

1. Calling someone a "terrorist" online isn't defamation.
2. Accusing someone of severing a horse's head and dumping it in a pool, however, could be defamation.

Internet forums are venues where citizens may participate and be heard in free debate involving civic concerns. It may be said that such forums are the newest form of the town meeting. We recognize that, although they are engaging in debate, persons posting to these sites assume aliases that conceal their identities or "blog profiles." Nonetheless, falsity remains a necessary element in a defamation claim and, accordingly, "only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action" (600 W. 115th St. Corp. v Von Gutfeld, 80 NY2d 130, 139, cert denied 508 US 910; see Gross v New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 146, 153). Within this ambit, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the accusation on the newspaper site that the plaintiff was a "terrorist" was not actionable. Such a statement was likely to be perceived as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" (Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v Bresler, 398 US 6, 14; see Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1; Immuno AG. v Moor—Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235, 254, cert denied 500 US 954). This conclusion is especially apt in the digital age, where it has been commented that readers give less credence to allegedly defamatory Internet communications than they would to statements made in other milieus (see Sandals Resorts Intl., Ltd. v Google, Inc., 86 AD3d 32, 43-44, quoting Jennifer O'Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a [Screen] Name: The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPS to Reveal the Identities of Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online Defamation Cases, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2745 [2002]). Accordingly, we conclude that this statement constitued an expression of opinion, and, as such, is nonactionable.

...there is now an impressive body of precedent holding that people don't interpret online name-calling literally. See, e.g., Seldon v. Compass Restaurant, Chaker v. Mateo, Sandals v. Google (cited here), DiMeo v. Max, Finkel v. Dauber and others. I wish this meant that plaintiffs will think twice about suing over online name-calling, but I doubt it.

On Thursday, a Florida judge found no evidence that Katz suffered defamation or damages because of Chevaldina's blog, but nevertheless banned her and her husband from stepping on any of Katz's properties, which pretty much prevents them from visiting any of the local businesses in the community of Sunny Isles, which is known as Little Moscow for its high Russian population.

Judge Ellen Leesfield said they shouldn't want to visit these premises anyway because of their hatred for the man.

But Chevaldina said many of these business owners are their Russian friends who rent from Katz and invite them into their stores and restaurants.

In Sunny Isles Beach, Raanan Katz has a street and an official day named in his honor. His company, with its omnipresent "RK" basketball logo, seems to claim every other strip mall in North Miami-Dade. He's also minority owner of the Miami Heat....

Katz cuts a singular figure in Miami. Once an Israeli basketball star, he built a real estate empire in Boston before gobbling up a block of South Beach in 1984. Two years later, he bought into the expansion Heat franchise and has been a courtside fixture since then.