The natural enemy of the family dog is the local cop. Some of the stories we hear about cops shooting dogs, man, it’s like they don’t even try to deal with the animal reasonably. They shoot first and put the leash on later. I get that some people are just irrationally afraid of dogs, but cops are armed and in stressful situations. And since “dog murder” isn’t really a thing, there’s no incentive for cops to hold their fire.

We’ve reported in the past about how jury awards are going up when cops are found to recklessly kill family pets. But money cannot replace the companionship of a best friend.

Now, one state is trying to take more decisive action by requiring cops to learn how to deal with “short, hairy children”….

The Denver Post (gavel bang: ABA Journal) reports that a bill called the “Don’t Shoot My Dog” law is making its way through the Colorado State Senate.

The bill would require police officers to undergo training on how to deal with dogs. And it has bipartisan support:

“The reason I think it is important is dogs are not just property to most people, they are their short, hairy children,” [said Jennifer Edwards of The Animal Law Center]. “They are a part of the family, and it is absolutely devastating to lose an animal and to lose an animal so wrongfully when it could be solved by better training and better understanding of dog behavior.”

The bill’s sponsors, Democrat Lucia Guzman and Republican David Balmer, point out that “landscaping companies [and] delivery companies” deal with dogs all the time, without shooting them.

Some of the stories about police brutality to dogs are disgusting:

Among those expected to testify in favor of their bill is Gary Branson of Pueblo, whose 4-year-old labrador mix was shot multiple times by a Commerce City police officer after the pet escaped a relative’s home.

In Branson’s case, the 58-year-old left Chloe with a relative while visiting his brother in California last November. The dog got out through an open garage door and was running around the neighborhood.

Commerce City police said the dog was aggressive and continued to behave that way after being restrained with an animal-control noose. Chloe was shocked with a Taser and then shot multiple times.

What kind of sick person Tasers and shoots a family lab that has already been restrained?

Dogs are not people and shouldn’t be treated as such under the law. But they’re not mere property either. We need to carve out a legal space for our furry companions that at least respects our rights to keep them alive.

Senate panel OKs “Don’t Shoot My Dog” bill after emotional testimony [Denver Post]
‘Don’t Shoot My Dog’ bill moves forward, would require more police training [ABA Journal]

More stories from Above The Law

• Administration FREAKS OUT Students With Reports Of Possible Death Threat Before Realizing It Was Just Homework
• This Is Perhaps the Wittiest Response to a Pissy Law Student Email Ever
• Beware Greek Organizations Bearing Insurance Coverage

These rules are not designed to promote safety, nor improve quality of service. They are intended to stop innovation, protect incumbents, hurt independent drivers, and shut down Uber in Denver.

But one thing that has generally been accepted is that law enforcement agencies were required to operate these drones under very strict guidelines and within very strict geographic boundaries. It would appear, for Mesa County, Colorado at least, that may not be universally true. The EFF's Drone Census project has uncovered that Mesa County has two UAVs and can operate them without many of the restrictions in place elsewhere.

The MCSO must abide by standard FAA restrictions on domestic UAV flights, which cap flights to below 400 feet and preclude night flights or operating over "populated areas, heavily trafficked roads, or an open-air assembly of people." But MCSO's drone authorization includes no geographic restrictions: effectively, the agency can fly its UAVs anywhere in Mesa County. This freedom has allowed the agency to log dozens of operational missions since fall 2010. MCSO flight logs indicate that its UAV team has logged more than 160 flight hours on its drones since January 2011.

MCSO has been using drones operationally for two years, but the department has no written drone policy outlining the uses for which its officers may deploy UAVs. Ms. Barnes writes that MCSO is "currently in the process of drafting a written policy for the use of our unmanned aircraft."

The Court admonishes Mr. Mangano regarding his lack of civility.

A third-party who has been assigned the bare right to sue for infringement has no interest in the legal dissemination of the copyrighted material. On the contrary, that party derives its sole economic benefit by instituting claims of infringement, a course of action which necessarily limits public access to the copyrighted work. This prioritizes economic benefit over public access, in direct contradiction to the constitutionally mandated equilibrium upon which copyright law is based. The legislative history relating to the Copyright Act of 1976 supports this interpretation.

In short, Righthaven knows full well that it does not have the right to bring this case. Instead of conceding that point, Righthaven is unnecessarily prolonging this litigation. In doing so, Righthaven wants this Court to believe that if a party brings a case, which it had no right to bring, then it should suffer no consequences, should pay no attorneys fees, and should simply be able to walk away – even after causing the defendant to expend thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees. Righthaven wins one thing in this case – it wins the chutzpah award.

In Glengarry Glen Ross, Ricky Roma says to George Aaronow, “Always tell the truth – It’s the easiest thing to remember.” Had Righthaven followed this simple bit of wisdom, it would not find itself in its current thicket of predicament in Nevada, and it might find its fortune in Colorado to be more promising.

Righthaven’s scheme is based upon “Assignments” of copyrights from news entities to itself. When such assignments are honest and bona fide transfers of rights, they are remarkably simple – the copyright owner simply transfers all title to the copyright to the new owner. Righthaven’s scheme is much more complex, because there is so much dishonesty to obfuscate. In 1992, Glengarry Glen Ross was made into a film with the tagline “Lie. Cheat. Steal. All In A Day's Work.” Righthaven should have watched the entire film and learned from Ricky Roma; instead it relied upon the tagline and has lied, cheated, and stolen from dozens of hapless defendants in Nevada and in Colorado. That conduct ends in Colorado with this Reply Brief.

RIGHTHAVEN IS NOT AN ASSIGNEE, IT IS A LAW FIRM IN DISGUISE

Amicus invites the Court to ignore the Righthaven for a moment and consider a general proposition: Assume that a company has an actionable claim. The company wants to hire someone to pursue a lawsuit over the claim. The company finds a firm that employs lawyers and handles lawsuits to do just that. In fact, prosecuting lawsuits is all the firm does. So the company and the firm strike a deal: the firm will prosecute the claim, and the firm and the company will split any recovery, after expenses, 50/50.

In the real world, that arrangement is called a “contingency fee representation agreement,” the “company” is the client, and the “firm” is a law firm. But Righthaven does not appear to operate in the real world. Righthaven claims this exact arrangement is actually an “assignment,” that it is not a law firm but a “copyright enforcer,” and that its clients are not clients but are “key relationships.” See Righthaven Website, Ex. L. This is nothing but corporate doublespeak, deployed in an attempt to camouflage an arrangement that is totally impermissible outside the context of a lawyer-client relationship.

Moreover, Righthaven claims to be engaged in a novel pursuit presenting new and undecided issues in copyright enforcement. Those claims are accurate only so long as one does not consider precedents relating to the validity of assignments and the unauthorized practice of law. What Righthaven tries to present as some inventive new way of enforcing copyrights is nothing more than a copyright-specific form of a scheme that has been rejected, so far as Amicus can determine, by every court that has ever examined it. When considering the following arguments and authorities, Amicus submits that it will be extremely useful to keep in mind this language from the SAA: “Assignor hereby engages Righthaven to undertake the pursuit of Infringement Actions.”

Righthaven brings the following authority to the Court’s attention so as to make it aware of its apparent prior mistaken reliance on Rule 12(f) in summarily striking the remaining contents of the Notice of Dismissal (Doc. # 17). Righthaven resubmits in connection with this Amended Notice the largely the same statements previously stricken by the Court with some slight modifications in view of the nature of this filing. Righthaven certainly understands the Court will likely strike most of the statements contained in this Amended Notice, but in doing so it asks that the Court not take such action under Rule 12(f) in view of the foregoing case law. Righthaven additionally wishes to stress that the Amended Notice and its contents are in not being filed as an affront to this Court or its prior decision to strike certain contents of the Notice of Dismissal. Righthaven simply maintains, as any advocate would because of the need to clarify or otherwise modify that its prior submission was to be with prejudice, that the Court improperly struck the contents from its prior submission under Rule 12(f). Righthaven further maintains it is entitled to have the full content of this submission made publicly available absent a subsequent contrary determination by the Court that a basis to strike exists other than under Rule 12(f) upon which its has relied. Accordingly, the following statements, which are largely consistent with those previously contained in the Notice of Dismissal and stricken by the Court under a mistaken belief in Rule 12(f) authorizing it do so, are resubmitted in connection with this Amended Notice of Dismissal.

Moreover, because none of the postings by Colorado Pols generated any appreciable traffic at the websites of the underlying publishers, it is beyond dispute that this copying by Colorado Pols harmed the market value and revenue-generating potential of the infringed works. Indeed, MediaNews Group has been monitoring the traffic to its sites from ColoradoPols during the listed time period, and the links inserted by Colorado Pols in the infringing excerpts of MediaNews Group's stories are generating no more than zero to five clicks to the underlying stories at The Denver Post's website.

In light of these considerations, Colorado Pols has no legal basis for invoking the Fair Use Defense, or the First Amendment, to justify its unfair competition with our clients. This kind of misappropriation simply has no defense under the law.

This statement is remarkable for a number of reasons, but the biggest problem with what Singleton is proposing is that it is totally counterintuitive to how marketplaces work. The market determines the clearing price of a product, not the owners of that product. Attempts to force the market to give you a bigger profit...well, they end in disaster. Every time.

The idea that the Post will suddenly become more valuable if it is not offered for free online doesn't fix the fundamental problem that the news in general is already offered online, everywhere, for free. It doesn't make the print version of a newspaper more valuable or more relevant if you have to pay to read it online; all it does is make the newspaper more complicated to read, and thus, less attractive to most potential readers (and advertisers). In going to a paid online model, what they will be doing is saying, "you can't get our version of the news for free anymore." In response, most people will just shrug and visit other websites instead, just like we are doing in response to this letter.

One of the neat things about the Internet is that we don't have to make assumptions here - we can actually show you whether or not referencing the Post is vital to our "business model." In April 2010, the last full month that we referenced the Post or any of the outlets included in this letter, Colorado Pols generated 617,661 page views. If it were true that our very existence depended upon the Post and similar news outlets, it would stand to reason that our traffic would drop dramatically once we stopped talking about them, right?

We've told you what kind of traffic we received in April, and we'll tell you what kind of traffic we have once the month of July is completed - an entire month of no references to the Post or others listed in the letter, from either us or others posting diaries or comments. We are fully confident that our traffic won't decrease because we aren't referencing the Post, because we know that our success has absolutely nothing to do with the Post, the Lamar Ledger, or any other news site. People come to Colorado Pols to read (wait for it) Colorado Pols. It's not any more complicated than that.