An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile--hoping it will eat him last.

You have enemies? Good. That means you’ve stood up for something, sometime in your life.

“We are pissed,” Edison Junior CEO Jamie Siminoff told me on the phone today. “I think they are being a bunch of assholes, and I think they’re hurting their customers.”

The patent application, filed under the heading “Content Distribution Regulation by Viewing User,” proposes to use cameras and sensors like those in the Xbox 360 Kinect controller to monitor, count and in some cases identify the people in a room watching television, movies and other content. The filing refers to the technology as a “consumer detector.”

In one scenario, the system would then charge for the television show or movie based on the number of viewers in the room. Or, if the number of viewers exceeds the limits laid out by a particular content license, the system would halt playback unless additional viewing rights were purchased.

While Kinect hackers have managed to crank out some very interesting uses of the body-tracking technology, it looks as though the in-house team has something a bit more devious up its collective sleeve. With this in place, PPV events could move to the Xbox to get the most bang for their buck during prize fights and MMA bouts. Movies rented through XBLA (Xbox Live Arcade) could rake in even more money by charging for each additional set of eyeballs, leading to Xbox owners treating their own living rooms like drive-ins and sneaking in additional viewers through piles of coats lying strategically on the floor.

Every use may not be as mercenary as the above scenario, however. The Kinect "Consumer Detector" could also prevent younger (or at least, shorter) eyeballs from being sullied by R-rated movies or, god forbid, porn.

The system could also take into account the age of viewers, limiting playback of mature content to adults, for example. This patent application doesn’t explain how that would work, but a separate Microsoft patent application last year described a system for using sensors to estimate age based on the proportions of their body.

A method of distributing content to a user, comprising: providing a selection of content available to the user; for each content, presenting a licensing option comprising associating a performance of the content with an individual user's consumption of the content at a display device; receiving a selection of one of the content and a license display option for said content; presenting the content to the display device if a number of user performances allowed for the content is equal to or less than the license option for which the selection is received; and monitoring the presentation of the content at the device to determine the number of users consuming the content during the performance.

 Microsoft is known for revealing additional product details in job postings, but a new round of listings has unveiled a brand new TV service. Described as a "Cloud-based TV platform," Microsoft is looking to hire engineers to build client applications for the service. LiveSide spotted several job postings related to Cloud TV recently that tempt job candidates to "get in on the ground floor of an ambitious new project."

"We are studying it and we expect to make that free, and instead of having 1 million [subscribers], having at least 10 million to 15 million in every corner of the earth.... Will you lose $50 million to $100 million in revenue? I don't think so. If the site is good, you'll get much more."

"People reading news for free on the web, that's got to change."

1. Those other sites don't have the qualities that make some people willing to pay for the WSJ. The quality isn't as good and the direct monetary benefit is not nearly as clear.
2. Most of those other sites have much clearer (free) competition.
3. Nowhere at all does Murdoch talk about actually giving people a reason to buy. All he's saying is that if they put up a paywall, people will pay. Sure, a few might, but it's a small number, and doing so will stagnate any sort of growth, piss off advertisers, and allow competitors to take a giant leap forward -- all in one shot.

The price of a product in a competitive market falls to the marginal cost of creating and delivering one more unit.

For printed newspapers, the marginal cost was a little more paper and ink, maybe an extra block on the delivery route. Subscription fees never accounted for the fixed costs of producing the content: the building, staff, printing press, etc. That share of costs has long been paid by advertising and diluted by economies of scale.

The same economic forces apply online. And because the marginal cost of bits is nearly zero, the appropriate price becomes too small to bother tracking. Free is the result.

In fact, the principle of marginal-cost pricing is even stronger in the Internet economy because there are very low barriers to entry and nowhere near the startup costs of print. And the marginal costs such as bandwidth and storage decline every month.

Those who ignore the rule of marginal-cost pricing and try to charge users for content in a competitive market will be undercut by more efficient competitors who stick with free. They'll also face an endless fight against piracy, because economics says the product should be free and technology makes it easy to duplicate and spread.

Because it's not culturally disposed to charging fees and has few billing relationships, Google's online search clout has been limited to free ad-supported arrangements. Google's share of total domestic online revenues could be at risk as user payments begin to match or exceed advertising, Mitchell contends. Google claims more than 30 percent of online ad market and a smaller share of online content apps payments.

Imagine you're a young business school graduate trying to decide where you want to start your career. (OK, I know there are no jobs, but imagine it anyway.) You attend a newspaper industry summit and hear one of the big ideas from an organization at the heart of this world is to compete with Craigslist. What do you think you would think? Talk about an industry looking in the rear view mirror. Isn't that an idea that might have had legs, oh, maybe five years ago? How could it represent in the eyes of that young business school graduate any kind of exciting opportunity today? The advice boils down to, "Let's win back our business from the guy who's eating our lunch." How is the newspaper industry going to attract any of the best and brightest into its ranks if its ideas are stale, at best?

What might even be more troubling about this proposal is how newspaper people seemed to denigrate the Craigslist brand, when all they need to do is talk to people -- including in their own buildings -- to find out that most of those who've used the site seem to genuinely value it. Why? Because it gets results and it's free.

Of course leaders should always be learning. That's a given. But are they serious? Isn't this a little late? If newspaper industry leaders aren't doing this already, do they really belong in their positions? Why should shareholders pay executives to learn all they can when they should be able to find ones who already know what they're doing? If people need advice like this, should they be running newspaper companies?

Impressive numbers notwithstanding, for years we couldn't figure out a way to make the SDMB generate a dime. Finally at a meeting one day, Mike Lenehan, my first editor, said, "We could charge!" My immediate thought was: I should have beaned this guy with an eraser instead of that brick. However, lacking an alternative plan, we tried it. To everyone's surprise, it worked. Several thousand people paid good money for the privilege of posting, and paid again when their subscriptions ran out. (The great majority of our visitors are non-posting lurkers, in case you're wondering about the numerical disparity; merely reading the board has always been free.) For years we pulled in a tidy sum of cash each month.

But here's the thing. It was a tidy but non-growing sum of cash. What's more, the previously steady increase in visitors flattened out. Tiring of convent life, we decided to rejoin the real world and discontinued subscriptions last August, shrewdly timing this to coincide with the current economic collapse. (Being the world's smart human is one thing; having a head for business is something else.) Visitor growth immediately resumed its upward climb.

In short, subscriptions are self-limiting. But that's only half the story. The other half is this: Your content -- that term is always going to grate -- is your own best advertisement. The Straight Dope, again, is a good example. (The Straight Dope is a good example of a lot of things.) My online archive, consisting of the totality of human knowledge distilled into convenient 800-word chunks, has always been available for free -- currently more than 2,800 columns. We make no effort to promote this, and why should we? Whenever people Google the questions that really bug them, inevitably we pop up. As a result -- I'm looking at quantcast now -- we drew 845,700 visitors last month. Chicagotribune.com pulled in 2.7 million, which, granted, is more. However, the Trib is part of a multibillion-dollar corporation that employs thousands (well, it used to be thousands; what it is after all the layoffs I hesitate to say). TSD employs a few steadfast disciples and me. Lesson: If you're producing a quality editorial product, put it out there gratis. You want the world to know.

Eric J. Johnson, a professor at Columbia Business School, said he had been amazed by media companies repeatedly adding free online services, like on-demand video. "Before you add something to your site, you should say that if consumers really want it, that should be part of a package that you could charge for."

Anderson did not draw enough distinction between marginal cost -- which in the case of digital distribution is zero -- and average cost. When Anderson writes that "the marginal cost of digital information comes closer to nothing," what he means is the marginal cost of distributing that digital information. There are significant costs in recording music. The cost of creating a brand and inducing awareness, other considerations Anderson understates, are both unavoidable and considerable. An insignificant cost of creating and distributing one more digital file does not reflect the amount of investment to be recouped.

1. The painful lessons of experience. You might want to look into the history of attempts by general news sites to get consumers to pay for access. Did you actually think we hadn't thought of it, and tried it? Your ignorance of the field and of history is one of the things that makes the online guys reject everything you say. Do you need a list? The burden of research here is on you; it's your idea, after all. But I can tell you where to start.

2. The problem of scale (volume). It takes scale to make paid content work, and you don't have the volume you think you have. Quit making up wishful percentages based on your totally bogus monthly unique-user count ("well, if we get just 10 percent of our 85 zillion unique users to pay"). If you're going to engage in wishful thinking, base it on the cohort of individuals who visit your website more than three times a week. You will be shocked, and dismayed. I've been saying this for years: How can you get them to pay if you can't even get them to visit frequently when it's free?

3. The problem of scale (breadth). The idea of premium paid content (to generate reader revenue) plus free commodity content (to support an ad model) is alluring, but be honest with yourself. Local sites don't have the breadth of content to simultaneously support a paid premium content model, while maintaining enough free pages to harvest the advertising benefits of the open model.

4. Relative strength of the geotargeted advertising model. Ultimately the idea of paid content goes to war against the idea of ad-supported content. In local markets, the ad model is stronger than in global markets. There is, and always will be, a gross surplus of ad inventory on the Internet, and that drives CPMs into the sand. But actual deliverable geotargeted advertising -- and please understand that I'm talking about a reality that includes the entire sales support system, not theory -- is an entirely different matter. Local advertising sold by local sales forces is a substantial revenue stream, and if you're not tapping into that, it's your own fault.

5. Competition. There are plenty of competitors and would-be competitors just waiting for you to strangle your own website so they can step in and steal your future. The larger the market, the more this is true. In some relatively small, isolated markets you may be able to get away with it. For awhile.

6. Lack of unique content, coupled with a false sense of being unique. When you've had a virtual monopoly for decades, you grow arrogant and develop blind spots about your own weaknesses. From the viewpoint of the consumer, you're not nearly as unique and special as you think. And you've exacerbated this problem with your poor pay scales historically, and more recently your vicious cutting aimed at higher-salary veterans.

7. Support costs. If somebody drops 50 cents into a newsbox and it won't open, they just go away mad. If somebody is paying for access to your website and it won't work, they're going to call and suck up 12 dollars of staff time. You have no idea what you're getting into. Computers are evil, perverse devices aimed at driving humans crazy.

8. Your own staff. Your online staff hates the idea and they'll do everything they can to undermine it. Yeah, you can fire them. Why don't you get a table saw and cut off the fingers of your right hand while you're doing it? I've seen this happen time after time as newspapers consolidate print and online staffs, and the "formerly known as print" people conspire to expel the "formerly known as online" people. The result is a great leap backward. It's self-destructive.