Neither Genzyme nor Mt. Sinai has tested whether the reduced dosage is either safe or beneficial for treating Fabry disease. In fact, in November 2010, The European Medical Agency determined that the lowered dose of Fabrazyme resulted in patients having more strokes, heart attacks, renal disease and other symptoms including severe GI distress and pain and burning in their extremities (neuropathy). It also determined that the lowered dose actually accelerated the course of the disease in some patients. Europe recommended in October 2010 that all patients be given a full dose of Fabrazyme instead of the lowered dose. Genzyme rejected the European assessment and continued to provide only unapproved low doses to patients in the U.S.

The latest report is based on survey data from 2008 which finds that the total IP income (primarily from licencing) at reporting Canadian universities was $53.2 million. The cost of generating this income? The reporting institutions employed 321 full-time employees in IP management for a cost of $51.1 million. In other words, after these direct costs, the total surplus for all Canadian universities was $2.1 million. The average income per university from IP was only $425,000. Patent applications and patents issued were actually down in the reporting institutions and there were less than two-dozen spin-off companies reported by the universities.

"the United States cannot afford to merely fund research and say a prayer that some entrepreneur will commercialize it down the road,"

1. First, tons of universities set up tech transfer offices because of Bayh-Dole. Thinking that the law would suddenly create a new revenue stream in licensing patents, universities spent heavily on setting up such offices to facilitate the transfer of patents to commercial entities. Unfortunately, patents, by themselves, are rarely that valuable, and most universities greatly overestimated the value of their patents. This hurt in multiple ways. Fewer patents than expected were licensable -- and even when a potentially licensable patent came up, the tech transfer office often valued it way too high, such that companies refused to license it, or if they did, were saddled with such debt that they couldn't build a real business. On the whole tech transfer offices have been a huge money loser for the majority of universities.
2. Second, Bayh-Dole actively stifled important research. Academic research has always been about active sharing of information, with different individuals testing, retesting, and modifying various hypotheses and tests. But with the focus on patenting, suddenly universities didn't want their professors sharing any more, greatly holding back the standard process by which research actually becomes useful.
3. Third, by focusing on patenting and creating an exclusive right around federally funded research, it limited what fields that research could be applied to for commercialization. That's because often, the licensing would be on an exclusive basis to a single company in a specific field -- blocking out all other potential commercialization routes.

Part of the problem has been a lingering misunderstanding about where the value lies in innovation. Patenting a new basic science technique, or platform technology, puts it out of the reach of graduate students who might have made tremendous progress using it.

Similarly, exclusive licensing of a discovery to a single company thwarts that innovation’s use in any number of other fields. R. Stanley Williams, a nanotechnologist from Hewlett-Packard, testified to Congress in 2002 that much of the academic research to which H.P. has had difficulty gaining access could be licensed to several companies without eroding its intellectual property value.