Naturally, UMG appealed, and in doing so made some compelling arguments about the wording of the law. The appellate court agreed, and has now issued pretty much the opposite decision: pre-1972 sound recordings are not covered by the DMCA (pdf and embedded below) and thus Grooveshark has no DMCA safe harbors for such songs.

There are a few different parts to the ruling, but the core argument is straightforward: section 301(c) of the Copyright Act explicitly states that no "rights or remedies" under common law copyright on pre-1972 recordings shall be "annulled or limited" until 2067, and it's pretty hard to argue that the DMCA doesn't do that:

Initially, it is clear to us that the DMCA, if interpreted in the manner favored by defendant, would directly violate section 301(c) of the Copyright Act. Had the DMCA never been enacted, there would be no question that UMG could sue defendant in New York state courts to enforce its copyright in the pre-1972 recordings, as soon as it learned that one of the recordings had been posted on Grooveshark. However, were the DMCA to apply as defendant believes, that right to immediately commence an action would be eliminated. Indeed, the only remedy available to UMG would be service of a takedown notice on defendant. This is, at best, a limitation on UMG’s rights, and an implicit modification of the plain language of section 301(c). The word “limit” in 301(c) is unqualified, so defendant’s argument that the DMCA does not contradict that section because UMG still retains the right to exploit its copyrights, to license them and to create derivative works, is without merit. Any material limitation, especially the elimination of the right to assert a common-law infringement claim, is violative of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.

For defendant to prevail, we would have to conclude that Congress intended to modify section 301(c) when it enacted the DMCA. However, applying the rules of construction set forth above, there is no reason to conclude that Congress recognized a limitation on common-law copyrights posed by the DMCA but intended to implicitly dilute section 301(c) nonetheless.

...

Under such circumstances, it would be far more appropriate for Congress, if necessary, to amend the DMCA to clarify its intent, than for this Court to do so by fiat.

Take note of that last bit, because this ruling has made it more true than ever. And that's where the problems come in. It seems pretty clear that there is some sloppy drafting in how the DMCA is written (which isn't a surprise), in that what you have is wording that can be read this way, even though it clearly goes against the intent and purpose of the DMCA. If the DMCA's safe harbors don't apply to pre-1972 recordings, then the DMCA's safe harbors no longer apply at all to any service that includes music. That can't be what Congress intended, even if the wording of the law can be read that way.

Thus, if you go strictly by the wording, while ignoring the intent, the logic of the decision is sound, but the implications are disturbing: as Grooveshark pointed out in their defense, this interpretation would gut the DMCA. One of the key purposes of safe harbors was to prevent online services from needing to proactively scan for infringing works, since that would drastically and unfairly limit their growth, and we wouldn't have things like YouTube today if that were the case. But if pre-1972 recordings (which is plenty of material) are not included, then user-generated content sites do have to scan everything. And while it might be somewhat easier to identify pre-1972 recordings than it is to identify infringing uploads, it would still be insanely prohibitive — not to mention the massive loss to our culture from having a huge chunk of music history mostly vanish from the internet.

It's a little unclear just how far-reaching this ruling will be (it's at the state level, and it is in itself explicitly contradicting the earlier MP3Tunes ruling, which it declares to be "wrongly decided") but the potential implications are huge. Exempting all pre-1972 recordings from the DMCA would impact all corners of the internet in a bad, bad way. The only optimistic thought is that perhaps it would force congress to revisit the law, and we could finally push for a Digital Millennium Copyright Act that actually works in the digital millennium.

We do not find persuasive UMG’s effort to reconcile the internal contradictions its reading of the statute creates by positing that Congress must have meant § 512(c) to protect only “web hosting” services. Web hosts “host” websites on their servers, thereby “mak[ing] storage resources available to website operators.” The thrust of UMG’s argument seems to be that web hosts do not undertake the sorts of accessibility-facilitating functions that Veoh does, and thus the services they perform “fit within the ordinary meaning of ‘storage,’” and thereby “harmoniz[e]” with the notice and takedown procedures. UMG’s theory fails to account for the reality that web hosts, like Veoh, also store user-submitted materials in order to make those materials accessible to other Internet users. The reason one has a website is so that others may view it. As amici note, these access activities define web hosting – if the web host only stored information for a single user, it would be more aptly described as an online back-up service.

As an initial matter, contrary to UMG’s contentions, there are many music videos that could in fact legally appear on Veoh. “Among the types of videos subject to copyright protection but lawfully available on Veoh’s system were videos with music created by users and videos that Veoh provided pursuant to arrangements it reached with major copyright holders, such as SonyBMG.” Further, Congress’ express intention that the DMCA “facilitate making available quickly and conveniently via the Internet . . . movies, music, software, and literary works” – precisely the service Veoh provides – makes us skeptical that UMG’s narrow interpretation of § 512(c) is plausible. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8. Finally, if merely hosting material that falls within a category of content capable of copyright protection, with the general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share unauthorized copies of copyrighted material, was sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers, the § 512(c) safe harbor would be rendered a dead letter: § 512(c) applies only to claims of copyright infringement, yet the fact that a service provider’s website could contain copyrightable material would remove the service provider from § 512(c) eligibility.

Copyright holders know precisely what materials they own, and are thus better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service providers like Veoh, who cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not.

Of course, a service provider cannot willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid obtaining such specific knowledge. See Viacom Int’l v. YouTube.... Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to UMG as we must here, however, we agree with the district court there is no evidence that Veoh acted in such a manner. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that Veoh promptly removed infringing material when it became aware of specific instances of infringement. Although the parties agree, in retrospect, that at times there was infringing material available on Veoh’s services, the DMCA recognizes that service providers who do not locate and remove infringing materials they do not specifically know of should not suffer the loss of safe harbor protection.

The video, posted by the official YouTube account for the convention, DemConvention2012, was blocked, according to YouTube, for ostensibly infringing on the copyright of one of many possible suspects:

This video contains content from WMG, SME, Associated Press (AP), UMG, Dow Jones, New York Times Digital, The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. (HFA), Warner Chappell, UMPG Publishing and EMI Music Publishing, one or more of whom have blocked it in your country on copyright grounds.
Sorry about that.

When contacted by Wired for comment, Erica Sackin, an Obama campaign staffer who works on digital outreach, had no knowledge of the outage, asked this reporter for the url and then upon seeing the takedown, said, "I'll have to call you back."

Divestments in the wake of mergers should first offer copyrights, at market rates, to the artists who created them. To sell them to other corporations, whether large or small, is just a perpetuation of an old business model, which has seen the recorded music business halve in value over 10 years. During that time, the technological revolution has displaced the old music business players. We do not need to repeat the mistakes of the past.

It would be good to have music business people rather than financiers owning and running music companies again. It would be even better to have artists owning their work and entering into partner relationships with service-providing major and independent record companies with all the finance and expertise an artist needs to develop their own business.

As you can imagine the lawsuit dramatically impacted our ability to operate the company. The financial drain of millions of dollars going to litigation took away our power to compete, countless hours of executive's time was spent in dealing with various responsibilities of litigation, and employee morale was deeply impacted with a constant threat of shutdown. Trying to convince new employees to join the company in spite of this was extremely challenging. To make sure that our money supply was cut off, in an unprecedented move, UMG sued not only the company, but our investors (Michael Eisner, Art Bilger, and Spark Capital) personally. This move raised lot of eyebrows in the legal community, and at one point was thrown out by a judge, only to continue to be appealed and litigated by UMG. This completely choked off all of our financial oxygen, as trying to convince investors to invest with the threat of them personally being sued is insurmountable.

With the appeal looming, financing continued to be choked off for us, and in April 2010 we had to sell the company in a fire sale to a small startup. The company that we had built, that was once valued at over $130 Million was gone. Along with it went the livelihoods of over 120 people and their families, $70 million of money entrusted to us by investors, and a big part of me. I had sacrificed so much to live the life of an entrepreneur. My marriage couldn't stand the strain of this lifestyle and ended in 2009, and while all of this was going on, my father was dying. Instead of spending time with him at his bedside, I was sitting in depositions with lawyers, and stressing over the lawsuit. He died July 13 2009, two months before we won the original judgement on the lawsuit. He would have been proud of me for following through with the fight. I felt so beaten down after this experience, that I couldn't imagine going back to being an entrepreneur. I was disenchanted, disgusted by the system that would allow these kinds of behaviors to go on, and it is not until recently that I have been able to come up to bat again.

Our partners do not have broad take-down rights to remove anything they don’t like from our service. In limited cases, if they so choose, and based on exclusive agreements with their artists, partners can take down live performances.