As of this date, no responsive memorandum has been filed. LRCiv 7.2(i) provides in part “if the opposing party does not serve and file the required answering memorandum, ...such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” Pursuant to this rule, the Court deems Plaintiff's failure to serve and file the required answering memorandum a consent to the granting of Defendant-Movant's Motion to Quash the Subpoena to Wild West Domains Seeking Identity Information.

The district court’s conclusion that rules governing personal jurisdiction and venue provide no impediment to pre-Rule 26 discovery of the ISPs is legal error. A showing of “good cause,” which is required for discovery ostensibly intended to identify defendants, requires an evaluation of whether the information sought from the ISPs would be used to name and serve defendants in the forum. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352-53 & n.17 (1978) (where “the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied”). The Copyright Act and the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute limit the court’s reach to defendants who reside in the district. And the uncontroverted evidence before the district court showed that few, if any, of the targeted Internet subscribers reside in the District of Columbia—as publicly available geolocation software used by Plaintiff’s counsel in other cases confirms. The district court’s decision to defer any consideration of personal jurisdiction or venue until after the subscribers’ personal information had been disclosed to Plaintiff requires reversal.

The court’s decision to permit discovery of the ISPs before deciding whether the 1,000-plus “Does” are misjoined provides an additional basis for reversal. Plaintiff, by routinely declining to name and serve defendants after obtaining the subscribers’ personal information, virtually ensures that Rule 20’s requirements for joinder will go unaddressed if not evaluated at the outset. And as a growing majority of courts have concluded, deferring a ruling on joinder deprives the courts of filing fees and encourages a proliferation of improperly coercive lawsuits. Given the groundswell of published opinions that disagree with the lower court and have severed or dismissed non-resident “Does” or all Does except for “Doe No. 1,” deferring a ruling on joinder in a suit that seeks nationwide subscriber information also encourages forum shopping—as the record here shows persuasively.

The record reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel’s cases have migrated across the country, with the venues selected, not by the locus of the parties or situs of harm, but based on counsel’s perceptions of which forum is most likely to authorize the greatest discovery, at the lowest cost, with the least judicial oversight.

The specter of intra-district, judge-specific shopping in Plaintiff’s counsel’s cases further underscores the problem with the lower court’s approach. The ISPs raised below Plaintiff’s counsel’s practice of filing complaints and dismissing them vel non based on the judicial assignment—only to re-file in another court. When presented with the same facts, Judge Wilkins quoted with approval Judge Huvelle’s finding: “Plaintiff’s actions a[re] akin to ‘judge shopping.’… This Court could not agree more.” ...

The ISPs respectfully submit that the district courts in this Circuit should not be the destination for 1,000-plus Doe cases that are brought primarily to compile mailing lists—not to adjudicate actual cases or controversies.

AF Holdings and its counsel owe a duty of candor to the Court, and a duty of fairness to appellants.... The serious issues concerning attorney misconduct and potentially forged documents were not identified for the court below; they necessarily affect the “good cause” analysis and provide an alternative basis for reversal to address the evidence now being considered in the pending disciplinary proceedings in the Central District of California.

Specifically, in a series of cases beginning with Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001), courts have adopted a balancing standard to assess requests for early discovery to identify anonymous online speakers that protects the right to speak anonymously while at the same time ensuring that plaintiffs who have valid claims are able to pursue them. Without such a standard, abusive plaintiffs could too easily use extrajudicial means against defendants from whom they could not, in the end, obtain judicial redress. See Levy, Litigating Civil Subpoenas to Identify Anonymous Internet Speakers, 37 Litigation No. 3 (Spring 2011).

The use of BitTorrent to select and share movies is expressive and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 350 (“[F]ile-sharers are engaged in expressive activity, on some level, when they share files on BitTorrent, and their First Amendment rights must be considered before the Court allows the plaintiffs to override the putative defendants’ anonymity.”).

Although the expressive aspect of the conduct alleged here – the posting of copyrighted movies to BitTorrent – is somewhat minimal, that does not mean that discovery to identify the anonymous user without adequate initial evidence that individual Doe Defendants committed the alleged infringement. The weakness of AF Holdings’ assertions of personal jurisdiction and proper joinder means that First Amendment concerns weigh more strongly here in favor of quashing the subpoenas. Certainly it was not appropriate for the district court to ignore the question altogether.

Here's a fun fact...my husband sues people for pirating porn and the phone companies for putting it in the hands of people under 18...the men caught really hate his firm and have tried to harm him physically and financially, but they are the worst kind of thieves imaginable and shame on all the mobile carriers for allowing people to move X rated material to the hands of minors. Someone we know paid an undisclosed amount to settle a case so that we would not release his name to the public.

Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Mr. Gibbs also from time to time sent me certifications to sign on behalf of AF Holdings stating that I am familiar with ADR policies. My practice was to sign those certifications on behalf of the Salt Marsh Trust and return them to Mr. Gibbs.

Due to the date of my appearance in this matter, I have no knowledge of the filings of AF Holdings, LLC's ADR certification in this matter.

Philip W. Vineyard, my attorney... was advised by Andrew Waxler, attorney for Mr. Gibbs.. that Mr. Gibbs states that he does not have possession of the signed ADR certification.

Pursuant to Local Rule 5-1(c)(4), the ECF user, rather than the user's law firm, retains full responsibility for any document filed through the ECF filer's user ID and password.

The first step in this process is to conduct what is referred to as a 'pre-complaint investigation.' The purpose of this step is to gather evidence about who used your Internet account to steal from our client. The list of possible suspects includes you, members of your household, your neighbors (if you maintain an open wi-fi connection) and anyone who might have visited your house. In the coming days we will contact these individuals to investigate whether they have any knowledge of the acts described in my client's prior letter.

Alan, this is John Steele again.

You have not responded or contacted me regarding litigation you're involved in. I know you've been served with a third lawsuit. And there are more coming. Don't worry about that.

Well, obviously, if I don't hear from you, I'm going to start filing for certain default motions and start getting relief that way.

I can assure you that just ignoring legal matters, it's not going to go away. I can guarantee you, I'm not going away.

So I highly recommend you at least, you know, follow the rules.... otherwise your life is going to get really complicated.

“Mr. Godfrey. This is John Steele calling. I understand that you just got served. So, I do need to know if you are going to be representing Mr. Cooper in this suit as well. Obviously there is a conflict of interest that I can see but obviously I’m going to have to defer that decision about whether you are going to represent your co-defendant to you. Uhm and I leave the question as to the other suits that are coming your way in the next few days, I’ll just wait until you actually get served before I bringing those up, but at least on this issue, this suit, I do need to know if I may contact Mr. Cooper directly or if I will be working through you. All right. Thank you.”

He talks about "battle-stations"? That tells you something about where this judge is coming from. In the same sentence he talks about attorneys having "moral turpitude," he uses Star Trek terms to describe it? It's really beneath the dignity of the court.

As for the needs of the many outweighing the needs of the few [a Star Trek quote at the top of Judge Wright's order]—that's not [how the legal system works]. If the needs of the few didn't matter, black people wouldn't vote in most Southern states.

The deposition that [former partner] Paul Hansmeier gave wasn't even certified. It shouldn't have even been allowed to be used. There are hundreds of problems with this order in my view.

I—and others involved—have been in front of hundreds of judges. This is the first judge that has ever sanctioned anybody involved with Steele Hansmeier, Prenda Law, or whatever.

I think the judge knows we're going to appeal. He wrote that the sanctions were designed to cost just less than [an effective appeal]. Look, you may hate me and the litigation that's gone on in the past, but most people have to be a little nervous when a judge puts out a number and says that.

Steele: Not until I received an order to show cause. I've spoken to some of the other people [involved], and they're in a similar situation. I didn't know about this until February of this year. Until March I hadn't read a single pleading in this case. I, quite frankly, had never been involved in any case in California.

If there was evidence I was involved and [Prenda Law lawyer] Paul Duffy was involved in more than just the somewhat supervisory role of Brett Gibbs, then that evidence would have come out.

Ars: Brett Gibbs testified at the March hearing that you and Hansmeier were "senior partners" at Prenda Law. He says you were supervising. Were you?

Steele: No. Absolutely not. Where's the evidence that we supervised Brett Gibbs? Where are the e-mails?

Ars: Gibbs testified that you were in control of these entities. You ran them. You initiated cases, you settled cases.

Steele: Where are the documents showing that I own any of these entities? I've never even heard of a couple of them.

I'm well aware Mr. Cooper said he never signed those documents. He said it was a forgery—those were words the court used. I'm very comfortable with the facts, and everything in my possession leads me to believe that Mr. Cooper's involvement with AF Holdings was different than what he led the court to believe. It will ultimately come down to a "he said, they said." Nobody I'm aware of, including myself, has ever forged Alan Cooper's signature. That is a pretty outrageous claim.

And for the love of God, where is the evidence [of forgery]? If someone had found something, it would be on the front page of Ars Technica and half a dozen other sites within minutes. There's no way any of that evidence could exist. Because it's not true.

I work part-time with Livewire Holdings, one of the entities that Lutz owns. My role is on the business side. I acquire other adult content companies and deal with expanding the holding company. The main goal is to handle a lot of content and websites and to be involved in the adult space. For that, I'm paid a flat fee. I won't say how much, but it's a modest flat sum.

Steele: I think they've done a few cases. I'm not involved with that litigation. I don't file anything. You know, what pirates oftentimes don't get is that this is not a huge moneymaker. I know from past experience at Steele Hansmeier that over half the clients we got never made any money off suing pirates.

Ars: Well, how much money have you made? Last year a Forbes reporter suggested you could have collected $15 million in settlements, and you responded by saying the actual figure was "more than a few million." Have you made millions of dollars suing people?

Steele: I wish I had. At the time my wife made some joke wanting to know where I hid the other $14.5 million. There are a lot of costs associated with litigation.

Ars: If you and Paul Hansmeier don't run AF Holdings, why would Hansmeier be the person who was sent to be deposed about AF Holdings?

Steele: I believe he went out as a favor. They needed a corporate representative, and he was authorized to provide that, for AF Holdings, for Mr. Lutz. You want to have a strong corporate representative to get up and deal with Mr. Pietz for seven hours. There's not a whole lot of people in a typical adult content company that can answer a lot of the questions that were asked.

Ars: And so what is Paul Hansmeier up to? I called him to talk about the order, and he referred me to you.

Steele: I believe he deals with some class action type of litigation. He also helps me when I'm looking for acquisitions, he's got experience in that area. So he works essentially part-time for Livewire. It's on a project basis.

The defendant has filed a copy of that Order hoping that it would be viewed as a mandate by this Court. However, the defendant’s attempts to issue this mandate should fail for the following reasons.

First and foremost the undersigned respects the California decision and believes that it was rendered in the best interest of the residents of California.

Nevertheless, this instant case is pending in a Georgia District Court and it is trusted that any decision rendered, whether for or against the plaintiff, will be done so in the best interest of the residents and practitioners of Georgia.

While this Court may or may not agree with some of the issues presented in the California case, unbeknownst to the defendant, the California case will not necessarily become a mandate on this Court. It is solely within the discretion of this Court to follow or not follow the decisions made in the California case.

The defendant should realize that California has different laws than Georgia, a different Governor than Georgia; a different legislative body than Georgia, different business needs than Georgia and different views than Georgia and as such all of its decisions cannot serve as a mandate for Georgia.

For example the California Courts have legalized gay marriage. Perry v. Schwarzenegger 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal., 2010);Certified question, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th. Cir.); Answered 52 Cal.4th 1116 (2011) Affirmed, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.) Such a decision cannot serve as a mandate on Georgia Courts to legalize gay marriage as well.

Prior to filing the document, the undersigned contacted Prenda Law to find out whether or not Mr. Cooper would be available to testify at trial but was advised that they could not locate Mr. Cooper. The undersigned was advised that Mark Lutz and Peter Hansmeier would be available to testify as witnesses. Had the undersigned realized that the Electronic Frontier Foundation was hanging with Mr. Cooper, he would have been able to track down Mr. Cooper and questioned him about the documents. It turns out that Mr. Cooper was a caretaker of one of the properties of a Prenda Law member and had left said property in August, 2012.

Therefore, even if the undersigned had placed a knife to the throats of each of Prenda’s members, none would have been able to give him Mr. Cooper’s contact information at the time on November 5, 2012 when Plaintiff commenced its law suit. It is certainly not the first time a company has lost contact with an agent (or alleged agent as stated).

You could see just how devoted Steele and his partners were to their new business model, though, because even these kinds of warning shots didn't deter them. Steele's initial operation, which became Prenda Law in November 2011, continued to iterate. It filed cases in other Illinois federal districts downstate. It filed in Illinois state courts, jiggering the charges to match the venue (copyright infringement of this kind is a federal issue). It filed in Florida, attempting to use an arcane procedure called a "true bill of discovery" to obtain IP addresses. It filed in California. It tried out "reverse class actions" suits against alleged downloaders. It formed a company in Las Vegas (hiring a "CEO" named Mark Lutz) and set up trusts located offshore (in Nevis) in order to own porn copyrights. No pesky PR department or tentative CEO could hold up Prenda's litigation pain train if the law firm could simply ditch the client and go into business for itself.

How could the scheme go on for so long even as federal judges complained about fraud, as "John Doe" defendants complained repeatedly that they had no idea what the cases were about, and as critics complained about the injustice of the entire business model? The answer is that federal judges aren't generally investigators. Prenda had gone to great lengths to obscure what was really going on, who was doing what, and where the money went. Judges want to clear cases off their dockets and in rare cases will entertain sanctions motions, but to unravel something as complex as Prenda's behavior required a real investigation. Yet without more details, actual criminal investigators had very little to go on; most of the judicial complaints dealt with behavior in court, not public crimes.

So Prenda could essentially turn the entire US judiciary into a laboratory for incrementally refining its porn trolling techniques, testing venues, judges, corporate structures, collection procedures, and legal arguments, looking for perfection. And what it arrived at in the end had a certain devious logic to it. Even Otis Wright, the federal judge in Los Angeles who brought down Prenda's principals and referred them all for criminal and tax prosecution this week, had to concede the conceptual beauty of the system.

“The hearing regarding me in March was 12 minutes long and there was no evidence or testimony admitted. I have never had any ownership interest in AF Holdings, Ingenuity13, or Prenda Law and no evidence otherwise was ever presented. I am not an attorney in this matter, and have never practiced law in California. In fact the first time I heard of this case was when Mr. Gibbs told me he got an Order to Show Cause in February 2013 regarding this case.”

He continued, “I would also comment that the attorneys representing myself, Paul Hansmeier, Paul Duffy, and the others were not allowed to make argument nor were we allowed to present witnesses. And normally with orders regarding sanctions, the Court will point to evidence, testimony, or something to explain the sanction. In this order, there is nothing.”

For his part, Steele told AVN that it is his understanding that Livewire Holdings, one of the entities identified by Judge Wright—by way of an actual Prenda relationship chart included in the order—as being a member of the Prenda family, “is filing multiple new cases this week."

“Hopefully,” he added defiantly, “the pirate that got away in this matter will be caught and brought to justice down the road.”

Steele on Tuesday told XBIZ that he plans on appealing Wright's order with the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

"Obviously we don't agree on the ruling," Steele said. "Judge Wright based his order on an eight-minute hearing where there was no testimony, no evidence introduced. Clearly Judge Wright does not like this type of litigation and he's no fan of intellectual property law."

Then they offer to settle—for a sum calculated to be just below the cost of a bare-bones defense

This punitive portion is calculated to be just below the cost of an effective appeal.

Steele, Hansmeier, and Duffy (“Principals”) are attorneys with shattered law practices. Seeking easy money, they conspired to operate this enterprise and formed the AF Holdings and Ingenuity 13 entities (among other fungible entities) for the sole purpose of litigating copyright-infringement lawsuits. They created these entities to shield the Principals from potential liability and to give an appearance of legitimacy.

AF Holdings and Ingenuity 13 have no assets other than several copyrights to pornographic movies. There are no official owners or officers for these two offshore entities, but the Principals are the de facto owners and officers.

The Principals started their copyright-enforcement crusade in about 2010, through Prenda Law, which was also owned and controlled by the Principals. Their litigation strategy consisted of monitoring BitTorrent download activity of their copyrighted pornographic movies, recording IP addresses of the computers downloading the movies, filing suit in federal court to subpoena Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) for the identity of the subscribers to these IP addresses, and sending cease-and-desist letters to the subscribers, offering to settle each copyright infringement claim for about $4,000.

This nationwide strategy was highly successful because of statutory copyright damages, the pornographic subject matter, and the high cost of litigation. Most defendants settled with the Principals, resulting in proceeds of millions of dollars due to the numerosity of defendants. These settlement funds resided in the Principals’ accounts and not in accounts belonging to AF Holdings or Ingenuity 13. No taxes have been paid on this income.

For defendants that refused to settle, the Principals engaged in vexatious litigation designed to coerce settlement. These lawsuits were filed using boilerplate complaints based on a modicum of evidence, calculated to maximize settlement profits by minimizing costs and effort.

The Principals have shown little desire to proceed in these lawsuits when faced with a determined defendant. Instead of litigating, they dismiss the case. When pressed for discovery, the Principals offer only disinformation—even to the Court.

The Principals have hired willing attorneys, like Gibbs, to prosecute these cases. Though Gibbs is culpable for his own conduct before the Court, the Principals directed his actions. In some instances, Gibbs operated within narrow parameters given to him by the Principals, whom he called “senior attorneys.”

The Principals maintained full control over the entire copyright-litigation operation. The Principals dictated the strategy to employ in each case, ordered their hired lawyers and witnesses to provide disinformation about the cases and the nature of their operation, and possessed all financial interests in the outcome of each case.

The Principals stole the identity of Alan Cooper (of 2170 Highway 47 North, Isle, MN 56342). The Principals fraudulently signed the copyright assignment for “Popular Demand” using Alan Cooper’s signature without his authorization, holding him out to be an officer of AF Holdings. Alan Cooper is not an officer of AF Holdings and has no affiliation with Plaintiffs other than his employment as a groundskeeper for Steele. There is no other person named Alan Cooper related to AF Holdings or Ingenuity 13.

The Principals ordered Gibbs to commit the following acts before this Court: file copyright-infringement complaints based on a single snapshot of Internet activity; name individuals as defendants based on a statistical guess; and assert a copyright assignment with a fraudulent signature. The Principals also instructed Gibbs to prosecute these lawsuits only if they remained profitable; and to dismiss them otherwise.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated their willingness to deceive not just this Court, but other courts where they have appeared. Plaintiffs’ representations about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies. But this deception was calculated so that the Court would grant Plaintiffs’ early-discovery requests, thereby allowing Plaintiffs to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds from them. With these granted requests, Plaintiffs borrow the authority of the Court to pressure settlement.

Gibbs’s statement is a blatant lie. His statement resembles other statements given by Plaintiffs in this and their other cases: statements that sound reasonable but lack truth. Thus, the Court concludes that Gibbs, even in the face of sanctions, continued to make factual misrepresentions to the Court.

• They have to pay the defendant's legal fees of $40,659.86, which he then doubles "as a punitive measure" to $81,319.72, noting "This punitive multiplier is justified by Plaintiffs’ brazen misconduct and relentless fraud."
• He notes that "The Principals, AF Holdings, Ingenuity 13, Prenda Law, and Gibbs are liable for this sum jointly and severally, and shall pay this sum within 14 days of this order." Basically, all of them together are responsible for figuring out how to pay the money. As defined earlier, Steele, Hansmeier and Duffy are "the Principals" though I wouldn't put it past the three of them to claim that they are non-parties to all of this and thus not responsible for the payment.
• The bigger issue: referring the conduct of Steele, Hansmeier, Duffy and Gibbs to various state and federal bars. As Wright notes: "there is little doubt that that Steele, Hansmeier, Duffy, Gibbs suffer from a form of moral turpitude unbecoming of an officer of the court." That won't look good on a resume.
• The even bigger issue: alerting the feds of possible racketeering violations:

  though Plaintiffs boldly probe the outskirts of law, the only enterprise they resemble is RICO. The federal agency eleven decks up is familiar with their prime directive and will gladly refit them for their next voyage. The Court will refer this matter to the United States Attorney for the Central District of California. The will also refer this matter to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service and will notify all judges before whom these attorneys have pending cases. For the sake of completeness, the Court requests Pietz to assist by filing a report, within 14 days, containing contact information for: (1) every bar (state and federal) where these attorneys are admitted to practice; and (2) every judge before whom these attorneys have pending cases.

• And, finally, a smaller issue: Duffy and Gibbs, who are admitted to practice in California are referred to the "Standing Committee on Discipline." That's a relatively minor point given all of the above.

My testimony was that I don't know what the exact name of the trust is. If the name of the trust is Salt Marsh, then Salt Marsh is the owner. If the name of the trust is not Salt Marsh, then --

Q. So returning to these corporate representatives. Have there been any other corporate representatives other than Alan Cooper, Mark Lutz for AF Holdings?
A. I can think one of other corporate representative.
Q. And who is that?
A. And that would Anthony Saltmarsh.
Q. Where does Mr. Saltmarsh reside?
A. I don't know where Mr. Saltmarsh resides.
Q. Was Mr. Saltmarsh ever compensated for acting as a corporate representative for AF Holdings?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Exhibit 101 and 102. Those are both the ADRs that are signed by Salt Marsh. I believe you testified you thought that that might be of the name the trust that owns AF Holdings. Could that be a misspelling of Anthony Saltmarsh?
A. The only thing I can say about these documents is that if you wanted me to come prepared to testify about them, you may have included them as exhibits to the notice or supplement the notice with the documents. You're asking me is it possible that Salt Marsh as spelled on here is a misspelling of the name Anthony Saltmarsh?
Q. Perhaps an alias would be a better word for it.
A. Or an alias for Salt Marsh. I'm a bit skeptical of that theory because it says AF Holdings owner and Anthony Saltmarsh is not an owner of AF Holdings.

Finally, the Court addresses Mr. Navasca’s request that it order AF to produce the original of an ADR certification that was e-filed by AF as Docket No. 8. The ADR certification that was e-filed does not contain any actual signature from an AF representative; rather, there is simply the following e-signature: “/s/ Salt Marsh, AF Holdings Owner.” Docket No. 8 (ADR certification). As Mr. Navasca points out, under the Civil Local Rules, AF’s counsel should have maintained a copy of the ADR certification containing the original signature as a part of its files. See Civ. L.R. 5-1(i)(3) (providing that, in the case of a Signatory who is not an ECF user, the actual filer of the document “shall maintain records . . . for subsequent production for the Court, if so ordered, or for inspection upon request by a party, until one year after the final resolution of the action (including appeal, if any)”). Because Mr. Navasca has asked the Court for relief encompassed by the Civil Local Rules, the Court grants the request. AF’s counsel is hereby ordered to produce the original of the ADR certification, containing the original signature of “Salt Marsh” by April 29, 2013. If AF’s current counsel does not have the original document, then it must contact former counsel to obtain the document. On April 29, AF’s current counsel shall also file a declaration with the Court, stating whether it was able to provide a copy of the original document and, if not, why not.

The Court finds neither argument availing

As to spoliation, it is far from clear that there was any spoliation in the first instance. Notably, Judge Vadas instructed AF to “review the expert declaration that Navasca filed with his letter brief, to fully understand the purpose and effect of CCleaner.” Docket No. 50 (Order at 2). However, there is no evidence to suggest that AF did that or any other investigation into whether CCleaner would in fact irrevocably destroy electronic files. Furthermore, as the Court noted at the hearing, even if CCleaner did irrevocably destroy electronic files, that might actually work in AF’s favor; in other words, the stronger the evidence of improper spoliation, the better the chance AF stood of obtaining, e.g., an evidentiary sanction or adverse inference in its favor based on the spoliation.

Effectively conceding the weakness of its spoliation argument, AF focused at the hearing on the prohibitive cost of the undertaking. But the Court finds this position unconvincing for two reasons. First, AF ignores the fact that the Court stayed its undertaking ruling and expressly gave AF the opportunity to file a motion to reconsider. The Court even noted that AF could present evidence of its professed inability to pay. In spite of this, AF never took any action to move for reconsideration, opting instead for a voluntary dismissal. Cf. AF Holdings LLC v. Trinh, No. C-12- 2393 CRB (N.D. Cal.) (Docket No. 45) (Order at 2) (noting that a plaintiff can obtain relief from a bond requirement if unable to pay but that AF had offered no support for its contention that a bond is beyond its means). Second, to the extent AF suggests that it may be financially able to pay, but the bond is simply more than the value of the case, see Mot. at 2 (arguing that Plaintiff cannot “afford to tie up nearly $50,000 in capital simply in order to proceed with its claims against a single infringer”), it ignores the fact that a bond may be required in any given case in California (based on California specific law). As the plaintiff which initiated the action, AF knew at the outset that a bond might be required. A plaintiff cannot invoke the benefits of the judicial system without being prepared to satisfy its obligations as a litigant. Cf. AF Holdings LLC v. Magsumbol, No. 12-4221 SC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25572, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (in case in which AF moved for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice before court was able to rule on defendant’s motion to post an undertaking; denying AF’s motion because tendered reasons for requesting dismissal were not compelling – “Plaintiff brought this case knowing the rules of this jurisdiction and the risks of litigation, and now he seeks dismissal of his case without prejudice so that he can bring it another day”).

Paul Duffy has a problem. He's counsel of record for AF Holdings, to the extent that AF Holdings even is a client separate and distinct from Prenda Law. But in between the time he filed the motion for voluntary dismissal and now, the April 2 hearing in Los Angeles happened where he (among other Prenda Law people) plead the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer questions about AF Holdings. This act put him in a bind: if he opened up his mouth in San Francisco to talk about AF Holdings it could inculpate him in its affairs. You can't assert the Fifth Amendment in some contexts and waive it in others, that's not the way it works. Anything he says about AF Holdings in some proceedings can and will be used against him in others.

On the other hand, as counsel to a purportedly separate and distinct client, he can't just blow off the hearing, even if that might be the best option for saving his own skin. AF Holdings, whoever it is, is staring down the barrel of a judgment on the order of tens of thousands of dollars against it. If it were truly a separate client it should be able to count on him to try to prevent such a judgment. Note: this doesn't mean the client could expect him to prevail, but it could expect him to at least give it the ol' college try. That meant that he couldn't just not show up (which apparently was what he did — or, er, didn't do — at a hearing yesterday in Illinois). He couldn't just withdraw as counsel, either, because that generally requires the court's permission once a lawsuit is underway in order to make sure a client isn't being left high and dry (see, for example, the earlier motion to substitute Duffy for Gibbs, which they needed the court to approve). Nor could he choose to just not argue, or purposefully argue badly, without abrogating his ethical duties to the client. But it was unclear what he could argue that wouldn't further implicate him in the misdealings of the Prenda Law enterprise.

In any case, as Judge Chen honed in on later in the hearing, usually a plaintiff is happy for there to be spoliation problems. "Normally if you argue spoliation, you win the case!" It seemed very strange, he observed, to give up because you are claiming spoliation (and, he asked later, if it really were such a problem, why did you wait to withdraw the case and not do so as soon as you learned of it?).

• Paul Duffy is trying to dismiss the counterclaims filed against him in his defamation lawsuit against Alan Cooper, arguing that the counterclaims make no reference to him personally, but rather John Steele and Paul Hansmeier. Of course, if they were all working together, as an awful lot of evidence seems to suggest, that may be a problem for Duffy. The more hilarious issue is that Duffy claims that Cooper's lawsuit against Prenda (for allegedly falsifying his name on documents) is an "unrelated matter," rather than the whole freaking reason that Duffy is suing. Ken breaks down how incredibly stupid this statement is:

  Yeah, sure, Cooper's suit is "completely unrelated" — except that (1) it involves the same parties, (2) it concerns Prenda's operations, (3) it accuses Prenda of stealing Cooper's identity, which Prenda's and Duffy's complaints suggest is a defamatory statement, (4) John Steele used all three suits to threaten and intimidate Cooper as soon as Cooper filed his complaint, and (5) Prenda's and Duffy's complaints specifically identify the Cooper complaint as one of the forms of defamation they are suing over. This is not just a lie to a federal court. It's not even a plausible lie. It's a stupid, ineffectual, desperate lie.

• Ken explains the reasons why Cooper and Godfread decided to file using Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law, rather than Illinois's. As we had mentioned earlier, the case is in Illinois, so it took many of us by surprise that they were relying on Minnesota's anti-SLAPP law. However, Ken notes that since the key issue in an anti-SLAPP situation is that it forces the plaintiff to present their evidence early, this means that Duffy will be caught in a tough spot: responding with evidence would eviscerate the 5th Amendment protection he took in California.

  But here's the beauty of this situation for Cooper and Godfread — the anti-SLAPP statute forces Duffy and Prenda to come forward with actual evidence establishing that they might win. To do that, they have to come forward with evidence that the statements that they are complaining about are false. But those statements are about exactly the things that Steele and Hansmeier and Duffy took the Fifth rather than address. Duffy and Prenda can't carry their burden unless they reverse the decision to take the Fifth. Ultimately, Cooper's and Godfread's narrower argument is elegant and well-suited to the circumstances. It's not always the right strategy to make every possible argument.

  That "narrower" argument he's talking about is the (slightly surprising) decision by Cooper and Godfread not to point out that many of the statements that Duffy and Prenda are claiming defamatory are either insults or statements of opinion, rather than fact, and thus not subject to defamation. Instead of going down that road, they're focused on forcing Duffy's hand. We noted earlier that Cooper and Godfread had called Prenda's bluff. That may have been premature. Now they're really calling the bluff, and Duffy's going to have to show his cards.
  
  
• Back in the main showdown case in California, we had already pointed out that (over the objections of Team Prenda), Judge Otis Wright had allowed lawyer Morgan Pietz (representing some of those sued by Prenda) to file more evidence. And he's done so. White summarizes the situation nicely.

  Pietz can be excused for sounding a bit triumphant after the attorneys opposing him took the Fifth rather than address the questions he raised. He leads by pointing out that although John Steele claims there is no evidence that he has any ownership interest in Prenda Law's clients, Steele's own attorneys previously told the Florida State Bar the opposite — and a Prenda law local counsel also said that Steele had an interest in AF Holdings. Pietz attacks the credibility of Brent Berry, the real estate agent who claimed that Alan Cooper was in on the scheme and is violent and mentally ill. Pietz points out that Berry is Steele's agent and just sold a house for him in February. Pietz also points out that Berry signed the declaration in February, but Prenda law oddly withheld it until after the hearings before Judge Wright. Finally, Pietz echoes what everyone has been saying — Berry's testimony might suggest that Cooper knew his name was being used, but if accepted it proves that Cooper was a mere shill for the Prenda Law attorneys who actually controlled the plaintiff entities. Pietz also offers rebuttals to the Prenda lawyers' other arguments — he argues that Judge Wright's powers allow him to award attorney fees as sanctions based on the record before him, and he offers the declaration of a technical expert to rebut Prenda's arguments that its investigation of downloaders was reasonable and sufficient.

  Given Judge Wright's clear questions about Prenda's actions, I would imagine that this extra fodder isn't going to be particularly helpful to John Steele, Paul Duffy and Paul Hansmeier.
  
  
• And that's not all. Ken also has updates on a few other Prenda cases around the nation where people are hitting back at all things Prenda. Go check out his post for all the details.

The contradictions within the statements of Gibbs are indications of an eventual truth coming to light- not a fundamental deception. He has decided to expose the actors that he was referring to in his previous affidavit, and show that the managment of the litigation in this case was handled by both John Steele and Paul Hansmeier.

For example, the decision to file the Sunlust Action was made by Messrs. Steele and Hansmeier, the settlement parameters were given to me by Messrs. Steele and Hansmeier, and it was Messrs. Steele and Hansmeier who gave me instructions concerning how to advise the Florida counsel in the Sunlust Action. Moreover, I believe it was Mr. Steele that was responsible for locating the various Florida counsel to handle the litigation in Florida on behalf of Prenda Law....

I was told by either Paul Hansmeier or John Steele that Mark Lutz would show up at the November 27, 2012 hearing in the Sunlust Action. I believe that it was either John Steele or Paul Hansmeier that made this decision. I was not part of the decision making process which led to Mark Lutz appearing at the November 27th hearing.

the outrageous attacks made on the real Alan Cooper are shameful. However, they are also easily discredited, and undersigned counsel would appreciate an opportunity to do so. Similarly, the other two declarations submitted by Mr. Duffy and Prenda also have problems, which undersigned counsel would like to briefly address and refute.

For example, although Gibbs claimed he was supervised by Steele and Hansmeier at Prenda Law, when pressed for specifics about the degree of supervision he received, Gibbs only offered that Steele and Hansmeier gave him authority to file certain cases here. See Dkt 108-5, at 77:8-24. Gibbs' further testimony has revealed he had significant autonomy in handling the cases. See Dkt 108-5, at 77:25-78:4 (claiming Steele and Hansmeier "gave me certain parameters [pursuant to] which I could settle the case myself.");

The Court stated: "First, with an invalid assignment, Plaintiff has no standing in these cases." Dkt 48, at 9:8. Apparently re-articulating the same concern, the Court added: "Second, by bringing these cases, Plaintiff's conduct can be considered vexatious, as these cases were filed for a facially improper purpose." Dkt 48, at 9:9-10. As both Gibbs and Prenda/Duffy/ Van Den Hemel noted in their Responses To The OSC, the Court is mistaken about the law in this regard; the signature of the assignee is irrelevant to the validity of the assignment, so long as the assignor signs. See Dkt 49, at 25:9-26:19; Dkt 108, at 11:24-12:9.; see also 17 U.S.C. 204(a). Lastly, the Court stated: "the Courtm will not idle while Plaintiff defrauds this institution."; Dkt 48, at 9:10-11. However, even if the Court were to discount the evidence submitted impugning Cooper's credibility and blame Steele for this "fraud,"; it hardly rises to the level of fraud upon the court recognized by the Ninth Circuit, i.e., "a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991).

Regarding any other alleged fraud the Court may consider, as Section III above makes clear, except in rare circumstances not present here, this Court is not empowered to sanction Steele or anyone else based on conduct occurring entirely outside of the subject cases and the Central District. Based on its prior statements, the Court may have erroneously felt otherwise before.

Disturbingly, the Court's apparent conclusions about the relationships between the persons and entities named in the March 14, 2013 OSC wholly ignores evidence to the contrary. Compare, e.g., Dkt. 69-1, pp. 21:18-2, 38:22-39:15, 40:8-12 (regarding who owns AF Holdings) with Dkt 108-5, at 114:5-8 (I do have the picture, and I know who the client is. We have talked about the client, and the client has been running everything. Yeah, I know who the client is”); see also Dkt 108-5at 19:15-18 (suggesting Prenda law is "controlled by Mr. Steele.")

However, Steele cannot be sanctioned for any of these alleged misrepresentations made to this Court regarding the relationships among the parties and entities named in the Court’s March 14 OSC because Steele has taken no actions nor made any representations to this Court of any kind, nor is there any evidence before this Court that he acted or was otherwise involved in anyone else's alleged misrepresentations to this Court.

Respondent Hansmeier was not a party to proceedings outside of the April 2, 2013 proceeding, where no evidence was presented. There is simply no tie between Hansmeier and the issues raised within the court’s order to show case. And the court should limit the inferences that it draws about Hansmeier’s culpability for the actions of a third-party attorney, like Gibbs, who was neither employed nor supervised by Hansmeier in connection with this matter

Q And who did you understand were the decision makers of Steele Hansmeier?

A John Steele and Paul Hansmeier.

Q When you were an of counsel to Steele Hansmeier, who supervised you?

A John Steele and Paul Hansmeier.

Q Did you have periodic meetings while at Steele Hansmeier to discuss cases?

A Yes, we did.

Q And were those weekly meetings?

A Yes. Sometimes they would be sending the schedule, but, yes, mostly weekly meetings.

Q Who participated in those meetings?

A John and Paul would call me, and they would hold a weekly meeting.

[....]

Q And were you supervised at Prenda Law?

A Yes, I was.

Q Who were you supervised by?

A Paul Hansmeier and John Steele.

Q Were you supervised by Paul Duffy?

A No.

Q And when you say supervised, could you just describe what you mean by that? How did they supervise you?

A Sure. You know, they essentially were the ones that would initiate cases. By that, I mean, they would tell me they wanted to file certain cases in California, for instance, and they would instruct me to go ahead and file those. And they would give me the authority to do so. I would be told what cases we are looking at and how many cases we are talking about, and then I would file the cases. And they would give me general guidelines on what to do and sometimes the cases would be settled by John as was pointed out earlier, and sometimes they gave me certain parameters which I could settle the case myself.

Q Did you ever talk to anybody that you understood to be the client, AF Holdings?

A No. The communications were solely through Paul Hansmeier and John Steele.

Q Did you ever talk to anybody who said they were affiliated with Ingenuity 13?

A Well, I mean, aside from Mark Lutz who is the CEO of Ingenuity 13, but aside from that, no. All my communications were straight through Paul Hansmeier and John Steele.

[....]

And whose decision was it to dismiss those cases?

A Ultimately, it was John Steele and Paul Hansmeier's decisions. We had talked about it. As counsel of record here, I just kind of broke down like a cost benefit analysis of those cases. And they said, basically, go ahead and dismiss them because -- they said go ahead and dismiss them.

Q When the cases were filed, did you have a discussion with anybody about whether notice of interested parties should be filed?

A I did. Yeah.

Q And who did you have discussions with?

A Mostly Paul Hansmeier. Yes. Mostly Paul Hansmeier but sometimes John Steele, I guess. I don't know. It was a while ago I guess.

All of my coverage of the Prenda Law saga is collected here.

Last week I described how Prenda Law principals John Steele, Paul Hansmeier, and Paul Duffy asserted their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination rather than answer a federal judge's questions about Prenda Law's litigation campaign. I predicted that attorneys defending against Prenda Law cases would begin to use that assertion against Prenda. Behold: they have.

Georgia On Their Mind

We begin in in the Northern District of Georgia, where AF Holdings LLC brought suit against a Mr. Patel. AF Holdings' local counsel voluntarily dismissed the case on March 18 as part of Prenda's wave of dismissals. Too late, too late. Mr. Patel has filed a motion for sanctions. Since AF Holdings had already dismissed, Patel was forced to rely — as I explained — on the court's inherent powers.

Patel's Motion is a blockbuster. It weaves together information and documents from cases across the country to present its argument against Prenda law and its lawyers. The exhibits to the Motion are here: Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit D, Exhibit E, Exhibit F, Exhibit G, Exhibit H, Exhibit I, Exhibit J, Exhibit K, Exhibit L, Exhibit M, Exhibit N, Exhibit O, and Exhibit P. Among the most notable exhibits are transcripts. Exhibit C is the transcript of the utterly bizarre Florida hearing involving John Steele and Mark Lutz; Exhibit F is a transcript of the jaw-dropping March 11, 2013 hearing before Judge Wright at which Alan Cooper and Brett Gibbs testified, and Exhibit G is a transcript of the April 2 hearing at which Prenda's representatives took the Fifth. These are, on their own, very powerful, for reasons I have discussed before.

But that's not all. Patel has also submitted documents illuminating the conduct and seemingly inconsistent statements of various Prenda Law attorneys. Patel shows a pleading electronically "signed" by "Salt Marsh," one of the elusive figures behind Prenda Law's purported clients — it was also purportedly e-signed by Brett Gibbs. Patel shows that in January 2012, John Steele's attorneys wrote to the Florida State Bar on his behalf representing that "Mr. Steele is actually a client of Prenda — Mr. Steele maintains an ownership interest in some of Prenda's larger clients." It's difficult to reconcile this admission with Mr. Steele's assertion at the April 2 hearing that the attorney-client privilege would prevent him from answering questions about Prenda Law's clients. There's also a rather hilarious quote from a March 15, 2013 email on behalf of Prenda. The Motion doesn't make it clear whether this email was sent by Prenda local counsel or a Prenda principal:

I understand that there is an insane liberal group which is flying around Mr. Alan Cooper for its own benefit. This group is akin to "Anonymous". It doesn't believe in copyright laws. It does believe that computer hacking should be legal. I'm not certain if these southern courts (unlike liberal San Francisco Courts) will hold the same beliefs that this crazy "its ok to hack websites" group holds.

Bear in mind that assertion about the Electronic Frontier Foundation was uttered four days after Alan Cooper testified that his name had been misappropriated by Prenda and that John Steele had left him threatening voice mail messages when he complained. Whoever sent that email either isn't following what is going on, or believes he can bluff it out. Good luck with that.

Patel's motion is well worth reading for anyone interested in an exposition of the growing evidence concerning Prenda Law.

Annoyed In Illinois

Prenda's troubles don't end in Georgia.

In Illinois, Prenda — using its putative client "Lightspeed Media Corporation" — filed state law claims. One defendant — a Mr. Smith — removed the case to federal court in the Southern District of Illinois. Prenda recently began to retreat in that case — Paul Hansmeier and John Steele moved to withdraw, leaving Paul Duffy holding the bag. Duffy, in turn, dismissed the case during the great strategic repositioning of March 2013. Once again, they were too late.

Smith has filed a motion seeking attorney fees as a sanction. The exhibits to the motion are here: Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit D, Exhibit E, Exhibit F, and the Forbes article attached as an unlettered exhibit.

Smith is represented, in part, by Jason E. Sweet of Booth Sweet LLP, who also represents Alan Cooper and Paul Godfread in the defamation litigation Prenda recklessly brought against them. Sweet was responsible for what I called a Perry Mason moment during the March 11 hearing; he stood up from the gallery to tell Judge Wright that Brett Gibbs had, in fact, represented himself as "national counsel" for Prenda. Sweet knows the case and knows Prenda, which shows. The Smith motion is a helpful addition to the Patel motion: it focuses more on Prenda's methods of identifying defendants, it attacks Prenda's state law theories, and then it piles on with Prenda's recent misfortunes in courts across the country. A representative sample of the latter:

Steele, Hansmeier and Duffy have orchestrated a nationwide campaign through Prenda Law and other related entities that several courts have found extends beyond vexatious litigation into fraud on the court. For one example that beggars description, Duffy, a prinicpal of Prenda Law, wrote a letter to the court disclaiming any role in representing the plaintiff, a Prenda Law client, though Prenda Law’s local counsel admitted having been retained to represent the plaintiff by Prenda Law principal Brett Gibbs. Hr’g Tr., Sunlust Pictures, LLC v. Nguyen, No. 12-cv-1685, pp. 10-12 (M.D. Fl. Nov. 27, 2012) (Exhibit D hereto). Mark Lutz, formerly a Prenda Law paralegal, represented himself as the plaintiff’s “corporate representative,” but conceded that he had no knowledge of the corporate officers and was paid on a contract basis to make courtroom appearances as a corporate representative for Prenda Law plaintiffs, including Hard Drive Productions and Guava LLC. Id. pp. 13-17 (misidentifying Mr. Lutz as “John Lutz”). The Sunlust Court dismissed the case from the bench “for failure to appear at this hearing, for failure to present a lawful agent, for attempted fraud on the Court by offering up a person who has no authority to act on behalf of the corporation as its corporate representative.” Id. p. 20. Steele, who happened to be present at the hearing, represented to the Court, “I don’t represent Sunlust or anybody anymore. I no longer actively practice law. … I do appear occasionally at hearings on an ad hoc basis, but I do not have any current clients.” Id. p. 19. (At the time, Steele was listed as lead counsel in this action.)

Ouch.

Prenda's Dilemma

Here's the dilemma of Prenda Law's principals: they can't both take the Fifth and fully respond to motions like these. They can't assert good faith and explain seeming inconsistencies without submitting declarations. If they want to continue to refuse to answer questions, they can only respond with legal arguments and bland generalities.

Paul Duffy has just tried that in San Francisco. In response to a raucous motion for fees in an AF Holdings case in the Northern District of California, Paul Duffy has responded with a dry and academic argument about the circumstances in which the Copyright Act permits a court to award fees to a defendant. Duffy's response is not badly written, and doesn't seem to be wrong on the law, but it's not at all the response you'd expect from a lawyer being accused of what amounts to a nationwide criminal enterprise. It's like someone said "Ken, I have it on good authority that you routinely molest squirrels in a public park near your house," and I responded "your accusation is without merit because that park is private."

Paul Duffy, and Prenda Law, might get lucky, and courts might summarily ignore or deny the sanctions and fees motions. But if any judge seeks to make an inquiry even a fraction as involved as Judge Wright has, then Prenda Law and its principals will find themselves choosing between warding off sanctions and maintaining their prudent silence.

This is only the beginning. Stay tuned.

Beginning in late 2011, Alan began exhibiting unusual behavior on various occasions when I was visiting the property. Alan began acting erratic, frequently threatening to hurt others.

On several occasions, Alan bragged that "If I pissed him off, they would never find my body, just like the others"

Due to Alan's strange behavior, I began to minimize my contacts with him unless others were around. Although I still consider Alan a very good person and a friend to this day, on some days he acted like a completely different person and extremely agitated. I later found out from Alan that the days he had acted very unusual were the ones in which he had not taken certain antipsychotic medication his doctor had prescribed.

[....]

Almost immediately I became aware that Alan's mental state had further deteriorated and felt very uncomfortable to be alone around him.

On approximately August 13th of 2012, I went to Mr. Steele's property to prepare it for a potential buyer. My girlfriend was with me on this trip. Alan came out of his cabin and was clearly in an extremely agitated state. Before I could even speak with him, he began threatening to hurt me. Due to the manner in which made the threats were made, his comments about past violence, I felt in fear for my life.

I immediately called John Steele and told him what happened and that I could not show the property under these conditions. I contacted the Aitkin County police department to report what had happened. Due to Mr. Steele's request, I did not follow through with filing charges.

Alan has sent me a variety of bizarre text messages, accurate copies of which are attached in Exhibit A hereto. In these text messages, Alan threatened to shoot me, indicated that he was removing wood from Mr. Steele's property, explained that he had some mental disorder(s), and apologized for his bizarre behavior.

Although Alan requested in his texts that I go to his doctor that was treating him for his mental illness.

Alan indicated that if I entered the property he would shoot me. Although Alan stated he would only shoot me in the foot, I felt out of an abundance of caution not to trust his assurance that he would only shoot me in a non-critical part of my body.

On several dates, I had occasion to be present when Mr. Steele and Alan would speak about various matters. Normally this occurred while we were sitting around campfire located between the two cabins.

Alan and Mr. Steele seemed to have a very good realtionship and Alan would routinely ask John how he wished he could help Mr. Steele for all the things Mr. Steele did for Alan, such as allowing him to live on the property for free.

It was clear from their conversations and references to Mr. Steele's legal work that Alan was involved working with Mr. Steele. Alan did not seem upset about this relationship, and in fact often made jokes about not having to worry about ever buying beer again due to his assisting Mr. Steele.

I remember Mr. Steele at various times asking Alan to assist him with certain paperwork and I never saw Alan objecting to this assistance.

On at least one occasion. I recall Alan asking John, "How's my porn company doing?"

THE COURT: Can you tell me, for example, who directs the litigation here in California? Who makes the decision as to whether or not cases are dismissed or settled for how much money? Can you tell me that?

MS. ROSING: Your Honor, I can't testify.

THE COURT: "Yes" or "no", please. Because we need to move through this. Can you tell me that?

MS. ROSING: I personally cannot tell you that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Do you know whether or not there is another Alan Cooper other than the one that was here at the last hearing?

MS. ROSING: I am not aware of another Alan Cooper, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Good. What happens to the settlement money?

MS. ROSING: Your Honor, obviously, I represent Mr. Duffy and Ms. Van Den Hemel. I don't have personal knowledge of any of this.

THE COURT: Why weren't notices of related cases filed? Who made the decision to hide from the court the fact that all of these cases were related.

MS. ROSING: I do have a judicially noticeable document on that, your Honor, where the Northern District declined to relate the cases.

THE COURT: That is a different thing. That is consolidating them.

MS. ROSING: It is actually an order declining to relate them.

THE COURT: Same plaintiff, same film, same causes of action, and they are not related? Excuse me? Okay. Tell me this. Who made the decision not to disclose to the court the fact that the law firms have a financial interest in the outcome of this litigation?

MS. ROSING: Your Honor, there is no evidence before this court at all that the law firm or any, well, certainly, my clients, Paul Duffy or Angela Van Den Hemel, have any financial interest in the outcome of this litigation.

THE COURT: Excuse me. Did you read Hansmeier's deposition?

MS. ROSING: Yes, I did, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then you make the statement you just made?