The district court’s conclusion that rules governing personal jurisdiction and venue provide no impediment to pre-Rule 26 discovery of the ISPs is legal error. A showing of “good cause,” which is required for discovery ostensibly intended to identify defendants, requires an evaluation of whether the information sought from the ISPs would be used to name and serve defendants in the forum. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352-53 & n.17 (1978) (where “the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied”). The Copyright Act and the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute limit the court’s reach to defendants who reside in the district. And the uncontroverted evidence before the district court showed that few, if any, of the targeted Internet subscribers reside in the District of Columbia—as publicly available geolocation software used by Plaintiff’s counsel in other cases confirms. The district court’s decision to defer any consideration of personal jurisdiction or venue until after the subscribers’ personal information had been disclosed to Plaintiff requires reversal.

The court’s decision to permit discovery of the ISPs before deciding whether the 1,000-plus “Does” are misjoined provides an additional basis for reversal. Plaintiff, by routinely declining to name and serve defendants after obtaining the subscribers’ personal information, virtually ensures that Rule 20’s requirements for joinder will go unaddressed if not evaluated at the outset. And as a growing majority of courts have concluded, deferring a ruling on joinder deprives the courts of filing fees and encourages a proliferation of improperly coercive lawsuits. Given the groundswell of published opinions that disagree with the lower court and have severed or dismissed non-resident “Does” or all Does except for “Doe No. 1,” deferring a ruling on joinder in a suit that seeks nationwide subscriber information also encourages forum shopping—as the record here shows persuasively.

The record reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel’s cases have migrated across the country, with the venues selected, not by the locus of the parties or situs of harm, but based on counsel’s perceptions of which forum is most likely to authorize the greatest discovery, at the lowest cost, with the least judicial oversight.

The specter of intra-district, judge-specific shopping in Plaintiff’s counsel’s cases further underscores the problem with the lower court’s approach. The ISPs raised below Plaintiff’s counsel’s practice of filing complaints and dismissing them vel non based on the judicial assignment—only to re-file in another court. When presented with the same facts, Judge Wilkins quoted with approval Judge Huvelle’s finding: “Plaintiff’s actions a[re] akin to ‘judge shopping.’… This Court could not agree more.” ...

The ISPs respectfully submit that the district courts in this Circuit should not be the destination for 1,000-plus Doe cases that are brought primarily to compile mailing lists—not to adjudicate actual cases or controversies.

AF Holdings and its counsel owe a duty of candor to the Court, and a duty of fairness to appellants.... The serious issues concerning attorney misconduct and potentially forged documents were not identified for the court below; they necessarily affect the “good cause” analysis and provide an alternative basis for reversal to address the evidence now being considered in the pending disciplinary proceedings in the Central District of California.

Specifically, in a series of cases beginning with Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001), courts have adopted a balancing standard to assess requests for early discovery to identify anonymous online speakers that protects the right to speak anonymously while at the same time ensuring that plaintiffs who have valid claims are able to pursue them. Without such a standard, abusive plaintiffs could too easily use extrajudicial means against defendants from whom they could not, in the end, obtain judicial redress. See Levy, Litigating Civil Subpoenas to Identify Anonymous Internet Speakers, 37 Litigation No. 3 (Spring 2011).

The use of BitTorrent to select and share movies is expressive and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment. Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 350 (“[F]ile-sharers are engaged in expressive activity, on some level, when they share files on BitTorrent, and their First Amendment rights must be considered before the Court allows the plaintiffs to override the putative defendants’ anonymity.”).

Although the expressive aspect of the conduct alleged here – the posting of copyrighted movies to BitTorrent – is somewhat minimal, that does not mean that discovery to identify the anonymous user without adequate initial evidence that individual Doe Defendants committed the alleged infringement. The weakness of AF Holdings’ assertions of personal jurisdiction and proper joinder means that First Amendment concerns weigh more strongly here in favor of quashing the subpoenas. Certainly it was not appropriate for the district court to ignore the question altogether.

This Panel Opinion is a classic case of bad facts making bad law. Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation does not file this brief to dispute the Court's factual conclusions regarding the conduct at issue in this case. However, the Panel Opinion went far beyond what was necessary to address that conduct. As a result, it has created new legal uncertainty for online service providers and their customers, undermining over a decade of legislation and jurisprudence designed to help reduce that uncertainty. A predictable legal environment has proven to be crucial not only the growth of the Internet generally, but the growth of innovative platforms for free expression, in particular. This case should not provide a vehicle to impede that development.

Most important, the Panel Opinion adopts a "loose causation theory" that disconnects the scope of inducement liability from the defendants' acts—raising the troubling possibility that a single inducing act (such as a message to one customer) could open the floodgates to liability for third-party infringement entirely unrelated to that act. The Opinion's loose causation theory conflicts with fundamental common law principles of proximate cause essential to both predictability and fairness. The Panel's decision to depart from those principles was apparently based on the unfounded assumption that the Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) requires it. Not so. First, Grokster expressly recognized that secondary liability under copyright derives from common law principles. Second, given that Grokster's specific inducement standard was imported from patent law, it is more likely that the Court also intended to import the analytical framework patent law applies where, as here, a service is capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses.

There is a danger that this passage could be misconstrued to stand for a broader proposition that we do not believe the panel intended: that any time an online service provider is found to have exercised "substantial influence" over any user-submitted content on its service—no matter what that finding was based on—it thereby loses its DMCA safe harbor protections for all user-submitted content on the entire service. This is how some copyright plaintiffs have already tried to read the panel's ruling. In a recent submission to the Southern District of New York in the Viacom v. YouTube case, for example, the plaintiffs have asserted, citing the panel opinion, that this Court “made clear that where DMCA eligibility is unavailable due to the right and ability to control prong of the safe harbor, the DMCA defense is broadly lost as to all clips in suit.” Ltr. from Paul M. Smith to Hon. Louis L. Stanton at 2 (March 22, 2013) (attached as Ex. 1).

Imagine, for example, a video-hosting service that was otherwise eligible for the section 512(c) safe harbor, but that on one occasion commissioned a particular user to upload a video that, unbeknownst to the service, turned out to be infringing. A court might conclude that the service exerted a “substantial influence” over that instance of infringement and, if the service earned a direct financial benefit from it, there would be grounds for denying the safe harbor for a claim based on that video. But it would make no sense to thereby disqualify the service provider from DMCA protection across the board—even for countless other videos whose posting it did not control or from which it earned no benefit.

Likewise, consider a search engine eligible for protection under the section 512(d) safe harbor for linking to infringing material online. If one of the millions of links provided by the search engine pointed users to infringing material that had been authored by the search engine itself and that users were charged to view, a finding of control plus financial benefit might be warranted for that particular link. But, again, there would be no plausible basis for categorically depriving the service of the safe harbor for the millions of unrelated links it delivers to material that it does not control or financially benefit from.

Last summer, in an effort to strike the right balance between government transparency and the protection of critical intelligence activities, the government declassified four statements concerning its activities pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) Amendments Act of 2008. Not content with that disclosure, Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF” or “Plaintiff”) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request seeking additional information related to two of the declassified statements, specifically, that on at least one occasion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) “held that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” and that “on at least one occasion the FISA Court has reached th[e ] conclusion” that “the government’s implementation of Section 702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law.”

The government has determined that disclosure of the information withheld from Plaintiff could result in exceptionally grave and serious damage to the national security. Plaintiff obviously cannot contend otherwise. The Court accordingly should defer to the government’s determination in this case, uphold the Department’s withholdings, and grant this motion.

Yet, as the amicus brief points out, the OLC’s opinions aren’t some intermediary step toward establishing the final legal interpretations for the executive branch. In general, they are the final legal interpretations for the executive branch. The FBI could choose to exercise the authority that the OLC said it had — or not — but Congress, the judiciary and the public at large all deserve to know what the executive branch thinks it can do, once it issues a conclusive opinion.

Two key memos outlining the Justice Department's views about when Americans can be surreptitiously tracked with GPS technology are being kept secret by the department despite a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the ACLU to force their release. The FBI’s general counsel discussed the existence of the two memos publicly last year, yet the Justice Department is refusing to release them without huge redactions. 

The word "see" is obviously some sort of joke because there's absolutely nothing to "see" here, unless you consider To, From and Subject fields to be the "smoking gun." Oh, and this one paragraph that leads into 56 straight pages of black ink.

In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of location data generated by a GPS tracking device surreptitiously affixed to a car without court authorization and monitored continuously over a 28-day period.

The Justice Department's unfortunate decision leaves Americans with no clear understanding of when we will be subjected to tracking — possibly for months at a time — or whether the government will first get a warrant. This is yet another example of secret surveillance policies — like the Justice Department's secret opinions about the Patriot Act's Section 215 — that simply should not exist in a democratic society.

[The] second memoranda [sic] is going to be about guidance about what this means for other types of techniques, beyond GPS, because there's no reason to think that this is going to just end with GPS and some of that is going to be very much a judgment call.

Simple economics makes clear that, if patent protection for software were curtailed, the adverse consequences would be swift and severe. With less profit to capture from the commercialization of the fruits of research and development, businesses would divert their resources into other ventures, and software development would suffer. That would have a ripple effect on productivity across the entire economy. Advanced software allows factory workers to be more precise, cars more fuel efficient, and healthcare more effective. Any new obstacles to software development would carry a penalizing multiplier effect that could threaten the continued technological advantage of the United States. For these reasons, “[d]iscrimination against a form of innovation that is increasingly critical to technological advancement, indeed that in many areas dominates technological advancement, makes no sense.”

Academics, experts, consumer groups, Internet freedom organizations, libraries, educational institutions, patients and access to medicines groups have flown a long way from around the world to Auckland, New Zealand, to engage with delegates in the 15th round of Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.

For the first time, however, we have been locked out of the entire venue, except for a single day out of the 10 days of negotiations. This not only alienates us as members of public interest groups, but also the hundreds of thousands of innovators, educators, patients, students, and Internet users who have sent messages to government representatives expressing their concerns with the TPP. All of us oppose the complete unjustifiable secrecy around the negotiations, but more importantly, the IP provisions that could potentially threaten our rights, and innovation.

These new physical restrictions on us are reflective of the ongoing lack of transparency that has plagued the TPP negotiations from the very beginning.

Attached is the quotation recently provided to the SD Sheriff's CID team. They visited Datron's facility and experienced the system with all three cameras and left with a flashdrive full of personal footage and a new found purpose for submitting their wish-list early. Use this quote as a reference point for configuring your system. With this we should be able to tailor an ideal system for your needs and gain marketing support for 'special pricing' specifically for Seattle PD.

As is true in most states, California's public records law provides that documents related to equipment purchases are matters of public record unless exempted by statute. Accordingly, the San Diego County Sheriff and other public agencies have the latitude to justify denial of public records requests, but not to "deny comment" when faced with such a request.

But public records law puts the burden of evidence not on those who seek disclosure, but on those who would keep them from public view. Evidence Code section 1040 of California's disclosure law, which the San Diego County Sheriff's office has invoked as a basis for its denial, provides that public agencies may refuse to disclose official information in the case that such disclosure "is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice."

The onus is on the Sheriff to demonstrate how releasing the documents sought by MuckRock would injure the public interest.

.... these materials will certainly assist him to learn what steps, if any, the government took to inform the court of the scope of its planned seizure and related execution of search warrants. They would also show any plan provided by the government or the court in the warrant materials for minimization to protect innocent users before the seizure or to segregate the data after seizure. Federal judges increasingly impose detailed conditions prior to execution of computer searches.... For example, Judge Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit has observed that if the government refuses to forswear the ability to retain or use data that should have been segregated initially, the judge “should order that the seizable and non-seizable data be separated by an independent third party under the supervision of the court, or deny the warrant altogether.” .... Unsealing will allow Mr. Goodwin, as well as the general public, to learn which, if any, such conditions were undertaken in this case.

Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment people have a right to be secure in their “papers” and “effects” against unreasonable searches and seizures. A person's “effects” may be the subject of Fourth Amendment protection even where there is no particular privacy or liberty interest.... A property seizure occurs when a governmental intrusion meaningfully interferes with an individual's possessory interest.... The Fourth Amendment analysis, in turn, requires the Court to determine whether the seizure was “reasonable.” Gaining access to the materials that served as a basis for the government’s seizure of his property can assist Mr. Goodwin and other innocent Megaupload users in determining whether the seizure was unreasonable.

The public also has a strong interest in understanding the government process in executing search warrants on cloud computing servers that contain innocent third-party property. Seizures of domain names, and resulting searches of related servers, are tools the government is using with increasing frequency in criminal copyright enforcement actions. For example, the federal government has reportedly seized more than 800 websites so far under its Operation in our Sites campaign. The government has issued press releases and otherwise sought to publicize its efforts, obviously giving its own perspective on its actions. Legislators, the media, and the public are vigorously debating the very issue of these domain name seizures and related searches, even as a large percentage of Americans continue to use cloud computing services. Access to judicial records would ensure a more accurate and informed public debate, rather than one informed merely by the government’s press releases

[District Court Judge Jeremy] Fogel said that it isn't clear that EFF has met the high burden of showing that Universal exhibited "subjective bad faith."

EFF would have to show that there's no way the video was not fair use, first of all. In addition, EFF lawyers would have to show "there was some concerted activity on Universal's part to blind itself to that fact—that even knowing they had nothing to stand on with regards to fair use, they put out a takedown." Even if EFF could show that Universal Music acted recklessly or with negligence—that wouldn't be enough.

The amount of damages EFF is fighting for is tiny, in the grand scheme of things. And Fogel also expressed skepticism that EFF could ask for much in damages. He has already limited the amount they can ask for. EFF is asking for compensation for 10 hours of Lenz's time, spent dealing with the takedown notice before she contacted EFF, based on the Pennsylvania minimum wage at the time of $6.25 per hour. They're also asking for compensation $1,275 for the time that EFF attorneys spent advising her pre-suit.

Despite the fact that not much money can be won, in an interview with Ars, [EFF's Corynne] McSherry said that the principle is still important, so that content owners will pause before they shoot out takedown requests.

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The stakeholder engagement events in the morning were followed by a stakeholder briefing in the afternoon. The briefing allowed registered individuals from civil society and the public to ask questions of and make comments to eight out of the nine negotiators who represent a TPP country. The press was barred from the room. Roughly 25 people rose from the audience to ask questions to the trade delegates during the 90-minute briefing period. As predicted, they were not transparent about the talks, revealed little new information, and delegates also refused to make any comments based on leaked version of texts—the only text EFF and other public interest organizations have had access to. It is difficult for public stakeholders to ask accurate questions or receive any substantive answers when the content of the agreement continues to be shrouded in secrecy.

Rossini asked the USTR about its claims that the TPP’s intellectual property chapter will provide for fair use in its IP chapter, and how those public statements starkly contrast with the recent leaked TPP chapter that shows that the US delegation is in fact pushing for provisions that will restrict non-US countries from enacting fair use. Further, they neglected to comment on the fact that the leaked test has the potential to limit US fair use to the three-step test restrictions. In response, the lead negotiator for the USTR dodged the question and stated that they would not comment on issues raised by text EFF has “purportedly” received. The representative did acknowledge that fair use would be discussed during the week's meetings.

The last question of the briefing came from EFF’s International Intellectual Property Coordinator, Maira Sutton, who raised from the crowd and asked the lead negotiator how they justify pushing for ever more restrictive copyright laws in the agreement even though it has become clear, with the defeat of ACTA in Europe, that users are sick and tired of international agreements regulating their Internet through overprotective intellectual property provisions... In response, the lead negotiator for the US stated that the standard for copyright regulation in international agreements has been the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). They claimed that the DMCA was legislated fairly and is an effective model for copyright enforcement in the US. The representatives' answer contradicted the fact that EFF and others have been arguing for years that the DMCA is fraught with problems. Sutton responded that based upon what we saw in the recent leaked text on fair use, developing countries would not be able to implement such copyright laws as soundly given that the three-step test language restricts signatory nations from determining and establishing fair use as they see fit.

I asked him whether he stood by his presentation's claim that "TPP will result in 'kicking people off the Internet'" was a myth.

"It is," he said.

I showed him a printed-out copy of the section of the TPP leak that referred to "terminating specified accounts" of copyright infringers.

He visibly stiffened. "I'm not commenting on a leaked draft," he told me. "From what I know, the TPP framework would not force anyone off the Internet. I don't know anything about the TPP draft."

Had Schlesinger actually read the TPP, either the leaked chapter or the current draft? I can't say for sure. Legally, he can't have read the latter, because he's a federally registered lobbyist, which would bar him from seeing the text.

We just received an email from the USTR indicating that they are going to cut down the already inadequate 15-minute time allotment for our stakeholder presentation, to a mere eight minutes. In addition, they will all be held in four separate rooms. So not only will the presenters have barely any time to discuss their specific concerns with the agreement, it will literally be impossible for negotiators to attend all the presentations they would be interested in hearing since they will all be held simultaneously in different locations. Moreover, this entire round of negotiations will last 10 full days, and so it seems especially odd that they would need to cut down time for public participation this drastically.

Good evening,

You are confirmed for a stakeholder presentation slot on Sunday, September 9^th during TPP Round 14 Direct Stakeholder Engagement Forum.

Due to space constraints and an overwhelming showing of interest, we will have to limit presentation time to 8 minutes. Each presentation room will have a laptop, projector, and screen. If you would like to give a PowerPoint presentation, all you need to do is bring your presentation with you on a flash drive. No need to send to me ahead of time.
Please plan ahead so that your presentation fills the allotted time. We will have to stop you at the 8 minute mark in order to give every presenter an equal opportunity to make their presentation.

A schedule of presentations will be provided for you at the round. All presentations will be scheduled within the 11:00 am- 2:00 pm block, and take place in Potomac rooms A, B, C or D.

Thank you, again, for your participation. We value your input, and look forward to an on-going conversation regarding TPP.

Very best,

USTR

Instead of responding directly to that challenge and filing a motion to compel compliance in the way the Justice Department has responded to past challenges, government attorneys instead filed a lawsuit against the telecom, arguing that by refusing to comply with the NSL and hand over the information it was requesting, the telecom was violating the law, since it was “interfer[ing] with the United States’ vindication of its sovereign interests in law enforcement, counterintelligence, and protecting national security.”

They did this, even though courts have allowed recipients who challenge an NSL to withhold government-requested data until the court compels them to hand it over. The Justice Department argued in its lawsuit that recipients cannot use their legal right to challenge an individual NSL to contest the fundamental NSL law itself.

Jill Lesser, Executive Director of the Center for Copyright Information, told the Daily Dot that the repeated delays were because the coalition wanted an independent review from the American Arbitration Association.

She hinted that disagreement between the ISPs or the lobbying groups might have held up the process. Responding to a question about the delay, she wrote “members are all very involved in internal planning and review of the alert system, which has been and will continue to be a collaborative process.”

On appeal, Stone argues that the sanctions cannot be justified under Rules 26 and 45 or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the inherent power of the district court. He also contends that the attorneys ad litem lacked standing to bring the sanctions motion and are not the proper recipients of the attorneys’ fees awarded by the district court. Stone raises this last argument for the first time on appeal and raised the other arguments for the first time in his untimely motion in the district court to stay sanctions pending appeal, which was filed after this appeal was initiated. None of these arguments, thus, was preserved for purposes of appeal, nor does Stone contend they were. Accordingly, all the issues Stone raises on appeal have been waived....

Nonetheless, Stone asserted, at oral argument and for the first time, that this court can consider his arguments because his appeal is one of “extraordinary circumstances,” involving only “pure question[s] of law [in which] a miscarriage of justice would result from our failure to consider [them].” .... We conclude, however, that no miscarriage of justice will result from the sanctions imposed as a result of Stone’s flagrant violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the district court’s orders. Stone committed those violations as an attempt to repeat his strategy of suing anonymous internet users for allegedly downloading pornography illegally, using the powers of the court to find their identity, then shaming or intimidating them into settling for thousands of dollars--a tactic that he has employed all across the state and that has been replicated by others across the country.

The right that Liberty seeks to vindicate by its state law negligence claim – the imposition of liability on one who knowingly contributes to a direct infringement by another – already is protected by the Copyright Act under the doctrine of contributory infringement.

Liberty nevertheless argues that its negligence claim asserted here is not preempted because, as the Court understands the argument, the negligence claim rests on infringement by others whereas the Copyright Act provides a remedy only against a direct infringer. In light of the preceding discussion and the doctrine of contributory infringement – which Liberty’s memorandum ignores entirely – that position is untenable.

We're still not convinced it’s an agreement adequate for 21^st century society--especially in an environment where the public, Congress, and civil rights organizations are denied access to the treaty’s official text, while corporate representatives have full access to it. In a world where you can access the complete state code of Utah in Github to engage citizens in legislative drafting, secrecy and backroom deals are not exactly a 21^st century way to build the 21^st century society.

Carreon did not file his papers until June 30... By the time he filed them, he had been informed that the money already had been transferred.... At Inman’s request, his share of the money contributed to the BearLove campaign was sent by check to the American Cancer Society and the National Wildlife Fund, in equal amounts, on June 29.... As explained below, Carreon was aware at least as early as June 15 that the money was liable to be transferred at any time beginning June 26 and at all events no later than Monday July 2. He nevertheless made no effort even to file for a TRO until the close of business on June 28. And, while he notes that the ECF system was down at that time, he offers no explanation for not having sought to file his TRO application well before June 26 – which he knew to be the earliest date the money could have been transferred – so that the Court could have adjudicated it before the time period during which the money was due to be transferred began. Nor does he offer an explanation for having failed at least to bring the application to the Court’s attention by means other than ECF on Friday June 29.

The simple reason for that is that there never was an emergency here, or any serious threat to anyone or anything. Carreon’s application is gamesmanship. When Carreon filed his original complaint on June 15, he knew that funds would be disbursed within five business days of the close of the fundraising campaign, which was set for June 25. Indeed, on June 26, in conversation with Indiegogo’s counsel, he admitted that he was aware that the funds could be disbursed at any time between the time of that conversation and Monday July 2.... Yet Carreon waited nearly two weeks after filing his complaint to present the court with his TRO request at the eleventh hour. Had there been any threat of real harm, Carreon would have made this application with more than hours to spare

First, Carreon cannot demonstrate irreparable harm to anyone, and certainly not to himself. A temporary restraining order is a drastic remedy, intended to prevent the grave and irreversible consequences of some imminent event. Here, the only imminent event was the disbursement of just over $95,000 to the National Wildlife Fund and the American Cancer Society (not $200,000 as Carreon’s application mistakenly states), fulfilling Inman’s promise to donate the money to those organizations – the very outcome that Carreon claims to desire. Indiegogo will retain roughly $8,800 as a processing fee. Carreon’s total contribution was $10. Should it later be determined that any harm flowed from these events, that harm would be readily compensable with an award of monetary damages or restitution.

Second, Carreon has not demonstrated and cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. His claims against Indiegogo are barred by section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which protects from liability a provider of an interactive computer service that merely publishes information provided by another information content provider. And his claims under the Supervision of Trustees and Fundraisers for Charitable Purposes Act, Cal. Government Code sections 12580 et seq., are likewise barred because that statute does not create a private right of action that would afford Carreon standing to sue for its violation.

Plaintiff Charles Carreon’s application for a temporary restraining order... is notable as much for its lack of context as its lack of merit.

Likewise, the First Amendment does not permit the law to hold, as Mr. Carreon claims, that the phrase “Fuck Off” “cannot be lawfully associated with tax-exempt charitable solicitation in the State of California.”

LMH’s theory of liability cannot withstand even passing scrutiny. No matter how artfully pled, LMH’s claim sounds in, and is preempted by, copyright law. And as decades of copyright jurisprudence and legislation make clear, that body of law does not recognize a cause of action based on mere negligence. Accordingly, no court has ever found, or could ever find, that anyone has violated copyright law simply because another user of his or her Internet connection did so.

And that is a good thing. Every day cafes, airports, libraries, laundromats, schools and individuals operate “open” Wi-Fi routers, sharing their connection with neighbors and passers-by at no charge. Sometimes people use those connections for bad acts. Most of the time they don’t, and the world gets a valuable public service of simple, ubiquitous Internet access.

Creating a duty under tort law to prevent others from infringing copyright would drastically inhibit this activity, to the detriment of the general public and clear federal copyright and telecommunications policies promoting convenient, universal access to the Internet. Thus, manufacturing a new copyright cause of action based on negligence – which, make no mistake, is precisely what LMH asks the Court to do – would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

SB 6251 would effectively coerce, by threat of felony prosecution, online service providers to become censors of third-party users' content by threatening five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine per violation against anyone who knowingly publishes, disseminates or displays or anyone who “indirectly” “causes” the publication, dissemination, or display of content that contains an explicit or even “implicit” offer of any sexual contact for “something of value” in Washington if the content includes an image that turns out to be of a minor. Because of its expansive language (i.e., “indirectly” “causes”), the law could be applied not only to online classified ad services like Backpage.com but also to any web site that provides access to third-party content, including user comments, reviews, chats, and discussion forums, and to social networking sites, search engines, Internet service providers, and more. A law that takes such an overbroad approach is of serious concern to the Internet Archive, which aims to serve as a library for the Internet, and accordingly, houses more than 150 billion web pages archived since 1996.

The law expressly states that it is not a defense that the defendant did not know that the image was of a minor. Instead, to avoid prosecution, the defendant must obtain governmental or educational identification for the person(s) depicted in the post (notably, even if that ID does not contain a photograph). This means that service providers – no matter where headquartered or operated – may be asked to review each and every piece of third-party content accessible through their services to determine whether the content is an “implicit” ad for a commercial sex act in Washington, whether it includes a depiction of a person, and, if so, obtain and maintain a record of the person’s ID. These obligations would severely impede the practice of hosting third-party content online.