A more interesting question may be why they chose one, or why they weren't able to achieve both. Usually "choosing family over career" means "raising a child" in this topic. So, was adaquate child care available? If it was available, how expensive was it? Was any flexibility available from employers?
Was there *really* a choice, or was there only the appearance of a choice?
Way to play right into the copyright industry's hand, too.
If he actually gets the rights, and stops it from being performed, you know that the copyright groups will spin this to get termination rights revoked. Even though the informed will understand that this is an issue with copyright in general, all the focus will be on the termination rights.
Maybe I'm just paranoid, but the labels couldn't ask for an artist to do something more perfect for them on this issue. Is it a sham? Wheels within wheels, and all that.
The Five Eyes coalition can simply share domestic intelligence with each other, and have the Canadians data mine US citizen's information. While the US data mines Canadian information.
Sure, they can do that. But in order to datamine, they need a continuing source of the data. How would the Canadian/UK/Aus/NZ government force a US phone or Internet company to install monitoring systems within networks in the US?
Compounding that problem is that text messages don't always go through in near real-time. The (very large) building I work in has spots that have horrible reception. If someone sends me a message, sometimes I don't get it for a few minutes - plenty of time for me to walk out to my car and start driving.
Agree. The McDonald's coffee lawsuit is thoroughly misunderstood based on very early media stories. The temperature of the coffee was way above what even reasonably hot coffee should have been, and if I'm remembering right, left second degree burns after a very brief exposure. Since Techdirt normally likes to heap scorn on the media for leaving out very important details, it should not perpetuate myths even if they have become part of the cultural record.
Trust my encryption keys sitting on a server in Sealand? I think I'll pass.
Don't get me wrong, I'm all for a real data haven Cryptonomicon style, but Sealand isn't remotely close. (No UN recognition of soveriegnty, long track record of unstable "government", no independence in energy, finances, or even food supply makes that a no-go.)
All commonly used crypto algorithms can be broken in a handful of years, worst case, by anyone who has a moderately sized budget.
I don't think you understand the math involved here. To put it very simply, Moore's law has held pretty steady at doubling compute power (give or take) at 18 months to 2 years. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and say we can lower that to 1 year.
Q: What would a secure algorithm need to do to keep up with a doubling of computer power every year?
A: Add single bit to the key length each year. Instead of a 256-bit key, you'd need a 257-bit key.
Today, assume a 256-bit key encrypted with algorithm X takes 1 year to brute force.
A 512-bit key encrypted with the same algorithm will take the same amount of time (1 year) to brute force *over*250*years*from*now assuming yearly doubling of compute power.
For any serious modern crypto system, key lengths are much longer, and the algorithms are more robust.
Those "heat death of the universe" estimates are assuming naive brute-force encryption. In the real world, that is not how it's done.
And that's specifically why I qualified that statement with "so long as the algorithm is secure" - because modern techniques are to find a weakness in the algorithm or implementation of the system. If a flaw is discovered in the algorithm, all bets are off. If a flaw is discovered in the implementation, all bets are off (example: Android bitcoin wallet using stupid method to generate random numbers, story last week).
If you want a good example of the difference between attacking an algorithm, and attacking the implementation, head over to ArsTechnica and read up on their password cracking stories. All of that is attacking the implementation of how passwords are stored, and how people choose passwords. And yet, with the big password disclosures, there are still some fraction of the lists that remain uncracked - because those passwords cannot be predicted using the methods and would still take absurdly long lengths of time to crack trying every possibility.
Barring huge advances in quantum computers or large number factorization, they're fine from brute force decryption. So long as the algorithm is secure, we're talking heat death of the universe timescales with current and reasonably predictable CPU speed increases.
Of course, that still leave the door open for rubber-hose decryption (otherwise known as 'Tell us the key or we'll keep beating you with this rubber hose.'). Which they're half a step away from using if they're willing to detain people only tangentially related to the case.