We just wrote about Yahoo admitting to the world that it was done and cooked as an innovative company when it chose to threaten to sue Facebook over patents. Plenty of other commentators wrote similar stories. We've all seen this pattern before: Company that used to lead the market, but has become an also-ran, suddenly pops up with patents to sue the hot new thing. It's a sad statement of a company that just can't compete any more. However, in a really, really bizarre screed, hedge fund investor Eric Jackson seems to suggest there's a crazy conspiracy of hypocritical bloggers making these statements.

It should be noted that Jackson has a bit of a reputational stake here: four months ago, he specifically called on Yahoo to do exactly what it's doing now. So, now he seems to want to defend this turf, but his argument is bizarre and nonsensical. It starts off with a crazy conspiracy theory about how Silicon Valley bloggers have a special "clubby" relationship with VCs:

If you’re a blogger, you play nice to keep future sources happy (unless you’re someone like Kara Swisher and reached another level of appreciation/admiration). If you’re a VC, what makes your $10 million check more valuable than the next guy’s? Of course, you’re going to be nice. It’s all about access for these non-engineers. If you’ve been black-balled in Palo Alto – whether you’re a VC, blogger, or PR person — what advantage do you have?

Considering that I am a "Silicon Valley blogger" and have been around and doing this longer than anyone he mentions, I find this curious. I know it's become a popular talking point lately -- this supposed close relationship between VCs and bloggers -- but I seem to get by just fine without such relationships (yeah, I know some VCs, but I don't recall ever using one as a source, other than on information they stated publicly -- so not as a "scoop"). As for "what advantage" you have, if you don't have VCs feeding you information, that's a ridiculous question. Plenty of blogs have advantages in the community of readers they have and the analysis and insight they provide. Jackson seems to believe that the way a blogger can provide value is by being first. He's wrong.

He follows this up with an argument that doesn't make any sense at all -- something about the fact that new nominees to Yahoo's board are all from New York... and that means something crazy about the "negative reputational effects" it would have on anyone in Silicon Valley to serve on Yahoo's board. I have no idea what this means. I can't think of any negative reputational effect it could possibly have. He also mentions the "open secret among Silicon Valley elites that Yahoo! is in great need of reform." Wait. That's an "open secret"? How about it's not a secret at all. It's common sense to anyone who has watched Yahoo fade from glory and fail to actually keep up in the marketplace. Suggesting all this stuff about "open secrets," "Silicon Valley elites," and "reputational effects" just makes it sound like there's a conspiracy going on where there's none. Someone has hit the paranoia sauce hard.

What does all of this have to do with patents? I have no freaking idea. And neither does Jackson, who transitions with the grace of a rhinoceros ballerina, by simply switching to the patent question and insisting that this somehow "proves" the nonsense he just spouted.

But the vocal, nonsensical, and hypocritical response this morning to Yahoo! serving Facebook notice that it’s in violation of 10 - 20 key patents by several Silicon Valley watchers takes this clubbiness to new heights.

A bunch of veteran Silicon Valley observers, who know damn well what Yahoo's move is a sign of, isn't evidence of any "clubbiness." It's evidence that a bunch of people who know this space have seen this train wreck before. He then attempts to explain the "two big problems" with people pointing out that Yahoo's actions are a bad sign.

The merits of their assertion that anyone claiming intellectual property rights is somehow a “troll” and “not innovating.” When did we decide that IP is reprehensible? I missed that lesson at blogging school.

Er. It's not "blogging school." It's just Silicon Valley (and history) in general. We believe in innovating in the marketplace, not fighting in the courtrooms for the most part. A study last year suggested that somewhere between 70% and 80% of folks in Silicon Valley are generally distrustful of patents. I learned that by paying attention to reality. Not blogging school.

Should no company be able to “innovate” something without it immediately being copied by dozens of other firms? Is mass copycatting preferable to having rule of law saying someone should be able to come up with a new idea — as recognized by an impartial third party — and then have that idea protected for some period of time (not forever)?

Actually, there have been studies and research that suggest that despite Jackson's mocking rhetoric, indeed, yes, the ability to copycat is preferable to monopolies on ideas. Why? Because merely being a copycat isn't particularly effective. First movers have an advantage, and you win in the marketplace not by copying, but by out-innovating and providing something better. Even better, as others copy you and try to out innovate you, you get to learn from them too. And thus, innovation accelerates. That's a good thing.

If Sarah Lacy et al. find IP so reprehensible, I would ask them: are you arguing for Silicon Valley to be a place much closer to China where Internet firms can engage in mass copycatting immediately as a normal course of business? Is that what you want? Is that what your sources at Facebook, LinkedIn, Digg, and all the other great Web 2.0 companies of the future want?

It's already the normal course of business for the most part. We see copying happen all the time, and history has shown that's where much of Silicon Valley's innovative nature comes from. And I have no idea what the sources at these companies want -- but in general, yes, most of the folks I know in Silicon Valley seem to prefer to compete in the marketplace. I was at a roundtable of entrepreneurs not too long ago, meeting with some federal officials, discussing patents, and the officials seemed to expect that everyone would talk about the importance of more patents. Instead, every single entrepreneur talked about how patents were a distraction and a hindrance to their business. Multiple entrepreneurs talked about how they didn't care if people copied them, because they understood their own customers better and were already ahead in the market. Jackson seems to ignore all of this.

The obvious hypocrisy between these Valley-types criticizing Yahoo! and yet whistling past the Cupertino graveyard with Apple is what’s really galling to me. If all of you are so incensed by a company protecting its IP rights, why are you not picketing in front of Tim Cook‘s house? Hasn’t Apple pursued this line of defense/offense for its business most aggressively of anyone in the Valley?

Er... we've criticized Apple's patent strategy plenty and have done done so for years.

It goes back to clubbiness. One of the rules of the Valley is that no one criticizes Apple (or Google for that matter).

Geez. I guess all those blog posts above don't exist. And, honestly, that's just crazy talk. I know tons of "Silicon Valley bloggers" who criticize Apple (and "Google for that matter") all the time. Just for the hell of it, since all the links above are about Apple, here are some criticizing Google too, for "that matter."

Does Jackson even read the blogs he's slamming?

And for those saying that Yahoo! caved to Wall Street pressure to launch a patent fight now against Facebook prior to its IPO, this avoids looking at some key facts. Starting in 2005, Yahoo! began to make a concerted effort to develop its patent portfolio. According to PatentVest, Yahoo! was granted 20 patents in 2002 by the US PTO, 50 in 2006, 80 in 2008, 300 in 2010, and 325 in 2011. One of the key IP lawyers at Yahoo! in 2006 left the company shortly thereafter to take a more senior job at Google doing the same thing.

All companies in Silicon Valley recognized this trend and began investing in protecting their IP starting in 2006. Yahoo! was one of many doing this. When Yahoo! began growing its portfolio, it was before anyone realized Facebook was going to be the size it is today. Of course, Yahoo! famously tried to buy Facebook for $1 billion in 2006 — which was seen as an outlandish number to pay at the time by the blogosphere.

This is a convenient rewriting of history. While he's right that many companies in Silicon Valley started investing heavily in obtaining patents around that time, it wasn't to use them as an offensive weapon -- but as a defensive weapon against silly lawsuits from dying companies... like what we're seeing with Yahoo today.

Which brings us to today. Yahoo! has a case against Facebook. It might have cases against others in the future. Yahoo!’s owned by its shareholders – not the clubby bloggers of Silicon Valley.

Let the bloggers do what they need to do to protect their self-interests. Yahoo! will do the same.

But that's the thing: this strategy never works. That's what the bloggers were saying. Because we've seen it. The companies that start suing more nimble, more successful competitors over patents, always end up failing in the long run. That's why it's a clear indicator of a company that's done innovating. Breaking out the "sue over patents" folder is a key sign of a company that knows it can't compete. Because when you can beat the competition by innovating, suing over patents is always seen as a waste of time.

Shareholders in Yahoo -- and Jackson admits that he is one -- may get some short term benefits, if it happens to get a chunk of cash from some company, but when a company that fits Yahoo's profile starts suing over patents, it's a clear, clear sign that it's time to short that stock. The company has given up.

And I'm still wondering when I get invited into this supposed "club."

It appears that the same arguments that many of us have been fighting for many, many years are suddenly playing themselves out again in the National Review Online. It started with a really fantastic article by Reihan Salam and Patrick Ruffini arguing that legislating to deal with "piracy" doesn't work and is the wrong approach anyway, because innovating and providing better solutions simply works better. If you're a regular Techdirt reader, you won't be surprised by the Salam/Ruffini piece -- it hits on many of the key points we've raised. However, it is nicely packaged up in a single article that should be required reading for anyone trying to understand why fighting piracy through legislation is the wrong approach.

In response, Robert VerBruggen, an associate editor at the National Review decided to write a rebuttal that isn't so much a rebuttal at all. As Tim Lee rightly points out, the two sides appear to be arguing totally different things. Salam and Ruffini are pointing out that enforcement isn't working (and isn't workable), while also leading to collateral damage. But, at the same time, innovating and providing solutions that people want do seem to work -- and create new opportunities for content creators and consumers alike. VerBruggen, on the other hand, is pulling out the famed "but... but... piracy!" argument we've seen too often -- as if the fact that "piracy exists" suddenly makes all logic pointless. As Lee notes:

VerBruggen responds by insisting that piracy is wrong. He’s right, but this doesn’t get him as far as he thinks it does. This isn’t just an abstract exercise in moral philosophy. The government has limited resources, and a long list of problems to deal with. The question isn’t “should the government try to stop piracy,” it’s “how many resources should the government devote to combatting piracy as opposed to other problems.”

And VerBruggen never really grapples with this question. He seems to believe that the right amount of enforcement is more than we already have, but he doesn’t offer any principled basis for deciding how much more, or how to tell when we’ve passed the point of diminishing returns. Without such a principle, we’re just going to have this debate over and over again, as each new anti-piracy measure fails and Hollywood comes back for still more restrictions.

This is a key point, and I don't know if VerBruggen is just new to this debate and therefore trotting out silly, long-dead tropes because he doesn't know any better -- or if that's just the best the "other side" can do these days. Either way, I wanted to dig a bit deeper into a few of VerBruggen's really questionable claims.

When brick-and-mortar bookstores complain about the threat they face from Amazon.com, they are complaining that customers will leave them for a superior alternative; when Hollywood complains about piracy, they are complaining that customers have left them for an illegal alternative. They have stopped paying for Hollywood products yet are still consuming them. These are not even remotely similar situations — morally, legally, or economically.

VerBruggen says this as if "an illegal alternative" and "a superior alternative" are mutually exclusive. They're not. And that's the issue. History has shown, time and time again, that infringement is a way for consumers to express that they're not satisfied with the official versions and have found "a superior alternative." That the said alternative is "illegal" is an issue, but it doesn't necessarily mean that the best response is a legal one. Why VerBruggen makes these assumptions is unclear.

With this distinction in mind, one might find it rather odd for Salam and Ruffini to insist that the solution to piracy is “innovation” rather than law enforcement. By “innovation,” they mean primarily that Hollywood should make it easier and cheaper for customers to buy their content digitally, citing studies indicating that when digital content becomes readily available through legal channels, piracy goes down. But even assuming Hollywood can discourage piracy by cutting prices and offering its content in different ways, since when do we tell crime victims to appease their tormenters?

As far as I can tell, this is the craziest part of VerBruggen's argument. It is, effectively, "so what if everyone can be better off by innovating out of this mess, this is wrong wrong wrong!" As we've pointed out for years, if you have a solution where everyone is better off, there is no moral argument. It seems silly to be arguing what VerBruggen seems to be arguing, that it's more moral to have everyone worse off with no piracy, than to have everyone better off with some piracy. It just doesn't add up.

Moreover, in no other industry do we allow consumers to force prices down by taking products for free whenever they, personally, think the legal versions are too expensive or inconvenient. Any customer may refuse to buy a product that’s undesirable, or even organize a boycott — but then that customer needs to go without the product.

The problem here is easy to spot. It's in the word "take." That's not what's happening here. The truth is that, as in every other industry, consumers force down prices by finding "a superior alternative" as he suggested earlier. Taking implies something is directly taken from the creator and they no longer have it. That's simply not true.

Salam and Ruffini provide no justification for singling out industries that sell intellectual property — and little evidence that these industries’ disproportionately young, bratty, and entitled consumers are better equipped than the free market to decide what a “fair” price is for an album or movie that cost thousands or even millions of dollars to create and market.

I won't even bother discussing the fact that he appears to be calling the industry's customers, who they're supposed to be trying to win over, as "young, bratty and entitled," and just focusing on his bizarre definition of "free market." He seems to miss that this is the free market. Setting up a centralized government-granted set of artificial monopolies over non-rivalrous, non-excludable goods is a price restriction on a free market. A "fair price" is what the actual market sets -- and that means the market of everyone, not just the customers that VerBruggen likes.

For starters, while making content widely available for low prices does seem to reduce piracy, it hardly eliminates it.

Er. Enforcement and new laws every two years has hardly eliminated it either -- in fact, it's been shown to increase the rate of piracy. So, I'm at a complete loss here. If VerBruggen is arguing that the only proper solution is the one that "eliminates" infringement, well, then he's living in a fantasy land, because no such solution exists. The argument that Ruffini and Salam made (which is backed up with pretty significant evidence) is that innovating and providing "a superior alternative" does a better job to reduce piracy than enforcement (which doesn't appear to work at all beyond an initial hit until people scramble and find alternatives). Again, we're back to VerBruggen basing his entire argument on "piracy is wrong wrong wrong," without taking into account what his preferred solution actually does compared to Salam and Ruffini's alternative.

Spotify’s payment formulas are not public, but various leaks indicate that on average, artists and labels are paid around one-third of one cent every time a user listens to (“streams”) a song. By way of comparison, artists and labels make 70 cents when a song is purchased for 99 cents from iTunes. Thus, a user has to listen to a song on Spotify more than 200 times before earning ad revenue for the artist and label that’s equivalent to a sale.

Comparing a Spotify play to an iTunes purchase is meaningless, because they're not the same thing by any stretch of the imagination. I mean, why not compare Spotify to radio? In some ways, that may be more comparable. In the US, musicians get paid a big fat nothing for radio plays. Yet, somehow, it's been pretty damn important for artists to get on radio. Because it helps them make money elsewhere. Looking at Spotify in isolation misses the point... but VerBruggen does that again and again:

But piracy does “put pressure on profit margins,” as Salam delicately put it on National Review Online recently. By one estimate, per capita, inflation-adjusted spending on recorded music has fallen 64 percent since its peak in the late 1990s, and is lower today than at any time since at least 1973, despite the fact that every other person you pass on the street is wearing earbuds.

Again, he's looking at one small aspect of the music business in isolation: how much is spent on recorded music. But he leaves out every other aspect of the music business -- including things like live -- which has grown at an incredible rate over the same time. More importantly, he leaves out that artists earn a larger chunk of revenue from live than they do from recorded music sales -- most of which go to the labels, not the artists. Why focus on that anyway? It's like complaining that automobiles are terrible for transportation because fewer buggy whips are selling. When you have dumb metrics, you're going to get silly results.

The numbers change little when one uses total rather than per capita revenue, and home-video sales are falling as well.

Oh come on. Home video wouldn't even exist if Hollywood had its way and banned the VCR 30 years ago, so I'm sorry if I find complaints about the home video market shrinking as evidence of a problem. As we saw with the VCR, new markets develop, and they seem to develop against Hollywood's own wishes -- and then become a huge revenue driver for Hollywood. The best solution, if we look historically, is to get Hollywood out of the way and just let those new models develop to save Hollywood from itself.

That in itself should be troubling to anyone who thinks the profit motive matters — with less profit, presumably, will come less creative output.

Thing is, we don't need to "presume" anything. We have data. And the data shows that more music is being created and released and monetized than ever before. And the data shows that more films are being created and released and monetized than ever before. You can presume all you want until the cows come home, but if reality says you're wrong, it's difficult to take those presumptions seriously.

As commentator Eduardo Porter noted in the New York Times, while the total number of music-album releases rose between 2005 and 2010, releases of albums that sold at least 1,000 copies — a rather low standard by which to judge whether an artist is making a significant contribution to the world of recorded music — declined about 40 percent. Of course, like Salam and Ruffini’s, Porter’s data are highly debatable — he relies on the Nielsen sales database, which excludes some independent releases and does not count sales of single songs.

It doesn't just exclude "some" independent releases. It excludes tens of thousands (potentially hundreds of thousands) of independent releases. If you just look at TuneCore and CDBaby alone, you'd realize how silly relying on SoundScan is as a proxy. And, once again, this is only looking at "recorded music" sales in isolation. The fact that fewer albums sold 1,000 copies ignores the massive explosion of new music (which just paragraphs earlier, VerBruggen "presumed" was impossible), meaning that there's a ton more competition. Furthermore, it ignores that recorded music is not the main way that many artists monetize these days, and looking at it in isolation is pretty pointless. Finally, many of those artists who sold less than 1000 albums would have made a big fat $0 under the old system, because no major label would have bothered with them and they wouldn't have had any other outlet. Aren't we all (including, most importantly, the musicians) better off in a world where a whole bunch of artists get to make something rather than nothing? But, again, the "but... but... piracy!" argument blinds VerBruggen to this reality.

The finer points of entertainment economics aside, if widespread and increasingly popular illegal behavior is costing American companies business, and possibly reducing artists’ creative output, it is first and foremost a law-enforcement problem, not an “innovation” problem. It is entirely reasonable for Hollywood to petition the government for better anti-piracy efforts, even if the industry has lobbied for bad legislation in the past.

Almost nothing in this paragraph is supported by... anything. If law enforcement doesn't work, how is this possibly a law enforcement problem? This is yet another example of someone trying to be right rather than realistic. It's a recipe for disaster, but it's the same recipe that the legacy entertainment industry has been cooking up for decades to no effect. Who would ever double down on that strategy?

Some of you youngsters may not remember what really kicked off the big "net neutrality" fight over the past few years. It was back in 2005, when then AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre suggested that internet companies should pay a second time to reach users. This was particularly nefarious. What Whitacre was suggesting was actually that AT&T get to double charge everyone. That's because the way it was (and still) is that everyone pays for their own bandwidth -- including the big internet services like Google. However, the way Whitacre was describing it, the bandwidth you got only paid for half the transit. That is, you only paid for your bandwidth from your premise to "the cloud" but not back out to any end machine. That that bandwidth was paid for by whoever owns those end machines was entirely ignored. So the plan was not just that Google would pay for its own bandwidth, but that Google would also pay for your bandwidth to get Google to your computer (ignoring that you already paid for it).

That didn't go over so well with people, and got particularly ridiculous when Mike McCurry, running an AT&T lobbying effort, insisted that Google didn't pay a dime for its bandwidth. For rather obvious reasons, he refused my proposition that he agree to pay Google's bandwidth bills.

Either way, it appears that the brilliant minds at AT&T have been trying to devise a new way to present such a plan that doesn't leave them so open to charges of being greedy double chargers -- and they may have found it by focusing on the mobile world, with their new love of "tiered" and "capped" plans that limit how much bandwidth you actually get. What they're going to do is charge app makers a fee to offer their services to you in a way that the data doesn't count against your cap. They describe it as an "800 number for the mobile internet."

"A feature that we're hoping to have out sometime next year is the equivalent of 800 numbers that would say, if you take this app, this app will come without any network usage," Donovan said on the sidelines of a mobile-industry conference here. It's far from clear how willing technology companies would be to pay wireless carriers for data use. Mr. Donovan said there was interest from companies who could use the feature to drum up new business from customers wary of using data-heavy services like mobile video.

This is nefariously brilliant. People associate 800 numbers with toll-free phone calls, so it's kind of like that... except it isn't anything like that at all. It's just a way to get companies to pay for the data connection you're already paying for. But the end result is exactly like what Whitacre wanted five years ago: get the app providers to pay double for bandwidth. Karl Bode summarizes the whole ridiculous plan as only he can (via that link above):

The end result is the same, with AT&T imposing bizarre tolls on content companies to obtain preferred customer status, picking winners and losers while retaining power in the wireless ecosystem.

It's an idea we're sure AT&T will pitch as a cost-saving endeavor for consumers, but given this is AT&T, you'd be naive to think cost savings will be in the equation. You'll still pay the same data rates, content companies will now just pay a fee to obtain preferred "reduced cap impact" status, then pass the higher development costs on to you. It's a ridiculous and dangerous idea, and the fallout will likely be similar to AT&T's "free ride" comments. AT&T executives either don't care how bad these ideas make them look, or don't realize it thanks to too many isolated meetings at headquarters packed with telco-think yes men.

Eventually you start to think that AT&T executives should just stop thinking before they hurt someone or themselves. If AT&T put half as much energy into running a top-flight network with quality support as they did cooking up hare-brained troll toll schemes -- they might just stop coming in last place in all major customer satisfaction studies.

This is really just another reason why the telcos are pushing so hard to move users into unnecessary tiered plans -- because they can't pull off scams like this on unlimited data plans nearly as easily.