Just the other day, I told you the story of some immature and racist apps in Google's Play store. In that post, I discussed how the kind of speech that offends is truly a barometer of exactly how free we want speech to be. It's one thing to embrace free speech that suits us, but it is every bit our duty to protect speech that does not suit us as well, because it is the ideal of free speech we are protecting, not the speech with which we disagree. The only other option, of course, is to become a society less permissible of speech. True, that society may yield a lower amount of speech the majority finds offensive, but what else gets caught in the drain-trap that shouldn't have? We remind one another all the time that private companies like Google aren't under obligation to the 1st Amendment and free speech, but we still have that ideal that permeates our society and so some of us choose to embrace the more open and permissible environments because we believe more information, data, and culture is always better and we'll deal with the annoyances that come along with it. Others choose to embrace the Apple App store, which gives you a wonderful idea of exactly what happens when speech and culture become more constricted.

Take one recent example: Apple's rejection of an gaming app based on the war in Syria, created to help educate others about exactly what is occurring there. The game was rejected based on Apple's not allowing apps that "solely target a specific race, culture, a real government or corporation or any other real entity".

"This decision is a shame really as it makes it hard to talk about the real world," said designer Tomas Rawlings.

"We had hoped that Apple would be more nuanced in how they applied this rule but we got a bit worried when it had been in submission for around two weeks without a decision - we then figured that because of the controversy of using the gaming medium to cover an ongoing war meant passing the game had become an issue for them."

Rawlings insists there is nothing actually offensive in the game and notes that the response from those that got their hands on it has been generally positive. From what I can tell, the game is essentially a quick scenario decision making game told from the Syrian rebels point of view. It incorporates real world news items and events and allows the player to decide how to handle them. There's no deragatory name-calling. No over the top violence. But because they mention a "real government", it's out.

And that's exactly the problem with a less permissible garden like Apple's app store. Sure, in Google's garden (or the wider open internet, for that matter) you will occasionally have to ignore a few weeds, but you get the full spectrum of flowers to enjoy. Apple's garden may have less weeds, but they have less flowers, and the choice over which flowers you see isn't up to you. That's not the system I want to embrace.

Senator Joe Lieberman may finally be out of the Senate, but his "legacy" lives on. Over the years, we've noted that he's regularly sought to censor technology that terrorists use, on the ridiculous theory that censorship somehow makes the terrorists disappear. One of his campaigns, way back in 2008, was to force YouTube to magically censor videos from terrorists. After putting a lot of public pressure on YouTube, the company caved. And... as a result of that, it recently shut down the video channel of an important Syrian watchdog organization which had been posting video evidence of atrocities occurring in that country. YouTube has apologized and reinstated the channel, but this is what happens when you encourage censorship. It is impossible not to have it lead to censoring important speech.

YouTube sent the Observatory an email on Sunday that said its channels "syrianhro" and "almrsd" had "violated the policy of the site by publishing shocking and offensive videos," the Britain-based watchdog said.

The Observatory, which disseminates graphic videos on YouTube of atrocities from the bloody civil war the UN says has killed more than 60,000 people, condemned the closure.

"This is the second time in two months that the site administration has closed the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights channel," it said in a statement, in reference specifically to almrsd.

Of course, if we're to take Lieberman's theory to its logical conclusion, so long as no one can see the atrocities in Syria, we can all pretend they haven't happened, right?

After the internet was almost entirely cut off in Syria last week, it came back over the weekend, and people are still puzzling through exactly what happened. The government keeps trying to blame others, such as attacks by those fighting against government forces. However, an analysis by Cloudflare has made it clear that it's almost certain that the government was behind the shut down:

To begin, all connectivity to Syria, not just some regions, has been cut. The exclusive provider of Internet access in Syria is the state-run Syrian Telecommunications Establishment. Their network AS number is AS29386. The following network providers typically provide connectivity from Syria to the rest of the Internet: PCCW and Turk Telekom as the primary providers with Telecom Italia and TATA for additional capacity. When the outage happened, the BGP routes to Syrian IP space were all simultaneously withdrawn from all of Syria's upstream providers. The effect of this is that networks were unable to route traffic to Syrian IP space, effectively cutting the country off the Internet.

Syria has 4 physical cables that connect it to the rest of the Internet. Three are undersea cables that land in the city of Tartous, Syria. The fourth is an over-land cable through Turkey. In order for a whole-country outage, all four of these cables would have had to been cut simultaneously. That is unlikely to have happened.

Furthermore, they note that the shutdown was quite systematic, suggesting "this was done through updates in router configurations, not through a physical failure or cable cut."

Meanwhile, the folks at Renesys look into just how difficult it is to cut a country off from the internet, and whether other countries are at risk of the same sort of thing. Basically, it comes down to how decentralized the internet is in various countries -- and in many countries there isn't much decentralization. As Renesys notes, some countries have just one or two telcos who handle all internet traffic to and from the world. Those countries are easy to cut off. Renesys helpfully provides a map: They then go into more details. Here are the two bullet points on the more at risk countries. If you want to learn about the somewhat more safe countries, click on over and read their full post (which has a much bigger discussion on all of this, which I highly recommend):

• If you have only 1 or 2 companies at your international frontier, we classify your country as being at severe risk of Internet disconnection. Those 61 countries include places like Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkmenistan, Libya, Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, and Yemen.
  

• If you have fewer than 10 service providers at your international frontier, your country is probably exposed to some significant risk of Internet disconnection. Ten providers also seems to be the threshold below which one finds significant additional risks from infrastructure sharing — there may be a single cable, or a single physical-layer provider who actually owns most of the infrastructure on which the various providers offer their services. In this category, we place 72 countries, including Oman, Benin, Botswana, Rwanda, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uganda, Armenia, and Iran. Disconnection wouldn't be trivial, but it wouldn't be all that difficult. Egypt falls into this category as well; it took the Mubarak government several days to hunt down and kill the last connections, but in the end, the blackout succeeded.

As the internet is increasingly a global phenomenon, this kind of stuff matters a lot.

Earlier this summer, we wrote about Syria briefly deleting itself from the internet. We wondered about the logic behind this, seeing as other countries who attempted this -- namely, Egypt and Libya -- had regime change follow quite closely after such a decision. Furthermore, not too long ago, reports were that the Syrian government was trying to use the internet to get its own story out. Of course, a lot has happened in Syria in the interim. So perhaps views have changed.

Reports came out quickly today that the Syrian internet went almost entirely offline. Renesys, who reported this first, also provides some striking graphics on the situation:
I can't imagine this strategy will be particularly successful.

Police and security forces around the world -- and that includes in the West -- hate being recorded when they're overstepping the mark in the execution of their duties, since it allows the public to challenge official accounts, and even to use videos to seek redress. But there's one thing worse than being recorded, and that's being livestreamed: even the most nimble authorities can't confiscate the recording from its creator, since it's already been uploaded for the world to see.

No wonder, then, that the livestreaming app Bambuser has become one of the most popular -- and potent -- weapons for activists to deploy against heavy-handed policing, allowing them to fight back in a non-violent way against institutional brutality around the world. But the inevitable corollary is that powerful as it is, Bambuser is now seen as a threat in itself. Last year, the Egyptian government blocked Bambuser, and this worrying tweet from the official Bambuser account, suggests that the Syrian authorities are going even further in their crackdown on the service:

We just got this: "secret police arrested a person because he had bambuser application on his mobile" Disgusting to hear! #Assad

No more is known about the fate of that activist, but it's a disturbing turn of events when just the presence of a piece of general software on your phone is grounds for arrest. Of course, it would be relatively easy to disguise that app with a fake name and icon, but it won't take police long to move on to the next stage and try opening up apps to see what they do. And in any case, anyone actually using Bambuser or similar streaming tools to record police and security force actions now knows that they are in danger.

This shows that the theory that turning everyone into citizen journalists to broadcast what's happening, as it's happening, will give activists new tools to fight against oppressive regimes is fine -- until the mere possession of those tools is enough to get you arrested.

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As various uprisings have occurred in the middle east, we've seen the regimes in Egypt and Libya try disconnecting the entire country from the internet, after realizing that opposition forces were making use of the internet to coordinate. In neither case did it prevent regime change soon afterwards. Soon after the situation with Egypt, we noted that Syria was actually trying to go in the opposite direction, trying to make use of the internet to communicate its own story... and to keep track of protestors. Of course, in the year plus since then, the situation in Syria has obviously gotten significantly worse and more contentious. And... late last week, it was noted that Syria appeared to remove itself from the internet for about 40 minutes. It was brief, but it at least suggests that someone in the government is toying with the idea of shutting off the internet. Of course, given the two examples of how well that's worked so far, it probably doesn't bode well for Syria's leadership.

One of the bizarre issues that came out after Wikileaks began releasing its treasure trove of US State Department cables, was this suggestion from the US government that Wikileaks was clearly an anti-US organization. However, as has been pointed out time and time again, it's not: it's an anti-secrecy organization. You can agree or disagree with that position, but the various attempts to brand Wikileaks and Julian Assange as particularly anti-American (and to even look to use Espionage Act claims against them) always seemed misguided. With the latest release of millions of Syrian government emails, it makes you wonder if those same people who were complaining about the organization being anti-American are now also complaining about it being "anti-Syrian."

Randomly, this can't be particularly surprising when, as we noted a few months ago, some hackers had worked out that a large number of high level government officials in Syria used 12345 as their email password.

Well, this is rather incredible. With the news that Anonymous hacked the offices of the Syrian President and dumped a ton of emails online... comes the news that the hack was insanely easy. Why? Because, apparently, the password was 12345. No joke. Of course, that's considered one of the worst passwords of all time. And, as pointed out by Lauren Weinstein, this is the exact same password that was immortalized by Dark Helmet (the original one, rather than our local Techdirt hero) as being the stupidest password he's ever heard -- and the "kind of thing an idiot would have on his luggage!"

After social networking played a role in the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, we found it interesting that Syria lifted a ban on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube that had been in place for many years. The government claimed that it wanted to show that it encouraged openness and expression, though some found that hard to believe. Indeed, as things have gotten worse in that country, there were reports a few weeks ago of a massive attempt by the government to swipe passwords on Facebook. Further reports are now claiming that either with swiped passwords or by forcing arrested dissidents to cough up their own passwords, the Syrian government has started posting fake pro-government messages on the pages of those dissidents.

I'm curious as to why the government is doing this. Do they really think that anyone is convinced by this or that it's effective? If you have been friends with or following a well-known dissident, who suddenly disappears, and then his page starts posting pro-government messages, it seems like most people would quickly realize that something was wrong. Meanwhile, the various dissidents and activists have found that the best way to avoid this is to just create fake personas on Facebook, despite that going against the company's policies. One hopes that Facebook is willing to let things slide under the circumstances...

You may recall reports a few months ago from Tunisia, that indicated the government there had used a form of a man-in-the-middle attack to get usenames and passwords and access Facebook accounts of certain political opponents. It appears that Syria is trying to do the same thing. Reports have come out that Syria, via the Syrian Telecom Ministry, has kicked off a large man-in-the middle-attack on the HTTPS version of Facebook's site. While the EFF notes that the attack is amateurish, that doesn't mean it won't snare a potentially large number of people:

The attack is not extremely sophisticated: the certificate is invalid in user's browsers, and raises a security warning. Unfortunately, because users see these warnings for many operational reasons that are not actual man-in-the-middle attacks, they have often learned to click through them reflexively. In this instance, doing so would allow the attackers access to and control of their Facebook account. The security warning is users' only line of defense.

Either way, I'm a bit surprised that governments are using and promoting such ineffective means of spying on the populace. Of course, hopefully, this helps teach people to not just click through potential warnings, but also to get a better sense of how to keep their own computers secure and how to avoid such attacks.