most small-to-mid-level musicians i know don't have health insurance. some musicians find tricky ways, some pay, most take the risk & pray.
when i was in my early twenties, buying my own insurance would have been equal half my rent. it just didn't seem like an option. my parents had just watched the death of my step-brother (uninsured when stricken with a disease) almost destroy the family bank, and so they DEMANDED i get insurance.
we fought.
they offered to pay half.
i agreed.
i was lucky.
many aren't.

people OUTSIDE the US were looking at all the tweets from the US and feeling really, really, really bad for us. and some younger tweeters (teenagers, i can only assume) were shocked that we americans don't have what they have (the NHS was getting a lot of love and support from the brits, especially seeing as it's under threat).

people INSIDE the US couldn't believe what people OUTSIDE the US didn't KNOW. this is the amazing power of twitter sometimes. we all think we share common knowledge, and then something like this pops up and BAM – you see a whole bunch of people in different countries shocking the hell out of each other. we all know that lance armstrong doped, that lady gaga gained weight, , etc….but tons of people in the UK/Finland/Australia/etc don't know the extent to which US people FREAK OUT on a daily/monthly/yearly basis about insurance. how much it changes our lives. and how EVERYbody has a story.

But Nagaraj found was that the availability of public domain material dramatically improved the article's images. Before the digitization, players from between '44 and '64 had an average of .183 pictures on their articles. The '64 to '84 group had about .158 pictures. But after digitization, those numbers dramatically changed: there were 1.15 pictures on each of the older group's articles -- but only .667 in the new group. More recent players, covered by privately-owned parts of Baseball Digest, had half as many images on their pages as did old-timers.

And the effects of this -- of just having an image on the page -- cascaded to other metrics. "Out-of-copyright" players's pages saw a significant boost in traffic. Articles from the pre-'64 that were already in the top 10 percent saw their hits increase more than 70 percent. Articles from that group in the least-popular ten percent saw traffic to their articles increase by 25 percent. Those pages were more frequently edited across the board, too. And this makes sense: Google rewards updated content, and it rewards images. The out-of-copyright players provided more of both.

"Being recognized by the state of Sweden is a large step for all of kopimi. Hopefully, this is one step towards the day when we can live out our faith without fear of persecution", says Isak Gerson, spiritual leader of the Church of Kopimism.

Considering Twitter was instrumental in breaking the story of Osama Bin Laden's death, it seems somewhat strange that they would also be instrumental in limiting access to one of the biggest stories of 2011, if not the decade. (Of course, we're barely into this decade so we probably shouldn't be building these "best of" lists quite yet...) At the center of this unfortunate situation is a dataset constructed from public tweets using either "osama" or "bin laden," which was compiled using Twitter's own API.

Shortly after hearing of Bin Laden's unexpected mortal coil shuffling, Rob Domanski, who blogs as The Nerfherder, was informed of an archive of Osama Bin Laden-related tweets, all packaged up in handy XML format for use with DiscoverText software:

The datafiles were samples taken from live feed Twitter imports starting shortly after the announcement that Osama bin Laden’s death.

• Twitter searches for "bin laden" (647,585 documents, 505 MB)
• Twitter searches for "osama" (586,665 documents, 451 MB)

This was all for research purposes, however Twitter quickly shut down the project citing their Terms of Service (TOS) Agreement.

Stuart Shulman of DiscoverText had compiled the documents "using an authorized connection to Twitter via their API" which is apparently a violation of Twitter's API Terms of Service. He received an email from Twitter asking him to remove the datasets:

I'm writing about Twitter data being offered for sale on DiscoverText. Scraping the Twitter service is prohibited by our site Terms of Service, and furthermore, resyndicating data obtained through the Twitter API is prohibited by section I.4.a of our API Terms of Service (http://dev.twitter.com/pages/api_terms).

As such, we request you remove the datasets listed at http://discovertext.com/osamabinladen.aspx and any other datasets containing Tweets offered on your site.

Shulman responded:

Let’s be clear. We have never sold a Tweet. The data collected through the Twitter API and shared through our system is the same publicly available data other users capture with screenshots and share on blogs, Facebook or Twitter itself. Nonetheless, the datasets we have assembled and similar samples are being taken temporarily off the Web site pending a resolution of this issue with Twitter.

Well, "temporarily" has turned into "indefinitely." As of June 1st, Shulman's dataset contained 4.5 million Osama Bin Laden-related tweets, all of which can only be marveled at as a REALLY BIG NUMBER but not shared in any usable fashion thanks to Twitter's complaint.

If it's just a "policy first" decision on Twitter's part, it seems a little short-sighted. This information was (and is) of great interest to people worldwide. Perhaps some sort of warning could have been issued instead of a full takedown, thus allowing Twitter to assert its position on API usage without locking up the dataset. Once the dataset already exists, why block it? It's disheartening to see something with as much potential as Shulman's project getting thrown under the TOS bus.

The United States is nominally a democracy, but it's sadly ridiculous to think this means very much. To get at the value of WikiLeaks, I think it's important to distinguish between the government--the temporary, elected authors of national policy--and the state--the permanent bureaucratic and military apparatus superficially but not fully controlled by the reigning government. The careerists scattered about the world in America's intelligence agencies, military, and consular offices largely operate behind a veil of secrecy executing policy which is itself largely secret. American citizens mostly have no idea what they are doing, or whether what they are doing is working out well. The actually-existing structure and strategy of the American empire remains a near-total mystery to those who foot the bill and whose children fight its wars. And that is the way the elite of America's unelected permanent state, perhaps the most powerful class of people on Earth, like it.

As Scott Shane, the New York Times' national security reporter, puts it: "American taxpayers, American citizens pay for all these diplomatic operations overseas and you know, it is not a bad thing when Americans actually have a better understanding of those negotiations".

...

I'd say providing that information certainly would have been a socially worthy activity, even if it came as part of a more-or-less indiscriminate dump of illegally obtained documents. I'm glad to see that the quality of discussion over possible US efforts to stymie Iran's nuclear ambitions has already become more sophisticated and, well, better-informed due to the information provided by WikiLeaks.

A firm that dominates a market is a monopoly. End of story. That is the definition of a monopoly. It is not necessarily an illegal monopoly, or a problem, but that's a different issue. It is, however, clearly a monopoly by any standard definition.

Declining information monopolists often find a lifeline of last resort in the form of Uncle Sam. The government has conferred its blessing on monopolies in information industries with unusual frequency. Sometimes this protection has yielded reciprocal benefits, with the owner of an information network offering the state something valuable in return, like warrantless wiretaps.

Both these cases highlight why traditional property ideas don't fit well with information uses. What would work better? I present what I think is a more useful framework in the book, a view that is so far absent from the law of information. That framework would analyze information uses not under archaic laws of property but would rather weigh the use as being "productive" or "destructive" or both and determine if, on the whole, the net social value created by the use is positive. If so, it should not be treated as illegal, regardless of the law.

What do I mean? Since information can be used simultaneously by everyone and, after use, is still intact if not enhanced by the use, it's really unhelpful to think about information being "stolen" or, in the censorship context, of being "dangerous." Rather, the law should evaluate whether a use adds more value to information than it takes away. Information use that adds value (reviewing a movie) is productive and should be legal. A use that only takes value away (for example, identity theft and other forms of Internet fraud) is destructive and should be illegal. Uses that do both (copyright infringement in the service of promoting the underlying content) should be allowed if the net effect is positive.