Attention everyone.  If I could have all of your eyes looking forward please, I have an announcement to make: the pirating of music on the internet has officially ended.  So says Wired's Paul Boutin:

"Mark down the date: The age of stealing music via the Internet is officially over. It’s time for everybody to go legit. The reason: We won. And all you audiophiles and copyfighters, you know who fixed our problems? The record labels and online stores we loved to hate."

That's quite a whopper, isn't it?  Particularly from the same esteemed publication that brought you the news that the web is dead.  You'd have to imagine there would be something pretty substantial in his article to make the claim that the record labels had somehow fixed things so that online infringement no longer should exist, right?  Sadly, not so much.  He starts off by listing out a couple of the problems most folks had with things like DRM, transferring legit purchases to multiple devices, etc.  Then he tells us all why everything is okay now (and for a fun little game, see if you can spot the demeaning slight he sneaks in on music fans):

"Well played, protesters: In January 2009, Apple announced that it would remove the copyright protection wrapper from every song in its store. Today, Amazon and Walmart both sell music encoded as MP3s, which don’t even have hooks for copyright-protection locks. The battle is over, comrades."

So...because, after years of fighting, iTunes finally stood up and removed the DRM, followed by a few retailers, we're supposed to look to the record labels as our saviors?  For not treating us like criminals? And while they're still pushing for new laws and demanding money from ISPs (that will come out of consumers pockets anyway)? That doesn't really pass the smell test.  Paul then goes on to declare the joy audiophiles should feel now that MP3s are being sold with 256 Kbps audio quality, compared to the initial 128 Kbps offering, stating that if anyone wants quality better than that, "you can get a pretty good turntable for around $500" and go spin vinyl.  Oh, and he wants to make sure you know that if you steal vinyl records, that's called shoplifting.  Mmkay.  What else you got, Paul?

"That leaves one last war cry: Music should be free! It’s art! Friends, a song costs a dollar...Most download retailers send about 70 percent of each sale to the record companies that own the music. Artists with 15 percent royalty deals get 15 percent of that 70 percent, or about 10.5 cents per dollar of sales. Those who write their own music and own their own music publishing companies—an increasingly common arrangement—get another 9.1 cents in “mechanical royalties.” Every download sends almost 20 cents straight to the band."

Yup, you read that right.  This, of course, is pure nonsense.  That isn't the way royalties with modern day recording contracts work.  Through the magic of recording label accounting, the average musician makes roughly $23 for every $1000 in music sold -- and that's only if they actually recoup, which is difficult to do, thanks to the way the record labels account for things. For those of you who share my math skills and don't want to reach for a calculator, that's barely 2%.  Some of that result stems from necessary things the bands may need to spend on: managers, lawyers, taxes.  But a good deal of it also comes from neat little, and sometimes recoupable, charges from the record label, things like independent radio promotion, tour support, roughly fifty percent of the music video costs, etc.  Other times, the record labels flatout don't pay the royalties from truly successful albums.  Bottom line is, at the end of the day, record labels make money off of selling music, musicians do not.

And, even if we go with Paul's bogus number of 20 cents on the dollar, is that really that good of a deal? A musician today can use a service like Bandcamp, and get 85% of whatever money they bring in -- and can do so in more creative ways with pay what you want offerings, that can actually bring in much more money. The idea the "record labels" have solved "piracy" by offering musicians 20 cents that they'll never get because they'll never recoup is laughable.

But Paul chooses to ignore those things and instead offers up a pithy conclusion as to why music is still being pirated:

"You're cheap."

Uh huh.  Nuanced arguments would probably be more appreciated from the group of folks you're talking to, who actually spend more money on music than those who do not "pirate".  Funny definition of cheap you're working from...

In the end, there are many reasons why people still file share (and they are still file sharing in droves, which sort of debunks Paul's entire premise), but you don't learn any of that from Paul's article. Since when did Wired switch from thought-provoking analysis to pure trollbait?

With all of the new security procedures we keep hearing about, it's important for the government to keep convincing us that we're under a very real immediate threat that could put us at risk at any moment. Along those lines, you may have heard over the weekend about how the FBI supposedly stopped a terrorism bomb plot in Portland, Oregon. Except it appears more and more people are scratching beneath the surface and realizing that the entire plot appears to have been cooked up by the FBI itself. Yes, it sounds like they found a dumb kid who was willing to carry out a bombing. But there doesn't appear to be any evidence that he actually had any ability to actually do so... until the FBI came along and provided him with all the details.

Of course, this is hardly new. There appears to have been a very similar story just a month ago, involving a guy in DC who wanted to bomb Metro stations, but the only actual plotting he was able to do was after federal authorities stepped in and helped him plan everything.

Even that is hardly new. I remember a fascinating episode of This American Life back from the summer of 2009 describing (in great detail) a very similar story of a supposed "arms dealer" that the Justice Department championed as a success story when it arrested and prosecuted him for selling missiles to terrorists. The only problem is that the deeper you dig, the more you realize that the whole plot was also set up by the feds. The guy had no way to get a missile. It was actually provided by the feds themselves.

As that report notes, this is how the government has acted since 9/11. It basically creates its own terrorist plots, and then searches for willing participants... and then arrests them, and hypes how it prevented a terrorist attack, even if there's absolutely no indication that anyone involved would have actually been able to carry out any sort of attack (or arms deal) without the aid of the US government.

We've talked about "security theater," but this appears to be law enforcement theater, complete with actors and props. Feel safer yet?

This one is just amusing. Scott Cleland, who works for the big broadband companies as a professional propagandist, and has a long history of making absolutely ridiculous claims in order to support their positions, apparently got a bit of traction from the non-thinking press, after he started pushing the message that all of the Democrats who signed a "pledge" to support network neutrality from the group the Progressive Change Campaign Committee (PCCC) lost in the recent election. So, suddenly, it sounds like a referendum on net neutrality with the people saying they're against it. Verizon was so excited about this that it even Tweeted about it and various folks in the press parroted the claim without really looking into the details. Even CNN wrote an article about it, suggesting this was the "final nail in the coffin for net neutrality."

While I doubt any net neutrality legislation is going to get passed anyway (and, that's a good thing, because after the telcos got done with it, it wouldn't be what you wanted anyway), to suggest in any way that this election was a referendum on net neutrality is pure folly. What the "press" left out is that the PCCC's net neutrality pledge was hardly the only such thing out there. Also, the PCCC pledges were not from existing Representatives, but those trying to get elected to Congress against incumbents -- and nearly every one came from historically Republican districts. In other words, nearly every one of those Democrats who "lost," were guaranteed to lose no matter what. On top of that, Broadband Reports took a look at a couple of other "net neutrality" pledges by folks actually in Congress, and noted that a bunch of Democratic Representatives who signed an anti-Net Neutrality pledge still lost their races, and of those who signed on to a pro-net neutrality list, not a single Democrat on that list lost their re-election bid. So, uh, it sorta suggests that a politician's stance on net neutrality had nothing to do with this election, and if you want to make up fake headlines that don't really mean anything, why would the press not mention any of the relevant facts, and simply parrot the fake story by a guy paid for propaganda?

We've been covering all the hyped up claims of cyberwar, often made by law enforcement officials or defense contractors who clearly benefit from keeping people fearful. However, evidence of such claims is always lacking, beyond some vague "trust us, it's bad!" But, all we've seen so far is that people are definitely trying to hack into each other's systems, but that's hardly "war." However, it looks like this hype isn't just happening in the US. A UK official is getting in on the act too, claiming that cyberwar attacks are already happening. But, of course, he's again pretty vague on details. At best he says that the internet has "increased the risk of disruption to infrastructure such as power stations and financial services."

Of course, right before I had read that article, I had been reading an article where the reporter spoke to an energy grid expert, who called such claims "a bunch of hooey." The guy, Seth Blumsack, along with a couple of colleagues, had been hearing all these stories about how "at risk" the electric grid was, so they went looking for the evidence. After looking at the claims and predictions, they realized that those claiming the electrical grid was at risk didn't actually appear to understand the physics of how electric grids actually work.

Blumsack, Hines and Cotilla-Sanchez decided to contrast the performance of a topological model with one based on actual physics - specifically on Ohm's and Kirchoff's Laws governing the flow of electricity in the real world. They tried out both kinds of model on an accurate representation of the North American Eastern Interconnect, the largest and one of the most trouble-prone portions of the US grid, using real-world data from a test case generated in 2005.

The three engineers say that the physics-driven model was much closer to reality, and that this verifies what physics models show. The results showed that in fact it is major grid components through which a lot of power flows - big generating stations and massive transformers - which are the main points of vulnerability, not the minor installations scattered across the country.

It isn't so much that a minor event on a minor line or installation can't crash the network: such things do happen. But in general there have to be huge numbers of such minor events before one of them happens to hit the miracle weak point and bring everything down. It would be an impossible task for terrorists or other malefactors to know in advance just where and when a minor pinprick could cause massive effects.

"Our system is quite robust to small things failing," says Hines.

Seems like, once again, the claims of cyberwar are overblown.

For some time now, we've been pointing out how the new claims of cyberwar threats from politicians and defense contractors was massively overhyped. We keep getting comments on those posts along the lines of "the real threat is secret, so you have to trust the government," which isn't exactly comforting. Sometimes we get comments saying "you're not a security expert, so you don't know the real threat." At which point we ask people to explain the real threat and they always come up short. With military leaders getting together to once again hype the still unexplained "cyberwar threat" security expert Bruce Schneier has written a great piece detailing the lack of an actual threat.

He points out, correctly, that cybersecurity is important, but elevating it to a bogus "war" is dangerous:

We surely need to improve our cybersecurity. But words have meaning, and metaphors matter. There's a power struggle going on for control of our nation's cybersecurity strategy, and the NSA and DoD are winning. If we frame the debate in terms of war, if we accept the military's expansive cyberspace definition of "war," we feed our fears.

We reinforce the notion that we're helpless -- what person or organization can defend itself in a war? -- and others need to protect us. We invite the military to take over security, and to ignore the limits on power that often get jettisoned during wartime.

Instead, he notes, almost all of the known "examples" of cyberwar are either cybercrime or espionage -- which are not the same thing. As he points out:

If, on the other hand, we use the more measured language of cybercrime, we change the debate. Crime fighting requires both resolve and resources, but it's done within the context of normal life. We willingly give our police extraordinary powers of investigation and arrest, but we temper these powers with a judicial system and legal protections for citizens.

This is an important point. No one is saying that online security isn't important. We're just questioning whether it's really a "war" that requires the military to be heavily involved or if there are better options. It's great to see some in the security field start to speak up on this subject as well.

As the anonymous person who submitted this story noted, this appears to be a respectable Australian news publication, presenting a list of totally made up "texting disorders" put together by a "technology researcher" as if they were real and serious issues. The list is almost comical:

• Textaphrenia: thinking you've heard or felt a new text message vibration when there is no message.
• Textiety: a feeling of anxiety from not receiving or sending any text messages.
• Post-traumatic text disorder: injuries related to texting, such as walking into objects by not paying attention to your surroundings.
• Binge texting: sending massive amounts of texts to build self-esteem among peers.

Those aren't disorders. That's a joke list that someone put together for fun, right?

About a decade ago, if you followed the technology space, you might recall a series of articles about a professor at the University of Reading, named Kevin Warwick, who made himself famous by implanting a computer chip in his arm, declaring himself an expert in "cybernetics" and figuring out ways to get way too much press for nothing special. The Register, amusingly, dubbed him "Captain Cyborg" and regularly mocked his various exploits. We haven't heard much about Warwick in a while, but when I saw a bunch of folks chatting about a BBC article concerning the "first human infected with computer virus," I was immediately reminded of Warwick. Reading through the article, it was no surprise to find out that this "experiment" is actually being conducted by a colleague of Warwick's, Mark Gasson -- who according to Warwick's own bio lead the research group that Warwick works in.

The story is -- as with all captain cyborg stories -- a lot less than the headline suggests. Gasson wasn't "infected with a computer virus." He took a chip that had a computer virus and stuck it in his arm, just like Warwick has done n the past. The parallels to an actual virus are minimal, and the usefulness for anything is even less than that. Gasson presents this as useful for considering the implications for implanted technology such as pacemakers, but that's nothing new. People have talked about potential technology issues from the wireless interface to pacemakers for years. Doing some sort of publicity stunt with an implanted computer chip doesn't further that discussion along.

TechCrunch points us to a story about an Israeli company by the name of Netex who is claiming a patent over "www.addressing." What's that? Well, apparently it's the process of simply adding a ".com" to the end of a word you put in a browser address bar. There are all sorts of questions raised by this, and the reporting at the Israeli site Ynetnews leaves a lot to be desired. First, neither Ynetnews nor TechCrunch point to the actual patent. I've been searching on both the supposed inventor's name (Aviv Refuah) and his company's name and I can't find it. If anyone out there can find the actual patent, please post a link in the comments.

The next problem with the article is the claim that this patent is "worth millions" and that Google, Microsoft and Yahoo "will have to pay royalties." It remains to be seen if that's true (and given what's stated, it seems quite doubtful).

Next problem? The article claims that this patent is about the address bar in the browser -- not a search engine box -- though, the reporter doesn't seem to understand the difference between the two. Admittedly, Google now offers a browser in Chrome, but the article keeps referring to the patent as a "search option." Yahoo doesn't offer a browser.

Then there's the issue of claiming that Google and Yahoo "use" this technology:

Refuah says various internet giants such as Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo have been using the program for years, and now they will have to pay royalties to Netex.

That implies -- falsely -- that Google, Microsoft and Yahoo have somehow been using some technology that they got from Netex. It's a common trick used in reporting about patents, but its highly misleading. Much, much, much more likely is that Google, Microsoft and Yahoo simply added a useful and obvious feature, that Netex is now showing up and claiming ownership years later.

Finally, it's tough to say much about the actual patent claims in question -- seeing as we haven't seen them -- but from the Ynetnews description, it's difficult to see how such a thing could possibly be considered patentable (and one would think that Netscape would have some prior art, though I can't remember exactly when Netscape added the ability to add .com to the end of something put in the browser bar). But, honestly, can anyone with a straight face explain why such a thing should be patentable?

What is it with these bizarre exaggerated claims about the "harms" associated with modern social networking tools? There was just a totally exaggerated report claiming that social networking was harmful to your health, but when you looked at the details, it didn't actually say that at all. The latest, is the claim that new research says that Twitter can make you "immoral." Really? Well, if you actually read the details that doesn't seem to be what the report says at all. Instead, it seems to note that if you only interact with people through short bursts of information, it may take you longer to recognize the emotional impact of what's being said because it's harder to spend the time to reflect. It's difficult to see how that finding is really all that new or surprising. But it says nothing about Twitter somehow turning moral people into immoral people, as the original story suggests.

While online scams and cybercrime are growing, the claim made recently that cybercrime is a trillion-dollar business simply isn't true, says The Register. As Gary Stiennon points out, if it were, it would be bigger than global IT business itself, as well as the GDP of several industrialized nations. AT&T's chief security officer threw out the figure in front of a Senate committee; he also said that cybercrime was a bigger business than the global drug trade, another claim Stiennon disputes. He dug into where the myth was started, and how it's evolved, and traced it back to a single comment made by a consultant to the US Treasury Department in 2005. It's then been so commonly cited -- often by security companies looking to advance their own agendas -- and repeated that it's become widely accepted. Certainly cybercrime is a problem, and a growing one, but overstating its true impact won't make fighting it any easier.