Wow. We've heard about all sorts of crazy copyright lawsuits, but every so often you get one that just makes you sit back and wonder at the amazing chutzpah it must have taken for a lawyer to actually go forward and file a case. This is one of those times. The estate of William Faulkner, Faulkner Literary Rights LLC, has sued Sony Pictures Classics and a bunch of movie distributors over the Woody Allen movie Midnight in Paris.

At one point in the movie the lead character, played by Owen Wilson, misquotes a nine-word William Faulkner quote. Quoting directly from the lawsuit:

In describing his experiences, Pender speaks the following lines (the "Infringing Quote"): "The past is not dead! Actually, it's not even past. You know who said that? Faulkner. And he was right. And I met him, too. I ran into him at a dinner party."

The Infringing Quote is taken from a passage in the William Faulkner book "Requiem for a Nun" ("the Book"), where it reads: "The past is never dead. It's not even past." ("the Original Quote").

The lawsuit points out that the book first was registered with the copyright office in 1951 and it was renewed in 1979. I don't think anyone doubts that the copyright on the book is legit -- but, seriously? He quoted nine words (really eight if you drop one for the error in the quote). This has to qualify as either de minimis use or fair use, at the very least. And, seriously, what kind of harm does the Faulkner estate really think happened here? The filing misstates the nature of copyright law, arguing that it has the exclusive right to reproduce or distribute the quote -- completely ignoring fair use or de minimis use as possibilities that push back on that "exclusive right."

Beyond that, they try an even more ridiculous argument, dropping into the Lanham Act (trademark law) claiming (ridiculously):

The use of the Infringing Quote and of William Faulkner's name in the Infringing Film is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, and/or to deceive the Infringing Film's viewers as to perceived affiliation, connection or association between William Faulkner and his works, on the one hand, and Sony, on the other hand.

The use of the Infringing Quote and of William Faulkner's name in the Infringing Film is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, and/or to deceive the Infringing Film's viewers as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of Sony's goods, services, or commercial activity by William Faulkner and/or his written works.

To which we can only think to ask... who, exactly, could possibly be confused by this? Seriously. Faulkner died in 1962. I don't think anyone thinks he's officially affiliated with the movie. Hell, even if he was alive, we're talking about eight words misquoted.

Oh, and did we mention that the Faulkner estate claims that Sony's actions here were malicious, fraudulent, deliberate and/or willful. Or, you know, perhaps it just knows that quoting 8 words from William Faulkner doesn't infringe a damn thing. Later, they argue that the use of Faulkner's name was "grossly negligent." Because, you know, mentioning actual human beings without their permission is against the law... other than the fact that it's not.

Even the awesome folks over at Courthouse News, who tend to be a "just the facts" kind of organization couldn't resist adding some commentary on this particular case:

Although Courthouse News customarily refrains from commenting upon litigation in the story in which the lawsuit is reported, and at risk of offending the shade, or estate, of Charles Dickens: This is a far, far weirder thing than Sony has ever done.

As we've described in the past, the insurance companies that back movie productions are notoriously risk averse on IP things, and they have lawyers trained in this kind of thing go through movies bit by bit to make sure every possible bit of copyright or trademark issue has clearance or they won't approve errors and omissions insurance (E&O). They take this process pretty seriously (quite often too seriously). If this bit got through that process unscathed, it seems likely that Sony (and its insurers) are quite confident that this sort of thing is completely legit.

Hopefully Sony Pictures doesn't wimp out and pay the Faulkner Literary Rights folks to go away. This is a case worth fighting, and you'd have to hope that Sony recognizes that it's quite likely to succeed in court.

We recently discussed the common fallacy that "copyright is in the Constitution", but that's only one example of copyright defenders misrepresenting a document to support their cause. Another favorite, often invoked by folks like Rob Levine and David Lowery, is the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights—a relatively toothless document in the US (compared to the Constitution) but one that feels good to have on your side.

But here's the thing: it doesn't say what copyright supporters think it does. Not even close. Not only are they focusing on only one half of the declaration's relevant article, and ignoring additional detail from another UN declaration that is meant to go hand-in-hand with the first... even the tiny part they focus doesn't match their position. Let's take a look.

The line in the declaration that establishes a right to some sort of intellectual property is Article 27, Section 2:

Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Right off the bat, we see a problem: moral and material rights. The US, explicitly and intentionally (with some very minor exceptions) does not protect the moral rights of creators—the copyright system is based almost exclusively around economic rights. So when copyright supporters in America cite the Declaration of Human Rights, they are in fact pointing to a clause that the US directly violates.

Now, maybe that doesn't sound like much—after all, at least US copyright is in line with the "material rights" part. But is it? That's where we need to look at the bigger picture of international rights. That's something that copyright supporters never seem to do, and it's pretty obvious why. As mentioned, the line they cite is the second section of the relevant article—now lets have a look at Section 1:

Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

Now it's starting to look like the Human Rights Commission intended for there to be a little bit more balance in Article 27—and that they had their priorities straight. Sections 1 and 2, taken together, would seem to suggest (at the very least) that copyright should be focused primarily on commercial endeavours (and that patents are a pretty questionable concept all around).

Is that a subjective interpretation? By itself, yes—but don't take my word for it. See, there's something else that copyright supporters are leaving out of the picture: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is just one of three documents that, together, form the International Bill of Human Rights (nobody ever accused the UN of efficiency). Another, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, provides considerable additional detail on the question of creators' rights. Let's take a look at Article 15 of that document:

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:

(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.

That's an awful lot of caveats and addenda, all focused on ensuring that the copyright reins aren't too tight. In fact it seems like the text is specifically trying to distance itself from traditional intellectual property regimes. This time, you definitely don't have to take my word for it, because here's where we get to the really damning evidence: the general comment (pdf) on the document from the Economic and Social Council, which attempts to further explain the intention of all the rights. Here are some choice quotes:

Whereas the human right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments. Moreover, the scope of protection of the moral and material interests of the author provided for by article 15, paragraph 1 (c), does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as intellectual property rights under national legislation or international agreements.

It is therefore important not to equate intellectual property rights with the human right recognized in article 15, paragraph 1 (c).

...

The right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions seeks to encourage the active contribution of creators to the arts and sciences and to the progress of society as a whole. As such, it is intrinsically linked to the other rights recognized in article 15 of the Covenant, i.e. the right to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a)), the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (art. 15, para. 1 (b)), and the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity (art. 15, para. 3).

...

Moreover, the realization of article 15, paragraph 1 (c), is dependent on the enjoyment of other human rights guaranteed in the International Bill of Human Rights and other international and regional instruments, such as the right to own property alone as well as in association with others, the freedom of expression including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, the right to the full development of the human personality, and rights of cultural participation, including cultural rights of specific groups.

Starting to paint a different picture, no? The comment goes on to offer some specifics, underlining how thoroughly different this human right is from intellectual property rights. For one thing, it's not transferable:

The Committee considers that only the “author”, namely the creator, whether man or woman, individual or group of individuals, of scientific, literary or artistic productions, such as, inter alia, writers and artists, can be the beneficiary of the protection of article 15, paragraph 1 (c). This follows from the words “everyone”, “he” and “author”, which indicate that the drafters of that article seemed to have believed authors of scientific, literary or artistic productions to be natural persons, without at that time realizing that they could also be groups of individuals. Under the existing international treaty protection regimes, legal entities are included among the holders of intellectual property rights. However, as noted above, their entitlements, because of their different nature, are not protected at the level of human rights.

For another, it calls for a bunch of specific moral rights that do not and have never existed in the US:

In line with the drafting history of article 27, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant, the Committee considers that “moral interests” in article 15, paragraph 1 (c), include the right of authors to be recognized as the creators of their scientific, literary and artistic productions and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, such productions, which would be prejudicial to their honour and reputation

And even when it comes to material rights, special mention is given to the fact that this doesn't have to resemble traditional copyright, although it can:

The term of protection of material interests under article 15, paragraph 1 (c), need not extend over the entire lifespan of an author. Rather, the purpose of enabling authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living can also be achieved through one-time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the exclusive right to exploit his scientific, literary or artistic production

Now, in addition to all this, the general comment does include plenty of lines that make room for traditional intellectual property laws—it's not as though the whole thing reads as a total condemnation of copyright. However, this closer look at the contours of international human rights makes it abundantly clear that it was not intended as an endorsement of copyright either. Every time something that sounds like US copyright is mentioned, it's because it's being permitted but not required—and often written in such a way as to suggest that it's not recommended either. Moreover, it's impossible to avoid the fact that the US does not recognize the moral rights called for in the declaration—which I actually think is probably a good thing, but can't just be ignored by those who want to use the declaration as ammo for defending copyright.

I think the question of whether or not there is an innate human right to control one's creative output, in either the moral or material sense or both, is a fascinating and important topic with lots of room for debate. But that has very little to do with the current economic regime of copyright—least of all in the US, since many other countries do wrap moral rights into copyright law. Apologies to the IP crowd, but neither the Founding Fathers nor the United Nations support you the way you think they do—so you're going to have to stop falsely appealing to their authority and come up with some new arguments.

As a UK court recently ruled, Apple's UK website is required to post a notice about the court ruling that Samsung didn't copy Apple's design with its devices. Apple has now complied with a tiny link in the page footer: The notice itself is amusing in its somewhat passive aggressive tone. It first notes the court ruling, and then explains:

In the ruling, the judge made several important points comparing the designs of the Apple and Samsung products:

What kind of important points? Well, all the ones about how Apple's products are awesome, while Samsung's... not so much.

"The extreme simplicity of the Apple design is striking. Overall it has undecorated flat surfaces with a plate of glass on the front all the way out to a very thin rim and a blank back. There is a crisp edge around the rim and a combination of curves, both at the corners and the sides. The design looks like an object the informed user would want to pick up and hold. It is an understated, smooth and simple product. It is a cool design."

"The informed user's overall impression of each of the Samsung Galaxy Tablets is the following. From the front they belong to the family which includes the Apple design; but the Samsung products are very thin, almost insubstantial members of that family with unusual details on the back. They do not have the same understated and extreme simplicity which is possessed by the Apple design. They are not as cool."

And then... it reminds you that other countries have ruled completely otherwise:

However, in a case tried in Germany regarding the same patent, the court found that Samsung engaged in unfair competition by copying the iPad design. A U.S. jury also found Samsung guilty of infringing on Apple's design and utility patents, awarding over one billion U.S. dollars in damages to Apple Inc. So while the U.K. court did not find Samsung guilty of infringement, other courts have recognized that in the course of creating its Galaxy tablet, Samsung willfully copied Apple's far more popular iPad.

In other words, it's the petulant Apple "complying" with the UK judge, while at the same time making sure to add a "but, but, but... the judge is really wrong -- other than the part where he likes our design."

Various US government agencies have spent a lot of time and energy hoping to ensnare as much cell phone data as possible without having to deal with the "barriers" erected by the Fourth Amendment. The feds, along with Los Angeles law enforcement agencies, have bypassed the protections of the Fourth Amendment by deploying roving cell phone trackers that mimic mobile phone towers. The FISA Amendments Act has been used as a "blank check" for wholesale spying on Americans and has been abused often enough that the Director of National Intelligence was forced to admit these Fourth Amendment violations publicly.

The good news is that a few of these overreaches are receiving judicial pushback. Orin Kerr at the Volokh Conspiracy has a very brief writeup of a recent shutdown of another cellphone-related fishing expedition led by an assistant US Attorney. An attempt was made to acquire records for ALL cell phones utilizing four different towers in the area of a specific crime at the time of the event. As Kerr notes, this ruling refers to the Fifth Circuit court decision that found cell phone data to be protected under the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a warrant to access it.

Magistrate Judge Smith points out that part of the issue is that the principals involved (the assistant US Attorney and a special agent) seemed to lack essential knowledge of the underlying technology, and that this lack of knowledge prevented them from recognizing the overreach of their request:

Moreover, it is problematic that neither the assistant United States Attorney nor the special agent truly understood the technology involved in the requested applications. See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, 2012 WL 2120492, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2012). Without such an understanding, they cannot appreciate the constitutional implications of their requests. They are essentially asking for a warrant in support of a very broad and invasive search affecting likely hundreds of individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

There has been a lot of discussion here at Techdirt regarding the incredible lack of knowledge present in those seeking to regulate or exploit various technologies. Considering the amount of possible collateral damage and the heightened chance of rights violations, you'd think these entities would be exercising maximum caution before tampering with something they don't understand. Instead, the common approach is to use the ends (safety, crime prevention, etc.) to justify the missteps and rights-trampling of the means, leaving the judicial system and various trampled citizens to sort out the mess.

Judge Smith quotes the Fourth Amendment and points out that warrants must be issued and only "upon probable cause" before continuing to run down the list of wrongs in this request.

Finally, there is no discussion about what the Government intends to do with all of the data related to innocent people who are not the target of the criminal investigation. In one criminal investigation, the Government received the names, cell phone numbers, and subscriber information of 179 innocent individuals. See United States v. Soto, No. 3:09CR200 (D.Conn. May 18, 2010) (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress). Although the use of a court-sanctioned cell tower dump invariably leads to such information being provided to the Government, in order to receive such data, the Government at a minimum should have a protocol to address how to handle this sensitive private information.

But, as Smith points out, the government doesn't have a protocol in place, even more than two years down the road.

Although this issue was raised at the hearing, the Government has not addressed it to date.

This is hardly new territory for government agencies. The TSA has had nearly 20 months to begin taking public comments on the use of various body imaging scanners, but despite two trips to the DC Circuit Court, it has yet to begin this process, something generally undertaken before implenting a new system. If it's something the government feels may be unpopular with the public, it tends to attempt to stall indefinitely, an (in)action that (again) places the burden back on the courts and the general public.

But, at least in this case, Judge Smith is using this lack of action against the government representatives.

This failure to address the privacy rights for the Fourth Amendment concerns of these innocent subscribers whose information will be compromised as a request of the cell tower dump is another factor warranting the denial of the application.

It's a good sign that stalling tactics may hurt more than help in the future. Many government and law enforcement agencies are still looking for any loophole in current laws in order to bypass the limitations placed on them by the Constitution. There's still a long way to go before there's anything resembling an equitable relationship between the general public and those in power, but we'll take everything we can get and (hopefully) receive more help pushing back against these intrusions.

I'll be honest about my viewpoint to start this piece: I hate geo-restrictions, particularly on digital goods. I simply cannot see how they benefit anyone. Customers are blocked or pay different prices for like goods, often times angering them (not something you typically want to do to customers). Companies feel the brunt of this anger, or else at least feel the impact of the a restricted customer base through their own unwillingness to deal fairly in a global marketplace. Perhaps most importantly, for savvy customers, there are tools to simply get around the artificial barriers these companies erect, making them just more useless DRM-like nonsense.

And, apparently, some consumer advocate groups out there are beginning to feel similarly. Take Australian advocacy group CHOICE, for instance, who recently submitted to a parliamentary inquiry on technology pricing with the opinion that consumers down under should be spoofing their IP addresses to get better deals from global providers.

The group has today released a guide explaining how to do so using virtual private networks (VPNs) and alternative domain name systems (DNSs).

Choice also suggested setting up US iTunes accounts and using surrogate US addresses for forwarding packages from American stores. Choice has noted previously that Australians pay 52 per cent more for digital music downloads on iTunes compared to US users.

If you just heard a loud thumping sound, it was probably the collective fainting of technology and media providers over the idea of Australians paying the same price for goods as Americans. You can almost hear their angry cries now, can't you? "This is geo-piracy! They aren't playing by the rules!"

And that might be true. But the thing is, if the rules suck, why should you play by them? Take the iTunes example: how in the world, with a globally connected internet and the offering of digital goods, could it possibly make sense for a consumer in one nation to pay more than a consumer in another? Excluding the false barriers that have been erected (like licensing, geo-restrictions, etc.), where is the logic in this practice? Minus the occasional invalidation of product warranties, there is none, as CHOICE notes.

"As long as consumers are aware of the risks and do their due-diligence, there is no reason why they cannot pick up a bargain online with confidence," Levey said. "It also undermines the virtual walls these companies have built around the Australian market, which in the long term will help bring down prices to a global parity."

Or, in other words, position global providers to actually compete in a global marketplace, not the artificially segmented anti-consumer marketplace they've constructed for themselves.

Back in May, Techdirt pointed to a presentation from Mike Palmedo listing a wide range of research that demonstrates the lack of a connection between policies introducing stricter IP laws or enforcement and economic growth or innovation. Apparently, the African Union Scientific, Technical and Research Commission didn't get around to reading that post, since it has produced a draft statute for the creation of a new Pan-Africa Intellectual Property Organization that seems based entirely on assuming this link exists.

Here's how Brook K. Baker, a US law professor specializing in this area, describes these plans over on infojustice.org:

The statute, drafted by true believers of IP-maximalist ideology, proposes to establish a region-wide intellectual property organization with the sole agenda of expanding IP rights, strengthening enforcement, harmonizing regional legislation, and eventually facilitating the granting of IP monopolies by a central granting authority that may well be legally binding on Member States.

One reason the proposal is so bad is that, once again, all the benefits flow to rightsholders at the expense of users:

Throughout the proposed legislation, there is not one reference to achieving a balance between the interests of rightholders and users of technology and creative endeavors. There is not a word on preserving permitted limitations or exceptions to IPRs or controlling misuse of IP monopolies. There is not a single commitment to withstanding pressures from the US and EU for ever expanding intellectual property rights that are longer, stronger and broader nor for the draconian enforcement obligations that suppress legitimate competition and impose costly border, criminal, and civil enforcement obligations on Africa taxpayers.

The draft will be considered at a meeting of African science and technology ministers in the Republic of Congo in November. If you want to read the details, the proposed text is available (as a Microsoft Word file) from the Intellectual Property Watch site.

It's particularly disappointing that this hugely retrogressive move should be proposed at a time when African innovation is really starting to take off, with a number of tech hubs emerging across the continent. The present proposals seem likely to throttle those exciting developments, because they will impose a neo-colonial IP framework on Africa that will see it ruthlessly exploited by Western companies thanks to their copyright and patent monopolies, just as its physical resources were expropriated in the 19th century.

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