The Good And Bad Of Banks Too Big To Fail Getting Bigger...

from the not-all-bad,-but... dept

Ever since the whole financial crisis began, and the concept of "too big to fail" became a common phrase, I've been wondering why the US gov't didn't set up a simple provision in any bailout procedure: if you are too big to fail, and because of that need a gov't bailout, then a part of that bailout means you need to become small enough to fail. I think it's a perfectly reasonable suggestion that has been pretty much totally ignored.

So, when news came out that the biggest banks, the ones deemed "too big to fail," are now getting even bigger, you might think that I'd view that as a bad sign. And... partly, I do. But not for the reasons you might expect. The issue of "too big to fail" isn't the bottom line size of the bank, it was about how interconnected it was in the rest of the economy, and how any ripple effects of a failure would damage (significantly) other parts of the economy. But, since the government has done pretty much next to nothing to actually deal with that sort of systematic risk (and, no, putting in place a "systematic risk" manager, as we keep hearing, isn't going to fix the problem), it should come as no surprise that these banks still have such risks.

But, the fact that, by themselves, these banks are growing isn't a bad sign. Given what the government has done, it's actually a good sign. You should be a lot more upset if, after the government gave these banks so much money, they went out and lost it all. Instead, many of them have at least put it to good use (and some have returned money to the government at decent interest rates -- though, the amount returned still is a blip compared to the amount at risk).

The real issue isn't the size of the banks, but how interconnected they are. But little to nothing has been done to take on that problem -- which is a bad thing. However, given that, it's at least a decent sign that these banks we've given so much money to are actually doing better these days.

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Too Big To Fail Isn't The Problem... It's The Hidden Risk That's The Problem

from the as-if-that's-possible dept

Duncan Watts has a thought provoking writeup in the Boston Globe talking about the problems of systematic risk, and why no one could successfully see exactly how the various dominoes would fall, leading to our current (and still ongoing) economic financial crisis. Basically, his argument is that the system has become too intertwined and complex, such that no one can really manage the risk. This is hardly a new idea. Watts' suggestion (which, again, is not necessarily new, and has been discussed by many, including Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner) is that perhaps we need a "systematic risk manager" within the government, whose job (like anti-trust folks) is to look at various companies and determine if they're too big to fail -- and then see how to change things such that they're no longer too big to fail.

It's a nice idea... in theory. In practice, it's a lot harder. The very reason systematic risk is such a problem is that it's so hard to even imagine the scenarios taking place. The idea that Lehman Bros. failing would have so much impact elsewhere is simply beyond the scope of what most people could have even imagined -- and that would almost certainly include any "systematic risk manager." While I agree that it's a problem that we end up with companies that are "too big to fail," I tend to think, in the long run, it's futile to try to predict ahead of time who's really "too big to fail," but that such an issue should only come up in the event of a gov't bailout. Thus, if you need to take gov't money to stay alive because you are deemed "too big to fail," then it should be required that as a part of the terms of the deal, you need to work out a plan that makes you small enough to fail.

Otherwise, you end up in a situation where companies who are successful get penalized for it. The only time "too big to fail" is a problem is when such a company fails. We shouldn't necessarily be penalizing a company that's too big to fail if it's not going to fail.

Separately, Watts notes that this idea of trying to prevent "too big to fail" is a way of avoiding systematic risk. I'd argue he has the equation a bit twisted. Too big to fail isn't the problem. It's the hidden risk that leads a company that is "too big to fail" to fail that's the problem. The answer to that is not breaking up successful companies -- it's increasing transparency into actual risk. That means increasing openness and data sharing, rather than the status quo of quarterly reports with the real details hidden and buried beneath complexities, combined with Wall Street putting together packages whose sole purpose is designed to hide the actual risk. Make the real data transparent (and real-time) and let anyone access and mess around with the data, and you get a much more accurate view of the risk, and you avoid situations where "healthy" investments suddenly turn sour.

Watts has the right idea that systematic risk is a problem, but the wrong solution. Companies that are too big to fail failing is a symptom of a lack of transparency over the actual risk. The answer isn't to stop companies from getting so big. It's to provide more transparency into the actual risk.

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Why Aren't We Trying To Solve The Too Big To Fail Problem?

from the getting-it-wrong dept

Last year, with all the talk of companies being "too big to fail" and governments bailing out such companies left and right, we had what seemed like a simple suggestion. Recognizing that it is possible for a company to be "too big to fail," in an intertwined economy, because the fallout would create even more problems, we suggested that a requirement for taking government money would be to become small enough to fail. That could mean spinning off parts, selling off parts, shutting down parts, exiting businesses, shrinking businesses -- whatever. There just needed to be some sort of guarantee that within a certain time frame, the company wouldn't be so tied up that if it failed it would bring down the rest of the economy. And, if a company didn't want to deal with those restrictions, then fine, it didn't need to take gov't bailout money.

The idea didn't get much traction (not surprisingly), and now some are pointing out that the opposite seems to be happening. Our solution to dealing with companies that are too big to fail has been to make them bigger and bigger, and pass off the question of "too big to fail" to other politicians in the future -- at which point the problems will likely be even bigger and harder to deal with. Propping up companies that are too big to fail, without a clear path towards making them small enough to fail, is a recipe for a future disaster.

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Creative Destruction: Time To Make Companies Small Enough To Fail

from the channeling-schumpeter dept

The news is filled with stories of the latest bailout: this time of the US auto industry, and for some reason it has me thinking about Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter, as (hopefully) many of you know, was an economist in the first half of the 20th century, who today is probably most well-known for two things: his championship of the concept of "entrepreneurs" and ongoing innovation as the process of economic growth, and the creation of profits, as well as the idea of "creative destruction" brought about by those entrepreneurs, taking down old industries with new ideas, new products and new processes. There is much that Schumpeter got wrong in his analysis (in general, I'm not a huge fan of much of Schumpeter's work), but throughout it all, there were some very important ideas that have been proven time and time again.

It's important to revisit his work, as we're seeing a sudden influx of economic philosophy "battles" between different schools of economists over how to deal with the financial crisis. The new Keynesians still believe that through government tweaking, we can guide the economy to some sort of "soft landing." The more free market-focused economists fear the end result of such tweaking. The split in schools of thinking has become significantly less pronounced than in the past, and ideas seem to permeate back and forth among these and other economic philosophies, but some core beliefs are common across most economists, and they've been shown to be correct time and time again.

Competition and Innovation

Innovation, driven by competition, is the core of economic growth. Competition drives companies to keep innovating, creating better and better products (often for less and less money). Companies that rest on their laurels get beaten in the marketplace, and that's good for everyone (except, temporarily, employees and shareholders of those companies). It gives the public better products, made more efficiently, and it keeps companies from becoming burdens.

Encouraging competition should be a key goal of government, but in most cases that means staying out of the way. Unfortunately, things don't always work out that way, and the government has often been much more involved than necessary, later causing problems. This is often seen in a rush to send antitrust lawyers after a company for being successful, but not when it's doing any actual harm on the market, or preventing any real competition from happening.

We also see it as a problem in the government's intellectual property policies, which often do little to encourage innovation, and plenty to hinder it by creating defacto monopolies.

If the government should be involved at all, it should be to enable (not create) the infrastructure that's necessary for further innovations. It should be enabling the next generation of entrepreneurs to be creating the next great businesses.

Too Big To Fail

But, rather than doing that, we see the government looking to prop up non-competitive, non-innovative behemoths that are being called "too big to fail." These are companies that, often with the help of government regulations and subsidies, have become so intertwined in the economy, that a failure on their part really would cause significant ripples throughout the rest of the economy. While there are some who suggest they should be allowed to simply fail anyway, the economic risk in doing so is quite large -- in part, as a result of bad gov't policies for many years, abused and exploited by these companies.

Simply giving these companies more money and new regulations isn't going to make a difference. It only puts off the inevitable, and potentially will make things even worse when the problems resurface. The regulations and "oversight" will seem like a good deal at first, but over time the companies will twist the regulations to their advantage. They'll create new and larger loopholes, and the regulations won't do what they're intended to do, but will instead have created massive new problems. It's what almost always happens.

Creative Destruction

So perhaps it's time to go back to Schumpeter, with a big twist. If we grant the premise that some of these companies are too big to fail, and they absolutely need gov't bailouts to make them work, then why not set the terms of the bailout as being that they need to use the money to become small enough to fail? That is, they can get the money, one time only, and then need to look at breaking themselves up into separate pieces (even competitive pieces) that, by themselves, are no longer too big to fail.

The end result is that you aren't left with the same terrible situation, while also creating a new generation of "spinoffs" that can innovate and compete against both older firms in the space, and new upstarts that can more readily enter the market, rather than face a few giants. That way we're enabling more competition and innovation, leading to economic growth, while dismantling the structure of "too big to fail."

It's not quite that simple, of course. But, on the whole, it makes absolutely no sense to be "bailing out" companies that are too big to fail while leaving them as too big to fail. The end result is just going to keep sucking in more bailout money and wasting it, rather than encouraging innovation and competition.

A Cold Douche

This, obviously, is not the "creative destruction" that Schumpeter was talking about at all. In fact, at times he toyed with the idea that companies too big too fail were where the market would eventually end up. But, he also recognized the power of destroying old industries and setting the path for new innovations -- and he knew that the process was often messy, tied to business downturns.

In economist Robert Heilbroner's excellent The Worldly Philosophers, Heilbroner recalls sitting in Schumpeter's class at Harvard during the Great Depression:

When he lectured on the economy at Harvard in the midst of the depression, Joseph Schumpeter would stride into the lecture hall, and divesting himself of his European cloak, announce to the startled class in his Viennese accent, "Chentlemen, you are vorried about the depression. You should not be. For capitalism, a depression is a good cold douche." Having been one of those startled listeners, I can testify that the great majority of us did not know that a douche was a shower, but we did grasp that this was a very strange and certainly un-Keynesian message.

And, indeed, this economic restructuring is a good cold shower (though, some may prefer douche), but we don't get that sort of restructuring when the government is propping up exactly what needs to be restructured.

So, let's repurpose creative destruction with a clear plan: if you accept government bail out money because you're too big to fail, then that money needs to be used to make you small enough to fail.

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