Arrgh, House Report No. 94-1476, The legislative history for the Copyright Act of 1976.

Look to pages 54-55:

Correspondingly, the definition of ?pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works? carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality. The term is intended to comprise not only ?works of art? in the traditional sense but also works of graphic art and illustration, art reproductions, plans and drawings, photographs and reproductions of them, maps, charts, globes, and other cartographic works, works of these kinds intended for use in advertising and commerce, and works of ?applied art.? There is no intention whatever to narrow the scope of the subject matter now characterized in section 5(k) as ?prints or labels used for articles of merchandise.? However, since this terminology suggests the material object in which a work is embodied rather than the work itself, the bill does not mention this category separately.

In accordance with the Supreme Court?s decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), works of ?applied art? encompass all original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection. The scope of exclusive rights in these works is given special treatment in section 113, to be discussed below.

The Committee has added language to the definition of ?pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works? in an effort to make clearer the distinction between works of applied art protectable under the bill and industrial designs not subject to copyright protection. The declaration that ?pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works? include ?works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned? is classic language: it is drawn from Copyright Office regulations promulgated in the 1940?s and expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Mazer case.

The second part of the amendment states that ?the design of a useful article ? shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.? A ?useful article? is defined as ?an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.? This part of the amendment is an adaptation of language added to the Copyright Office Regulations in the mid-1950?s in an effort to implement the Supreme Court?s decision in the Mazer case.

In adopting this amendatory language, the Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design. A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like. The same is true when a statue or carving is used to embellish an industrial product or, in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a product without losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art. On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee?s intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies? dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill. The test of separability and independence from ?the utilitarian aspects of the article? does not depend upon the nature of the design?that is, even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be identified separately from the useful article as such are copyrightable. And, even if the three-dimensional design contains some such element (for example, a carving on the back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver flatware), copyright protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover the over-all configuration of the utilitarian article as such.

The Supreme Court case Mazer v. Stein – 347 U.S. 201 (1954) makes the utiltarian/ornamentation distinction determining ornamental aspects of utilitarian objects are copyrightable, in the particular case lamp base sculpture art. Copyright doesn’t extend to the utilitarian aspects (an electric lamp).