In deciding whether to grant the TRO/preliminary injunction, the judge weighs several factors, including harm and public interest.

This is what the judge said, according to the transcript:

Well, then, to move to the other Dataphase factors of the threat of irreparable harm to the movant if injunctive relief is not granted; and secondly, which is capable of being combined, the state of balance between the harm to Rushmore Photo and injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; that’s the reality that is in this testimony and I think testimony presented by witnesses for both parties that certainly more than 50 percent, somewhere between 70, 80, and perhaps a higher percentage of Main Street Sturgis vendors are selling licensed goods under this mark, and the mark has been previously protected by predecessors and interests and enforced by some of those holders. And so that does show that in terms of harm to the public, we have a body of licensees who believe that they have an exclusive product to sell; it’s been licensed; they have paid for the license; and the market would either be diluted, damaged, or affected by inferior or infringing goods if I restrain the enforceability of the Sturgis mark.

The other part here, if we look at the harm, the rally is in part or perhaps even largely funded in terms of its ability to be produced and run successfully, partly funded by the royalties flowing from the Sturgis mark; and I believe if we eliminated that, that there would be harm done. The charities that have been listed both in testimony and in the plaintiff’s submission in their brief, those are community charities that also benefit. That ties in, of course, to the public interest.

What is the public interest here? The public interest with regard to enforcing the mark so that the royalties can flow into the entities which have been identified, that is, a production and successful holding and hosting of the rally by the city of Sturgis and the charities which benefit the public interest certainly weighs in favor of protecting those interests.

So overall on the state of this record, without more, and in the context of a temporary restraining order and request for preliminary injunction, I do find that the request for injunctive relief must be denied.

As you can see, the judge was applying a balancing test, looking at the factors delineated in Dataphase (which is binding circuit precedent on this court).

Mike frames the issue thus: “Separately, the idea that since royalties support a charity it’s okay to abuse trademark law seems beyond belief. I’m curious where in the Lanham Act it says “descriptive terms are okay to trademark if the judge thinks it’s good for the community”?”

Nowhere in the Lanham Act does it say that, obviously, so right away you should be on notice that Mike is framing things the wrong way. Whether it’s a descriptive term (the implication being that the mark is not valid; but of course, there’s no actual argument from Mike) is not before the court. As the judge explains in the transcript, the mark is presumed to be valid since it’s registered, and the merits of the case haven’t been looked at yet. This is only a TRO/preliminary injunction, remember, so the judge is limited by what evidence he can look at and consider. And as indicated above, the judge does a balancing test that considers the harm and the public interest, among others. So yes, being “good for the community” is quite relevant.

Mike chose not to look into any of this. Instead, he saw a chance to bash on IP. Never mind what the facts of the case are, what sort of motion the judge was actually considering, and what the factors are that the court was looking at. Nope, he saw a chance to say how dumb something was, and the only one who came out looking dumb was him. Again.

Did that frame it for ya?