I’m not sure this warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment. Recall that the Amendment allows warrantless searches in certain circumstances, including some administrative searches, so long as they are “reasonable.” From the Supreme Court:

Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a ?closely regulated? industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search, see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741, 107 S.Ct. 1492, —-, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (dissenting opinion), have lessened application in this context. Rather, we conclude that, as in other situations of ?special need,? see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, 105 S.Ct. 733, 750, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (opinion concurring in judgment), where the privacy interests of the owner are **2644 weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

This warrantless inspection, however, even in the context of a pervasively regulated business, will be deemed to be reasonable only so long as three criteria are met. First, there must be a ?substantial? government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at 602, 101 S.Ct., at 2540 (?substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety conditions in the Nation’s underground and surface mines?); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S., at 315, 92 S.Ct., at 1596 (regulation of firearms is ?of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders?); Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S., at 75, 90 S.Ct., at 776 (federal interest ?in protecting the revenue against various types of fraud?).

Second, the warrantless inspections must be ?necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.? Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at 600, 101 S.Ct., at 2539. For example, in Dewey we recognized that forcing mine inspectors to obtain a warrant before every inspection *703 might alert mine owners or operators to the impending inspection, thereby frustrating the purposes of the Mine Safety and Health Act-to detect and thus to deter safety and health violations. Id., at 603, 101 S.Ct., at 2540.

Finally, ?the statute’s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.? Ibid. In other words, the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S., at 323, 98 S.Ct., at 1826; see also id., at 332, 98 S.Ct., at 1830 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). To perform this first function, the statute must be ?sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.? Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at 600, 101 S.Ct., at 2539. In addition, in defining how a statute limits the discretion of the inspectors, we have observed that it must be ?carefully limited in time, place, and scope.? United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S., at 315, 92 S.Ct., at 1596.

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2643-44, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987).

Do these searches meet this test? That’s the question. It’s not as simple as warrantless search = Fourth Amendment violation, IMO.